Use Of Voluntary Agreements Research Articles

Voluntary Agreements for Energy Efficiency: Review and Results of European Experiences

During the 1990s there was great attention and debate in the European Union (EU) and in OECD countries outside the EU on the use of voluntary agreements to attain environmental and sustainable energy policy goals. At the time there was a lot of theoretical analysis and discussions on this policy instrument and in particular on its effectiveness and cost efficiency. Before the debate was over, a number of important voluntary agreements to improve energy efficiency or reduce CO2 emissions were implemented in Europe both at national and European levels. These voluntary agreements cover end-use equipment and appliances (e.g. cars, electric motors, residential appliances, etc.), industrial processes, and industrial energy management policies and practices. The paper classifies and analyses the different types of voluntary agreements aiming at improving energy efficiency in Europe, and reviews voluntary agreements and other initiatives of similar nature (voluntary programmes, unilateral commitments, self-regulation) in industrial sectors in a number of Member States of the European Union. The paper also examines some successful European initiatives of voluntary nature, including unilateral agreements for improved energy efficiency of end-use equipment, such as the European agreement on energy consumption of washing machines, and the European agreement on power consumption in standby mode of televisions and video cassette recorders (VCRs). The paper concludes that, if set up under the right institutional framework (as presented and discussed in the paper), voluntary agreements can deliver energy savings in a flexible and cost effective manner and could represent an important instrument for improving energy efficiency and climate change mitigation, in addition and co-ordination with other important policy instruments.

Television advertising and children: lessons from policy development

To conduct a policy review of the regulations related to food advertising on television aimed at children. The study consisted of documentary analysis of relevant legislation and policy documents related to children's advertising from both industry and non-governmental organisations at a global level and in 20 countries. This was supported with semi-structured telephone interviews with individuals from 11 countries. The initial findings resulted in a listing of regulatory impacts from which we developed a taxonomy of regulatory schemes. There was a tension between the development of legislation to cover this area and the use of voluntary agreements and codes. This tension represents a food industry/civic society split. The food and advertising industries are still engaged in a process of denying the impact of advertising on food choice and children as well as commissioning their own research. Outright bans are unusual, with most countries addressing the situation through voluntary agreements and self-regulation. We found a deep division over the way forward and the role and place of legislation. Policy-makers expressed concerns that national legislation was increasingly less relevant in dealing with broadcast media transmitted from outside national boundaries and therefore not subject to the receiving countries' laws but to the laws of the country from which they were transmitted. The options for the regulation of advertising targeted at children range from (1) a complete ban on advertising as in the case of Sweden, through (2) partial restrictions on advertising by type of food, target group or limits on the amount of advertisements or times shown, to (3) continuation of self-regulation by the advertising and food industries. There is a global dimension to regulation that needs to be built in, as national frontiers are no barriers to broadcast media and public health nutrition needs to ensure that its concerns are heard and addressed.

Management of water bird shooting by voluntary agreements in Denmark

AbstractGame shooting is free in national territorial waters to any Danish citizen with a valid hunting license. In areas of importance for migrating water birds this has led to a high level of disturbance. Therefore, a number of locations free of shooting and other activities disturbing the water birds were implemented in Denmark in the period 1993–2001. The problem of water bird disturbances has a number of similarities with the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which is well known from resource economics, particularly the open access to use the resource. In this paper we apply the ‘tragedy of the commons’ framework to describe the management aspects of water bird shooting and we report from an empirical survey on the use of voluntary agreements among hunters for co‐ordinating the shooting in local areas. Based on a questionnaire survey, we show that voluntary agreement among hunters has improved the local shooting in a number of cases. In combination with results from controlled experiments of the interaction between shooting frequency and disturbance of water birds, this indicates that preservation of water birds can be compatible with self‐regulated shooting where disturbance is kept at a low intensity. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Environmental Voluntary Agreements: A New Model of Co-operation between Public and Economic Actors

The diffusion of voluntary agreements can be considered as the result of the innovation of environmental policies based on a new style of interaction between public and private actors. As the environmental problems complexity increases, an evolution of interaction model occurs. The literature on environmental policy innovation shows in a clear way that the use of voluntary agreements and their real capability to produce relevant effects are strictly linked to the innovation paths of environmental policies, policy styles and policy networks. In this paper we will focus our attention on the evolution of the model of interaction between public and economic actors as the key element to evaluate voluntary agreements' effectiveness in reaching policy targets.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade Models

The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels.

Voluntary Agreements as an environmental policy instrument — evaluation criteria

As the resource to voluntary action grows wider, a question must be held on the factors that influence the performance of a Voluntary Agreement as an environmental policy instrument. Our goal in this paper is to answer that question, outlining the main variables that make a Voluntary Agreement simultaneously efficient, effective and just. Using several articles on the subject of voluntary action, under the themes of “economic regulation” and of contracts under “asymmetric information”, as well as available reports on the Portuguese and European experience on the use of Voluntary Agreements, we will undertake this objective following three steps: (i) we begin by underlining the main factors that justify the private and public option for Voluntary Action. (ii) We then present an analysis of the co-regulation process under the requirements of the three E criteria: efficiency, effectiveness and equity. (iii) Finally we conclude by presenting an “evaluation table” that summarises the elements that we found to be the most important for the “performance” of the voluntary action in each one of those criteria.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements, Emission Taxes and International Trade: The Importance of the Timing of Strategies

The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels. The conventional approach in strategic trade and tax models was to look at a two-stage game where governments set taxes first and then firms react. In such a policy regime the government is concerned about the international competitiveness of its firms and sets taxes below marginal damages. In this paper, we consider a policy regime with a reversed timing. Firms commit themselves in the face of emission taxes to abatement efforts and to lower levels of the environmentally intensive output. Then the government introduces the tax. Under this timing of strategies the tax is equal to marginal damage. Firms waive profit and reduce output in order to use less of the polluting input. The reward for this behavior will be a less strict use of policy instruments and hence lower abatement costs in the near future.

Barriers to the use of voluntary agreements: a case study of the development of packaging waste regulations in the UK

The development of plans to implement the 1994 EC Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste in the UK provides a case study of why it is often difficult to use voluntary measures to achieve policy objectives. An analysis of the case study reveals that the fear of some companies refusing to participate in efforts to implement the directive, the lack of adequate data on packaging flows and the number and diversity of companies involved in the negotiations with government made a voluntary agreement impossible to develop. Despite the government’s initial desire to avoid regulation, legislation, and associated regulatory measures, were introduced because of their concern over the slow pace of the negotiations and in response to pressure from industry representatives. The factors that prevented the use of voluntary agreements in this case study are relevant to many other areas of environmental policy, questioning the potential for the use of voluntary measures alone. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. and ERP Environment.

Voluntary agreements as an environmental policy instrument in Finland

This article provides an overview analysis of the use of voluntary agreements (VAs) in Finnish environmental policy. VAs are quite a new phenomenon in Finland. They have been implemented in relation to four different policy initiatives relating to the reduction of the usage of CFCs, the reduction of the amounts of packaging wastes, energy conservation and the remediation of contaminated soil. The usage of VAs has mainly been based on ad hoc practices and on individual cases rather than on planned or strategic decisions at the ministerial or governmental level. Nonetheless, the negotiative and consensual policy style associated with VAs is not a new phenomenon in the culture of Finnish environmental policy. It can even be argued that the traditional and quite successful consensual policy style or process of ‘negotiated rule-making’ inside the formal regulatory system has prohibited the more active development of VAs. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?

There has been growing interest in the use of voluntary agreements (VAs) as an environmental policy tool. This article uses a simple model to determine whether VAs are likely to lead to efficient environmental protection. We consider cases where polluters are induced to participate either by a background threat of mandatory controls (the “stick” approach) or by cost-sharing subsidies (the “carrot” approach). The results suggest that the overall impact on environmental quality could be positive or negative, depending on a number of factors, including the allocation of bargaining power, the magnitude of the background threat, and the social cost of funds.

From Rio to Kyoto: The Use of Voluntary Agreements to Implement the Climate Change Convention

Review of European Community & International Environmental LawVolume 7, Issue 2 p. 159-169 From Rio to Kyoto: The Use of Voluntary Agreements to Implement the Climate Change Convention Karen Campbell, Search for more papers by this author Karen Campbell, Search for more papers by this author First published: 17 December 2002 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9388.00142Citations: 2AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume7, Issue2July 1998Pages 159-169 RelatedInformation

Canadian Petroleum Association - History and Organization

Abstract The Canadian Petroleum Association was formed in 1952 after twenty-five years of development since its conception as the Alberta Oil Operators' Association during Turner Valley days. Its membership of 230 oil and gas exploration, development, pipeline and transportation companies which operate mostly in Western Canada represents approximately 97 percent of Canada's petroleum production. Besides having Divisions in the western provinces, the Association has an Ottawa Information Office which serves as a liaison betweenthe industry and the Federal Government. It also maintains a Statistical Economics Department. Introduction What is an association? I think that the answer can be summed up by sayingthat an association is "a voluntary non-profitmaking body formed by independent firms to protect and advance certain interests common to all." Such matters as wage scales, inventories, prices, production statistics, credit and collection reports, legislative advice, economic problems, organization data, methods of finance, and operational procedures are of unique and vital concern to the members of a specific industry. It is claimed that trade associations enable their members to co-ordinate their competitive forces without relinquishing the rewards which result from personal initiative and enterprise. In terms of function, there are two main types of trade associations:Those that confine themselves to voicing the views of their members on matters of common interest.Those that exercise some measure of control over their members. The latter, in many countries, make extensive use of voluntary agreements for controlling prices, output and channels of distribution. In some instances, trade association arrangements go beyond price and output stabilization and take in measures designed to control production capacity. The overwhelming majority of trade associations, including the Canadian Petroleum Association, are of the first type. They prefer self-government of industry by consent rather than by coercion. They avoid any attempts to stifle competition or to bar new entrants by means other than persuasion and presentation of facts. Thereby, they gain the advantages of good will, elasticity of operation and maximum possible membership.