Use Of Terror Research Articles

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.

Repression, opportunity, and innovation: The evolution of terrorism in Xinjiang, China

ABSTRACTHow does state repression affect the incidence and impact of terrorism? This study conducts a process tracing analysis of the ongoing contention between the Uyghur separatist movement and the Chinese state to provide a plausible explanation for the present lack of consensus on this question. Relying on insights from collective action theory, it argues that although repression was initially successful in curtailing the opportunistic use of terrorism, novel political opportunity allowed some separatists to adopt innovations, such as suicide bombing, to circumvent repression. Repression has since proved ineffective in quelling terrorism, and will likely remain incapable of forestalling future terrorist innovations.

Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror: Christianity, Violence and the West, by Philippe Buc

Philippe Buc’s ambitious new study concerns the relationship of what is described as religion to certain forms of violence over the last two thousand years in ‘the cultural areas located in what was, circa 1500, Roman Catholic Europe (plus, an offshoot of the Protestant branch, what became the United States of America)’. He expressly omits Eastern Orthodox Christianity, claiming that Byzantium ‘did not know holy war’ (Heraclius?), and Islam, although he includes the Jewish war of 66–73 CE, primarily as an archetype for subsequent Christian violence. Categories analysed are restricted to holy war, the use of terror and terrorism, and martyrdom, seen as an exchange of violence between oppressor and victim. The wider contexts of social or judicial violence, for example the blood feud or legal punishment, are not considered. The case-studies range from Josephus’ account of the Jewish wars to the crusades (especially the First), the sixteenth-century French wars of religion, the English Civil War, colonial America, the French Revolution, the modern United States, Stalin’s show trials of the 1930s, and the Baader-Meinhof gang in 1970s Germany. A central unifying theme is the ubiquity of utopian models of assumptions and action precisely derived from Christian apocalyptic writing, especially the Book of Revelation. This strenuous display of comparative erudition is deployed to support two related arguments. One is specific, that so-called Modernity in the ‘West’ betrays close inheritance and continuity from its pre-Modern, Christian past, primarily in public and political attitudes and performance. In part, this tackles current questions of how religion informs theories and practices of justified violence as an intrinsic element or specious excuse. More generally, Buc insists that such mimetic behaviour operates at a level beyond superficial or familiar rituals. Utopian movements—crusades, religious war, secular revolutionary radicalism, Christian fundamentalism—do not simply assume the guise of religion or pseudo-religious ideology as a cover for ‘actual, concrete problems and crises’. Their utopian vision, derived from Christian eschatology, ‘orients and constrains action’. This conclusion reconfigures discussion of whether religions necessarily are nurseries of violence by concentrating not on their general transcendent theological claims but in detail on Christian ideas of the End of Time, and hence on the nature of historical processes and of the individual’s or society’s place in them.

Mediated Public Diplomacy of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: The Synergistic Use of Terrorism, Social Media and Branding

This study aims to provide an initial theoretical model for understanding and analyzing the mediated public diplomacy strategy of virtual states. It examines the mediated public diplomacy strategy of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its ability to synchronize terrorism tactics with communication strategies to gain media access and exposure, push news frames that serve its interests, and target stakeholders with a dual message using sophisticated branding strategies that resonate with cultural values and help it ultimately recruit supporters and deter foes.

The Second Intifada

AbstractDominant theories fail to explain the use of terror during the Second Palestinian Intifada. Notably, they fail to explain Hamas’s abandonment of suicide attacks by 2005. We classified the universe of fatalities on both sides and examined the conflict’s patterns of lethal violence. Our analysis of fatality ratios and rates of change by fatality category supports a dual-arena theory of terror. Noting a rapid increase of indiscriminate Israeli civilian deaths and a relative evening out within this category in the conflict’s initial phase, we demonstrate that externally Hamas aimed to improve the balance of forces to compel Israel to negotiate on equal terms using the “out-suffering” mechanism. Internally, Hamas used terror to build confrontational capacity by attracting Palestinian factions to a resistance pole and isolating conciliatory elites. When their continued deployment became too costly relative to emerging options, the campaign was swiftly called off. In the end, while based on strategic calculations, Hamas’s use of terror proved to be a failure.

Terrorism versus insurgency: a conceptual analysis

This study analyzes the distinction between terrorism and insurgency by drawing upon the case of the PKK conflict in Turkey. It provides a conceptual discussion through multi-dimensional analyses from the actor-oriented, the action-oriented, the purpose-oriented, and the ontology-oriented perspectives. In so doing, in addition to the organizational characteristics, it critically identifies the PKK’s varying strategies of terrorist and insurgent violence, and their temporality and reasoning as the conflict unfolded to make conceptual inferences. This study found, first, that while the PKK as an actor indicates an insurgent character, the PKK’s use of violence reflects intense terrorism action particularly after its military defeat. Second, the use of terrorism by the PKK reflects an inextricable overlap in temporality and a direct link with guerilla methods. Despite the PKK’s terrorist and insurgent violence resulted from different factors and reasoning at the intermediate level; they are designed to converge at the overall aim of the PKK’s political campaign. Third, the PKK violence reflects varying purposes of terrorism, e.g., intimidation, attrition, survival and group solidarity. Fourth, after reaching the tipping point that resulted in its military defeat in 1994, the PKK resorted to more indirect and asymmetrical violence in an increasing tendency to deflect state power and, thus, to coerce Turkey into a political compromise, i.e., a negotiated settlement.

The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West

This article investigates whether the 9/11 attacks affected the assimilation rate of Muslims in the US. Terror attacks by Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against Muslims, thereby raising their costs of assimilation. We find that Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: greater chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; higher fertility; lower female labour force participation; and lower English proficiency. These findings shed light on the increasing use of terror and concurrent rise in social tensions surrounding Muslim immigrants in the West.

Horror politicus w XX wieku. Próba interpretacji wybranych wątków Carla Schmitta teorii partyzanta

According to Carl Schmitt, the phenomenon of the political has different forms. These forms can be distinguished based on different possible relationships between political action and the state. This article presents the history of what Schmitt refers to as the phenomenon of partisanship. Partisanship is a specific form of politics, established in the early ninetieth century, which has gradually expanded its presence. Partisan activity is characterized by totality, which has evolved to become the dominant component of political action over time, particularly in the twentieth century. This totality affects not only the size and range of political activity, but it is also – and perhaps first of all – ruthless in its use of terror and violence, which is considered entirely justified by total partisans/terrorists.

Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes

AbstractHow effective is terrorism? This question has generated lively scholarly debate and is of obvious importance to policy-makers. However, most existing studies of terrorism are not well equipped to answer this question because they lack an appropriate comparison. This article compares the outcomes of civil wars to assess whether rebel groups that use terrorism fare better than those who eschew this tactic. I evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of terrorism relative to other tactics used in civil war. Because terrorism is not a tactic employed at random, I first briefly explore empirically which groups use terrorism. Controlling for factors that may affect both the use of terrorism and war outcomes, I find that although civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars, terrorist rebel groups are generally less likely to achieve their larger political objectives than are nonterrorist groups. Terrorism may be less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win.

Terror and Insecurity: The Impact of Boko Haram Crisis on Nigeria’s External Image

The use of terror as a ratio for resolving internal fundamental differences is not uncommon in neo-colonial societies. This is not saying that flashes of same are not recogn ised in the developed environment. The prevalence of this alternative appears as old as the political history of Nigeria. This work underscores the theoretical and historical basis of rebellion in Nigeria primarily focusing on the rise, fundamental philosophy and the vision of the Boko Haramists. The central thesis of this work is that Boko Haram activities have negative effects on Nigeria’s external image and fundamentally, it exposes the nature and dynamics of Nigeria’s security problems. The work contributes in part to the literature on this issue but significantly, it situates the problems within strategic logic which amplifies the degeneration of the problems and the incessant rebellion against the Nigerian State.

“Citizen Journalism” in the Syrian Uprising: Problematizing Western Narratives in a Local Context

This article analyzes the term ‘citizen journalism’ against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings in order to show how it overlooks the local context of digital media practices. The first part examines videos emanating from Syria to illustrate how they blur the lines between acts of witnessing, reporting, and lobbying, as well as between professional and amateur productions, and civic and violent intentions. The second part highlights the genealogies of citizenship and journalism in an Arab context and cautions against assumptions about their universality. The article argues that the oscillation of Western narratives between hopes about digital media's role in democratization in the Arab World and fears about their use in terrorism circumscribe the theorization of digital media practices.

Terrorism and External Audiences: Influencing Foreign Intervention Into Civil Wars

ABSTRACTThis article evaluates the effects of terrorism on interventions into civil wars. Considering civil wars from 1970–1999, this study analyzes how the use of terrorism as a tactic affects external interventions on behalf of opposition groups, interventions on behalf of governments, and diplomatic interventions. While some authors would suggest that groups might utilize terrorism as a tactic to gain external support, this study finds little evidence that groups are actually successful in gaining such support. In fact, terrorism that targets civilians appears to actually decrease the likelihood of military interventions on behalf of opposition groups. Furthermore, in civil wars with high numbers of terrorist attacks there is a greater likelihood of economic intervention on behalf of governments, further weakening the potential benefit for groups in utilizing terrorism as a tactic. While this is certainly a welcome finding, a consideration of five case studies of suicide terrorism (Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Iraq, India, and Turkey) provides evidence that the use of suicide terrorism within civil wars may have decreased the likelihood of external interventions on behalf of the government and of diplomatic interventions. These results are more troubling and suggest potentially grave consequences for mediating many of these conflicts.

Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War

Although violent organizations often use terrorism as a means to achieve political aims, recent studies suggest the tactic is ineffective because it fails to help groups gain concessions. While focused exclusively on concessions, these studies overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical analyses on overly aggregated data, masking any effect terrorism has on important bargaining outcomes. Using new monthly data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars.

The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Examining the Role of Political Pragmatism in State Building and Activism

Of the two major Palestinian factions, Hamas has demonstrated that it is more radical and willing to use acts of terrorism than Fatah. While some arguments have made the case that Hamas has become more moderate in light of efforts to develop stable institutions of government and societal organizations, there has not been conclusive evidence of this ideological shift. In fact, the continued adherence to the Muqawama (resistance) Doctrine represents a decisive facet of the movement's enduring pledge to nullify the state of Israel through a prolonged war of attrition. This article examines the role of political pragmatism in the evolution of Hamas. First, it discusses why the moderation argument alone does not provide an adequate understanding of the movement's evolution, especially since it continues to embrace the use of terrorism and violence as facets of Islamism and as an extension of the Muqawama Doctrine. Second, rather than solely using the moderation argument, this article offers an alternative approach which considers how the combination of strategic policy approaches implemented by Hamas has reflected the role of pragmatism in pursuing its domestic and foreign policy agendas, which are intertwined with the values of the Muqawama Doctrine.

Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008)

A developed-world consensus ties state failure to new and serious international insecurity. But that conclusion rests upon an uncertain foundation; insights into the nature and intensity of failure-related threats remain tentative and unsystematic. This study begins to remedy the problem, examining the broad relationships between weakness, failure, and terrorism with panel data for 153 countries (1999–2008). I argue that the quantitative literature too often disregards the political context determining terrorism's use, that terrorism is endogenous to many measures of state failure, and that estimates of the failure-related threat of terrorism are overstated. Consistent with these expectations, I find that most failing and failed states are not predisposed to terrorism. However, among the “most failed” states, those at war or experiencing political collapse are significantly more likely to experience and produce terror. These results refine the relationship between failure and external threat and highlight the importance of terrorism's macro-level political context.

The Global Fight of Terror Implications of 9/11

The attention which is given to terrorism is often considered disproportionately to its real danger. The use of terror as a meanto attain personal or political objectives exists all over the world. Terrorism incidents kill and maim millions of people. People strivefor power and these power-wielding individuals may commit terrible acts.Modern terrorist ideology has changed. Victims of terrorism are often those who have no offensive intentions towards the terrorists– passengers, journalists, diplomats, educators, students, business executives and other civilians.Nowadays terrorists are more likely to choose this tactics rather than the traditional methods - assassinations of heads of stateor prominent officials. Terrorists prefer easy targets.Less than 12 hours after the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush proclaimed the start of a global war on terror. Ever since, there hasbeen a vigorous debate about how to win it. Bush and his supporters emphasized the need for the offensive attack against terroristsand to use all existing levers for countering such brutalities.Radicalization and terrorism have become major problems at national, regional and global levels, as a threat to collective security.Deepening the problem even more, the significance of Terrorism personifies not only casualties and annihilation of the enemybut also implies moral claims.The aim of this paper is to analyze whether it is possible to win the global war on terror and make readers get acquainted withthe coordinated, collective and global structuring war effort which has developed since 9/11.

Stealing Consciousness

In light of the recent revelations about the electronic surveillance by the US National Security Agency, this essay analyzes such surveillance as part of state strategies to control populations. It also examines the use of terror scares—that is, fear mongering—by states as the rationale for their control practices. It contrasts the origins of terrorism in the French Terror to contemporary terrorism, and shows how cybernetic control and surveillance steal human communications and thereby steal consciousness.

Strategist or Pragmatist: A Challenging Look at Ocalan's Retrospective Classification and Definition of PKK's Strategic Periods Between 1973 and 2012

The PKK, a violent group seeking secession in southeastern Turkey through the use of terror and guerilla methods, has evolved through different strategic and pragmatic phases in pursuing its goal. Ocalan, the incarcerated leader, classified the PKK's objectives into four deliberate strategic periods and commenced the final period of Strategic Lunge in March 2010 (for establishing de-facto autonomy). To compare these periods to PKK's real evolution, this article reviewed the entire process of the PKK (1973–2012) through analysis of resolutions from PKK congresses/conferences and the characteristics of PKK violence (e.g., target status, incident type/location, form, and purpose). This study argues that as opposed to Ocalan's assessment, PKK moves—particularly after 1994—are based on emergent (ex-post) pragmatic shifts rather than predetermined (ex-ante) strategic plans, as verified by analysis of the nature/form of PKK violence. It also argues that the PKK's pragmatic moves permeated even into its ideology and declared goal. Contrary to Ocalan's four-stage strategic periods, the PKK's initial manifesto indicates a three-stage Maoist strategy for reaching its goal. However, the PKK's military attempt to reach the third stage in 1991 failed due to conditions that were not sufficient for realization of the third stage of Maoist strategy. As a result, the PKK quit pursuing military victory after acknowledging its defeat in 1994; instead, since it still possessed the ability to initiate violence, it strategically employed (and ceased) violence to supplement its campaign of political compromise and negotiation.

The Jackson County War: Reconstruction and Resistance in Post–Civil War Florida by Daniel R. Weinfeld (review)

Reviewed by: The Jackson County War: Reconstruction and Resistance in Post–Civil War Florida by Daniel R. Weinfeld Learotha Williams Jr. The Jackson County War: Reconstruction and Resistance in Post–Civil War Florida. Daniel R. Weinfeld. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-8173-1745-4, 224 pp., cloth, $29.95. Daniel R. Weinfeld’s The Jackson County War: Reconstruction and Resistance in Post–Civil War Florida, examines a topic with which many scholars and students of Florida history will be familiar: the bloodshed and wanton loss of life in Jackson County during the early days of the state’s reconstruction. Historians seeking to better understand Reconstruction and the use of terror to subjugate freed persons in the Sunshine State have discussed at length the tragic events of the period. William Watson Davis’s Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida and John Wallace’s Carpetbag Rule in Florida were two of the earliest efforts to chronicle and interpret the violence in the [End Page 549] Middle Florida county, and during the twentieth century, historians Joe M. Richardson, Jerrell Shofner, Richard Peek, Canter Brown, and others actively engaged the county’s violent past. Indeed, the assassination plots, murders, victims, as well as the names of those responsible for the violence have been a well-documented part of the state’s history for more than a century. Through his meticulous research, Weinfeld successfully presents the reader with the most detailed biographical sketches of many of the major participants in the violent era to date. In addition to an excellent discussion of the events of the period, the author provides new insight into the strengths and flaws of the many politicians who dominated Florida politics during Reconstruction. Weinfeld begins The Jackson County War with a discussion of the peaceful character of the county prior to the Civil War and how Union victory ushered in dramatic economic and social change for the area’s black and white population. The book emphasizes that neither segment of the population fully comprehended the changes the war wrought, the most important being African American emancipation. Against this backdrop, Weinfeld introduces the two men whom many in Jackson County blamed for their problems with the African American population, Freedmen’s Bureau agents Charles Hamilton and William J. Purman. Weinfeld then proceeds to discuss the period from the defeat of the Confederacy to the end of violence in the county in 1871. The author presents the reader with a history of how the violence evolved from isolated random individual acts of racial violence to a more organized group violence fueled by political as well as racial impulses. By the book’s end, Weinfield demonstrates that many of the chief perpetrators of the violence not only escaped punishment for the lawless acts, but benefited economically, socially, and politically for them. Historians with interests in the history of African Americans in Florida will find Weinfeld wrestles with many of the same obstacles they have faced in studying free persons during this period, chief among them a scarcity of first-person accounts from African Americans who survived the era. The author uses testimony from congressional investigation of the Ku Klux Klan activity in the South, court cases, and newspaper articles to recount what life was like for African Americans living in Jackson County and how they responded to the murders and violence that became a common feature of their lives during Reconstruction. Although the author weaves a very powerful narrative of what the group faced in Jackson County—with the exception of prominent African American politician Emanuel Fortune and the County’s African American justice of the peace, Calvin Rogers—outside of being targets of violence, African Americans as a group appear to occupy only secondary roles in the drama, despite comprising half of Jackson County’s postwar population. The murder of Maggie McClellan described in the book’s introduction was likely in retaliation for a failed assassination attempt that resulted in the death of a small African American child, but it does not become clear that the suspected perpetrator was the actual target until later in the work. Readers will very likely leave this book understanding that further scrutiny of...

The Soviet Regime’s National Operations in Ukraine, 1929–1934

This article makes use of documents from secret police archives to show that the Soviet secret police in Ukraine, the GPU (State Political Administration— Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie), together with the centre in Moscow, played a crucial role in the national operations of 1929–1934. These documents contradict the views of historians who argue that the regime’s key power centres—Moscow and the secret police—were sincere in promoting Ukrainian culture and language. Instead, the archival materials indicate that a counter-Ukrainization was already being planned in the mid-1920s. The article argues that trials of “nationalists” were organized in order to prevent the crystallization of a political opposition in Ukraine at a time of crisis brought about by collectivization and famine. The repression of Ukrainians had a national component, was inspired by the centre, carefully organized by the secret police, and implemented through a steady flow of group criminal cases. Protocols from the interrogation rooms, testimonies by interrogators themselves, and scholarly literature on the topic are used to reconstruct the motivation of the GPU men who fabricated the criminal cases. The article demonstrates that all the cases were constructed according to a master narrative and presents a case for why torture was used: to legitimize the widespread use of terror in Ukraine, the regime required that the victims confess to being Ukrainian nationalists and members of anti-Soviet organizations whose goal was separatism.