Practical Use Of Reason Research Articles

The Necessity of the Discipline of Pure Reason for the Systematicity of the Practical Use of Reason in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

The Necessity of the Discipline of Pure Reason for the Systematicity of the Practical Use of Reason in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

The Highest Good as the Ideal of Reason in the Canon of the first Critique

Abstract In the Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant claims that a highest being is the transcendental ideal of speculative reason. However, the Canon of the Doctrine of Method presents the highest good as an ideal of both the speculative and the practical use of reason. In this paper, I argue (1) that the highest good is the ideal of the unity of reason – unlike the ideal in the Dialectic – insofar as (2) the highest good serves both the speculative and the practical employment of reason. Accordingly, I also argue that (3) these two employments are complementary, not alternative. Kant’s argument for the ideal of the highest good in the Canon shows that the unity of reason combines the two lawful employments of reason. In order to be reason’s highest ideal, this ideal cannot just mirror the demands of speculative reason – it must also involve the other fundamental employment of reason, i. e., the practical. This highest standpoint cannot be merely speculative but must be moral as well: not just a highest ideal, but also a good (the highest good).

Rereading Habermas in Times of CRISPR-cas: A Critique of and an Alternative to the Instrumentalist Interpretation of the Human Nature Argument

Habermas’s argument from human nature, which speaks in favour of holding back the use of human germline editing for purposes of enhancement, has lately received criticism anew. Prominent are objections to its supposedly genetic essentialist and determinist framework, which underestimates social impacts on human development. I argue that this criticism originates from an instrumentalist reading of Habermas’s argument, which wrongly focuses on empirical conditions and means-ends-relations. Drawing on Habermas’s distinction of a threefold use of practical reason, I show how an alternative—the ethical—reading avoids essentialist and determinist objections by addressing an existential level of sense making. I present three reasons that speak in favour of the ethical reading and I demonstrate how it incorporates social aspects of character formation. Habermas’s account therefore offers exactly what the critics claim is missing. The paper concludes with a conceptual challenge that the ethical reading has to face within Habermas’s overall approach to genetic engineering.

The Principle of Reason's Self-Preservation in Kant's Essay on the Pantheism Controversy

AbstractIn his 1786 essay on the pantheism controversy, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’, Kant implies that ‘the maxim of reason'sself-preservation [Selbsterhaltung]’ is reason's first principle for orienting itself in thinking supersensible objects. But Kant does not clearly explain what the maxim or principle of reason's self-preservation is and how it fits into his larger project of critical philosophy. Nor does the secondary literature. This article reconstructs Kant's discussion of the principle of reason's self-preservation in ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ It suggests that this principle is best understood as the discipline of pure reason. The principle of reason's self-preservation performs the same methodological function that Kant assigns to the discipline of pure reason. This principle establishes the rule of law in reason and subjects reason to its own laws. In so doing, it prevents reason's dialectical errors and also grounds reason's faith(Vernunftglaube), which in turn systematically conditions the practical use of reason.

El origen de la cultura en Kant. El hiato entre la vida y la moral

“The Origin of Culture in Kant. The Hiatus Between Life and Morality”. This paper attempts to investigate the meaning and function that culture plays as an existential activity in the work of Kant, driving special attention to the Critique of Judgment and to the materials furnished by the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view , having as key goal the survey of its anthropological and social sources. From this perspective, I intend first to argue that the Kantian analysis of life and the intrinsic nihilism recognized in it largely explain the origin of the concept of culture in Kant, basically understood as a set of practices that allow human beings to extract some teleological performance from time passing. Secondly, I will discuss the phenomenon of entertainment as an anthropological key subject to deepen in the necessity of the advent of culture in human society. Both purposes belong to what I consider a Kantian genealogy of culture, adequate for the interpretation of the link between the theoretical and practical use of reason.

¿Naturalizar la idea de justicia? Una respuesta crítica desde la teoría moral de Jürgen Habermas

The aim of this paper is to study critically, with the help of Habermas´s moral theory, the current naturalistic approach to morality —which is based on both the evolutionary theory and neuroscience—. In doing so it will be explained the specifically moral use of practical reason, as Habermas propose; it will be compared this moral use with Kohlberg's postconventional stage of moral development; and it will be claimed that naturalistic approach cannot explain this stage, that can be understood as specific justice area.

Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought

It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) is essentially the same sort of spontaneity found in the practical use of reason. Accordingly, the faculties of understanding and practical reason both possess genuine autonomy.

Educating the Common Agent: Kant on the Varieties of Moral Education

Abstract:I discuss the relation between Kant’s trust in the rational capacities of ordinary agents and education. First, I show that Kant is very optimistic regarding our common moral capacities. Then I discuss what room this leaves for moral education. I argue that a discussion of Kant’s conception of moral education should distinguish between different functions of education: (i) education is necessary for agents to make the transition from a purely instrumental to a pure practical use of reason (Basic Education); (ii) education can strengthen the motivational force of the moral law by presenting the moral law in all its dignity and clarity (Motivational Education); (iii) education can instruct agents about the source of morality and offer an abstract formula of the Categorical Imperative (Philosophical Education); and (iv) education can enhance agents’ capacity to apply general moral principles to concrete cases (Education of Judgement).

La Fenomenología del Lenguaje y el Concepto de la Razón Práctica en el Pensamiento de Charles Taylor

Tomando como punto de partida el concepto que tiene Taylor acerca del ser humano como un ser de significados, este articulo estudia el modo como Taylor elabora su concepcion del uso practico de la razon, recuperando ciertas nociones fundamentales de la tradicion fenomenologica y hermeneutica relativas al lenguaje, como lo son la idea del trasfondo y la situacion encarnada del hombre. Puesto que, en definitiva, el trasfondo constituye un horizonte de referencia anterior, desde el punto de vista ontologico, al dominio subjetivo de la razon en el agente humano, el analisis de Taylor termina por favorecer ciertos enfoques de la filosofia contemporanea como, por ejemplo, la analitica existenciaria de Heidegger, que buscan prescindir, paradojicamente, de la premisa del sujeto. Si atendemos a esta indicacion, un desafio que resta, pues, al desarrollo futuro de los modos de comprension de la filosofia moral, y de la antropologia filosofica, es el de como vincular el analisis del problema moral, de un sujeto de sentidos, con una teoria ontologica del trasfondo que es, en cambio, a-subjetiva.

Practical theology: A critically engaged practical reason approach of practice, theory, practice and theory

Browning’s influential use of practical reason for his fundamental practical theology is analysed. His correlation of theory and practice in his three stages of theory, practice and theory is also critiqued because his approach reduces practical theology almost to professionalism and principles for ministry. His approach could also result in an antagonistic relationship between practice and theory as practice is reduced to theory or academics. This article seeks to present a critically engaged practical reasoning approach in which theory and practice have an in-ter-dependent relationship. Practical reason is an activity in which engagement happens at every stage. For this to happen, theory and practice interact as equal variables that have a bearing on each other not to reduce the one to the other, but to complement each other in a lateral hermeneutical process. This process has four stages, unlike Browning’s three-stage correlation. The stages are schematically presented as practice, theory, practice and theory.

La Imaginación En El Devenir Moral Del Hombre En Rousseau

The main object of this article consists in describing the characteristics and the role that imagination plays in Rousseau’s thought. First of all, we will discuss Rousseau’s conception of imagination in the context of a paradoxical filiation taking into account that both Montaigne’s humanism and Pascal’s influence coexist in his thought. Secondly, we will show that this double filiation converges in human beings’s impossibility of developing an absolute knowledge of nature and in a switch from reason to imagination, which is involved in both the speculative and the practical use of reason. Finally, we will analyze imagination’s role in the configuration of piety.

La imaginación en el devenir moral del hombre en Rousseau

The main object of this article consists in describing the characteristics and the role that imagination plays in Rousseau’s thought. First of all, we will discuss Rousseau’s conception of imagination in the context of a paradoxical filiation taking into account that both Montaigne’s humanism and Pascal’s influence coexist in his thought. Secondly, we will show that this double filiation converges in human beings’s impossibility of developing an absolute knowledge of nature and in a switch from reason to imagination, which is involved in both the speculative and the practical use of reason. Finally, we will analyze imagination’s role in the configuration of piety.

Anthropologia transscendentalis. Kant's theory of human nature.

In recent years mankind has greatly extended its knowledge of living things, in general, and itself, in particular. Such a wide-ranging body of knowledge has consequently led to the need for a theory to encompass it, that is, a coherent framework in which to systematically arrange mankind's understanding of itself, not only with regard to its physical nature, but to its individuality and sociality as well. Such a theory would moreover provide the means to mediate between the various domains of scientific and technological enquiry, on the one hand, and the cultural dimensions of human society, on the other. Already in the 18th century, Immanuel Kant strove to establish a discipline that was systematic, yet at the same time accessible. It was due to his efforts that philosophical anthropology was introduced into university curricula, to the benefit not only of philosophers, but of physicians and jurists as well. Kant's position is by no means prejudicial towards science. To the contrary, he was quite careful to appraise the impact of the sciences on the overall cognitive horizons of mankind and therefore on their potential to influence humankind's idea of itself. Clearly such a perspective is relevant to today's strongly felt need to reconcile modern neuroscience's revolutionary findings on the biological bases of the mind - of man's experience and behaviour - with the idea man needs of himself in order to orient his actions not only as individual but also as "citizen of the world" as well - something on which Kant worked with unremitting commitment throughout his entire research career. This article traces Kant's anthropological conception with regard to four specific issues: (1) its relation to science; (2) the relationship between empirical and transcendental in the speculative use and in practical use of reason; (3) the dialectic between what nature does and what human beings does, in the construction of humanity itself; (4) and finally about the character of the person and the character of the human species.

“Prudentia” e o uso prático da razão em Schopenhauer

O objetivo do texto é analisar o estatuto específico que a noção de prudentia recebe em Schopenhauer, notadamente se analisada no interior de Aforismos para sabedoria de vida. Trata-se da compreensão do uso prático da razão, no rigoroso sentido de uma sabedoria de vida ou de uma prudentia que definimos como diferenciação da diferenciação. Ao lado dessa hipótese principal, trata-se também de indicar outros horizontes interpretativos dos Aforismos, tais como sua estratégia literária marcada pela plausibilidade, a expressão ‘grande pessimismo’ bem como o deslocamento da sabedoria estoica para as máximas aristotélicas.

Idea metafizyki w filozofii Immanuela Kanta

The article investigates the notion of “metaphysics” in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, with emphasis on the idea and significance of metaphysics in the theoretical and practical use of reason. The author presents the Kantian interpretation of the term “metaphysics”, which determines the way Kant understood the task of the science of metaphysics. Metaphysics is also treated as the unavoidable outcome of the use of reason, which pursues completeness in knowledge. Nevertheless, the outcome of metaphysical speculation can never satisfy reason in its theoretical aspirations. The article also presents the consequences of the Kantian transposition of the objects of metaphysics to the terrain of practical reason, where their reality is postulated in view of moral perfection, which is the goal of mankind.

The canon of pure reason: Kant on the non-dependent establishment of the practical use and the unity of reason

This paper systematically discusses Kant´s argumentation in the Canon of the Critique of pure reason on the matter of the establishment of the practical use and its outcomes for the problem of the unity of reason. Bearing in mind that there is much disagreement in the literature, not only as to the specificity and function of the chapter of the Canon wi thin the various moments of Kant´s philosophy, but also as to its critical importance, the approach centers essentially on Kant´s own argumentation. The aim of this paper is to show that the Canon anticipates an important thesis of the Critique of Practical Reason, i.e., the self-sufficient legitimation of the practical use of reason in relation to its theoretical use, Moreover, is demonstrated that there are important systenatic differences between Kant´s argumentation in the Canon and in the second Critique, which lead to the uniqueness of the treatment of the problem of the unity of reason in the former text. The first part of the paper briefly presents Kant´s position in the pre-critical period on the legitimation of the practical use of reason. Thereafter, it is sustained that Kant´s search in the Canon for a source of positive cognition is particularly connected with his critical thesis of a self-sufficient establishment in the Canon. It is argued that, notwithstanding the anticipation of the refered critical thesis, the establishment of the practical use of reason in the Canon requires a theological consideration of morality. The third part of the paper deals with the problem of the unity of theorical and practical uses of reason in position on the establishment of the practical use reason. I come to the conclusion that the Canon guaranteed by means of a transition from the practical to the theoretical use of reason.

On the public use of practical reason

A number of phenomena have lent a new complexity to the long-standing challenge of constructing a legitimate and stable political order. I contend that both legitimacy and integration under contemporary conditions ultimately hinge upon a form of public practical reasoning that departs considerably from the ones proposed by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and several deliberative democrats. I argue that the generalizability test that constitutes the cornerstone of most contemporary neo-Kantian theories of public reason should be abandoned as a rule of public argumentation and be replaced by a norm of civic responsiveness towards minority claims. I not only suggest that a wider variety of reasons, motives and genres of speech needs to be admitted within the purview of public reason, but more fundamentally that generalizability cannot cogently be seen as anything more (or less) than a civic virtue. The underlying point of this article is that neo-Kantian theories of public reason work with a problematic conception of practical reason. I conclude by providing reasons, against some radical and agonistic democrats, why the language of public reasoning needs to be retained and renovated.

La question de l'objectivité de la réalité pratique des idées de la raison pure

ABSTRACTMy aim in this article is to demonstrate that the reality of ideas of pure reason (liberty, God, and the immortality of the soul) in the practical use of reason is less objective than the reality of pure concepts of understanding in their function of determining the object. To this end I explain how the objective reality of ideas of God and the immortality of the soul can be qualified as “subjective,” and in what sense the objective reality of the idea of liberty as a res facti can be considered as incomplete in terms of theoretical objectivity. Finally, I propose that the acquisition of practical objective reality does not entail expanding our theoretical knowledge of the objects of these three ideas.

La théologie comme science : théologie de la raison pure et philosophie de la raison pratique

It appears to be a given today that reasonable action on the world comes from the practical use of reason. Our knowledge of the history and philosophy of science shows that the type of reason at work on reality is always practical reason. In contrast, positivism and neo-positivism believed that pure reason would give us knowledge of the world. However, every use of pure reason is a theological use rather than a philosophical one. Pure reason is the "point of view of God" ; therefore, every philosophy of pure reason is a "philosophical theology".