Use Of Cyber Weapons Research Articles

Cyber weapons: concept, its manifestations and countermeasures

The article is devoted to the analysis of the concept of “cyber weapons”. Modern approaches to its definition are highlighted, its signs and types are defined. The range of criminal purposes for the use of cyber weapons has been established. It is noted that cyber weapons have become a serious means of informational influence in cyberspace as a new theater of military operations. Foreign and domestic approaches to defining cyberspace are analyzed. Proposals were made to counter the use of cyber weapons in national cyberspace. Attention is drawn to the need to implement legislative initiatives in the field of combating cyberattacks.

Towards econometric estimation of the cost of cyber conflict

In the modern era, understanding the costs and implications of conflict extends beyond traditional kinetic boundaries into the cyber realm. While economic analysis has historically been concerned primarily with the state’s ability to sustain and engage in physical warfare, recent research has begun to quantify the additional societal and collateral costs. To shed light on the total costs of the use of cyber weapons and capabilities, we argue that a comprehensive analysis must be done using econometric tools. This paper describes two important tools in this toolkit, counterfactual analysis and bottom-up accounting, in the context of cyber conflict. It discusses how significant collateral costs manifest in the inadvertent aftermath of vulnerability stockpiling for use in cyber weapons, coupled with the losses and thefts of these resources. Such incidents represent not only a direct financial burden but also erode the trust and goodwill of nations who do not disclose the discovered vulnerabilities. Finally, multiple data sources and bottom-up accounting techniques are used to conduct a case study estimating the aggregate societal cost of cyber conflict in the Ukrainian war between late 2013 and 2020. The aggregate cost of the 76 recorded cyberattacks is estimated to be approximately $160M. Finally, counterfactual analysis is concluded to face significant data availability challenges preventing high quality synthesis of the two methods described.

The International Legal Regime of Control over Cyber Weapons in the Future World Order: Threats and Prospects

The article is devoted to the analysis of the growing number of problems in the global environment of information and communication technologies (ICT), which characterize the current crisis military-political situation. Until recently, experts from different countries spoke about many of them purely theoretically, and possible scenarios of using ICT for malicious infl uence on military critical infrastructure were sometimes even denied. Now this problem is not only recognized by the scientific and expert community, but we are already talking about the voiced facts of the practical use of cyber weapons, other information and cyber means in the conditions of the crisis. Thus, the malicious use of ICT can provoke the outbreak of an interstate military confl ict. First of all, because of the disproportionate use of methods of responding to threats and attacks, when the aff ected party can use real weapons in response. In addition, a confl ict may arise by mistake, since there is currently no universal methodology for identifying violators, criteria for classifying cyberattacks as an armed attack have not been worked out, universal principles for investigating incidents have not been formed. The issues of coordination of measures taken in response to information operations recognized as acts of use of force have not yet been resolved. As a result, information wars and the use of new technologies can become the detonator of an interstate military confl ict with the use of even nuclear weapons. Therefore, the question of the need for active actions of the "great powers" to prevent confl icts in the global information space, which in the conditions of military operations can develop into a global confl ict, is as relevant as possible. The article provides a factual analysis of ICT threats during the special military operation of Russia, explores the possibilities of creating an international regime for the prohibition of information (including cybernetic) weapons, the relevance and increasing importance of studying these processes by the scientific community. The article substantiates the formulation of the problem of international information security as part of a broader topic of international security against the background of global challenges.

Mitigating the Risk of Advanced Cyber Attacks: The Role of Quality, Covertness and Intensity of Use of Cyber Weapons

ABSTRACT Modern countries employ computer networks that manage organizations in the private and public sectors. Cyber-attacks aim to disrupt, block, delete, manipulate or steal the data held in these networks, which challenge these countries’ national security. Consequently, cybersecurity programs must be developed to protect these networks from cyber-attacks in a manner that is similar to operations against terrorism. This study presents several models that analyze a contest between a network operator (defender) that deploys costly detectors to protect the network and a capable cyber attacker. Generally, when the deployed detectors become more potent or the defender exhibits higher vigilance, the attacker allocates more resources to R&D to ensure that the attack remains covert. We show that detectors may be substitutes, complements, or even degrade each other, implying that defenders must account for the cyber weapons’ characteristics and the attacker’s profile and strategic behavior. We derive the optimal number of detectors when the attacker’s R&D process features R&D spillovers and show that targeted detectors act as deterrents against high-quality weapons only if the attacker’s budget is not substantial. Finally, we demonstrate that common cybersecurity practices may be detrimental from a social-welfare perspective by enhancing an arms race with the attacker.

International Law Issues of Cyber Defense

International Law Issues of Cyber Defense

Development of Cyber Weapons to Improve Indonesia's Cyber Security

It is indisputable that technical advancements have an impact on a country's military capability and security. This is inextricably linked to the deployment of numerous technologies and new discoveries aimed at boosting the military's defense system. As a result of this predicament, all governments are attempting to modernize their defense systems in order to deal with dangers posed by technological advancements. This is both a challenge and an opportunity for Indonesia's existing defense system. The goal of this study is to look into the development of cyber weapons and how they may help Indonesia improve its cyber security. The purpose of this study is to utilize a descriptive qualitative technique to investigate or explain the concerns surrounding the importance of cyber weapons in strengthening cyber security in Indonesia. The conclusions of this study show that as the number of Internet users grows, so does the global trend of cyber attacks. It's difficult to compare precision cyberweapons systems to existing kinetic weapons because of their new nature. Additionally, the development and use of cyber weapons can yield economic rewards. Human resources, as well as support and cooperation from Indonesian cyber defense groups with professionals in the field of hacking, are all crucial variables to consider while designing cyber weapons.

Computer network attacks as an act of aggression in the context of the development of modern international relations: pros and cons

The article analyzes the conflicting approaches to the possible recognition of computer network attacks as an act of aggression in the focus of modern international relations and trends in scientific and technological progress. The question raised in the article is as follows: is aggression against another state possible through the exclusive use of cyber weapons? To solve the indicated problem, the scholastic method of conducting a discussion is used, in which two series of contradictory arguments regarding the subject of discussion are put forth, and the conclusion summarizes the general conclusion based on particular theses. The conclusion is argued that the historically established definition of aggression in modern conditions of development of scientific and technological progress does not meet the interests of international peace and security, since new types of force of destructive influence constantly appear, which can generate consequences comparable in scale and severity to the consequences of using conventional weapons. However, there are still some problematic moments that arise in connection with the qualification of cyberattacks as a crime of aggression, requiring understanding and resolution in accordance with the development of the science of international law and law enforcement practice in the context of international relations.

A fragile public preference for cyber strikes: Evidence from survey experiments in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel

ABSTRACT To what extent does the public support the use of cyber weapons? We propose that public exposure to the destructive potential of cyber-attacks will dispel the clear cross-national preference for cyber strikes. To test this, we conducted two survey experiments (n = 2,585) that examine support for cyber versus conventional military strikes in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel. In study 1, we exposed respondents to television news reports depicting various forms of terror attacks, and then measured the subsequent support for retaliatory options. Findings indicate that the high public support for deploying cyber weapons dissipated entirely among respondents exposed to lethal cyber-attacks. In study 2, we probed this vanishing support, finding that exposure to destructive cyber-attacks undercuts the perception of cyber as a less lethal domain, therefore diminishing its appeal. We conclude by discussing how the fragile public preference for cyber weapons encourages military escalation in the short-term.

What is the Role of Cyber Operations in Information Warfare?

Much attention has been focused on the potential consequences of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and the use of cyber weapons as an asymmetric equalizer. However, as a capability considered to be under the larger umbrella of an information operations (IO)/information warfare (IW) campaign, how significant a weapon is cyber for the strategist in an information environment? As observed in recent IO/IW campaigns targeting U.S. elections in 2016 and 2020, lack of any discernable disruptive cyber attacks may have provided an answer to this, as a cyber power purposefully elected not to implement attacks. Instead, cyber espionage was used, and even at that, played a minor complementary role in the larger effort. This calls into question the efficacy of cyber as an instrument of IO/IW, and the true nature of its role in more strategic soft-power operations. This paper argues that cyber is at best a supportive enabler of campaigns where information is the catalyst to achieve strategic results, reducing cyber attacks as tools best used for signaling, punishment, or implemented in first strike scenarios.

Prohibited means and methods of armed conflicts

The goal of this article is to analyze prohibited means and methods of armed conflicts under the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Technological progress, the transformation of the nature of armed conflicts and the idea of the war based on terror are the main reasons why the list of prohibited means and methods of armed conflicts should be constantly updated. The main text of this article consists of three thematic blocks. The first block represents an excursion into the history and development of IHL. It outlines its division into two branches, the Geneva and Hague law. The second part consists of definitions and characteristics of basic terms such as means and methods of armed conflicts. Under the means of warfare it is understood weapons, military equipment and other means used to cause harm and defeat the enemy. Methods of warfare are the procedures for using certain means to suppress the troops of the opposing side and inflict losses on it at the very minimum acceptable level. The third part of the study is devoted to new methods and means of warfare, among which the author analyzes such phenomena as hybrid wars, cyberwar and the involvement of private military and security companies in military operations. Hybrid wars, widespread in the 21st century, raise very complex issues related to the classification of a conflict, as the line between the state of war and peace is blurring. Most often, information about the nature of third-party intervention is kept secret. Moreover, such a third party refuses to acknowledge its participation in hostilities. It is concluded that parties to hybrid wars are required to comply with international standards that limit the methods and means of warfare and protect their victims. The article examines the concepts of cyber war, identifies the main characteristics of this type of war. The main conclusion was made about the need of formation of new restrictive approaches regarding the prohibition of the use of cyber weapons. Another trend related to modern armed conflicts is the process of delegating the performance of traditional state functions by states in favor of private military and security companies. The conclusion is drawn on the need to develop international legal standards for the activities of private military and security companies within the UN.

Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention

States’ capacity for using modern information and communication technology to inflict grave harm on enemies has been amply demonstrated in recent years, with many countries reporting large-scale cyberattacks against their military defense systems, water supply, and other critical infrastructure. Currently, no agreed-upon international rules or norms exist to govern international conflict in cyberspace. Many governments prefer to keep it that way. They argue that difficulties of verifiability and challenges posed by rapid technological change rule out agreement on an international cyber convention. Instead, they prefer to rely on informal cooperation and strategic deterrence to limit direct conflict. In this article, I seek to rebut some of the main objections to seeking an international convention on the use of cyber weapons. While there are significant obstacles to achieving effective arms control in the cyber domain, historical experience from other areas of international arms control suggests that none of these obstacles are insurmountable. Furthermore, while most critics of cyberarms control assume that cyberspace favors offensive strategies, closer inspection reveals the dominance of cyber-defensive strategies. This in turn improves prospects for striking an effective international agreement on cyberarms control.

States of cyber-warfare

Cyber-attacks are damaging and disruptive when orchestrated by criminals and hacktivists with a point to prove, but they take on a more sinister and potentially catastrophic significance when carried out or supported by government-funded military or intelligence units. State-sponsored cyber espionage and cyber terrorism have been steadily growing in frequency and diversity over the last decade as national authorities become increasingly reliant on digital information and expansive networks. The situation is considered so serious in some circles that calls to establish agreed rules on the use of cyber weapons against the critical national infrastructure (CNI) of individual countries are getting louder. Yet, as befitting the murky world of spies, it is hard to assess exactly how much progress has been made on any cyber warfare proliferation deals to date. Some question whether digital arms controls that restrict the use of specific types of cyber weapon, such as advanced persistent threats, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks or malware, are feasible in the first place.

Cyber-bombing ISIS: why disclose what is better kept secret?

ABSTRACTIt has become a conventional wisdom in strategic studies that the development and use of cyber weapons should be kept secret, as the effectiveness of these tools is dependent on opponents being unaware of a particular cyber weapon’s characteristics. Why, then, has the US military repeatedly publicized its cyber operations against ISIS in Syria and Iraq? Why reveal what is supposedly better conducted in the dark? In this essay, we provide four answers to this puzzle. We argue that the Pentagon aims to (1) legitimize major investments in the cyber domain to a domestic audience, (2) undermine the enemy’s trust in his own IT-infrastructure, and command and control systems, (3) signal “cyber strength” to third parties, and (4) establish norms regarding how to use cyber weapons in accordance with International Humanitarian Law.

International Convention for the Peaceful Use of Cyberspace

Cyber weapons now are an extension of state power. In hopes of gaining a strategic advantage, many countries including the United States, Russia and China are developing offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt political, economic, and social institutions in competitor nations. These activities have led to a cyber arms race that is spiraling out of control. This imminent global threat challenges the international community to be proactive. The purpose of this article is to propose an international convention to throttle the development, proliferation and use of cyber weapons before they cause electronic Armageddon. We begin by examining three successful efforts in arms control and use the lessons learned to draft a convention that can serve as a starting point for formal multilateral negotiations.

Protecting the National Interests in the Domain of Information Security as a Functional Task of the SBU

The development of modern information technologies and innovations in all areas of life resulted in new threats to national and international security. Over the past decade, such threats as transnational cybercrime, cyber terrorism, the use of cyber weapons transformed from potential and hypothetical into real ones. Combating those threats has become a priority of the national security and defence sector. The article focuses on how the profound changes in the global security system, in combination with the evolution of the cyber threats, influenced the activities of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), turning the Service in a key element of the future national cybersecurity system. The author reasons for enhanced international cooperation and systematises practical examples of effective international efforts to counter cyber threats.

Iceland and Cyber-threats: Is it more than fear of fear?

The challenge of cyber-threats is a modern reality from which no state, including Iceland, can hope to escape. Cyber-attacks can cause major damage remotely, at minimal cost and while concealing the culprits. Groups and individuals can carry them out as effectively as states, reversing traditional power calculations and making deterrence especially difficult. Individuals can use the Net both for mischief and to escape from authoritarian controls; groups such as terrorists and criminals can target states, commerce and individuals; and states can attack other states both directly and by proxy. The complexity of possible online conflicts was seen clearly in the events triggered by Wikileaks disclosures against the USA in 2010 and 2011. Among other recent developments, an attack on the Pentagon and the ‘Stuxnet’ virus used against Iranian nuclear plants have shown how even the smallest devices can penetrate high-security systems, and that computer-driven infrastructures are no longer immune. Iceland, for its part, acknowledged the relevance of cyber-threats in its 2009 risk assessment, and recently decided to set up a coordinating team for protection; but it has lagged behind its Nordic neighbours in this field and should take full advantage of cooperation with them now. Vulnerable states also have an interest in international regulation and restraint on the use of cyber-weapons, but the context for this is complex and viable proposals are slow to emerge. Iceland can and should contribute to new thinking, and perhaps also assist poorer states: but it needs to put its own house in order first.

Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?

Offensive cyber operations represent a broad new frontier in warfare that allow states to achieve kinetic-like effects without using traditional means such as airstrikes and troop deployments. For example, in a recent debate in the Obama Administration in the lead-up to the deployment of NATO forces in Libya, lawyers and policymakers considered using such cyber attacks in lieu of traditional military operations to disable Libya’s air defense network. Yet, like many areas of emerging warfare, a bevy of questions concerning the legality of these new types of operations arise. In particular, American policymakers have only begun to question whether the use of cyber weapons – such as the Stuxnet virus purportedly developed by the United States and Israel and responsible for attacking and destroying Iranian uranium enrichment facilities – trigger traditional means of limiting the President’s war-making authority, such as the War Powers Resolution.This article examines the interaction of this new tool of warfare with the War Powers Resolution, one of the most controversial means by which Congress has attempted to limit the President’s ability to use his Article 2, Section 2 authority as Commander in Chief to deploy U.S. military forces. 50 U.S.C. sec. 1541–1548. At its core, the article answers the following questions: insofar as it is constitutional, can (and under what circumstances) the War Powers Resolution serve as an effective limit on the President’s Article 2, Section 2 power? Conversely, does this new type of tool help the executive branch evade Congressional oversight of U.S. military operations?

Cyber-threat evolution: the year ahead

Last year, 2011, was the year that virtually all global players signalled their readiness to develop and deploy cyber-weapons. The mass hysteria sparked by the discovery of the Stuxnet worm in 2010 led a number of states to start treating the use of cyber-weapons against them as an act of war. However, by doing so, they are losing sight of some very important aspects of this type of threat. Take, for instance, Stuxnet. It was a unique phenomenon, designed exclusively for use at a specific time and at a specific place. And there was no readily available military solution to combat it. 2011 witnessed the development of many new types of threat. For example, cyber-weapons such as Stuxnet generated an almost hysterical response, but were highly specialised. However, other cyber-weapons, such as logic bombs, may become more common. Targeted attacks are on the increase, but so is the industry that has sprung up to counteract them. The focus will move to the browser and mobile devices. Over the next year, attacks on online banking systems will be one of the most widespread methods of stealing money. And the problems of hacktivism and leaks of personal data will increase. Aleks Gostev of Kaspersky examines what all this means.

Challenges in Monitoring Cyberarms Compliance

A cyberweapon can be as dangerous as any weapon. Fortunately, recent technology now provides some tools for cyberweapons control. Digital forensics can be done on computers seized during or after hostilities. Cyberweapons differ significantly from other software, especially during development, and recent advances in summarizing the contents of storage media can locate possible cyberweapons quickly. Use of cyberweapons can be distinguished in the usual malicious Internet traffic by being aimed at targets associated with political, social, and cultural issues that are often known in advance, and those targets can then be monitored. Cyberweapons are relatively unreliable compared to other kinds of weapons because they are susceptible to flaws in software; therefore, cyberweapons require considerable testing, preferably against live targets. Thus, international “cyberarms agreements” could provide for forensics on cyberweapons and usage monitoring. Agreements also encourage more responsible cyberweapons use by stipulating attribution and reversibility. The authors discuss the kinds of international agreements that are desirable, and examine the recent interest of the U.S. government in such agreements.