Abstract
States’ capacity for using modern information and communication technology to inflict grave harm on enemies has been amply demonstrated in recent years, with many countries reporting large-scale cyberattacks against their military defense systems, water supply, and other critical infrastructure. Currently, no agreed-upon international rules or norms exist to govern international conflict in cyberspace. Many governments prefer to keep it that way. They argue that difficulties of verifiability and challenges posed by rapid technological change rule out agreement on an international cyber convention. Instead, they prefer to rely on informal cooperation and strategic deterrence to limit direct conflict. In this article, I seek to rebut some of the main objections to seeking an international convention on the use of cyber weapons. While there are significant obstacles to achieving effective arms control in the cyber domain, historical experience from other areas of international arms control suggests that none of these obstacles are insurmountable. Furthermore, while most critics of cyberarms control assume that cyberspace favors offensive strategies, closer inspection reveals the dominance of cyber-defensive strategies. This in turn improves prospects for striking an effective international agreement on cyberarms control.
Highlights
States’ capacity for using modern information and communication technology to inflict grave harm on enemies has been amply demonstrated in recent years, with many countries reporting large-scale cyberattacks against their military defense systems, water supply, and other critical infrastructure
The US International Strategy for Cyberspace issued in May 2011 declares that, Bwe reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic...to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.^ 15 This implies a patent threat of escalation from cyber conflict to kinetic warfare, where the USA has a strong lead over most potential opponents
In addition to improving information and establishing clear rules of behavior, a third important function of an International Cyberwar Convention (ICWC) would be to lower the risk of accidental conflict by increasing transparency and by introducing mechanisms for crisis management
Summary
There is considerable ambiguity about the meaning of terms such as Bcyber warfare^ and Bcyber threats,^ and disagreement over what strategic goals can be achieved in cyberspace often boils down to analysts focusing on different problems or dimensions of threat. The US International Strategy for Cyberspace issued in May 2011 declares that, Bwe reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic...to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.^ 15 This implies a patent threat of escalation from cyber conflict to kinetic warfare, where the USA has a strong lead over most potential opponents. A similar tendency to shroud military plans in secrecy is visible in cyberspace, where concealment, stealth, and surprise are widely seen as integral to cyber security (after all, many cyber weapons and tactics would immediately lose their purpose if enemies knew of their concrete nature) This combination of bellicose and secretive diplomacy increases risks of conflict due to miscalculation of others’ capabilities or interests and raises the specter of inadvertent escalation from an accidental cyberattack to full-scale kinetic warfare through a sequence of semi- or full-automatic counter-attacks.
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