Use Of Bioweapons Research Articles

Specific Features of Investigating Crimes Involving the Use of Bioweapons

The author examines key forms and consequences of bioterrorist attacks and the international experience of counteracting such crimes in order to determine the methods and techniques of investigating bioterrorist crimes, and to analyze their effectiveness. The author also describes the difficulties of investigating crimes connected with the use of bioweapons, stresses the considerable progress made in the identification and description of the features of biological agents used in bioterrorist attacks, as well as in the coordination and communication between different agencies and organizations involved in the investigation of bioterrorism. The previously developed methodological recommendations on investigating this type of crime require rethinking and updating, and even more so because technological progress and increased awareness of the threats of bioterrorism lead to the development of new instruments and methods for identifying and determining the features of biological agents, as well as to the improvement of communication and coordination between various agencies and organizations participating in the investigation of bioterrorism. Studying the international experience of investigating bioterrorist crimes is of considerable importance. The investigation of bioterrorist attacks poses a number of problems connected with the nature of used biological agents and the complex character of search and cognitive activities of persons conducting the investigation: identification of the used biological agents; determining the place and time when the biological agent was used; finding and identifying persons involved in the terrorist act; ensuring the safety of experts and personnel working at the crime scene; information support of the investigation; need for the investigators to have special training and experience, etc. The possibility of the so-called “unconscious” biological terrorism should also be noted. The author concludes that a steady stream of investment in research and development, as well as the education and training of investigators are necessary for counteracting the constant threat of bioterrorism and for ensuring the development and implementation of proper response measures in case of a bioterrorist attack.

Possible Treatments for COVID Vaccine Induced Prion Disease

Many COVID-19 “vaccines" are considered bioweapons and are known to have the ability to cause prion disease. Prion inducing agents have been researched extensively as potential bioweapons and the field of prion research is infiltrated by clandestine bioweapons operatives. In order for prion disease inducers to be an ideal bioweapon the target population needs to believe there is no cure while the attacker knows of an treatment/ antidote to save its own population if there is “blowback”, where the attackers' population gets exposed to the bioweapon. The narrative in the prion field is that there is no effective treatment for prion disease. However false narratives are the norm in the current COVID-19 related bioweapons attack. The author performed a literature search to determine if any effective treatments to COVID “vaccine" induced prion disease may exist but hidden from the public. The author believes several such candidates may exist and their use for treating COVID “vaccine" induced prion disease needs to be explored. These agents include doxycycline and related minocycline, quinacrine and ivermectin. The nature of this paper is speculative in large part because of the use of bioweapons in the current civil war. It is of no surprise to many that people working in government, medicine, science, and the pharmaceutical industry are deliberately trying to cause harm while pretending to help humanity. One only has to read the long list of influential people associated with Mossad operative Jeffrey Epstein to realize the extent of evil in today’s world.

Biosecurity risks and governance in the age of synthetic biology

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the susceptibility of the United States and the world to biological threats. These threats can be unintentional, such as the result of zoonotic spillover or laboratory accidents, or deliberate, such as the release of a pathogen intended to be used as a biological weapon (or, bioweapons). While unintentional outbreaks are difficult to prevent, much effort has been spent to prevent the spread and use of bioweapons in the modern era. However, advances in technology threaten to outpace efforts to control bioweapon proliferation. This article reviews the changing nature of bioweapons, the governance structures established to prevent their spread, and the advances in technology that could deter and mitigate their use.

A People’s Liberation Army’s Experiment Went Awry Or A Well-Thought-out Chinese Military Operation to Stymie the World Without Firing a Shot?

Ever since the Covid19 virus brought the deadly pandemic, starting December 2019, the world’s attention has been fixated at the much-maligned Wuhan Virology Lab (WVL) in Hubei province of China. Number of scientists and intelligence agencies across the world believed that the virus was unnatural and leaked from the WVL and therefore they remained glued to the lab to trace the truth affiliated with the origin of the virus. However, classified documents from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) revealed that, Wuhan was a calculated bogey and a strategic subterfuge employed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to deflect the world’s attention from its biological weapons research and military use of bioweapons.

Biological warfare: the history of microbial pathogens, biotoxins and emerging threats

Bioterrorism is the deliberate misuse of a pathogen (virus, bacterium or other disease-causing microorganisms) or biotoxin (poisonous substance produced by an organism) to cause illness and death amongst the population. Bioterrorism and biological warfare (biowarfare) are terms often used interchangeably. However, bioterrorism is typically attributed to the politically motivated use of biological weapons by a rogue state, terrorist organisation or rogue individual whereas biological warfare refers to a country’s use of bioweapons. Although rare, bioterrorism is a rapidly evolving threat to global security due to significant advancements in biotechnology in recent years and the severity of agents that could be exploited. The pursuit of publicity plays a vital role in bioterrorism. The success of a biological attack is often calculated by the extent of terror resulting from the event, psychological disruption of society and political breakdown, rather than the lethal effects of the agent used.

Age of Bioterrorism: Are You Prepared? Review of Bioweapons and Their Clinical Presentation for Otolaryngologists.

This review on Category A bioweapons is intended to help otolaryngologists (1) understand the concepts of bioterrorism, (2) identify a bioterrorism attack, and (3) recognize specific otolaryngologic symptoms and signs of Category A bioweapons. PubMed and Medline databases. Review of current literature regarding Category A agents of biological warfare and their relationships to otolaryngology was performed using PubMed, Medline, and articles written by experts in the field of bioterrorism. Each Category A agent was paired with the term otolaryngology and then paired with epistaxis, sinusitis, airway obstruction, pharyngitis, tonsillitis, hearing loss, otitis media, and lymphadenopathy individually. For the latest accepted treatment and diagnostic strategies, bioterrorism was searched with filters for human studies, English language, and the past 5 years. Titles, abstracts, and papers were read for relevancy. While the use of bioweapons initially leads to nonspecific symptoms, a high index of suspicion and clustering of abnormal pathology will often lead the astute physician to the correct diagnosis of bioweapons. Some disease presentations of Category A agents (anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, botulism, plague, hemorrhagic fever) will involve the realm of otolaryngology. The head and neck manifestations of a Category A bioweapon attack will require knowledgeable otolaryngologists for prompt diagnosis, treatment, and notification of public authorities. This will help decrease the morbidity and mortality of any potential bioterrorism attack.

Educating the Podiatric Physician in Disaster and Emergency Preparedness

Even before 9/11 there had been increased incidents and threats of domestic terrorism in the United States. Among these incidents were the 1993 bombing at the New York City World Trade Center parking lot, the bombing in 1995 at the Oklahoma City federal building (killing 168 people, 19 of whom were children), and the pipe bombing at the Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. In addition, in 1996 there were the deaths and injuries resulting from the release of the toxic nerve agent sarin in a crowded Tokyo subway. Bioterrorism also has occurred in the United States and globally. In 1763 at Fort Pitt on the Pennsylvania frontier, British General Lord Jeffery Amherst obtained blankets and handkerchiefs from patients with smallpox to be given to Delaware Indians at an alleged peacemaking event. In the 1980s, a cult used Salmonella to poison citizens living in a small town in Oregon. More than 700 individuals became ill, and more than 40 required hospitalization. Historical documents record biological agents that have been studied or deployed as weapons since the 14th century and continuing to the present. In 1340, attackers catapulted dead horses and other animals at the castle Thun-l’Eveque in Hainault in what is now northern France. The defenders reported that ‘‘the stink and the air were so abominable. . .. They could not long endure’’ and negotiated a truce. Scientists of the infamous Unit 731, a bioweapons project of the 1930s, used human subjects, mostly Chinese and political prisoners, to test the lethality of various disease agents, including anthrax, cholera, typhoid, and plague. As many as 10,000 people were killed. During a variety of military campaigns, several hundred thousand people, mostly Chinese civilians, fell victim. In October 1940, the Japanese dropped paper bags filled with plagueinfested fleas over the cities of Ningbo and Quzhou in Zhejiang province. Other attacks involved contaminating wells and distributing poisoned foods. By the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq possessed an impressive bioweapons arsenal that included anthrax, botulism, and other lethal weapons. Although Iraq is known to have used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and against the Kurds in northern Iraq, their use of bioweapons is unknown. However, it took Americans witnessing the loss of more than 3,100 lives on national television for the entire population to appreciate that the potential for bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruction is real and no longer only a theme for science fiction novels and movies. Even after 9/11, it is still questionable whether health professional schools place a high enough priority on the importance of education and training in all-hazards preparedness at the undergraduate and graduate medical levels. An Internet-based survey was sent to 48 undergraduate and fellowship representatives, with receipt of 24 responses. The survey outcome demonstrated that 22 programs before 9/11 and 14 programs after 9/11 taught principles of disaster medicine concepts. The conclusion was that there has been a decline in the number of programs offered after 9/11. Most hospitals in urban, suburban, and rural areas have well-organized disaster preparedness planning projects in accordance with city planning efforts. Many hospitals, including government institutions, such as Veterans Affairs medical centers, county health affiliates, and medical schools, collectively engage in exercises to demonstrate proficiency for public safety reasons in the skills of appropriate disaster preparedness programs. However, it was demonstrated after Hurri*Office of Education, Planning, and Research; Institute for Disaster and Emergency Preparedness; Department of Family Medicine, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, FL. †College of Podiatric Medicine, Western University of Health Sciences, Pomona, CA. Corresponding author: Lester J. Jones, DPM, MS, College of Podiatric Medicine, Western University of Health Sciences, 309 E Second St, Pomona, CA 91766. (E-mail: ljones@ westernu.edu)

Bioviolence: preventing biological terror and crime

The potential of biological weaponry to inflict mass casualties and social disruption has received considerable international attention since the 1930s. Over the past 10 years the threat posed by terrorists using these weapons has loomed large, while concerns about the use of biological warfare by states have not entirely disappeared. Drawing on his extensive background in the areas of international law and arms control, Barry Kellman presents the case for a global approach to preventing biological terror and crime – “bioviolence” – whether initiated by terrorists or governments. Part I of the book (which consists of three chapters) briefly frames the threat posed by bioviolence, outlining the potential societal impacts, as well as the methods adopted and the motivation behind its use. Potential societal impacts of bioviolence vary enormously, with rapidly evolving technological advances in molecular biology, nanotechnology and other fields making it possible to produce more effective and lethal bioweapons, as well as adding increasing complexity to their possible deployment scenarios. Historically, governments have been the prime players in the bioweapons arena but, more recently, terrorists and criminals have also shown interest in using them to further their goals. One chapter presents a brief summary of national bioweapons programmes, past and allegedly current, together with those of recognized terrorist organizations, with a focus on Al Qaeda. Although such terrorist groups have had limited success in procuring or developing bioweapons, the threat that they pose to global peace must be taken seriously. Part II (which consists of six chapters) focuses on the current means and strategies to control biovolence and proposes a global strategy for preventing it. Kellman emphasizes that no control programme can guarantee that a bioattack will not occur, and that resources are not limitless and must be wisely spent. He balances this, however, by urging that more can and should be done. Public health preparedness against bioviolence is needed globally, not just in industrialized countries. In this respect, further national and international policies and laws against the development and use of bioweapons are required. However, a uniform approach to developing such policies and laws is complicated by competing interests; and there are major differences of opinion as to what should be considered a bioweapons development programme and even whether or not certain applications of microbial agents amount to biological warfare. Kellman raises a few questions. For example: should any restrictions be placed on scientific research or publication of scientific studies that might have application in developing bioweapons? Who should be in charge of a global strategy to control bioweapons and how should the mission be accomplished? He tackles these issues and reaches the conclusion that three new United Nations bodies are needed to deal with them; other agencies, in particular Interpol, could also assist in this respect. The book, while admirably written, would have benefited from some fact checking. For example, George W Merck was not, as claimed, the Secretary of War in the United States of America (USA) during the Second World War; this role was performed by Henry Stimson, who is named incorrectly as the Secretary of State. The USA did not use haemorrhagic fever viruses as weapons, and some of the cited agents, e.g. the Ebola viruses and hantaviruses, were first propagated well after the USA’s offensive bioweapons programme had been discontinued. Also, in contrast to what the book states, a smallpox patient walking though an airport terminal would present a low risk of disease transmission: high risk of smallpox transmission is associated with sustained close exposure such as that from household contacts. Similarly, person-to-person transmission of the haemorrhagic fevers is by direct contact and not via infectious aerosols, making the claimed scenario of contagion resulting from a patient walking through a crowded area implausible. Furthermore, although molecular biology can enhance the hazards posed by bioweapons, the reader must remember that such weapons were initially developed using relatively primitive technology that still remains readily available today. This book can be recommended to readers who are interested in the development of arms control policy and public health prevention of bioviolence. Kellman’s suggested approach is thoughtful and ambitious; however, a question remains about its effectiveness. The asymmetric threat posed by terrorism suggests weakness in this regard. Kellman recognizes, nevertheless, that no approach in a world of political realities, criminality and general uncertainties is perfect but argues that “…no other problem facing humanity is so potentially cataclysmic and has been so inadequately addressed”. Not all believe the threat is so grave, but action is certainly needed to limit the proliferation of bioweapons and this book serves its purpose well by stimulating reflection about how to proceed in that direction. ■

Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime

Even before the anthrax attacks in 2001, public health agencies and partner sectors had begun intensifying efforts to detect and respond to the specter of biologic agents used as instruments of terror. The events in 2001 highlighted the substantial preparedness gaps and needs in multiple dimensions, particularly the requirements for coordinating the work of public health and law enforcement, sectors that operate under different jurisdictional configurations and legal regimes. This book is written by a law professor who begins by positing the thesis that humanity is vulnerable to bioterrorism because current international legal regimes are inadequate to support preventive policies. The author may thus be overly ambitious by attempting to cover this topic on a global scale, rather than through the prism of 1 or a few governance systems. This book may be particularly helpful to persons who want to learn more about basic concepts regarding the methods of bioterrorism. For example, the second chapter provides an overview and description of biologic agents identified as candidates for use by terrorists, and the third chapter presents a synopsis of historical milestones in the use of bioweapons. The second part of the book offers a conceptual treatment of the author’s beliefs about factors accounting for the global failure to effectively confront the threat of biologic agents by multiple actors, and combines this with a focused discussion of 4 categories of measures to reduce bioterrorism. These categories are interdiction (a practically framed summary), denial of access to methods of bioterrorism, preparedness (i.e., detection and response), and nonproliferation regimens. The author concludes with a call for the establishment of “a global governance architecture for preventing bioviolence.” The book’s utility for practical applications seems constrained, in part, by a limitation common to single-authored books on topics with myriad and complex technical dimensions. In particular, examining bioterrorism must take into account the convergence of numerous and complex fields, including forensic and laboratory sciences, public health, law enforcement, and behavioral sciences, to name only a few. In addition, although some chapters provide information helpful for shaping readers’ understanding of particular issues, in many instances the text falls short of being practically relevant. For example, within the chapter on public health preparedness, the author devotes only 3 paragraphs to the critically important issue of “law enforcement–public health cooperation,” which, since the 2001 anthrax attacks, has been the focus of several major initiatives within the United States. An additional point is that the author appears to be coining a new term, bioviolence (“...the infliction of harm by the intentional manipulation of living micro-organisms or their natural products for hostile purposes”), for which he also provides a rationale. Yet to be determined is whether this term truly is helpful or possibly confusing because of the already well-established lexicon and conceptions surrounding bioterrorism. On balance, however, this book can be recommended because it helps to address a void in the literature, particularly in relation to concepts of preventing bioterrorism, and because it represents another step toward establishing the multidimensional knowledge base necessary to enhance preparedness.

A methodology for assessing the risk posed by the deliberate and harmful use of plant pathogens in Europe

Deliberate and malevolent use of plant pathogens, i.e. agroterrorism lato sensu (anticrop bioterrorism and use of bioweapons against the agricultural sector), may represent a non‐negligible threat for crops and forests in Europe. In order to assess this risk objectively, a methodology based on a critical review of existing Pest Risk Analysis schemes has been elaborated and is described in the present paper. In this methodology, three interdependent steps are suggested: (i) definition of an a priori list of potentially dangerous plant pathogens for Europe, (ii) detailed elaboration and analysis of theoretical scenarios of possible acts of agroterrorism, and (iii) elaboration and use of a risk assessment scheme adapted to agroterrorism.

Clinical Presentations for Influenza and Influenza-Like Illness in Young, Immunized Soldiers

ABSTRACTConcern about respiratory diseases in soldiers increased in the late 1990s as production of the successful adenovirus vaccines stopped and the possibilities of an emergent pandemic influenza strain and use of bioweapons by terrorists were seriously considered. Current information on the causes and severity of influenza-like illness (ILI) was lacking. Viral agents and clinical presentations were described in a population of soldiers highly immunized for influenza. Using standard virus isolation techniques, 10 agents were identified in 164 (48.2%) of 340 soldiers hospitalized for ILI. Influenza isolates (29) and adenoviruses (98) occurred most frequently. Most influenza cases were caused by influenza A and probably resulted from a mismatch between circulating and vaccine viruses. Most (58.5%) patients with an adenovirus had a chest radiograph; 31.3% of these had an infiltrate. Clinical findings did not differentiate ILI caused by the various agents. Only 29 cases of influenza occurred in ∼7,200 person-years of observation, supporting the use of influenza vaccine.

Vaccines for the prevention of diseases caused by potential bioweapons

The development of vaccines and implementation of vaccination programs are among the most important medical contributions to humanity. To date, vaccination has reduced morbidity and mortality from infectious diseases more than any other specific medical intervention. The intentional use of bioweapons against civilians (bioterrorism), recently highlighted by events around the world, has fueled interest in the development of vaccines for potential microbial agents of bioterror. This review discusses the microbial agents that are considered to pose the greatest risk to the public, the diseases associated with them, and the vaccines that are available for their prevention. The paucity of such vaccines and uncertainty regarding mechanisms of vaccine efficacy and the microbial antigens that elicit protection underscore the need for continued study of host–microbe interaction and the immune response to potential agents of bioterror for the development of new vaccines and immune-based therapies to combat their potential to harm the public.

Strengthening the BTWC: The role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in combating natural and deliberate disease outbreaks

Strengthening the BTWC: The role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in combating natural and deliberate disease outbreaks

Bioterrorism and its impact on the emergency department

With the recent anthrax attacks, bioterrorism has become a reality in the United States. These attacks have changed our understanding of anthrax and the use of bioweapons (BWs). Emergency department staff will be the first line of defense against probable future attacks. It is therefore critical that medical personnel are trained to recognize, respond to, and manage BW attacks. Recognizing a BW attack requires an understanding of the specific signals indicating a possible outbreak, as well as knowledge of the agents that constitute the most likely threat. Responding to an attack involves the proper notification of public health and law enforcement officials, surveillance tools to alert the medical community, and appropriate communication with the public to prevent panic. Managing an attack, in addition to direct treatment of victims, involves hospital defensive actions and effective utilization of resources and staff. Fundamental to the entire process is appropriate education and training of medical staff. Current data indicates a need for more BWs training to ensure preparedness.

Early warning systems for hazardous biological agents in potable water.

Background There is a growing concern with the potential for terrorist use of biological weapons (bioweapons) to cause civilian harm (1-5) This concern has been focused around two assumptions: that a terrorist is most likely to effectively disperse bioweapons through air (3), and that we must be prepared to address terrorist use of bioweapons through treatment of affected individuals, with emphasis on strengthening the response of the health-care community (3,5,6). For the most part, concern has not focused on the use of bioweapons in drinking water systems (4,7), and much less attention has been paid to preattack detection than to postattack treatment. Threats to drinking water supplies have plagued humans since the dawn of history. These threats range from the spectacular and highly disruptive (e.g., floods, spills of oil or toxic chemicals) to the more mundane, but not necessarily less important, such as impacts from storm pipe discharges or runoff from agricultural lands. A recent conference, Early Warning Monitoring to Detect Hazardous Events in Water Supplies, held 17-19 May 1999 in Reston, Viriginia (8), concluded that terrorist use of bioweapons poses a significant threat to drinking water. Several pathogens (e.g., anthrax, Clostridium perfiingens, plague) and biotoxins (e.g., botulinum, aflatoxin, ricin) have been weaponized, are potentially resistant to disinfection by chlorination, and are stable for relatively long periods in water (7). Further, although water provides some dilution potential, any size neutrally buoyant particle, as well as sophisticated technologies such as microcapsules, can be used to disperse human pathogens in drinking water systems. Effectiveness of an attack can be enhanced through introduction of the bioweapon near the tap, such as in the distribution system (postdisinfection). Water storage and distribution systems also facilitate delivery of an effective dose of toxicant to a potentially very large population, as well as a lower-level chronic dose (for chemicals) with longer-term effects and lower-detection thresholds. Although the probability of a terrorist threat to drinking water is extremely low, the consequences could be very severe for exposed populations; thus, this conference concluded that national attention must be focused on detecting threats from biological terrorism, as well as other catastrophic events in drinking water supplies, and on preventing human exposure wherever possible. To that end, the conference concluded that technology-based and other pre-event or pre-exposure management strategies can be effective deterrents to widespread human exposure to bioweapons, as well as other low-probability/high-impact contaminant events in drinking water supplies, such as the introduction of Cryptosporidium (9). Of particular note are new and developing technologies to rapidly detect pathogens in real time, both in source water and water distribution systems. Included among these technologies are DNA microchip arrays (10), immunologic techniques (11), microrobots (12), and a variety of optical technologies, flow cytometry, molecular probes, and other techniques (13,14). None of these technologies is presently available commercially nor have any of the technologies been tested in large drinking water systems. However, this conference concluded that these technologies may be among the most effective approaches for early detection and warning of the use of bioweapons, as well as other catastrophic contamination events in drinking water systems, and encouraged their rapid development. Given that early detection technologies will likely be available in a few years, and that pre-exposure management, where it is successful, will prevent adverse health effects, it is prudent to address the myriad issues that are associated with the use of early detection and warning systems, as well as other preexposure management techniques. In this paper, we present characteristics of early warning systems (EWSs) and other pre-exposure management approaches that may increase the chances of preventing human exposure, if biological weapons are used in drinking water systems. We also address the interpretation of, response to, and communication of information derived from EWSs. This report reflects the deliberations of a breakout group from this conference that addressed system characteristics and interpretation, response, and communication issues.