US Tariffs Research Articles

Health State Utility Valuation in Patients with Triple-Class-Exposed Relapsed and Refractory Multiple Myeloma Treated with the Bcma-Directed CAR T Cell Therapy, Idecabtagene Vicleucel (ide-cel, bb2121): Results from the Karmma Trial

Health State Utility Valuation in Patients with Triple-Class-Exposed Relapsed and Refractory Multiple Myeloma Treated with the Bcma-Directed CAR T Cell Therapy, Idecabtagene Vicleucel (ide-cel, bb2121): Results from the Karmma Trial

Impact of Tafamidis on Life Expectancy and Quality of Life of Transthyretin Amyloid Cardiomyopathy Patients

Background Historically, the prognosis of newly diagnosed patients with transthyretin amyloid cardiomyopathy (ATTR-CM) was poor with a median survival of only 2-6 years. The ATTR-ACT trial showed that tafamidis reduced all-cause mortality by 30.2% resulting in a hazard ratio (HR) of 0.70 [95% CI 0.51 to 0.96] compared to placebo by slowing disease progression. The aim of this study was to estimate the impact of tafamidis on mean survival and quality adjusted life years (QALY) using a disease simulation model. Methods A multi-state cohort Markov model was developed to simulate the disease course of ATTR-CM patients. In the model, patients were followed throughout a lifetime, and survival was stratified by prognostic NYHA I/II and NYHA III patient subgroups using individual patient-level data from both the ATTR-ACT and the long-term extension study to ATTR-ACT. Based on the patients’ distribution in the ATTRACT trial, the total patient cohort entering the model was comprised of 68% in NYHA class I/II and 32% in NYHA class III. Technical best practices were followed to extrapolate survival. Given that the proportional hazard assumption was violated, curves were fitted by treatment arm and by subgroup. The base case parametric distributions selected were Gompertz for NYHA class I/II and Weibull for NYHA class III, based on statistical tests of fit and clinical plausibility of the extrapolations. Utility values for the health states were derived from ATTR-ACT EQ-5D-3L using US tariffs. The outcomes were mean and incremental mean survival and QALYs. Univariate deterministic and multivariate probabilistic sensitivity analyses were conducted. Analyses were conducted for each NYHA class and weighted results presented. Results The overall predicted mean survival for the total population in the simulated patient cohort was 7.01 for tafamidis and 2.82 years for placebo, resulting in an incremental mean survival of 4.19 years [95% CI 1.32 to 5.55]. The corresponding QALYs were 5.64 and 2.09 respectively, resulting in 3.54 incremental QALYs [95% CI 1.20 to 4.72] in favor of tafamidis. The results were sensitive to parametric distributions selected for both placebo and tafamidis. Conclusions Based on the results of the disease simulation model, tafamidis is expected to increase the life expectancy and QALYs of ATTR-CM patients by 4.19 years and 3.54 QALYs, respectively. Longer term follow-up data from the ATTR-ACT extension study will further inform these findings when available.

US-China Trade War and its Impact on Pakistan Exports

This research study attempts to explore the effect of a trade war between the United States of America and China on Pakistan and other regional countries exports to the United States of America. The difference-in-difference methodology used to obtain the coefficients of each country to estimate the change in exports to the US from China, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The empirical results indicate that due to the imposition of US tariffs, China�s exports to the US reduced by 39%, whereas Pakistan�s exports to the US lowered by 3%. India and Bangladesh, on the other hand, gains from the trade war with India�s exports increased by 39% and Bangladesh�s exports increased by 50%. Therefore, it can conclude that the US-China trade war does not bring positivity to overall Pakistan�s trade position.

Tariff War and Impact on India

Recent years have witnessed a return of protectionism as tariff barriers were raised by the United States and other large trading partners, mainly China. However very little attention has been paid to the impact of the trade war on outside trading partners having trade relations with the US and China. This paper analyzes the impact of the tariff war on India, a large country having significant trade ties with both the US and China, yet not directly involved in the tariff war. Using product level data on exports and imports, the paper analyzes the implication of the tariff war on India through the lens of trade diversion and the pricing power of exporters. The analysis reveals a significant impact of the trade war on India’s external trade which points towards a substitution effect in products affected by the trade war. Further, the paper observes a heterogeneous impact of the tariff war across different product classifications. Final goods exports increased significantly due to the US tariffs applied within the tariff war, especially in more substitutable commodities.

Weaponized trade policy: the impact of US tariffs on the European automobile sector

With trade tensions running high, the Trump Administration is considering new tariffs on imported automobiles, and the main target would be the European Union, traditionally America’s closest ally. In this paper we combine disaggregated models to estimate the impact of these tariffs worldwide, and especially on Spain. First, a trade-policy simulation model computes the potential effects worldwide. Then we plug these into the World Input–Output Database, obtaining the inter-sectoral effects of the tariffs on Europe and the rest of the world. Finally, we insert these results into the Spanish inter-regional Input–Output Tables, obtaining final effects for Spanish regions via their inter-sectoral relations with the European Union and the rest of the world. By our calculation, the new US auto tariffs could end up destroying 10,400 jobs in Spain alone and 567,000 jobs worldwide. Moreover, they might have unexpected consequences, affecting, Spanish regions and sectors that just indirectly depend on the automobile industry.

An evaluation of EQ-5D-3L health utility scores using five country-specific tariffs in a rural population aged 45\u201369\u2009years in Hua county, Henan province, China

BackgroundThis study aims to compare the performance of the recently developed Chinese (city) tariff of the EQ-5D-3L against the UK, US, Japanese and Korean tariffs in a general rural population in China.MethodsFrom November 2015 to September 2016, 12,085 permanent residents aged 45–69 from 257 villages randomly selected from Hua County, Henan Province, China, were interviewed using EQ-5D-3L, and a one-on-one questionnaire investigation was used to collect data on factors associated with HRQOL. The health utility scores were calculated using the UK, US, Japanese, Korean and Chinese (city) tariffs. The agreement, known-groups validity and sensitivity of these five tariffs were evaluated. Transition scores for pairs of observed EQ-5D-3L health states were calculated and compared.ResultsThe Korean tariff yielded the highest mean health utility score (0.963), followed by the Chinese (city) (0.948), US (0.943), UK (0.930) and Japanese (0.921) tariffs, but the differences in the scores of any two tariffs did not exceed the MCID. The Chinese (city) tariff showed higher ICC values (ICCs> 0.89, 95% CI:0.755–0.964) and narrower limits of agreement (0.099–0.167) than the Korean tariff [(ICCs> 0.71, 95% CI:0.451–0.955); (0.146–0.253)]. The Chinese (city) tariff had a higher relative efficiency and effect size statistics in 10 out of 11 variables as compared to the UK, US and Japanese tariffs. The Chinese (city) tariff (0.215) was associated with moderate mean absolute transition scores compared with the UK (0.342), US (0.230), Japanese (0.149) and Korean (0.189) tariffs for 1485 observed pairs of the EQ-5D-3L health states.ConclusionsHealth utility scores derived from the five tariffs differed. The Chinese (city) tariff was the most suitable of these tariffs and was without obvious weakness. We recommend adopting the Chinese (city) tariff when applying EQ-5D-3L to assess quality of life among the elderly in China’s agricultural region with socio-economic status similar to Hua County. Results of this study had provided a crucial basis for health surveys, health promotion projects, health intervention trials, and health economic evaluation taking HRQOL as a target in rural areas of China.

Shooting Oneself in the Foot? Trade War and Global Value Chains

Despite the “Phase One Deal” agreed on mid-December 2019, bilateral tariffs between US and China remain at unprecedented high levels, which will have long-lasting effects. US tariffs remain very high on parts, components and other intermediate products; similarly, only the last wave of Chinese retaliatory tariffs has been half cut. We investigate in this paper how such tensions between highly interdependent economies will impact trade, income and jobs. We rely on a set-up featuring General Equilibrium, imperfect competition and importantly differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are taken into account at the tariff line level, before being aggregated within sectors. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a sizeable decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the tariffs in place as of February 2020, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US. Consistent with political economy determinants, these twists of value added are transmitted to production factors, leading to sizeable creation and destruction of jobs, and reallocation of capital to the benefit of protected sectors, mostly at the expense of their clients. Ultimately, this paper sheds light on the economic consequences of policies disrupting global value chains.

The Impact of Us Tariffs Against China on Us Imports: Evidence for Trade Diversion?

In this paper we provide evidence on the existence of short-run trade diversion effects towards third countries as a consequence of tariff shocks. We exploit sudden policy changes in the context of the trade dispute between the US and China. Based on a data set covering monthly product-level information on US imports from 30 countries for the period January 2016 until May 2019, we employ a difference-in-differences estimation framework. Doing so, we (1) can confirm previous findings showing a strong negative direct effect of US tariffs on US imports from China, but (2) do not find evidence for significant short-run trade diversion effects towards third countries. This latter finding holds for product and country subgroups as well as for a variety of robustness checks. JEL Classification: F13, F14, F61

Macroeconomic Effects of Tariffs Shocks: The Role of the Effective Lower Bound and the Labour Market

We simulate a version of the EAGLE, a New Keynesian multi-country model of the world economy, to assess the macroeconomic effects of US tariffs imposed on one country member of the euro area (EA), and the rest of the world (RW). The model is augmented with an endogenous effective lower bound (ELB) on the monetary policy rate of the EA and country-specific labour markets with search-and-matching frictions. Our main results are as follows. First, tariffs produce recessionary effects in each country. Second, if the ELB holds, then the tariff has recessionary effects on the whole EA, even if it is imposed on one EA country and the RW. Third, if the ELB holds and the real wage is flexible in the EA country subject to the tariff, or if there are segmented labour markets with directed search within each country, then the recessionary effects on the whole EA are amplified in the short run. Fourth, if the elasticity of substitution among tradables is low, then the tariff has recessionary effects on the whole EA also when the ELB does not hold.

Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective

Using another year of data including significant escalations in the trade war, we find that the costs of the US tariffs continue to be almost entirely borne by US firms and consumers. We show that the response of import values to the tariffs increases in absolute magnitude over time, consistent with the idea that it takes time for firms to reorganize supply chains. We find heterogeneity in the responses of some sectors, such as steel, where tariffs have caused foreign exporters to drop their prices substantially, enabling them to export relatively more than in sectors where tariff pass-through was complete.

US-China Economic Confrontation: Ideology, Chronology, Meaning

In summer 2018 the United States launched a trade war against China. Before that, there was a chance that both sides would find a compromise, some hopes were still in place during bilaterial negotiations in May. However, new US tariffs on import from China were imposed in July and August with the total of $50 billion. Beijing responded proportionally. September brought another round of US tariffs worth $200 billion. The successful economic growth of China leads to the transformation of the world economic space, where the leading positions are still occupied by the countries of the West. The new US administration, fearing economic competition, announced a policy of containing China. In this case, Washington is going to violate the existing rules of international trade. The tension in the economic relations of the United States and China is growing. The authors look into the history, ideology and details of the conflict between two major powerhouses of the global economy. They try to investigate how both countries will be affected by the emerging trade war, which is also challenging the whole system of international trade regulation. Besides, the conflict between Washington and Beijing is understood as a fundamental shift in the world economy and politics where rising powers take the lead in globalization. For the first time in the history of Sino-American relations economic tensions between the two sides have reached such a scale. Analysis of their consequences far exceeds the standard methods of assessment of trade policy measures.

Tariff Passthrough at the Border

We use micro data collected at the border and at retailers to characterize the effects brought by recent changes in US trade policy - particularly the tariffs placed on imports from China - on importers, consumers, and exporters. We start by documenting that the tariffs were almost fully passed through to total prices paid by importers, suggesting the tariffs' incidence has fallen largely on the United States. Since we estimate the response of prices to exchange rates to be far more muted, the recent depreciation of the Chinese renminbi is unlikely to alter this conclusion. Next, using product-level data from several large multi-national retailers, we demonstrate that the impact of the tariffs on retail prices is more mixed. Some affected product categories have seen sharp price increases, but the difference between affected and unaffected products is generally quite modest, suggesting that retail margins have fallen. These retailers' imports increased after the initial announcement of possible tariffs, but before their full implementation, so the intermediate passthrough of tariffs to their prices may not persist. Finally, in contrast to the case of foreign exporters facing US tariffs, we show that US exporters lowered their prices on goods subjected to foreign retaliatory tariffs compared to exports of non-targeted goods.

The national security argument for protection of domestic industries

ABSTRACTTracing the origin of the national security argument for protection of domestic industries to Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List, we study its post-GATT applications with reference to Article XXI of the WTO and highlight some recent abuses. We compare the use of tariff, production/input subsidy, and government procurement as alternative instruments of protection from the perspective of economic efficiency and study the disapproval of inward FDI to gain insights into the underlying national security concerns. The case studies of a) the US tariffs on aluminum and steel, b) German disapproval of the acquisition of a technology firm Leifeld Metal Spinning by a Chinese firm, and c) US’ all out global effort to cripple China’s telecom equipment giant Huawei are presented for illustration.

Rise of trade protectionism: the case of US-Sino trade war

In recent decades, China experienced the fastest economic growth by opening its economy and focussing on trade and is now the second largest economy surpassing Japan. The widening of the US trade deficit with China raised tensions between the two largest economies of the world. Although China is gradually opening, it is still protecting some of its industries and engaging in unfair trade practices. Trump administration argues that trade deficit hurts US manufacturing and promised to cut them. Previous administration used the WTO process to challenge China for abusing intellectual property rights, import restrictions, and subsidising its industries. Protectionism hurts both countries. USA is the largest trade partner of China and US tariffs can slow its growth. China’s tariffs on US goods also are raising prices for consumers. Moreover, studies indicate that unilateral measures of imposing tariffs neither reduce deficits nor create jobs.

The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy?

ABSTRACTThis article evaluates the recent protectionist US trade policy and the retaliation of the EU and China. The article employs a New Quantitative Trade Theory model and an Armington model for comparison. The simulation results show that US car tariffs are a credible threat to the EU, but the steel and aluminum tariffs are not. China suffers considerably from the US tariffs, especially the latest extended, tightened tariffs. The retaliation measures of the EU and China, however, do not cause significant US welfare losses compared to the situation without mutual trade policy.

Trade, plastics vex chemical execs

A year ago, at the American Chemistry Council’s annual meeting, the issues of trade and plastic waste were top of mind for the chemical industry executives in attendance. It was deja vu earlier this month at the trade association’s 2019 get-together: trade and plastic waste again dominated the conversation. With US tariffs on Mexican goods being threatened at the time, on top of those already imposed on products from China, the mood around trade was grim. Executives said they had come to accept the new reality of tariff-laden foreign trade and were taking steps to mitigate its impact. On the matter of plastic waste, attendees were more optimistic, arguing that the chemical industry is getting a grip on the problem of plastics in the oceans. Executives are confronting these issues against the backdrop of a softening global economy. At a press briefing at the conference, held in Colorado Springs, ACC

Global and regional effects of the US tariffs on iron, steel and aluminium: A SMART combination of models with a focus on Spain

AbstractOn 8 March, US President Donald Trump approved new import tariffs on “iron and steel” and “aluminium” of 25% and 10%, respectively. The aim of this paper is to estimate the impact that this decision might have on the Spanish regions. Our empirical strategy combines three powerful models to address the trade effect both over the global economy, and more specifically, in each Spanish region. First, by means of the SMART simulation model, we estimate the trade effect for 131 countries; then, we compute the intersectoral effects of such shock using the World Input–Output Database (WIOD); finally, we estimate the interregional and intersectoral effects within Spain, using an interregional input–output table. This last step combines both, the immediate product shock over the metal sector in Spain, and the global effect computed by means of the WIOD. The results obtained shows how the US tariffs might induce a total job loss of 185,000 employees worldwide, while in Spain, it may cost 3,500 jobs.

Global adjustment to US disengagement from the world trading system

US trade policy in the Trump administration is protectionist, raising tariffs outside of WTO rules, threatening trade wars, withdrawing from existing trade agreements, and negotiating new bilateral trade deals rather than free trade agreements. The reaction of the rest of the world has been to support the WTO rules-based trading system and to pursue new and expanded regional trade agreements that do not include the US. The result may be US disengagement from the world trading system, with countries diverting trade around the US. We use a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze changes in trade and production patterns for a variety of scenarios, including US trade wars. We find that adjustment to US disengagement is feasible—the changes in trade shares as countries divert trade are modest and achievable, with very little impact on the volume of global trade. If the US engages in trade wars with major partners, the best response for other trade partners is to sit out the trade war, accept higher US tariffs, and gain markets from global trade diversion around the US. Finally, because of indirect effects, widespread tariffs fail to benefit the protected sectors—a fallacy of composition in a protectionist trade policy.

The sky is not falling!

As of October 2018, almost half of US imports of goods from China are subject to new US tariffs at various rates, mostly at 10% until the year-end of 2018, when the rates were scheduled to be raised to 25%. These tariff rates will prove to be prohibitive for most if not all of the US imports from China. Assuming that US imports from China will be reduced by half, the initial direct real impact on the Chinese economy may be estimated at a loss of 0.43% of GDP. If indirect effects are included, the full real impact may be estimated at a maximum loss of 1.12% of Chinese GDP. These estimated impacts are relatively small and quite manageable. There is a possibility that the scope of the US tariffs may be expanded to cover all US imports from China, in which case the full negative economic impact will be doubled, but still leaving an expected rate of economic growth in excess of 4%. The Renminbi is not likely to be significantly devalued as a result of the trade war. However, there are also longer-term underlying forces at work behind the China–US trade war – the competition for economic and technological dominance and the rise of populism, isolationism, nationalism and protectionism. It is important for China–US relations, and China’s relations with the rest of the world, in particular with the European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan and Russia, to be carefully managed going forward.

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again ▀ In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside. ▀ The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016. ▀ One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year. ▀ We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support. ▀ But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.