US Tactical Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Flawed Assumption in Pro-Nuclear Arguments and South Korea's Strategic Choice

In this article I explore assumptions behind the aspiration for nuclear armament in South Korea. An increasing number of South Koreans advocate nuclear armament of their country, either by redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons or by developing an indigenous nuclear capability. Support for “going nuclear” reflects three beliefs: nuclear weapons can serve as a shield from external bullying, the balance of power between Seoul and Pyongyang has shifted due to Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capability, and possessing nuclear weapons is the sole way to protect ROK national interests given growing skepticism over the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. I revisit deterrence theory to demonstrate that these perceptions are based on the flawed assumption that nuclear weapons can only be deterred by other nuclear weapons. This assumption―an extrapolation from the Cold War experience―does not consider technological breakthroughs made since then. In fact, modern, technologically advanced conventional weapons can also deter nuclear weapons, especially those using relatively underdeveloped technologies. By continuously modernizing its conventional weapons and strengthening the ROK-US alliance, South Korea can deter Pyongyang from contemplating a nuclear assault on South Korea.

Rethinking NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons

NATO should move to a safer, more secure and more credible nuclear deterrent – including withdrawing, and not replacing, US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

ABSTRACTExtended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.

Ceci n'est pas une…American nuclear weapon in Belgium

There is hardly anybody in Belgium who publicly defends the continued deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on Belgian territory. The longer these weapons stay, the more the existing nuclear weapons policy and by extension North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself will be regarded as illegitimate. While one should not expect massive demonstrations similar to that at the beginning of the 1980s, the pressure to protest increases. By describing the different societal and political actors in Belgium and their respective views on the possible withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons, this article tries to explain the gap between policymakers and citizens on this issue. The main explanatory variables are a low-profile diplomatic culture and the lack of a strong link between the anti-nuclear movement and the political parties in power, resulting in the absence of political leaders at the governmental level, who clearly speak out in favor of withdrawal.

US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why their Withdrawal is Desirable and Feasible

The article describes how over the past two decades the role of US forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons has gradually declined, and explains the logic behind their decreased importance. The main arguments in favor of the continuation of the process of their removal from Europe, until they have been entirely eliminated over the next couple of years, are listed, and the reasons for NATO’s desire to nevertheless prolong its reliance on these weapons are investigated. Further, the political feasibility of their complete withdrawal and the political practicalities of such a withdrawal are analyzed.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITALY: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations

Despite the fact that Italy hosts almost half of the remaining estimated 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) that are currently deployed in Europe, case studies of Italy have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill that gap by outlining the key elements of Italy's position regarding the presence, role, and future of TNW in Italy. By considering both the military and political-symbolic dimensions of TNW, the author argues that Italy has largely embraced the process of the devaluation of nuclear weapons; however, this is offset by the country's determination to preserve the principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security. By making the alliance's cohesion a priority, Italy appears willing to postpone the complete elimination of TNW from its territory if necessary; despite this, Italy otherwise considers TNW to be not only weapons of little intrinsic value but also obstacles to the global nuclear disarmament program that it strongly supports.

NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.

Changing Dynamics of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula

Extended nuclear deterrence has been a cornerstone of US defense and foreign policy and a foundation of ROK–US security ties. This paper analyzes the changing dynamics of US extended nuclear deterrence on the Korean peninsula since the eruption of the North Korean nuclear crisis. It focuses on the negative security assurance and explains how US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea is adversely affected by the new negative security assurance of the Obama administration. It also investigates the history of security guarantees to North Korea provided by the USA and emphasizes how the USA's repeated security guarantees – in its attempt to denuclearize North Korea – have weakened the nuclear umbrella over South Korea. In addition, the paper points out that some policies of the USA at the negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis can only be explained by US politicians' drive for a positive political legacy. Therefore, some safeguard measures are necessary to supplement the diminishing US nuclear umbrella on the Korean peninsula. The unique threat to South Korea makes it a suitable place to actively apply the new concept of regionally tailored deterrence architecture and implement a dual‐track approach to negotiations for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis by preparing to redeploy US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. Finally, the paper explicates South Korea's non‐nuclear weapon policy and proposes a new concept of the South Korean alliance security assurance.

US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011

The authors write about US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and how NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010, places less importance on these weapons. Though the current Europe-based arsenal is only a fraction of what it was at its peak in 1971, 150—200 bombs are currently deployed in Europe and stored at six bases in five countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The authors present information on the weapons at each of these arsenals.

The Nuclear Security of Japan and South Korea: A Japanese View

The Nuclear Security of Japan and South Korea: A Japanese View