US Naval War Research Articles

Wargaming for Learning: How Educational Gaming Supports Student Learning and Perspectives

To what extent does educational gaming add value to more traditional instructional models in learning core concepts of national security and warfighting? This paper presents the results from a quasi-experimental, cross-sectional, and longitudinal study of students taking two standardized courses in the Joint Military Operations department at the US Naval War College. Split into wargaming and non-wargaming sections by instructor preference, subject learning is measured through self-reported and objective measures at three points: prior to the start of the content block on “Operational Art”; after the case study of the WW2 battle of Leyte Gulf but prior to any wargaming; and for subjects in wargaming course sections, after participating in the Leyte Gulf scenario of the “War at Sea” wargame. The results support the hypotheses that wargaming increases learning and alter student preferences in favor of learning through gaming but fail to find evidence that students recognize the value of the debriefing phase of educational gaming. This article adds to existing studies by focusing on an understudied practitioner population—graduate-level career military officers at a professional military education (PME) institution—and mitigating several of the methodological challenges facing many scholarly projects in the study of educational gaming in political science.

South of the Border: Women Travelers to Latin America

In South of the Border: Women Travelers to Latin America, Evelyn M. Cherpak, PhD, has compiled an extensive collection of essays, letters, and diaries by women who traveled to Latin America between 1818 and 1956. Cherpak, a former archivist, curator, and teacher at the US Naval War College, has focused on women from the United States and Europe, and this collection provides fascinating insights into the diverse attitudes, assumptions, and experiences of a particular class of international traveler.Cherpak has gathered 12 writers who published accounts of their travels and adventures in Latin America upon their return home. An additional three entries—those by Sarah Sabin Wilson, Mary Robinson Hunter, and Virginia Heim George—are based on previously unpublished letters and diaries. A short biographical section introduces each author. Among the women included here are some who traveled to Latin America as the wives of diplomats, businessmen, and mineowners; others were scientists, educators, or missionaries, while more than one woman was a thrill seeker.Among those who were professional writers is the journalist Nellie Bly, who reported from Mexico during a visit in 1886. Less than a year later, she became famous for her exposé of the insane asylums in New York City. Other notable women tried to establish themselves in Latin America on a more permanent basis, often without the aid of husbands or other family. Sarah Sabin Wilson describes her experiences running a Cuban plantation, Mary Lester recounts teaching in a rural school in Honduras, and Virginia Heim George tells of working for the YWCA in Brazil. The fact that few of the women included here were professional authors at the time of their travel is often an advantage, offering an unpolished but unguarded window into their experiences.Readers will benefit from Cherpak's inclusion of previously unpublished and difficult-to-find materials, and entries such as these allow researchers who cannot travel to archives access to original primary resources. The collection also combines material intended for widespread public consumption with private reflections and observations on Latin American culture, giving us access to a broad range of perspectives. These primary sources reveal how these largely middle-class white women from Europe and the United States judged the cultures, customs, and races of Latin America. It is an approach that usefully informs us of these women's cultural biases toward the Latin American people, although more contextualization in the classroom will be necessary to move beyond the stereotypes expressed by some of the authors.Placing their writings side by side permits us to discover commonalities in these women's experiences, informed by such factors as class, nationality, and gender. For example, through this collection one can track how the act of travel—its motivations, means, and meaning—changed from traveler to traveler in the intervening years and across locations. In this regard, a more extensive and detailed introduction would have been useful in framing the collection and highlighting its underlying continuities and tensions. For example, three of the authors—Sarah Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren, Marguerite Bates Dickins, and Wilma Jerman Miles—are the wives of naval officers. It would have been interesting for Cherpak, a historian of naval history, to draw out the implications of such connections.Cherpak's contributors comment on a wide variety of topics, including slavery, contemporary political figures, and women's customs regarding fashion, education, and the ability to socialize in public and private spheres. Few of these authors specifically addressed their lives as women or set out to write about the women whom they met while traveling. Nonetheless, although these travelers often did not see themselves as exceptional, they were able to gather information about women's lives that male travelers would have been uninterested in, unaware of, or unable to record.By letting these women speak in their own voices, Cherpak's volume allows them to tell us as much about themselves—including their prejudices and misconceptions—as they tell us about Latin America. With selections drawn from throughout Latin America and ranging from the early nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the digital edition of this book will be particularly useful for classrooms in which one might assign a pertinent chapter based on time and place. Our historical record is incomplete without the varied perspectives of women, and a collection that brings forgotten voices to our classrooms is something for which many instructors long. We need more compilations, anthologies, and websites that draw together and recontextualize unfamiliar primary sources, and Cherpak's book takes a step toward filling this gap in the literature.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN Y LA RELACIÓN DE LAS NACIONES

Frederick Hartmann nació en Nueva York en 1922 y murió en el año 2015 a la edad de93 años. Graduado de la Universidad de California en Berkeley, se incorporó a la US Navy enel programa acelerado durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial y tomó parte de nueve invasionesincluyendo la de Palau, Leyte, Linguyen, Gulf y Okinawa y recibió 7 estrellas de batalla.En 1946 se enroló en el programa de la escuela de graduados de la Universidad dePrinceton obteniendo en 1949 un PhD en Política. Fue luego profesor de la Universidad deFlorida en 1948 donde fue promovido rápidamente a profesor asociado y luego a profesorprincipal. Hartmann comandó una división de la Reserva Naval en Gainesville, Florida y fuepromovido a Capitán de Navío en 1966. Ese año aceptó una nueva posición creada en el UnitedStates Naval War College en Newport, Rhode Island, donde se desempeñó durante 20 añoscomo profesor de Ciencias Políticas, y fue el principal asesor de nueve presidentes del NavalWar College. Su prolífica producción literaria lo llevó a escribir quince libros, todos de granreputación, entre los que destacan The Relations of Nations y The Conservation of Enemies.Como graduado del Naval War College, me honro en intentar revivir su legado en estecorto artículo para la prestigiosa Revista de la Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Internacional, enel cual trato de revisitar su libro más famoso: The Relations of Nations (1957) escrito en seisediciones y traducido a muchos idiomas, siendo usado en escuelas de negocios internacionales,escuelas de guerra y escuela de política exterior en muchas naciones. El tema central es el queaboca al eje central de los estudios en el US Naval War College que son las relacionesinternacionales y la política y estrategia en el desarrollo de las naciones.

Aircraft carriers and the capacity to mobilise US power across the Pacific, 1919–1929

This paper analyses how aircraft carriers were developed and positioned within US Navy planning for war in the Pacific during the first decade of the interwar period. Building on Caren Kaplan's framing of military mobility as a capacity, the paper contends that as carrier technologies advanced during the 1920s so recognition of their capacity to act as more than simply mobile islands tasked with supporting the big guns of the fleet emerged. The paper draws on a range of primary sources, specifically pertaining to War Plan Orange (the US's plan for war against Japan primarily developed during the 1920s and 1930s), and analyses US Naval War College documents that positioned carriers, often aspirationally, as key tools of US Pacific power projection. Inflected through discussion of two US Fleet Problems – naval exercises which took place in 1924 and 1929 – the paper contends that the emergence of a recognition that the capabilities of both ship and aircraft needed to be considered in tandem offered new and important strategic opportunities for US war planners during the interwar period.

Meeting China Halfway - How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry

Meeting China Halfway--How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry. By Lyle J. Goldstein. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015. Hardcover: 389pp. Meeting China Halfway is a must read for anyone concerned about the current trajectory of US-China relations. It has much to say about how America and China might build greater strategic trust, and thus avoid the risks of a Thucydides trap. It puts forward constructive policy proposals about how these major powers might move from an escalation spiral in their relationship to a spiral. Recognizing that Chinese and American interests coincide over many global problems, successive chapters address major global issues, such as the environment, the Middle East, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, and how a spiral might proceed. For each issue it identifies a mutually reciprocal progression of steps that would promote cooperation and trust. Such a spiral would start with small steps and move on to more difficult initiatives. Associate Professor Lyle Goldstein was the founding director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, and has considerable expertise on China, with the language ability to analyse Chinese language sources, including military publications, not otherwise available to Western experts. Goldstein's basic concern in Meeting China Halfway is the increasing levels of distrust between Beijing and Washington. This is aggravated by the lack of appreciation on the American side of China's history, especially US imperialism, and the wide extent of anti-American sentiment in China. Goldstein notes that Most Chinese foreign policy and defense specialists are convinced that Washington seeks to contain and even derail China's rise (p. 355). With this background, it is not surprising that China responds robustly to US initiatives, especially those of a military nature, in the South China Sea. As Goldstein reminds us, there are hawks in both Beijing and Washington. In his view, Most troubling of all, the military establishments in both the United States and China each appears to hold that they must earnestly prepare for rivalry and even direct conflict (pp. 330-31). Given developments over the past year, with China's artificial island-building in the South China Sea and the US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), if anything these sentiments have increased since the book was published. This review focuses primarily on the chapter which addresses US-China relations in the South China Sea. title of this chapter is The New 'Fulda Gap' using the metaphor for US-China rivalry first introduced by Robert Kaplan in a 2009 Foreign Affairs article on the Indian Ocean. Given the depth of anti-American sentiment in China, Goldstein believes that it is Washington's responsibility to initiate the first steps of each spiral. With the South China Sea, the first step would be for Washington to invite China's participation in the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series of naval exercises. Subsequent steps by Washington might include promotion of regional coast guard cooperation, public recognition of China as a claimant in the South China Sea, and the scaling back of military activities in the region. last step involves terminating US military cooperation with Vietnam, believing that recent overtures toward military cooperation between Hanoi and Washington have violated reasonable principles of geopolitical moderation (p. 290). Similarly, Goldstein is opposed to the US encouraging India's entry into the South China Sea. reciprocal steps by Beijing might include proposals for combined counter-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits (unlikely to be well received by the littoral states), clarification of the nine-dash line, joint resource development on the principle of equality and ending its own initiatives for regional military cooperation. …

The Utility of Nuclear Weapons Today: Two Views

No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National Security. By Thomas M. Nichols Atomic Assistance: How 'Atoms for Peace Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity. By Matthew Fuhrmann My colleague Steven Metz recently wrote a very thought provoking piece, entitled Thinking About Catastrophe: The Army in a Nuclear Armed World. Metz argues, nothing is more important to American security than weapons. Despite all the fretting over terrorism, hybrid threats, and conventional aggression, only weapons can threaten the existence of the United States and destroy the global economy. (1) Indeed, despite the end of the Cold War and hostilities between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the topic of weapons is vital today. Not a day goes by without reference to weapons in national and international newspapers. For example, the New York Times, in its February 18, 2016 online edition, reported that Belgium police discovered ten hours of video purportedly showing a Belgian official at the home of the Paris attacker, Thierry Werts. Belgium officials argued the terrorist organization network involved in the coordinated attacks on November 13, 2015, that left 130 dead may also have intended to obtain radioactive material for terrorist purposes. (2) Terrorist organizations attempting to acquire weapons to carry out their nefarious activities, and renegade nation-states also continue to challenge the international system and international law by attempting to acquire weapons. The most recent example occurred on February 7, 2016, when the hermit kingdom of Korea tested a bomb and launched a satellite, provoking sharp condemnations from Russia and China as well as South Korea. Despite the fact weapons could be considered obsolete since an attack by one country could result in massive retaliation by another, the United States maintains a huge arsenal on high alert and ready for war. The two books considered in this review discuss the utility of weapons in the post-Cold War era. No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National Security, by Thomas M. Nichols, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College in Newport, examines the current state of US doctrine and strategy, the effects of American thinking about weapons on international security, and the various ways the United States might reduce the overall threat of weapons. (12) Why is it so difficult for the major powers, and the United States in particular, to break their addiction? What role should weapons play in America's national security? These are the central questions guiding No Use. (5) While the United States has reduced its stockpiles, it still maintains a considerable number of them. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Are weapons still relevant in the post-Cold War world? Nichols has his doubts. He argues Cold War-era precepts about weapons have continued to dominate security policy and strategies by default. (6) While they may still be considered a good mechanism, other nations may see weapons as aggressive tools in the military arsenal of its opponents. For example, Russian officials, despite their displeasure with Korea for its most recent test and satellite launch, believe the North Korean regime is simply fighting for its own survival, using the logic that when a pack of wolves attacks you, only a fool lowers his gun. (3) Nichols succinctly argues, deterrence will not be strengthened by creating smaller or more accurate bombs or by drawing up military senseless campaigns of desultory strikes. (157) Nichols believes a Armageddon, in the current international system, is unlikely to take place between nation-states. In fact, he contends that without a real threat to the American civilization itself, nuclear weapons are now more an instrument of choice rather than [of] necessity. …

No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, by Thomas M. Nichols

Thomas M. Nichols No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 232 pp., $39.95 (cloth) ISBN: 978-0-8122-4566-0Based on data for late 2013, United States' nuclear arsenal includes an estimated 7400 warheads; of these, 4650 ready for use, with an additional 2700 awaiting destruction.1 What utility do these weapons have? This question lies at centre of No Use, as Thomas Nichols of US Naval War College considers what role nuclear force can and should play in US national security strategy. Nichols advances a compelling argument that challenges prevailing assumptions about nuclear force and its role in US national security policy. The United States, Nichols argues, should abandon its Cold War outlook completely in favour of its existing unspoken nuclear toward Russia and China of minimum deterrence (173). No Use makes an important contribution to our understanding of past and present US nuclear strategy, as well as offering well-reasoned recommendations regarding future role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy.At core of Nichols' argument lies a paradox: although decades have passed since collapse of Soviet Union, US nuclear policy continues to be dominated by Cold War thinking. To demonstrate ongoing predominance of Cold War interpretations, Nichols briefly explores history of US nuclear strategy, illustrating predominant assumption that nuclear weapons were (and continue to be) a successful deterrent. While post-Cold War administrations have undertaken nuclear posture reviews (NPRs), these reviews have not precipitated any concrete change in US strategy. Instead, policymakers have retained an approach of favouring the devil we know rather than overhauling policy (81-82). In absence of significant change resulting from NPRs, US post-Cold War nuclear doctrine retains Cold War thinking, continuing to be a diluted version of Mutually Assured Destruction. As a result, United States is more prepared to respond to a nuclear threat from Russia or China-the easy scenarios to plan for, according to Nichols-than to a more probable, but less predictable, threat posed by a nuclear-armed smaller state or non-state actor (55-56).The challenges confronting United States and its allies today, however, not same as those posed by Soviet Union in past. While this seems obvious, No Use makes it clear that US nuclear thinking today draws no such distinction. Instead of reconsidering role of nuclear weapons, policymakers continue to recycle old assumptions, hoping that deterrence will work again (if indeed it did in first place). Existing US policy assumes that small states are subject to same supposedly iron laws of deterrence that constrain large powers (132). This poses a number of questions. Can a small state be deterred by threat of nuclear retaliation? Is United States willing to retaliate, and if so, how? Nichols addresses a lengthy list of issues that would face US government, including co-location of civilian and nuclear targets and potential damage to neigh- bouring allies. …

China as a Sea Power, 1127-1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People during the Southern Song and Yuan Periods by Lo Jung-Pang (review)

Reviewed by: China as a Sea Power, 1127-1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People during the Southern Song and Yuan Periods by Lo Jung-Pang Loh Wei Leng China as a Sea Power, 1127-1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People during the Southern Song and Yuan Periods Lo Jung-Pang , EDITED BY Bruce A. EllemanSingapore: NUS Press, 2012. 450 pp. ISBN: 978-9971-69-505-7. Paperback This publication on Maritime China was completed in draft form a quarter-century before Lo's untimely demise in 1981. It was, in fact, ready two years after his 1955 article, 'The Emergence of China as a Sea Power during the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods' in the Far Eastern Quarterly. Indeed, the English language academic community has long had access to Lo's pioneering articles; some essays of relevance to note are 'The Decline of the Early Ming Navy' (Oriens Extremus, 1958) and 'Maritime Commerce and Its Relation to the Sung Navy' (Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 1969). A host of other articles are listed in Geoff Wade's Introduction (p. 1, n.1), including his papers lodged at the Needham Research Institute in Cambridge (p. 2, n.6), the outcome of his communication with Joseph Needham whose Science and Civilization volumes are seminal works in the field of Chinese Studies. However, from this monograph readers will have the benefit of a full-blown exposition of Lo's findings on the rise of China as a maritime power in the era of China's maritime expansion prior to the more widely known period of the Ming and the Zheng He voyages. Thanks to Bruce Elleman, Research Professor in the Maritime History Department (the US Naval War College), who found the unpublished manuscript in the University of California at Davis archives and took on the task of editing it. Thanks also to Geoff Wade for his historiographical survey of the relevant literature since the 1980s to assist readers to better appreciate Lo's analysis of the historical precedents of China's pre-modern maritime development. This is most timely given China's current emergence as a global economic player, providing her with the wherewithal to become a naval superpower. From the strategic standpoint it has significant implications on the contestation of maritime resources in the South China Sea region and perhaps beyond, in the Pacific, and even towards dominance of other global arenas. The first of the book's four parts traces the factors behind the outward look towards the sea, as opposed to those periods when China was focused on her terrestrial frontiers, particularly in the north. Parts 2 and 3 examine key changes [End Page 132] during the Southern Song and Yuan dynasties, while Part 4 focuses on developments under the Ming. In his Preface, Lo's opening sentence is a forceful pronouncement on what he saw as an important phase of Chinese history, a period of transition to the modern world: The three hundred years from the beginning of the twelfth century to the beginning of the fifteenth was a period of fundamental and profound metamorphosis for China...a time of intellectual ferment and economic conversion and a time of political turmoil and social upheaval (p. xiv). While his main theme focuses on the Chinese navy and its performance, precisely because of the close interconnection with national, geographic, economic and social forces shaping how it functioned, this study provides a lens into the context within which the navy emerged, grew and declined. Chapter 1, 'China's Rise as a Naval Power', is a survey which stretches back to the Chou Dynasty (1046-1043 BCE) when ships were required to transport troops. The narrative takes in attempts, in subsequent centuries BCE, of fleets raised for invasions, countless naval encounters such as those between the states of Wu (in the lower valley of the Yangzi) and Ch'u (in present-day Hubei and Hunan) in the sixth century BCE to the 'first known sea battle in the history of China' (p. 27) in 485 BCE. Crossing into the...

Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares”

In early January 2010, Google announced that a computer attack originating from China had penetrated its corporate infrastructure (in mid-December) and stolen information from its computers, most likely source code. The hackers also accessed Gmail accounts of some human-rights activists and infiltrated networks of 33 companies. In April 2010, journalist John Markoff wrote: A person with direct knowledge of investigation now says that losses included one of Google's crown jewels, a password system that controls access by millions of users worldwide to almost all of company's Web services, including e-mail and business applications. The program, code named Gala for Greek goddess of earth, was attacked in a lightning raid taking less than two days last December, person said. (1) China's recent incursions into US military computer networks and Google's cyber systems are of concern when viewed in isolation. They reflect a more serious problem when viewed as part of a short-term goal of conducting preemptive reconnaissance that accommodates a longer-term goal of affecting US military planning or US economy. Many factors indicate that this may be China's goal. Initially, this article examines context within which Google attacks occurred and how Google's response--abandoning censorship in China--was used by Chinese to distract attention from their planned aggression. It then analyzes how a 2003 military regulation assisted China's response to Google's accusations. In short, these procedures are being used all too often by Chinese and are causing US authorities to be more and more intolerant of Chinese behavior. Why America Has Had Enough Journalist Josh Rogin recently listed ten computer incidents that are commonly known in United States through press releases and government agency briefings. All parties damaged by attacks suspect that Chinese are behind these incursions. The ten events are: * 2004: Titan Rain, Federal Bureau of Investigation name for a group of hackers from Guangdong province who stole information from US military labs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, World Bank, and others. * 2006: A US State Department official in East Asia opens an email that allows hackers to break into computers at US embassies all over region. * 2006: US Representative Frank Wolf's office is attacked. He is an outspoken lawmaker on Chinese human-rights issues and suspects Chinese in attack. * 2006: The US Commerce Department had to discard all of its computers due to targeted attacks originating from China. * 2006: The US Naval War College took all of its computers offline after a major cyber attack in which China emerged as main culprit. * 2007: Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez finds spy software on his computer following a trade mission trip to China. * 2008: The presidential campaigns of both President-elect Barack Obama and Senator John McCain are attacked by Chinese cyber spies. * 2009: Senator Bill Nelson revealed attacks against his computer had been traced to China. * 2009: Toronto researchers find a massive cyber espionage ring using Chinese malware they call Ghostnet. The attacks penetrated 103 countries, and their origin was China. * 2009: Lockheed Martin's F-35 program is hacked and China emerges as main suspect. (2) This list obviously does not include hundreds of thousands of pings (purpose unknown) that US Web sites have received from China over years, nor does it mention other specific incidents. And then along comes Google. How Serious was Google Attack? The attack on Google occurred in December 2009. Some sources state that as many as 33 companies were victims of hack attack. (3) Alan Paller, director of well-known information security training firm known as SANS Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, indicated just how invasive attacks were, noting the odds of 25 biggest companies in California not being fully compromised by Chinese is near zero. …

Strategic Studies: A Reader (review)

Reviewed by: Strategic Studies: A Reader J. Boone Bartholomees Strategic Studies: A Reader. Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo. Abingdon, U.K., and New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 978-0-415-77222-8. Notes. Index. Pp. ix, 450. $180.00 (pb). Thomas Mahnken, formerly of the US Naval War College and currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and Joseph Maiolo of King's College, London, edited this reader on strategy. The book is aimed at professional military practitioners and other students of strategic studies, international security, and modern war. It is divided thematically into six sections ranging from the uses of strategic theory through specifc strategic issues such as nuclear strategy to a concluding discussion of the future of war and strategy. A brief editors' introduction sets up each section. The volume mixes classic theoretical selections with modern scholarship and provides case studies to leaven hardcore theory. The book is interdisciplinary in approach and content, touching on theory, history, and political science. As with any work of this type, the key to utility is the selection of articles, and again as is common for the genre, the editors reflect their unique perspectives in their selection. In general, the chapters in Strategic Studiesare very good—often the best available on their topics. Nevertheless, there is heavy emphasis on certain subjects or perspectives at the expense of competing or alternative points of view. For example, the section on classic theorists contains essentially all the strategically relevant portions of Sun Tzu, three and a half pages of Liddell Hart that summarize his indirect approach, and a classic chapter from Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence. One cannot argue with any of those; however, the absence of Clausewitz from a section on classic strategy is puzzling. The editors acknowledge in their introduction to the section that their selections should be studied in relation to Clausewitz, and anyone familiar with Clausewitz will immediately recognize the difficulty of selecting a single reading of reasonable length to represent the Prussian theorist. Nevertheless, a short Clausewitzian piece or something from a modern interpreter might have enriched the volume. Similarly, one might question the selections in the section titled "Instruments of war: land, sea and air power." The land power reading is a largely tactical piece [End Page 933]about J. F. C. Fuller's armored theory. The selection on sea power is a chapter from Julian Corbett's Principles of Maritime Strategythat discusses limited war versus unlimited war. Two articles present air power—one arguing that early air power was a foundation of deterrence, and the other Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman's excellent study of the Kosovo war arguing that air power works best in conjunction with the other mediums. One might have expected something more strategic on land power. The Corbett reading is interesting, but does not represent sea power as well as the chapter that immediately follows it in Corbett's book: "Theory of the Object—Command of the Sea." A reading by, for example, John Warden might have been more useful in the air power discussion than the article on air power deterrence theory before 1939, especially since deterrence theory receives heavy emphasis in several other sections of the reader. Conversely, the editors have done an exceptional job in two of the most important and contemporarily interesting subject areas. The long section on irregular warfare and small wars includes great selections from T. E. Lawrence and Mao Zedong on insurgency theory. This is complemented by chapters from David Galula on counterinsurgency theory and Andrew Mack's essay "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." Two excellent articles with different perspectives on modern global terrorism round out this section. The second section of current interest is on "Future Warfare, Future Strategy." While Andrew Krepinevich's article on revolutions in military affairs might be questioned, the other four readings in this section are excellent. Colin Gray's "Why is Strategy Difcult", Adam Roberts's "Te 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective", and Hew Strachan's "Te Lost Meaning of Strategy" approach classic status. Overall, Strategic Studies: a Readeris a positive addition to the...

Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador (review)

Reviewed by: Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador Donald Stoker Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. By Robert B. Ramsey, III . Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006. ISBN 0-16-076722-9. Notes. Appendixes. Bibliography. Pp. ix, 176. $15.00. Compared to most sub-genres of military history, the historiography of military advising is fairly scant. In fact, it is a field lacking an accepted standard work. There are many articles, and a number of books addressing various advisory missions, but there is little that attempts any comparative analysis or offers much in the way of synthesis. Works on non-American military advisory efforts are even thinner. All of this is in spite of the fact that with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, military advising, as well as its study, has emerged as a growth industry. Robert Ramsey's book does not provide the needed sweeping survey of the art of military advising, but he does give us some solid and succinct case studies of three of the more important American military advisory efforts, useful synthesis, and some lessons learned. As the title foretells, Advising Indigenous Forces addresses the American advisory efforts in South Korea, South Vietnam, and El Salvador. The trio juxtapose nicely: South Korea – advising in the midst of a conventional war; South Vietnam – advising to build an army to do counterinsurgency and conventional warfare; El Salvador – a small U.S. team trying to build a force capable of counterinsurgency while also reforming it. The Korea case provides the most interesting study, but this is undoubtedly because of the utter duress under which the American advisors and their South Korean counterparts functioned, particularly in 1950 and 1951. The studies of Vietnam and El Salvador are also solid overviews, though the organization of the Vietnam case study does not provide the linear continuity I would wish. But in Ramsey's defense, this was an advisory effort that stretched over three decades while following many paths, and Ramsey is more interested in deriving lessons. The book also includes some interesting appendixes, including Lawrence of Arabia's wonderful 'Twenty-Seven Articles,' as well as some others concerning past guidance given to military advisors. Though somewhat repetitive in spots, and sometimes not as briskly written as one would like, it is a useful book. Ramsey is particularly strong in relaying the importance of cultural awareness, cultural sensitivity, and familiarity with various characteristics and aspects of the nation being advised. The book does not make use of some of the most recent scholarship on advising, but it is not meant as a synthesis of everything available. Its purpose is providing an overview of how American personnel were prepared for some of the most important U.S. advisory efforts, and what advice and lessons they could offer for military personnel who now find themselves cast in this role. This it does well. Donald Stoker US Naval War College, Monterey Program Monterey, California Copyright © 2007 Society for Military History

Preemption and JustWar: Considering the Case of Iraq

This article demonstrates that use of military force by Bush Administration against regime of Saddam Hussein does not meet ethical criteria for set forth in classical Just War tradition. It considers ethical questions raised by US-led attack against Iraq as part of war against global terrorism and argues that doctrine of preemptive war as applied in case of Iraq fails crucial ethical tests. Could Operation Iraqi Freedom and global war on terrorista be as pivotal in history of ethical decisionmaking as emergence of nationstate in Peace of Westphalia in 1648? Do new ethics for war on terror sever fourth-century Augustinian roots of Just War theory and ties to Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica 700 years later? Could first major war of 21st century inaugurate a revolution in ethical decisionmaking about warfare, justifying a new set of criteria for preemption of preventive war? Answers to these questions hinge on whether or not doctrine of preemption matures into new ethical criteria. Such criteria would build not on foundations for constraining unavoidable human violence, but stretch toward a vision of an ideal of liberty that justifies selective killing of some to achieve a greater good of liberty for many others. This emerging ethic installs States as guardian of a universal, even transcendent, cause of freedom and ultimate arbiter in that cause. (1) This article applies classic categories of Just War tradition to doctrine of preemption as advanced by current Administration in justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom. It does not address range of other explanations for and postures toward war outside Just War tradition. Specifically, it does not develop details of three other major ways to think about war: * Realism, belief that war is essentially a matter of power, self-interest, and necessity, largely making moral analysis irrelevant. * Holy War, belief that war is an instrument of divine power and that individuals, groups, or nations apply decisions about violence to coerce or destroy those opposing divine will. * Pacifism, belief that all war is intrinsically evil and can never be justified. (2) The article begins with a summary of national security debate as expressed in buildup to war against Iraq, including views of policy experts and decisionmakers, ethicists and academics. Second, it considers Just War ethical frameworks and definitions for two facets of warfare: justice in going to war (jus ad bellum) and justice in conduct of war (jus in bello), focusing on six criteria of jus ad bellum. In its attack on Iraq, Bush Administration redefined criteria for preemptive and preventive war that do not satisfy criteria established in classical Just War tradition and may signal development of an emerging ethic. Preemption, Prevention, and National Security Strategy Debate When National Security Strategy was published by Bush Administration in 2002, one of its most notable shifts specified a doctrine or principle of preemption. Preemption--and, more notably, preventive war--exploded onto scene of ethical debate as a major change in US security strategy. The 2002 National Security Strategy asserted, United States has long maintained option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security, and the States will, if necessary, act preemptively. (3) This argument is moot if one sees context of war against Iraq as a continuation of 1991 Desert Storm war, as does ethicist Thomas Nichols, Chairman of Strategy and Policy at US Naval War College, and as Joint Chiefs of Staff may have. (4) Professor Nichols presents an appeal for debate about how 2003 attack against Iraq is a proper application of jus in bello. …

Chinese Security in the Post-11 September World: Implications for Asia and the Pacific

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the Bush administration's policy changes, Chinese strategic specialists are engaged in a wide ranging and increasingly public debate over China's national security strategies and priorities. Although senior leaders continue to argue that most trends remain favorable for Chinese security interests, far more cautionary assessments are also being voiced. In this article, Jonathan D. Pollack, chairman of the Strategic Research Department, US Naval War College, points out that the increased complexity and differentiation in Chinese policymaking reveals multiple trends at work. Even as Chinese policymakers emphasize their keen desire to reinforce regional stability, the longer-term picture remains clouded, from the Taiwan straits to the Korean peninsula to Central Asia to future developments in nuclear weapons policy. Pollack argues that there is a compelling need to invigorate exchanges between senior officials in Beijing, Washington, Tokyo and other major capitals, lest China and other states undertake policies that undermine the prospects for long term regional stability and security.

Book Review: Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871

Book Review: Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871 Get access Geoffrey Wawro Geoffrey Wawro US Naval War College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar German History, Volume 20, Issue 4, October 2002, Pages 532–533, https://doi.org/10.1177/026635540202000414 Published: 01 October 2002

Great Britain and the 1914-1915 Straits Agreement with Russia: The British Promise of November 1914

* The author of The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917 (New York, I956), Mr. Smith is a professor at the University of Georgia and during I965-x966 will occupy the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. 1 The following are based, in varying degrees, on some or all of the Russian documents: Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 1z93-i923 (Norman, Okla., I93I); Albert Pingaud, L'histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la grande guerre (3 vols., Paris, I937-40); F. I. Notovich, Poteria soiuznikami Balkanskogo poluostrova [The Loss of the Balkan Peninsula by the Allies] (Moscow, I947); C. J. Smith, The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1957 (New York, I956); W. W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London, 1957). 2 Winston Churchill was the only member of the 1914-I9I5 War Cabinet who mentioned the British promises of November 1914 to the Russians. (See Winston Churchill, The World Crisis [4 vols., New York, I923], II, I98-200.) Churchill, however, gives no details as to either these promises or the formal agreement of March-April 1915. Although Sir Edward Grey is candid about the later, he overemphasizes the importance of the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign in explaining the agreement. (See Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 5892-g916 [2 vols., New York, 1925], II, 183-89.) Grey's version of events was accepted without question by his distinguished biographer and defender. (See George M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon [Boston, 1937], 320-22; see also The Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Memories and Reflections [2 vols., Boston, 1928], It, 77-78, and Lord Bertie of Thame, Diary, z954I918, ed. Lady Algernon Gordon Lennox [New York, 1924], 119, 149.) Aside from Pingaud's work, the most valuable French sources are Maurice Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la grande guerre (3 vols., Paris, 1921), and Raymond Poincare, Au service de la France (7 vols., Paris, I927-30). 3 Lady Violet Bonham Carter, widow of the late private secretary and literary executor of the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Sir Maurice Bonham Carter, arranged that I be permitted to consult the Herbert H. Asquith Papers in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.