US Allies Research Articles

The China in foreign policy of the US president Richard Nixon administration (january-february 1969)

The article investigates the formation of the foreign policy course of US President Richard M. Nixon on China in January-February 1969. The practical implementation of pre-election initiatives by the administration of President Richard M. Nixon in the Chinese direction in January-February 1969 was studied. There were analyzed reasons, course and consequences of the intensification of Washington's foreign policy strategy toward Beijing during the investigated period. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the process of forming the foreign policy course of the new administration towards China in January-February 1969 is outlined. It describes the specific US foreign policy actions towards communist China at the beginning of Richard M. Nixon's presidential period. Despite the presence in the political, academic, and social circles of the United States of certain attitudes in favor of the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the political reality of international life, the question of the legal recognition of China in the second half of the 1960s constantly moved to the background. The victory of Richard М. Nixon in the presidential election in 1968 was accompanied by a series of changes in the system of geopolitical and military priorities of the United States. The new administration’s more realistic approach to China was due primarily to the fact that Beijing, which renounced its alliances and claimed the role of a «third force», was a strong player in the international arena. Moreover, the policy of Kennedy–Johnson did not justify itself, as China has intensified its foreign policy, and established relations with many countries, including the US allies. At the beginning of the presidency of Richard М. Nixon, in January-February 1969, his administration managed to quickly develop and begin to implement a holistic concept of «new policy» for China. His Chinese policy was inextricably linked to the US foreign policy in Asia and reflected the clash of American and Chinese interests in the region. At the same time, the representatives of the American establishment had a clear idea of how they could influence Soviet-Chinese relations in order to deepen the rift between the USSR and China and what concrete benefits they could derive from this. A number of objective and subjective factors did not prevent the administration of the 37th President of the United States, Richard М. Nixon, radically changing Washington’s Chinese policy. Communist China continued to be recognized as a powerful factor in the US-Soviet dialogue. In spite of this, in the late 60s of the twentieth century, the objective preconditions began to evolve gradually, which promoted the normalization of US-China relations in the future and allowed to resolve most of the controversial issues that ultimately led to the international recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the United States of America.

The policy of the administration of the US President Richard M. Nixon on PRC (March-July 1969)

The article investigates the formation of the foreign policy course of US President Richard M. Nixon on China in March-July 1969. The practical implementation of pre-election initiatives by the administration of the President Richard M. Nixon in the Chinese direction in March-July 1969 was studied. There were analyzed reasons, course and consequences of intensification of Washington's foreign policy strategy towards Beijing during the during investigated period. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the process of forming the foreign policy course of the new administration towards China in March-July 1969 is outlined. It is described the specific US foreign policy actions towards communist China at the beginning of Richard M. Nixon presidential period. Despite the presence in the political, academic and social circles of the United States of certain attitudes in favor of the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the political reality of international life, the question of the legal recognition of China in the second half of the 1960’s constantly moved to the background. The victory of Richard М. Nixon in the presidential election in 1968 was accompanied by a series of changes in the system of geopolitical and military priorities of the United States. The new administration’s more realistic approach to China was due primarily to the fact that Beijing, which renounced its alliances and claimed the role of a «third force», was a strong player in the international arena. Moreover, the policy of Kennedy–Johnson did not justify itself, as China has intensified its foreign policy, established relations with many countries, including the US allies. At the beginning of the presidency of Richard М. Nixon in March-July 1969, his administration was managed to quickly develop and begin to implement a holistic concept of «new policy» for China. His Chinese policy was inextricably linked to the US foreign policy in Asia and reflected the clash of American and Chinese interests in the region. At the same time, the representatives of the American establishment have a clear idea of how they could influence Soviet-Chinese relations in order to deepen the rift between the USSR and China, and what concrete benefits they could derive from this. A number of objective and subjective factors not prevented the administration of the 37th President of the United States, Richard М. Nixon, radically changing Washington’s Chinese policy. Communist China continued to be recognized as a powerful factor in the US-Soviet dialogue. In spite of this, in the late 60’s of the twentieth century the objective preconditions began to evolve gradually, which promoted to the normalization of US-China relations in the future, and allowed to resolve most of the controversial issues that ultimately led to the international recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the United States of America.

Australian perspective on engaging with South Korea in the Indo‐Pacific

AbstractHow do the US allies engage with other actors in the US‐led Indo‐Pacific security order? This article examines this question in the case of Australia. We argue that the regional strategic network is a key consideration for Australia to facilitate its interaction with a target country in the Indo‐Pacific. This article analyzes Australia's approach toward South Korea as an example demonstrating the significance of the regional strategic network in shaping Australia's diplomacy. It does so by addressing the following three questions. First, what is Australia's vision for the Indo‐Pacific? Second, how does Australia perceive South Korea's role in the Indo‐Pacific? Third, how does Australia's Indo‐Pacific vision find the relevance of South Korea for Australia's security interests? The article elucidates that Australia's view on South Korea's place in the Indo‐Pacific security network influences Australia's interaction with South Korea and consequently plays an integral part in the US‐led regional security order‐building process.

Recalibrating South Korea's role and regional network in the Indo‐Pacific: An analysis from a network‐centered approach

AbstractDespite China, Russia, and North Korea's attempts to change the status quo in East Asia, South Korea has remained disconnected from the network of regional countries working together to cope with these revisionists. This article adopts a network‐centered approach to reveal how South Korea's regional network has narrowly focused on the bilateral ROK–US alliance to counter the North Korean threat. Although South Korea has expanded its role from junior partner to balancer and has often forged regional networks to respond to the changing balance of power, South Korea has ultimately utilized this role and network as leverage against North Korea to improve inter‐Korean relations. Now, the Yoon Suk‐yeol administration is attempting to reconfigure both its self‐identified role, describing itself as a “global pivotal state,” and its regional strategy in the Indo‐Pacific beyond the Korean Peninsula to align itself with the United States and other like‐minded countries.

The PRC’S Military Strategies on the Security Architecture of East and South China Sea under President Xi Jinping

Abstract:
 This article analyses the four main military strategies of the People's Republic of China toward the South and East China Seas Security architecture under President Xi Jinping. These strategies of Beijing have been applied mainly to the region, which has been under the US alliance system's security umbrella since the Cold War. The article demonstrates that the People's Republic of China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, seeks to reorder the regional security architecture to its favour by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and diplomatic-economic power to push out the US and allies’ countries' influence outside East and South China Seas. This article argues that the successful conclusion of the rising power's strategies over the East and South China seas will translate the current geopolitical rivalry to result in a power transition to the detriment of the rising power.
 Keywords: China, Xi Jinping, East China Sea, South China Sea, Power Transition

Olive Oil and Basketball: On Collective Memory and America’s Troubled Alliances with the Philippines and Thailand

United States’ alliances in Southeast Asia are troubled. This paper argues that dominant frameworks for understanding alliance dynamics, which assume that rational calculation and bargaining are the primary sources of alliance dynamics, are inadequate for explaining the fragility of US alliances with Thailand and the Philippines. It proposes that a constructivist perspective, emphasising identity, emotion, and collective memory, offers a useful supplementary lens for explaining why some alliances experience turbulence. The paper sets out the theoretical case for examining collective memory in an alliance context, together with a methodology for practical application. The paper finds that in the US-Thai alliance, the domestic politics of collective memory has constrained commemoration of highpoints in the longstanding US-Thai military partnership, leaving the alliance with weaker public support and more vulnerable to strains than would otherwise have been the case. In the Philippines, state sanctioned narratives recognising shared sacrifice during the Second World War are counterbalanced by traumatic memories of the United States-Philippines colonial war, producing a deep ambivalence. These results point to the need for more systematic analysis of collective memory as an important variable in international politics.

Who Supports the Huawei 5G Ban? Advancing a Two-Level Ideational Approach in International Relations

Abstract The US allies’ decisions to ban or allow Huawei from building fifth-generation (5G) mobile broadband are significant to various actors, but their decisions have not been examined systematically. While related literatures point to relative bargaining power or domestic political constraints, I argue that strengths of pre-existing ideas, across national leader and national security institutional levels of analysis, help explain US allies’ positions. Specifically, I argue that the following three understandings are key: (1) China has aggressive intentions, (2) information and communications technology (ICT) system requires security, and (3) data privacy needs state protection. I argue that when the three key understandings are strong across national leader and national security institutional levels, the leader would likely adopt the Huawei 5G ban. On the other hand, when the three key understandings are weak across two levels, the leader would likely allow Huawei to partake in building 5G networks without tougher controls. I conduct a plausibility probe-based comparison of the decision cases of Australia and South Korea and find support for my hypotheses. The cross-national evidence calls for more attention to specific understandings—particular to action contexts—across at least two levels of analysis in explaining decisions of interest.

Toward Measuring Free-Riding: Counterfactuals, Alliances, and US–Philippine Relations

Abstract Do allies free ride? Although plausible, the concept of free riding relies upon a counterfactual: if the ally did not have a powerful patron, then it would invest more in its own defense. However, these claims are often asserted, not shown. The concept of free riding, although influential in the field of security studies, is almost unfalsifiable. In this article, we show logically how difficult it is to ascertain actual free riding. Rather than dismiss the entire concept, however, we attempt to provide two hypotheses and one scope condition that moves closer to a direct assessment of claims of free riding: first, if the ally is free riding, as the patron's commitment decreases, the ally should spend more on its own defense; second, all things being equal, a state with a powerful patron should spend less than one without. The key scope condition is whether the ally cares sufficiently about the issue to fight. We use the case of East Asia—and in particular the Philippines—to illustrate these dynamics. We conclude that the low defense spending of US allies and non-allies in East Asia is not free riding but rather a reflection of their low threat perceptions.

Alliance Coordination: Explaining the Logic of Biden's Taiwan Policy†

The Biden administration is attempting to transform traditional US–Taiwan relations into a multilateralism‐based “US + alliance–Taiwan” interactional model, which can be conceptualized as alliance coordination. This article unpacks the logic of Biden's strategic thinking in the US Taiwan policy. Adopting an asymmetric alliance perspective, it argues that US allies' reactions to Biden's foreign policy and their ideological attitude toward China have interacted with the US placement of the Taiwan question on the agenda in the alliance system to produce different degrees of alliance coordination, which can be measured by the new typology constituted by seven approaches: all‐fields approach, pure high politics approach, high politics driven approach, half‐measures, low politics driven approach, pure low politics approach, and strategic inaction. Three cases, including the different reactions of Japan, European countries, and South Korea, are analyzed to demonstrate how the alliance coordination operates in realpolitik. Additionally, the assessment of this article reveals that Biden's alliance coordination would place growing strategic pressure on mainland China and introduces greater volatility into cross‐strait relations.

Beyond AUKUS: the emerging grand maritime alliance

The AUKUS agreement is the first in history to allow a non-nuclear country to have nuclear-powered submarines, but not nuclear weapons. It pushes the Australia–UK–US alliance to the level of a closer military, scientific, and industrial community and outlines a prototype for a new “maritime alliance.” The closer the internal relationship of this alliance, the more it will estrange China. The alliance seeks to create a “de-Sinicized” defense industry chain and has thus become the forerunner for the restructuring of international relations. The “integrated deterrence” strategy that the alliance is building will change the strategic deterrence structure in the Indo-Pacific region and some essential features of the US alliance system’s deterrence strategy against China. China should pay great attention to the political will, strategic structure, deterrence concept, and military tactics displayed by this major agreement.

Sanctions as a deterrent to nuclear testing

ABSTRACT This article considers the role of economic sanctions in deterring nuclear testing. It argues that sanctions have been relatively effective in discouraging the pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons but have a more mixed track record when it comes to preventing nuclear tests. The article explains why preventing further nuclear testing furthers US nonproliferation interests and discusses three different avenues for strengthening sanctions against nuclear testing: through the United Nations Security Council, unilaterally, or through coordination with like-minded partners. It argues for the importance of sanctions even in complicated cases where US allies are considering conducting nuclear tests.

Not your grandparents’ Cold War: Why America should emphasize economic rather than military strategies in its rivalry with China

ABSTRACT The current US-China competition draws comparisons to the Cold War contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. But there are three crucial differences between the great-power contests of today and during the Cold War: China is now more economically powerful than the Soviet Union was; the American and Chinese economies are more intertwined now than the United States’ and Soviet Union’s ever were; and US allies today are wealthier and more militarily capable than during the Cold War. Because of these differences, the United States should approach its rivalry with China in a way that emphasizes economics and focuses less on the types of ideological and military contests that characterized the Cold War.

The politics of military procurement: the F-35 purchasing process in Canada and Australia Compared

ABSTRACT The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive.

(Invited) How the Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) Is Expanding Robust Advanced Packaging with the US and like-Minded Allies

As investments in technology are made it will be important to consider what technologies are invested in. Advanced Packaging will be the key enabler of the next microelectronic revolution, as it allows increasing device density and functionality per footprint while realizing a broad spectrum of new products through heterogeneous integration. In fact, advanced packaging is becoming equivalent of the transistor of the Moore’s Law and ITRS era. However, the US lacks the necessary advanced packaging ecosystem: the US has not been a cost-effective location to develop a robust advanced packaging sector. The Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) is leading efforts in expanding robust advanced packaging with the US and like-minded allies.SRC has also served as a beacon for the community and has been relied on to bring similar but different interests together to achieve consensus on direction setting for the industry. Through a series of five workshops, 50+ presentations, and hundreds of international experts from industry, government, and academia SRC published the 2030 Decadal Plan For Semiconductors in January 2021. By soliciting participation from experts in all parts of the semiconductor ecosystem, the Decadal Plan serves to define the technical needs to achieve strategic goals by 2030, informing the community of ‘what’ needs to be done and not the ‘how’. Figure 1

Changes and Continuities in South Korea’s Major Foreign and Security Policies under the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration

Strengthening the South Korea–US alliance is South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s top priority in foreign and security policies. However, such a pro-American inclination is highly likely to create many diplomatic challenges caused by heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula and in its relations with China in the years to come. South Korea, as a middle power, should play a more proactive role in world affairs commensurate with its economic and cultural prowess in cooperation with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

Review: Art for the Future: Artists Call and Central American Solidarities, edited by Erina Duganne and Abigail Satinsky

Review: <i>Art for the Future: Artists Call and Central American Solidarities</i>, edited by Erina Duganne and Abigail Satinsky

Gulf Security through the Lens of the ROK-US Alliance

ABSTRACT An analysis of South Korea’s independent deployment of the Cheonghae Unit to the Strait of Hormuz sheds light on the fragmentation of media and political discourses in the country. Empirical evidence from five major South Korean newspaper outlets reveals that the South Korean government’s pre-emptive securitisation presents a wide gap in manifest and latent security interests between the state and society. Securitisation is debated with regard to the two interconnected questions of South Korea’s military deployment to the Middle East and the future of the Korean Peninsula – both of which are ultimately tied to the question of Seoul’s commitment to the US alliance.

The French experience in colonial counterinsurgency: transfer of practices and ideas

The paper describes the main stages and aspects of the development of the French theory and practice of anti-insurgency in the 20th early 21st centuries. It is shown that the systematization of the colonial experience of fighting insurgents in France originates in the 19th century. The starting date for the military thought of France in this sense is considered to be 1830, the beginning of the conquest of Algeria. The development of colonial counterinsurgency reached a new level at the end of the 19th century, when the concept of the oil spot appeared, based on the works of Joseph Simon Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. Its main provisions are also disclosed in this paper. After the trauma of 1940, the loss of Indochina and the French war in Algeria, a new concept emerged that responded to the challenges of the Cold War the concept of revolutionary war, created by the French military after the defeat in the First Indochina War of 19461954 Charles Lacheroy, Roger Trinquier and David Galula. The latter had a noticeable impact on the US counterinsurgency strategy already at the beginning of the 21st century. The era of the global War on Terror prompted US allies and their NATO allies to actively study the problems of colonial counterinsurgency.

From “Angry Mobs” to “Citizens in Anguish”: The Malleability of the Protest Paradigm in the International News Coverage of the 2021 US Capitol Attack

This study tests the robustness of the “protest paradigm”—a routinized, predominantly negative pattern in covering social protest—by examining the news coverage of the 2021 US Capitol attack in eight countries that vary in the nature of their political regime and geopolitical standing, with democratic US allies United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Australia on one side, and authoritarian adversaries Russia, China, and Iran on the other. Based on a computer-assisted analysis of 3,579 news articles, the study shows that rather than operating as a rigid template, the protest paradigm offers national media a malleable set of journalistic devices that can be appropriated to construct the meaning of disruptive global events in a way that reproduces dominant domestic ideologies and advances the ruling elites’ geopolitical interests. In addition to theoretical contribution, the study offers a novel empirical finding to the literature on protest coverage by providing evidence of national media not simply deviating from, but explicitly violating the protest paradigm. As demonstrated by the analysis of the Russian press, rather than delegitimizing the January 6 attackers by making light of their agenda and emphasizing their unruly behavior—which could be expected from coverage consistent with the protest paradigm—the Russian state-owned media trivialized the brutality of the attack by opting for cues with less violent connotations and elevated the legitimacy of the protesters’ actions by framing them as valid demands by politically minded citizens unjustly prosecuted for concerns about the integrity of electoral process.

The US Congress and the Issue of Beginning the Iraq War: the Kurdish Factor in 2002-2003

The political discussions in the US Congress on the start of the war in Iraq and the fate of the Kurdish minority in this country are being explored. The arguments of supporters and opponents of the war in Iraq are analyzed through the prism of the Kurdish factor based on the transcripts of the US Congress, as well as materials from hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It emphasizes the insignificance of the Kurdish issue in the initial period of discussion (the discussion on giving the US President the right to start military operations in Iraq), and the growing interest of legislators in the fate of the Kurdish population in January-March 2003. It is concluded that for the supporters of the invasion the Kurdish factor became the main one and the stake was placed on the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein because of his cruel attitude towards his own people, and in the camp of the opponents of the war the stake is placed on the thesis that the fate of the Kurds was known in 1980s but no one then decided to provide them with military support. The problem of double standards in American foreign policy towards both the Kurds, US allies in the region, and Saddam Hussein was first identified by the US Congress in 2003.