Unqualified Form Research Articles

\u201cExcellence R Us\u201d: university research and the fetishisation of excellence

The rhetoric of “excellence” is pervasive across the academy. It is used to refer to research outputs as well as researchers, theory and education, individuals and organizations, from art history to zoology. But does “excellence” actually mean anything? Does this pervasive narrative of “excellence” do any good? Drawing on a range of sources we interrogate “excellence” as a concept and find that it has no intrinsic meaning in academia. Rather it functions as a linguistic interchange mechanism. To investigate whether this linguistic function is useful we examine how the rhetoric of excellence combines with narratives of scarcity and competition to show that the hyper-competition that arises from the performance of “excellence” is completely at odds with the qualities of good research. We trace the roots of issues in reproducibility, fraud, and homophily to this rhetoric. But we also show that this rhetoric is an internal, and not primarily an external, imposition. We conclude by proposing an alternative rhetoric based on soundness and capacity-building. In the final analysis, it turns out that that “excellence” is not excellent. Used in its current unqualified form it is a pernicious and dangerous rhetoric that undermines the very foundations of good research and scholarship. This article is published as part of a collection on the future of research assessment.

Rejoinder

Rejoinder

Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good * Edited by SERGIO TENENBAUM

The papers in this edited volume are all centred on the guise of the good thesis (GGT), which in its most general and unqualified form says that our practical attitudes aim at the good. To get a firmer grip on this thesis, we have three notions to make more precise: practical attitude, aiming at and the good. This book does a good job of making these notions more precise, so we can see more clearly what is at stake in the debate about GGT. The book also provides a good score table for the main versions of GGT by discussing the main arguments for and against each version. Another virtue of the book is that it is not just concerned with the contemporary debate about GGT. It also engages critically with GGT as it was understood and defended by Socrates, Aristotle and Plato. Socrates favours a version of GGT that states that we cannot act against our better judgement. More precisely, the idea is that an agent cannot perform an action that he knows to be worse than another action available to him. On the face of it, this is an astonishing thesis, since it seems to rule out weakness of will. Matthew Evans provides a thorough reconstruction of Socrates's argument for this controversial thesis. Even though he concedes that Socrates's argument, under the most charitable interpretation, is still far from watertight, he shows that it is worth taking seriously.

The Prism of Rules

Most legal theorists, including almost all positivists and many others, take for granted or are implicitly committed to an assumption that is not an official part of positivism. The assumption is that the content of the law is determined by the contents of legally authoritative pronouncements. I call it the Pronouncement View (PV, for short). The kind of determination at issue here is constitutive, not epistemic. That is, PV concerns what makes the content of the law what it is, not how we ascertain the content of the law. PV is more of an organizing principle or core idea, than a precise doctrine. I have introduced PV in an unqualified form, but there are a variety of ways in which its claim could be moderated. For example, a qualified version of PV could hold that the contents of legally authoritative pronouncements play a central or predominant role in determining the content of the law. The debate between positivists and anti-positivists is often framed in a way that takes PV for granted. For example, one typical characterization takes the debate to concern whether laws must pass a moral test in order to be valid. The use of laws here betrays an assumption that the starting point is legally authoritative pronouncements. Given this starting point, if morality is relevant it will have to be as a way of screening the content of authoritative pronouncements. I suggest that the issue of whether a PV-based view of law is correct is more fundamental than the issue that divides legal positivists and anti-positivists, at least as the latter issue is commonly understood. For example, one common understanding of the latter issue is that positivists claim, and anti-positivists deny, that the criteria of legal validity - the criteria that determine whether a norm is legally valid - need not include moral facts. As will become clear, however, the picture of law presupposed by this way of framing the debate - according to which candidate norms qualify as legal norms by satisfying criteria of validity - is closely associated with PV and need not be accepted by non-PV-based views of law. PV leads to a characteristic set of concerns and problems, and yields a distinctive way of thinking about how law is supposed to operate. In this paper, I will offer an alternative to PV, which I call the Dependence View (DV, for short). I begin to develop the picture of law that it yields. The discussion throughout is exploratory and tentative. The goal is to sketch the alternative picture and identify problems and possible ways of developing it, not to refute the picture associated with PV.

Kofi Annan on an Immigration Strategy for Europe

Kofi Annan on an Immigration Strategy for Europe

God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy by John E. Hare

BOOK REVIEWS 477 "'hypothesis"), while still holding that it would be ideally preferable for the one true religion to enjoy exclusive legitimacy in the political community wherever possible (the "thesis"). In a society where the desirable "thesis" prevailed, it would be appropriate and even obligatory for civil authority to restrict the religious freedom of those without the true faith; this would entail no injustice, for "error has no rights." This theory is now untenable according to the Vatican II teaching-in a document significantly titled Dignitatis humanae-which affirms religious freedom as a universal right inherent in the basic dignity of all human persons, including the many persons who are religiously in "error." It is not at all evident how Simpson's ideal thesis can accommodate this teaching. The developed Catholic understanding of universal human rights, and the affirmation of the universal right to religious freedom in particular, would not have been possible without the influence ofthat same modern Western liberalism which Simpson disdains. This is an attitude he shares with Macintyre (notwithstanding their other disagreements) and several other virtue theorists of a Christian persuasion. It has become commonplace-and, for this reviewer, wearisome-to hear these thinkers cavil at liberalism for its proneness to laissezfaire individualism and moral relativism. The "recovery of virtue" program is thereby in danger of taking on a reactionary coloring. The judicious retrieval of Aristotelian insights could indeed serve as a healthy corrective for liberalism's excesses; but such a project must also more generously acknowledge liberalism's positive contributions to human civilization, and incorporate these contributions more adequately into a renewed virtue-centered moral and political philosophy. Pontifical University ofSt. Thomas ('Angelicum") Rome, Italy BRUCE WILLIAMS, 0.P. God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy. By JOHN E. HARE. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001. Pp. x + 122. $14.00 (doth). ISBN 0-8028-3903-7. In God's Call John E. Hare is seeking "an account of God's authority in human morality" (vii). The three chapters--one on each ofthe topics mentioned in the subtitle- range widely over a variety of philosophical topics, both systematic and historical. Kshall begin with a careful look at his first chapter, which is the longest and most complex, and then comment more briefly on the second and third chapters. Hare understands moral realism as "the view that moral properties such as moral goodness are real" and moral expressivism as "the view that moral judgments are ... orectic"-that is, that their role is to express some act or 478 BOOK REVIEWS disposition that belongs under the general heading of orexis, which "cover[s] the whole family of emotion, desire, and will" (viii). Hare's approach in the first chapter is to set forth the twentieth-century debate between realists and expressivists as a gradual convergence between the two positions, beginning with a statement of each view in its most unqualified form and proceeding through a series of "concessions" on each side. Each concession brings the two sides closer together, until in the end we are left with an intermediate position that Hare calls "prescriptive realism," which is meant to preserve the insights of both expressivism and realism. The first thing to be noted is that as Hare has defined realism and expressivism, they are not contradictories. They do not even belong to the same domain of questions. Moral realism, as he defines it, is a position in moral ontology; to deny it is to be, not an expressivist, but an anti-realist. It is less dear how we are to understand expressivism. It may be a claim about the meaning or use of moral judgments. In that case, it is a position in moral semantics; to deny it is to be, not a realist, but a descriptivist. On the other hand, it may be a claim about the causal function of moral judgments in guiding action. In that case, it is a position in moral psychology; to deny it is to be, not a realist, but a fool, since only a fool would deny that the making of moral judgments plays a role in guiding action. And there is a...

Social Identity Theory's Self-Esteem Hypothesis: A Review and Some Suggestions for Clarification

Distinctions are made between global and specific, personal and social, and trait and state self-esteem, and these are used to structure a review of over 40 studies concerning social identity theory's hypothesis that (a) intergroup discrimination elevates self-esteem and (b) low self-esteem motivates discrimination. It is observed that researchers have tended to employ measures of global personal trait self-esteem in their investigations of this self-esteem hypothesis, and it is argued that measures of specific social state self-esteem are more consistent with social identity theory's assumptions. Although no convincing evidence is found for the self-esteem hypothesis in its full and unqualified form, it is argued that this is due to a lack of specificity in its formulation and it is suggested that a more qualified and specific version of the hypothesis may be more appropriate.

Taxing the Proceeds of Crime

Illegally acquired gains are taxable, according to the judge‐made law of common law countries. Revenue codes are surprisingly silent on the subject. For a short while, though, things were different in the USA. Congress received its legislative power to tax ‘incomes from whatever source derived’ with the passage of the 16th amendment in 1913. In the same year, a tax was imposed on income derived from ‘any lawful business carried on for gain or profit’. In 1916, without debate, Congress omitted the word ‘lawful’ — substituting an unqualified form of words which still endures. Senator Williams, moving the Senate's acceptance of the 1913 bill, said that its ‘object’ was

The Truth Evaluability of Stoic Phantasiai : Adversus Mathematicos VII 242-46

T]he Truth Evaluability of Stoic Phantasiai : Adversus Mathematicos VII 242-46 CHRISTOPHER SHIELDS ORTHODOX STOICS ENDORSE each of the following propositions: (1) Phantasiai are true or false (i.e., are truth evaluable). (AM VII ~42-46 = SVF II 65 = LS 39 G, 3oF) ' (a) Only ax/6mata are true or false (i.e., are truth evaluable). (AM VIII.74 = SVF II.187 = LS 34B; cf. Stobaeus II.88 = SVF III 171 = LS 33 I, and Sextus, AM VII 151-57 = LS 4aC) (3) Nophantas/a is an ax/~ma, sincephantasiai are impressions in the soul,' and hence material, whereas axi6mata are /ekta, and hence immaterial. (AM VIII.74 = SVF II.187 = LS 34B; cf. Stobaeus II.88 = SVF III 17x = LS 33 I, and Sextus, AM VII x51-57 = LS 41C, and Simplicius, In Ar. Cat. 217.3~-~x8.1 = SVF II. 389 = LS 28L) These propositions cannot be true together; hence, if the Stoics hold each in an unqualified form, they have an incoherent doctrine about the semantic character ofphantasiai. Although there are some challenging ontological questions concerning why and in what sense the Stoics maintain (3),s the issue at hand is best regarded as a semantic problem, at least insofar as the potential inconsistency, as I will argue, is to be resolved by appeal to purely semantic ' Throughout I crosslist passages where possible to H. von Arnim, Stoicorumveterumfragmenta (SVF) (Leipzig, 19o3-5), and A. A. Long and D. Sedley, The HellenisticPhilosophers(LS) (Cambridge , x987). ' A phantas/a occurs in the soul, and is described in various contexts as a tup6sis, pathos, hetero/~s/s,or a//o~s/s (SVF II 53-59). sFor a discussion of the Stoic account of truth, see A. A. Long, "The Stoic Distinction between Truth (r &kfi0~La)and the True (z6 63.~0~g),"Les Stofc.iensel/cur Log/que,ed. J. Brunschwig (Paris: 1978), 297-315. [B~5] 326 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31:3 JULY 1993 considerations: the Stoics do not endorse proposition (l) in an unqualified way, and so do not commit themselves to this inconsistent triad. But if the considerations which show this derive exclusively from features of their semantic theory, then the resolution is logically independent of the ontological investigations (3) invites. This is a point of some significance, since discussions of Stoic ontology tend to overshadow investigations into their semantic theory, with the result that some subtleties in their analysis of the truth evaluability of phantasiai have gone largely unremarked. Here I would like to draw attention to one such subtlety in their account, primarily by investigating Sextus, Adversus MathenmticosVII 24~-46. Although I believe there may be some larger doxographical lessons to be gleaned from this passage, I will not press them here. Rather, I will argue that despite first appearances, AM VII 242-46 provides a coherent and plausible Stoic doctrine on the semantic character of phantasiai, and that this doctrine helps resolve the semantic problem encoded in (1)-(3). One upshot of this difficult passage is that the Stoics accept only a modified form of (1); but if this is correct, a second upshot is that Sextus himself fails to appreciate at least one central feature of the Stoic theory he recapitulates. I begin then with Sextus, AM VII 242-46, and argue that some features of the passage resist interpretation on the assumption that the Stoics maintain any simple form of a correspondence theory of truth for phantasiai (wl). But it is also implausible to regard the Stoics as implicitly adopting any form of coherence theory (w If they adopt neither, then their account of the truth evaluability for phantasiai is obscure. Even so, Sextus does provide a hint of a plausible Stoic position, according to which phantasiai are truth evaluable not in virtue of their intrinsic representational characteristics, but rather insofar as they inherit truth values from the ~ they can be used to express. If this is correct, then our initial inconsistent triad disappears, since the Stoics will rightly refrain from an unqualified commitment to (1), the claim that phantasiai are truth evaluable (w Despite the advantages of their adopting the proposed account of the truth evaluability...

Excited state electric dipole polarizabilities and moments by solvent spectral frequency shifts: Aniline, phenol and naphthalene

Abstract The solvent spectral frequency shift theory of A be in its rigorous or unqualified form has been used to determine the electric dipole polarizabilities and moments of some of the excited electronic states of aniline, phenol and naphthalene. The results of the present analysis show the internal consistency of A be 's solvatochromic method and are largely in reasonable agreement with those determined by means of electro-optical measurements and/or molecular orbital calculations.

The scope of imported identifiers in Modula-2

An extension to Modula-2 is proposed that allows better control of the scope of the unqualified form of imported identifiers. In the current language an imported identifier can be unqualified only for an entire module. Ada allows a more precise control of the scope. A fairly minor syntactic change to Modula-2 would allow a similar convenience.

Sauberes Wasser – technische Möglichkeiten, wirtschaftliche Konsequenzen

AbstractClean water – technical possibilities and economic consequences. Water pollution by industrial effluent is becoming more and more of a political warcry which creates a fear of technology – precisely that technology which is largely responsible for the present quality of life. It has so far gone largely unrecognized by the public that industry and municipal authorities have accomplished a great amount in the area of waste water purification. The versatile techniques developed in recent years are summarized, and biological purification is treated in somewhat greater detail. Annual investment in waste water treatment runs at several thousand million DM, and represent a considerable financial burden on industry and municipal authorities. The thesis that economic considerations should play no role in environmental protection is not acceptable in that unqualified form, and would mean that German industry would no longer be competitive in an international arena. Ecological demands cannot be separated from economic considerations. All participants will have to make some compromises on our way to our desired goal of a flourishing economy in an almost intact environment.

DEPRESSION IN CHILDHOOD: A Survey of Some Pertinent Contributions

It is my intention in this paper to examine some of the literature which bears upon the nature of in childhood, in that period of life between infancy and adolescence which includes neither. No new facts are presented, for this manuscript is based neither on empirical research nor clinical study. The essential lack of definition of is the focus of attention, if indeed such a disorder exists. In the interest of clarity, the term when used in unqualified form, refers to those behavioral manifestations, inferred or reported affects, and inferred dynamics to which the term is typically applied in adult psychopathology.' Hence, depression, as the term is used below, differs from depression only with respect to the age of occurrence. This convention is one of convenience and does not imply that such a childhood disorder has in fact been observed. A survey of the literature yields two indisputable facts. First, childhood and disorders which represent it or emulate it are rarely discussed. In a recent series of articles on in the In-

Probabilistic adverbial qualifications of adjectives

Summary These two inquiries are concerned with the effects of probabilistic adverbs (e.g., possibly, definitely ) upon evaluative ratings of adjectives. In Study I, 14 adjectives were rated, along a Pleasant-Unpleasant scale, both in unqualified form and when qualified by each of 10 probabilistic adverbs. Data were scaled by the method of successive intervals. The scale values were then tested against a linear model originally proposed by Cliff to account for the effects of intensive adverbs upon adjectives. This model states that the scale value of an adverb-adjective phrase equals the product of the psychological scale value of the unqualified adjective and an empirical “multiplying value” for the adverb, plus a general constant, K . It was found that the effects of probabilistic adverbs are highly consistent. The correlation between empirical scale values and theoretical ones derived from the model was .987 ( df = 138). It was shown that while the majority of variance is accounted for by adjectives rather than adverbs, nevertheless the high correlation cannot be considered artifactual and thus be attributed to chance effects of the adverbs. In Study II, 7 adjectives from Study I were rated along the same Pleasant-Unpleasant scale both in unqualified form, and when qualified by: (1) each of 4 discriminable probabilistic adverbs from Study I; (2) each of 4 discriminable intensive adverbs from Cliff's study; (3) each of the 32 possible combinations of 1 probabilistic and 1 intensive adverb. Data were again scaled by the method of successive intervals. This study posed two questions. (1) Can the empirical effects of double adverbial qualification be predicted from the observed effects of the two constituent adverbs when used singly? (2) Does the Adverbial Order variable yield differences in the scale values (e.g., definitely rather scared vis-a-vis rather definitely scared )? Five extensions to the basic model, designed to take account of double qualifications, were derived. The effects of double adverbial qualifications were excellently predicted using empirical data derived only from instances of single qualification. The two highest, linear correlations between empirical and theoretical scale values ( r = .991 and .987) for the 224 instances of double qualification were obtained using, as the multiplying value for double adverbial qualifiers, the geometric mean of the multiplying values for the two individual adverbs. The effect of the Adverbial Order variable was negligible. While the majority of variance was again attributable to the adjectives, the superior predictability of the data could not be accounted for by appeal to chance effects of the adverbs. It was also established that an interaction occurs between the effects of the two classes of adverbs. Psychological implications of the relative equivalence of intensive and probabilistic adverbs, of their interaction, and of the non-significant Adverbial Order variable are discussed.

Willard Phillips, a Predecessor of Paasche in Index Number Formulation

IT IS often supposed that the United States offered no noteworthy writings on the theory of value until the appearance in 1858 of Henry C. Carey's The Principles of Social Science. And the reproduction-cost theory of valuie contained therein is of more interest to the student of the history of economic doctrine as a curiosity than as a helpful contribution to the development of value theory. However, in a relatively neglected work by Willard Phillips,' antedating Carey's Principles by thirty years, is found a contribution to the theory of value as significant as it is different from the views on the subject held by the majority of the writers of the period. Willard Phillips' Manual of was published in Boston in 1828-ten years after Ricardo's Principles, seven years after Malthus' Principles and six years before Senior's article on Political Economy in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. It appeared, then, at a time when the labor theory of value held sway among the political economists of England, and only the demurring voice of Malthus could be heard above the vigorous assertations of Torrens, McCulloch, and James Mill in their efforts to state that theory of value in a more unqualified form than did Ricardo. It is not my intent here to discuss the theory of value put forth by Phillips,2 I intend, rather, to call attention to a proposal which Phillips made for the construction of index numbers. In Chapter II of his Manual of Willard Phillips enters upon the search for a measure of value in all times and places with the words;