God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy by John E. Hare

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS 477 "'hypothesis"), while still holding that it would be ideally preferable for the one true religion to enjoy exclusive legitimacy in the political community wherever possible (the "thesis"). In a society where the desirable "thesis" prevailed, it would be appropriate and even obligatory for civil authority to restrict the religious freedom of those without the true faith; this would entail no injustice, for "error has no rights." This theory is now untenable according to the Vatican II teaching-in a document significantly titled Dignitatis humanae-which affirms religious freedom as a universal right inherent in the basic dignity of all human persons, including the many persons who are religiously in "error." It is not at all evident how Simpson's ideal thesis can accommodate this teaching. The developed Catholic understanding of universal human rights, and the affirmation of the universal right to religious freedom in particular, would not have been possible without the influence ofthat same modern Western liberalism which Simpson disdains. This is an attitude he shares with Macintyre (notwithstanding their other disagreements) and several other virtue theorists of a Christian persuasion. It has become commonplace-and, for this reviewer, wearisome-to hear these thinkers cavil at liberalism for its proneness to laissezfaire individualism and moral relativism. The "recovery of virtue" program is thereby in danger of taking on a reactionary coloring. The judicious retrieval of Aristotelian insights could indeed serve as a healthy corrective for liberalism's excesses; but such a project must also more generously acknowledge liberalism's positive contributions to human civilization, and incorporate these contributions more adequately into a renewed virtue-centered moral and political philosophy. Pontifical University ofSt. Thomas ('Angelicum") Rome, Italy BRUCE WILLIAMS, 0.P. God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy. By JOHN E. HARE. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001. Pp. x + 122. $14.00 (doth). ISBN 0-8028-3903-7. In God's Call John E. Hare is seeking "an account of God's authority in human morality" (vii). The three chapters--one on each ofthe topics mentioned in the subtitle- range widely over a variety of philosophical topics, both systematic and historical. Kshall begin with a careful look at his first chapter, which is the longest and most complex, and then comment more briefly on the second and third chapters. Hare understands moral realism as "the view that moral properties such as moral goodness are real" and moral expressivism as "the view that moral judgments are ... orectic"-that is, that their role is to express some act or 478 BOOK REVIEWS disposition that belongs under the general heading of orexis, which "cover[s] the whole family of emotion, desire, and will" (viii). Hare's approach in the first chapter is to set forth the twentieth-century debate between realists and expressivists as a gradual convergence between the two positions, beginning with a statement of each view in its most unqualified form and proceeding through a series of "concessions" on each side. Each concession brings the two sides closer together, until in the end we are left with an intermediate position that Hare calls "prescriptive realism," which is meant to preserve the insights of both expressivism and realism. The first thing to be noted is that as Hare has defined realism and expressivism, they are not contradictories. They do not even belong to the same domain of questions. Moral realism, as he defines it, is a position in moral ontology; to deny it is to be, not an expressivist, but an anti-realist. It is less dear how we are to understand expressivism. It may be a claim about the meaning or use of moral judgments. In that case, it is a position in moral semantics; to deny it is to be, not a realist, but a descriptivist. On the other hand, it may be a claim about the causal function of moral judgments in guiding action. In that case, it is a position in moral psychology; to deny it is to be, not a realist, but a fool, since only a fool would deny that the making of moral judgments plays a role in guiding action. And there is a...