Unkind Behavior Research Articles

Penanaman nilai sosial pada pembelajaran muatan IPS kelas V sekolah dasar

<em>The descriptive qualitative research conducted aims to describe the cultivation of social values in social studies learning grade V elementary school. The subjects of this study were students and teachers of the VA class at SD Negeri Mangkubumen Kidul. Research data obtained from interviews, observations and questionnaires. Validity in this study used triangulation techniques and the analysis of Miles-Huberman model. The outcomes of this research show that teachers instill social values in several ways; 1) Instillation of social values through learning methods is lecture methods, giving concrete questions, questions and answers, reward-punishment, assignment methods;2) Planting social values through example and habituation, exemplary through arriving on time, welcoming students a friendly way, habituation tenable with routine activities such as praying, cleaning the table and spontaneous activities such as asking students for help;3) Verbal instillation of social values through motivation, reprimand and advice. motivation is given in by praise, reprimand and advice is given when students show unkind behavior such as arriving late, not collecting assignments, making rowdy in class. In this way, teachers implicitly instill social values in students, so that students can demonstrate behaviors that reflect social values and social values embedded in students that are integrated through learning activities.</em>

How to Improve Farmers’ Green Production Level in a Targeted Manner?

Improving farmers’ green production behavior can guarantee food safety at the source. In recent years, a rising number of studies have focused on food safety management and have provided general regulation recommendations. Unlike many studies, this study aimed to find targeted policy recommendations according to different spatial aggregations of non-green production behavior. In the current study, more than 800 tea farmers located in the Qinba and Huangshan Mountain regions of China were investigated. An order logit model was employed to evaluate the impact of government regulation and community governance on ignorant or unkind non-green tea production behavior. Furthermore, a multi-valued treatment effect model was also recruited to demonstrate the average treatment effect of government regulation and community governance. The results show that the difference in farmers’ ignorant or unkind non-green production behavior between regions is substantial but is similar in the same region. Farmers’ non-green production behavior is negatively impacted by community governance but not significantly affected by government regulation. Government regulation can effectively inhibit the occurrence of farmers’ unkind behavior, while community governance can effectively cause farmers’ unkind behavior. Thus, some measures to reduce local farmers’ non-green production behavior should be put forward according to the differences in the spatial distribution of non-green production behavior and the differences in the effect of government regulation and community governance.

Different Yet Similar: Multi-Generational Professionals and Their Sentimentality Towards Reciprocity

As the generational demographics of the American workforce have changed over time, it is crucial to identify if there are generational differences regarding the sentiment of reciprocity (Kolm, 1994), specifically among professionals. This quantitative study (n=122) found that generational identity does not influence positive (rewarding) reciprocity, meaning that regardless of age, professionals willfully reciprocate in a mutually beneficial manner, affirming that reciprocity is a personal norm (Gouldner, 1960). Alternatively, this study found that negative (punishing) reciprocity is significantly correlated & influenced by generational identity. Baby Boomers and Millennials show the highest contrast in negative reciprocity, with Millennials more willing to engage in punishing unkind behavior than their predecessors.

Fly on the Wall by Remy Lai

Reviewed by: Fly on the Wall by Remy Lai Kate Quealy-Gainer, Assistant Editor Lai, Remy Fly on the Wall; written and illus. by Remy Lai. Holt, 2020 [336p] Trade ed. ISBN 9781250314116 $16.99 E-book ed. ISBN 9781250785787 $9.99 Reviewed from galleys R Gr. 4-6 Tired of being treated like a baby by his mother and sister, twelve-year-old Henry Khoo decides to fly alone from Australia to see his dad in Singapore. The plan initially goes surprisingly well (he purchases a ticket with his mom's credit card), and soon he's up in the air. Unfortunately, he can barely focus on his journey because on the same flight is Tim Aditya, a kid who could reveal that Henry is the school-infamous gossip vlogger Fly on the Wall and who seems to be threatening to do just that. There's contrivance here, but the rush to get to the plane and then the slowness of the flight provides a nice trajectory for Henry's emotional journey. Readers initially get an onslaught of his anxieties, frustrations, and worries, both about actually completing this mission and about his mom and sister's perception of him as the family's baby, but soon it becomes clear that he's making assumptions about other people' assumptions and using that as an excuse for unkind behavior (including to poor Tim Aditya). Lai presents Henry's flaws with sympathy and grace, never condemning him and resisting preachiness while allowing readers to come to their own conclusions about what responsibility and independence look like. The cartoony art is crucial to the storytelling, as are the more formal, digital looking illustrations from the vlog. Fans of Lai's Pie in the Sky (BCCB 5/19) will appreciate this thoughtful, funny tale of a kid's unexpected journey to emotional growth. Copyright © 2020 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

Deception and reciprocity

We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and subsequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dictator game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the fairness of dictator-game outcomes affects subsequent lying decisions where lying hurts one’s counterpart. In doing so, we examine whether the moral cost of lying varies when retaliating against unkind actions is financially beneficial for the self (selfish lies), as opposed to being costly (spiteful lies). We find evidence that individuals engage in deception to reciprocate unkind behavior: The smaller the payoff received in the first stage, the higher the lying rate. Intention-based reciprocity largely drives behavior, as individuals use deception to punish unkind behavior and truth-telling to reward kind behavior. For selfish lies, individuals have a moral cost of lying. However, for spiteful lies, we find no evidence for such costs. Taken together, our data show a moral cost of lying that is not fixed but instead context-dependent.

Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence

This paper reports the results of an experiment on incentive contracts for teams. The agents, whose efforts are complementary, are rewarded according to a sharing rule chosen by the principal. Depending on the sharing rule, the agents confront endogenous prisoner's dilemma or stag-hunt environments. Our main findings are as follows. First, we demonstrate that ongoing interaction among team members positively affects the principal's payoff. Greater team cooperation is successfully induced with less generous sharing rules in infinitely repeated environments. Second, we provide evidence of the positive effects of communication on team cooperation in the absence of ongoing team interaction. Fostering communication among team members does not significantly affect the principal's payoff, suggesting that agents’ communication is an imperfect substitute for ongoing team interaction. Third, we show that offering low sharing rules can backfire. The agents are willing to engage in costly punishment (shirking) as retaliation for low offers from the principal. Our findings suggest that offering low sharing rules is perceived by the agents as unkind behavior and hence, triggers negative reciprocity.

Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence

This paper reports the results of an experiment on incentive contracts for teams. The agents, whose efforts are complementary, are rewarded according to a sharing rule chosen by the principal. Depending on the sharing rule, the agents confront endogenous prisoner's dilemma or stag-hunt environments. Our main findings are as follows. First, we demonstrate that ongoing interaction among team members positively affects the principal's payoff. Greater team cooperation is successfully induced with less generous sharing rules in infinitely-repeated environments. Second, we provide evidence of the positive effects of communication on team cooperation in the absence of ongoing team interaction. Fostering communication among team members does not significantly affect the principal's payoff, suggesting that agents' communication is an imperfect substitute for ongoing team interaction. Third, we show that offering low sharing rules can backfire. The agents are willing to engage in costly punishment (shirking) as retaliation for low offers from the principal. Our findings suggest that offering low sharing rules is perceived by the agents as unkind behavior and hence, triggers negative reciprocity.

Fairy-Tale Economics: Scarcity, Risk, Choice

Economists tell stories about how people behave. setup is always the same: an actor is confronted with a choice and must make a decision. Should he (it's usually a he) take a quick, assured return or wait for a less certain but larger payofff? Should he place his trust in another actor and collaborate for a larger joint profit, or act alone to make sure he is not cheated, so that at any rate he comes away with something? When he's played the same game for a long time, will he keep paying attention as the next decision comes?The game experiments used by economists to predict human behavior generate a certain range of stories as diffferent players try out diffferent strategies in successive iterations of the game. stories also change insofar as economists with diffferent commitments observe the outcomes. In one common story, it pays to seek short-term gain in a context of extreme uncertainty; in alternative versions, staying the course for the long term leads to far greater profit. In a second much-told story, the maximization of self-interest can only be pursued alone. But a diffferent telling discovers that cooperation brings not only greater stability but also bigger long-term benefit for all parties. limited matrix of elements becomes an arena in which fundamental human tendencies play themselves out: rationality, habit, and impulse; self-interest, cooperation, and the sense of fairness; conformity and self-assertion.2 In any encounter of strategies there are winners and losers, better and worse outcomes among the players.How much is changed when we change the idiom? Here is an example of what the comparative tradition of folklore studies calls the Marchen, what we know in English as the fairy tale. A hero saves a snake princess from a fire and is offfered any reward by her father, the King of Snakes: maybe he'd like a nice bag of gold? hero says no, he wants to know the language of animals. snake tries to dissuade him: knowledge is dangerous and can get you into trouble, he says. But the hero is both obstinate and attentive. Later he is walking down the road past a gibbet where two thieves have been hanged; he overhears the crows on the gibbet discussing where the loot has been hidden. cache proves much larger than the bag of gold he was originally offfered (Agonito 54-55). This story was told in the early 1960s by Italian immigrants in Syracuse, New York; we may note that immigrant families in that era had to decide whether to keep their children in school or take them out early to go into assured factory jobs.3Or consider the familiar contrast of kind and unkind behavior in fairy tales. story of the good girl who is rewarded for helping other creatures in need with riches falling from her hair and mouth, while the selfish stepsister receives toads and vipers (ATU 480),4 is perhaps too schematic to be altogether compelling to the listener. But other tales contrast more realistically the diffference of outcomes between the self-absorbed, self-interested actor and the one who listens, shares food, and offfers labor along the road to his or her ordeal, receiving timely instruction and assistance in return. This is an object lesson in social reciprocity among the vulnerable, and also in paying attention to your surroundings. A calculus is usually present, to be sure; many tales from oral tradition point out the riskiness of unthinking adherence to the highest moral standard. Sometimes when you rescue a snake it turns and kills you (ATU 155). Pure kindness toward an actor too weak to reciprocate is a luxury when the situation is desperate, while continued generosity toward someone who proves to play selfishly would be sheer folly (Mathias and Raspa, The Gourd of Blood). Being smart can be more important than being good, and being lucky often trumps either.The traditional fairy tale also explores decision making over the long term. Godfather Death (ATU 332) is a story about success and hubris. …

Using the Carrot and the Stick? Theoretical and Experimental Insights into Positive vs. Negative Reciprocity

In this paper we analyze negative reciprocity theoretically as well as experimentally. Although the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is often cited in the literature to justify why people punish unkind behavior, we show that this model is not able to predict punishments in ultimatum games. We therefore propose several model modifications: Amongst others, we suggest “gradual reciprocation”, meaning that subjects want to reciprocate the level of the others’ kindness. Moreover, we assume that perceived (un)kindness of the proposer towards the responder depends on the belief of the former regarding the punishing behavior of other responders. Accordingly, we measure this belief and find that punishments are significantly overestimated, implying fairer offers. While our model modifications lead to a correct prediction of behavior in the (convex) ultimatum game, a within-subject comparison with behavior in a trust game reveals that decisions in the second-mover roles in either game are not correlated. Robustly, we find no correlation, although our novel, graphical way of eliciting decisions from a continuous strategy space allows subjects to precisely express their preferences. Despite this result, we find a small, but significantly positive correlation between reciprocity parameters in both roles. This is possible because behavior is not only determined by a subject’s reciprocal inclination, but by her individual beliefs as well.

EXPLAINING GIFT-EXCHANGE-THE LIMITS OF GOOD INTENTIONS

This paper explores the limitations of intention-based social preferences as an explanation of gift-exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self-interested and one reciprocal player, gift-giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift-exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self-interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift-exchange in employment relations.

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity concerns among firms can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers.

Towards an understanding of the relative strengths of positive and negative reciprocity

AbstractScholars in economics and psychology have created a large literature studying reward, punishment and reciprocity. Labor markets constitute a popular application of this body of work, with particular emphasis on how reciprocity helps regulate workplace relationships where managers are unable to perfectly monitor workers.We study how idiosyncratic features of the labor market (compared to most scenarios in which reciprocity applies) affect the nature of worker reciprocity. In particular, we show how having an excess supply of workers (simulating unemployment) and managers who can observe the reciprocal behavior of workers and hire/fire them on that basis (simulating the reputational concerns inherent in labor market transactions) profoundly alters worker reciprocity. In the absence of reputational concerns, workers tend to reward kind behavior and punish unkind behavior by managers in approximately equal measure. In the presence of reputational concerns, workers exhibit a marked increase (decrease) in the propensity to reward kind (punish unkind) behavior by managers. We demonstrate how this is a consequence of workers and managers responding to changes in the strategic incentives to reward and punish.

Collusion and Reciprocity in Infinitely Repeated Games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

Is it rational to internalize the personal norm that one should reciprocate?

This paper shows in a simple game-theoretic model that it can be rational for non-altruistic individuals to adopt a personal value-based norm to reciprocate. Moreover, it is argued that such a behavioral commitment is feasible and thus self-binding. Reciprocal behavior has become a stylized fact in experimental labor markets. Our analysis suggests that in laboratory experiments “workers” may provide high effort either because they adopted the norm to behave reciprocally fair or because they fear to “work” with an “employer” who adopted the norm to punish unkind behavior.

Petient's Perceptions of Health Professionals' Unkind Behavior

Petient's Perceptions of Health Professionals' Unkind Behavior