Abstract
We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and subsequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dictator game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the fairness of dictator-game outcomes affects subsequent lying decisions where lying hurts one’s counterpart. In doing so, we examine whether the moral cost of lying varies when retaliating against unkind actions is financially beneficial for the self (selfish lies), as opposed to being costly (spiteful lies). We find evidence that individuals engage in deception to reciprocate unkind behavior: The smaller the payoff received in the first stage, the higher the lying rate. Intention-based reciprocity largely drives behavior, as individuals use deception to punish unkind behavior and truth-telling to reward kind behavior. For selfish lies, individuals have a moral cost of lying. However, for spiteful lies, we find no evidence for such costs. Taken together, our data show a moral cost of lying that is not fixed but instead context-dependent.
Highlights
Work environment substantially affects employee satisfaction and behavior
We investigate whether deception serves as a reciprocity device and the moral cost it entails
We further explore whether differences in deception rates in both circumstances are triggered by initial payoff allocations or unkind intentions
Summary
Work environment substantially affects employee satisfaction and behavior. Numerous examples demonstrate that low worker satisfaction decreases productivity. A fast-growing experimental literature has documented that deception entails positive moral costs (Bucciol and Piovesan 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Gneezy 2005; Mazar et al 2008).2 This literature predicts that, because lying is morally costly, less reciprocal behavior could occur when reciprocating requires individuals to lie than when it does not, regardless of the nature of a previous encounter. The proportion of individuals who lie is always lower than the proportion of individuals who directly choose the selfish payoff allocation, and the conditional probability of lying decreases as a function of the counterpart’s kindness This finding is in line with the predictions of a positive moral cost of lying that increases with increasing kindness, refuting the hypothesis of Hurkens and Kartik (2009). Our results show that there is an interaction between reciprocity concerns, lying costs, and incentives from lying, and highlight the need to combine insights from both the reciprocity and the lying literature in order to fully understand the drivers of deception
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