Unity Of Virtues Research Articles

Wisdom, Political Expertise and the Unity of Virtues in Aristotle

Abstract ‘Unity of virtues’ (UV) in Aristotle is the claim that the ethical virtues are mutually entailing. But commentators typically focus on the fact that wisdom implies all the ethical virtues, without explaining how the ethical virtues themselves are mutually entailing. I argue that the so-called ‘Grand End’ view, understood as applying to both wisdom (φρόνησις) and political expertise (πολιτική), allows us to give an account of UV at the level of the ethical virtues. By discussing the ethical virtues individually, I show how all the ethical virtues can be seen as different aspects of the philosopher-statesman’s multifaceted character.

The Unity of Virtue in Contemporary Virtue Ethics

The Unity of Virtue in Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Análise de Escalas e Medidas de Virtudes Morais: Uma Revisão Sistemática

ABSTRACT Objective: to investigate how scales for the concept of moral virtues are constructed and measured, in studies associated with business ethics and the tradition of virtue ethics. Methods: a systematic literature review was conducted to select empirical articles on moral virtues that design or apply scales. Based on search, selection, and analysis criteria, five databases were consulted, and 37 papers were selected, with subsequent analysis of the scales development and measurement procedure (items, sample, factor analysis) and emerging factors. Results: the study gathers scales of multiple moral virtues (19) and of specific virtues (18), showing limitations in the generation of items, and in the item-sample proportion in some scales, as well as theoretical contributions in leadership and relationship strengthening, making a theoretical and methodological discussion in the light of the assumptions of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Conclusions: the article intends to contribute to a better understanding of moral virtues in management, by discussing the scales from the unity of virtues and the phronesis-moral virtues connection, with implications for human behavior and business ethics. Procedures are recommended for future qualitative and quantitative studies in new research contexts.

The Unity of Virtue and Goodness

The Unity of Virtue and Goodness

The Relative Role of the Intellectual and Moral Virtues in Sustainable Management Decisions: The Case of Practical Wisdom and Justice

We analyze the status of virtues in management by going in some depth into the two main virtues, justice and practical wisdom. We next study how ethics requires that all virtues should be present under the ideal concept of a ‘unity of virtues’ for a completely wise person and discuss the practical limitations of this concept. Then, we draw a framework for decision making depending on whether the decision maker possesses justice and practical wisdom or lacks one of them and then discuss which one is better to have. We conclude that justice is more important, as it is about setting objectives and prioritizing, whereas practical wisdom is about attaining these objectives, once listed, in a rationally wise and contextual way. Hence, we conclude that objectives (justice) must come first, because this makes it more likely that, in the end, practical wisdom is developed, and thus we end up having the two virtues.

Morality and Interpretation: the Principle of Phronetic Charity

The recent discussions on the unity of virtue (or lack thereof) suffer from a lack of reference to the processes through which we interpret each other as moral agents. In the present paper it is argued that much light can be thrown on that crucial issue by appealing to a version of Donald Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which we call “Principle of Phronetic Charity”. The idea is that in order to treat somebody as a moral agent, one has first to attribute to them, at least pro tempore, a significant degree of practical wisdom (intended as ethical expertise) and, then, to assess and rationally adjust such attribution of competence via actual engagement with them – a process that may lead to different responses on the part of the interpreter (i.e., the confirmation, upgrading, or withdrawing of the preliminary interpretation). After expounding and defending the Principle of Phronetic Charity and the interpretive practices connected with it, we discuss the repercussions of our account on the issue of the epistemic access to virtue. We will show, in particular, that some important components of both disunitarianism and unitarianism have to be retained: in accordance with the former, we stress the role of concrete experience over pure speculation and, up to a point, the idea that virtues tend to form variegated ensembles; in accordance with the latter, we accept the claim that virtues are not attributed to moral agents in isolation. Ultimately, however, the account developed here rejects both the atomism of the disunitarian view and the holism of the “Unity of the Virtues”, since it is in fact a form of molecularism, according to which virtues come neither individually nor as a whole, but rather as clusters.

The Relative Role of the Intellectual and Moral Virtues in Sustainable Management Decisions: The Case of Practical Wisdom and Justice

We analyze the status of virtues in management by going in some depth into the two main virtues, justice and practical wisdom. We next study how ethics requires that all virtues should be present under the ideal concept of a ‘unity of virtues’ for a completely wise person and discuss the practical limitations of this concept. Then, we draw a framework for decision making depending on whether the decision maker possesses both justice and practical wisdom or only one of these, and then discuss which one is better to have. We conclude that justice is more important, as it is about setting objectives and prioritizing, whereas practical wisdom is about attaining these objectives, once listed, in a rationally wise and contextual way. Hence, we conclude that objectives (justice) must come first, because this makes it more likely for practical wisdom to be developed in the end, thus leading to having both virtues.

Kamtekar, Rachana. Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 240. $55.00 (cloth).

Kamtekar, Rachana. <i>Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for the Good</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 240. $55.00 (cloth).

How many ἀρεταί in Plato's Protagoras?

A large debate around Plato’s Protagoras concerns the so-called ‘unity of virtue’, namely Socrates’ ultimate position on the relation between ἀρετή and the five concepts (justice, piety, prudence, wisdom, and courage) connected with it. In this article, I will draw on the language and ideas of the dialogue to question the semantic presupposition which all the scholars involved in the debate, whatever their views, have been sharing, namely that the five concepts can be considered as ἀρεταί, and not just as ‘good qualities’ (τὰ καλά), or ‘parts’ (μόρια), or ‘names’ (ὀνόματα) of ἀρετή, as Plato terms them.

Phronesis as Ethical Expertise: Naturalism of Second Nature and the Unity of Virtue

Phronesis as Ethical Expertise: Naturalism of Second Nature and the Unity of Virtue

The Unity of Virtue, Ambiguity, and Socrates’ Higher Purpose

The Unity of Virtue, Ambiguity, and Socrates’ Higher Purpose

Leadership, Ethics, Prudence and Justice: Prudence Alone is Not Enough for Decision-Makers

It is not unusual for management researchers to take the stand that value judgements and, thus, virtues, are an unrealistic approach to management, because what is considered to be realistic is achieving specific results, which may be easier to obtain in the short-run if managers follow some rules not based on morality but on "fact" (i.e., empirical relationships between quantitative results and the actions taken).We argue that, on the contrary, virtues are crucial for competent decision-making, mainly if we take a dynamic, long-run view of the organization. We then analyze virtues, knowledge, and the relationship between them, to show the interrelationships between prudence, practical wisdom and justice. We argue that the unity of virtues, while it is a desirable end, may have to be acquired through practice, and that, for that purpose, justice has to be the main priority. Justice will then help to develop prudence and, with the other virtues incorporated as well, provide a better future for the organization in all its aspects.

Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue

AbstractFor Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into the ousia and a psychological investigation into the dunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of the ousia and a psychological accounts of the dunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually.

Euclides de Mégara, filósofo socrático

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar la influencia socrática sobre la filosofía de Euclides de Mégara, en contra de la interpretación que señala la influencia de los eleáticos sobre su teoría. Para ello indicaré que la doctrina de Euclides exhibe una fuerte impronta socrática, al menos en lo que concierne a: su labor como escritor de diálogos socráticos, el uso de la dialéctica erística, el desarrollo de algunos postulados éticos sobre la conducta frente a la muerte, el auto-dominio y la unidad de la virtud, y la presentación de una metafísica que coloca al bien en un lugar privilegiado. Aunque esta metafísica excede el socratismo, no puede ser identificada con los postulados de la filosofía eleática.

Unity of Virtues according to Socrates and Protagoras

Journal of Anthropology and Archaeology is a peer-reviewed international journal, which publishes original papers promoting theoretical, methodological and empirical developments in the discipline of socio-cultural anthropology.

„Kui kõik pirrud kahel otsal”: eepilise poliitika tagasitulek

After a brief decline of the heroic in the second half of the 20th century, the hero is back in Western culture and politics. If Lyotard claimed in 1979 that the time of “great heroes, great dangers, and great goals” is over, then in the new century they all seem to be back with a vengeance. This essay will explore some of the reasons, premises and implications of this heroic renaissance.Western concepts of the hero and heroic hark back to ancient Greece, where heroes were not only characters in epics and myths but also cult figures who were worshipped and venerated. The ancient Greek view of human nature was grounded in the concept of arete¯ that is usually translated as “virtue”, but in its original context it refers to a broader notion of excellence, according to the nature of a thing or being under discussion. It was by their superlative, god-like virtue that Greek heroes were distinguished from other mortals, as they exemplified the human limits of divine excellence. Although the exact and particular meanings of what constitutes a virtue constantly changed throughout antiquity, the basic premise of “the unity of virtue”, as well as how it constituted human nature, carried on into the Middle Ages and beyond. It was only with the emergence of modern ethics that this explicit link started to fade.However, the implicit relationship between virtues and heroism has survived to the present day. Our contemporary heroes are likewise embodiments of our own modern virtues. They articulate the framework that Charles Taylor has referred to as our “moral topography,” within which it is possible to conceive what it means to be human. Our heroes represent that which we value in ourselves as well as in others; they give us the means of self-understanding and self-creation while conflating the seemingly distinct categories of ethics and aesthetics.The beginning of the new century has been marked by an uneasy constellation of steadily increasing existential anxieties (along social, environmental, cultural and economic lines), and a corresponding widespread disenchantment with the existing social structures’ ability to respond to the challenges they face. Consequently, politics has once again acquired a distinctive epic dimension in the Western world. Turning to heroes (be they political leaders or cultural icons) lets us envision our current predicaments as cosmic struggles between good and evil. It enables us to see setbacks not as our collective failures but, instead, as challenges, as tests of spirit and determination in which we are ultimately bound to prevail.

The Synthetic Unity of Virtue and Epistemic Goods in Maximus the Confessor

In this essay, I show how the virtues, for Maximus the Confessor, contribute to the formation of a positive orientation toward (a deep and abiding desire for) the relevant epistemic goods (e.g., contemplation of God in and through nature, illumination of divine truths, wisdom, and experiential knowledge of God). The first section offers a brief overview of how three character-based virtue epistemologies envision the role of the intellectual virtues in the cognitive life. The second section draws attention to Maximus’s understanding of the relationship between the virtues and the relevant epistemic goods. The third section argues that a relationship of this sort entails a seamless connection (though without confusion) between the practical and contemplative aspects of deiform existence. The fourth section clarifies how select virtues foster within the self a praiseworthy desire for the relevant epistemic goods.

An Ethical Theory in the Old Academy

Abstract: By examining the passage on virtues in the Epinomis, possibly by Philip of Opus, I aim to show that the ethical theory expounded there differs both from the account of the Laws and from the notions we find in the fragmentary evidence concerning the Old Academy. Unlike the account in the Laws the unity of virtue is provided, not by justice, but by piety interpreted as a virtue involving mathematics, especially astronomy. The peculiar importance of mathematics in virtue is not attested in any of the other authors of the Old Academy.

Relations et relatifs : les stoïciens contre Aristote

Aristotle’s chap. 7 of the Categories include two successive definitions of relatives - according to the first, all that is said of something else is a relative, and, according to the second, a relative is something whose entire being consists in “a certain relation to something else”. The Stoics made use of these two definitions not only in the commentaries of Aristotle’s Categories by Athenodorus and Cornutus (Ist century BC / Ist century AD), but also in debates inside the school on the unity of virtues and on causality. The Stoics drastically limited their relatives to the ones whose all being consists in a relation, which they call πρός τί πως ἔχοντα (“relatively disposed towards something”), and rejected the possibility that such relatives may be qualities or substances, while Aristotle left these two possibilities opened. The Stoics also seem to admit that some differentiated qualities may be relative to external objects, for instance sweet and bitter, but such relatives do no not belong to the same category. Taking into account Aristotle’s apories and choosing between alternatives left undecided by Arisotle, the Stoics proposed a powerful alternative to the aristotelian doctrine of relatives.

Plato's Socrates: One Among Many, but Preeminent

Catherine H. Zuckert has written a monumental work on Plato's corpus that offers a new framework for understanding his dialogues. Not only does she trace Plato's presentation of Socrates' development over time, but she also shows how Plato uses other philosophic interlocutors to contribute to his philosophic project. Central themes include Socrates' discovery of erôs, the unity of virtue, and the place of teaching in philosophy, and the relation between intelligible ideas and sensible experience.