Abstract
A large debate around Plato’s Protagoras concerns the so-called ‘unity of virtue’, namely Socrates’ ultimate position on the relation between ἀρετή and the five concepts (justice, piety, prudence, wisdom, and courage) connected with it. In this article, I will draw on the language and ideas of the dialogue to question the semantic presupposition which all the scholars involved in the debate, whatever their views, have been sharing, namely that the five concepts can be considered as ἀρεταί, and not just as ‘good qualities’ (τὰ καλά), or ‘parts’ (μόρια), or ‘names’ (ὀνόματα) of ἀρετή, as Plato terms them.
Highlights
In this article, I will argue against scholars’ habit of referring to the five good qualities associated with ἀρετή in Plato’s Protagoras as ‘virtues’, by means of a textual and philosophical analysis
I will draw on the language and ideas of the dialogue to question the semantic presupposition which all the scholars involved in the debate, whatever their views, have been sharing, namely that the five concepts can be considered as ἀρεταί, and not just as ‘good qualities’, or ‘parts’, or ‘names’ of ἀρετή, as Plato terms them
Discussion of one of these problems will lead me to tackle the translation of ἀρετή, an interpretive matter preliminary to the major one of the following section, where I will show why the five good qualities should not be regarded as excellences
Summary
I will argue against scholars’ habit of referring to the five good qualities associated with ἀρετή in Plato’s Protagoras as ‘virtues’ (viz. ‘excellences’), by means of a textual and philosophical analysis. I will summarize the dialogue and fetch out the theoretical framework and the conceptual tools with which Plato provides us (section 1). In the light of that I will deal with the scholarly debate on Socrates’ position on the unity of excellence and the problems connected with it (section 2). Discussion of one of these problems will lead me to tackle the translation of ἀρετή (section 3), an interpretive matter preliminary to the major one of the following section, where I will show why the five good qualities should not be regarded as excellences (section 4). Before drawing my conclusions, I will illustrate what the relation between excellence and the five good qualities would be like, if, per absurdum, Plato had thought of the latter as excellences (section 5)
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