Unity Of Cognition Research Articles

Emotion as patheception

Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.

Emotions in Imaginative Situations: The Valued Place of Fairytales for Supporting Emotion Regulation

Fairytales represent a long-standing cultural practice used by early childhood teachers for supporting children's social and emotional development. Yet contemporary practices see governments demanding a more academic curriculum. In drawing upon cultural-historical research, we theorise how fairytales help children to collectively develop emotion regulation, where the unity of emotions and cognition are foregrounded during the telling, retelling, and role-playing of fairytales, allowing for a dynamic interplay between interpsychological and intrapsychological functioning. We suggest that fairytales have a valuable place within early childhood programs because they introduce emotionally charged imaginative situations which we believe support children's emotion regulation in group care situations.

Die Pluralität der Intellekte und die Einheit der Erkenntnis: Kritiken und Rezeptionen des Monopsychismus des Averroes in der sog. Scholastik

From an epistemological point of view, monopsychism implies that the unity or universality of cognition can be secured only through the unity of the subject. Scholastics in the 13–14th centuries who did not accept it for various reasons therefore had to show that the multiplicity of subjects does not impair the unity of cognition. But the attempts to harmonize the unity of cognition with the plurality of subjects were not successful. While some of them only transformed the issue into another with some variations, others accepted monopsychism to some extent.

The Principle of Unity of Cognition and Behavior: Implications of Activity Theory for the Study of Human Work

Activity theory has an extensive history in the Soviet Union dating back to the works of Vygotsky and his followers. Activity (or "deyatel'nost" in Russian) refers to a coherent system of internal mental processes and external behaviors and motivations that are combined and organized by the mechanisms of self-regulation to achieve a conscious goal. Activity theory is emerging as a new paradigm for psychology and an interdisciplinary approach to human sciences in Europe. Furthermore, scientists are writing about the internationalization of this approach. For example, activity theory exerted a great influence on the development of ACTION THEORY in Germany. In the United States, activity theory is associated with the sociocultural approach initiated by Vygotsky. However much data in this area remains unknown to the English-speaking world. This article introduces and discusses an important principle of Activity theory, that is, "the principle of unity of cognition and behavior." Because this principle is important to the study of work behavior, we believe that its introduction to the English-speaking scientific community will generate new ideas in the area of human performance.

The ‘Unity of Cognition’ and the Explanation of Mathematical Knowledge

The ‘Unity of Cognition’ and the Explanation of Mathematical Knowledge

Sociocultural critique of Piaget and Vygotsky

Piaget has su!ered a great deal of criticism that his theory of psychological development neglects the social nature of human development. Much of this criticism has come from researchers following a Vygotskian approach and comparing Piaget's approach unfavorably with that of Vygotsky. Smith (1995) refers us to Piaget's collected articles on sociology (Piaget, 1995) to argue convincingly that it is oversimplication and misunderstanding to assume Piaget's neglect of the social nature of human development. We want to o!er our own critique of both Piaget and Vygotsky from a new, sociocultural perspective, recently emerging in several disciplines of social sciences (Heath, 1983; Latour, 1987; Lave & Wenger, 1991; McDermott, 1993; Rogo!, 1990). We do not consider ourselves followers of Vygotsky's theory but of a sociocultural approach, despite the fact that the sociocultural approach is itself heavily built on and in#uenced by Vygotsky's work. For a while, a sociocultural approach was an invisible by-product of e!orts by mainly US psychologists like Cole (1978), Wertsch (1985), Scribner (1984), Rogo! and Wertsch (1984) and others to reconstruct and continue Vygotsky's paradigm. Just as the medieval endeavor to bring a renaissance of ancient Greek art and culture gave birth to a new art and a new culture, we argue that the renaissance of Vygotsky has gradually produced a new theoretical approach* namely the sociocultural. Initial critiques of Piaget from a Vygotskyian perspective came when the sociocultural approach was into the earlier phases of development, when `psychologistsa2 were `increasingly interested in the e!ects of the social context of individuals' cognitive developmenta (Tudge & Rogo!, 1989, p. 17). In contrast, from a current sociocultural perspective, cognitive development is embedded in social contexts and their separation is considered impossible and, thus, cannot have `e!ectsa. Like Smith, we claim that there is an overlooked similarity between Piaget and Vygotsky. However, from a recent sociocultural perspective, we associate these similarities with a shared failure to recognize the unity of cognition and social context. Our paper is primarily

Feature Independence and the Recovery of Feature Conjunctions

Abstract Recent neurophysiological and behavioral evidence suggests that in both perception and memory the differing attributes of multidimensional stimuli are retained independently of one another in the visual system. The phenomenal unity of visual cognition seems to be dependent on the recovery of feature conjunctions. A major objective for research in this area is to identify the mechanism(s) responsible for re-establishing appropriate feature combinations. Recent findings indicate that spatial location may play a mediative role in the feature integration associated with perceptual processing; however, whether location continues to provide the basis for the recovery of feature conjunctions from memory is unknown. This article provides an overview and critique of current research and offers a theoretical model of memorial feature processing.

Kants Erfahrungsbegriff: Quellengeschichtliche und Bedeutungsanalytische Untersuchungen (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 99 Treatise IV, Introduction.) He also fails to come to terms (here explicitly appealing to Frankena) with the many ways Hutcheson has of saying "The Apprehension of morally good Qualities, is the necessary Cause of Approbation, by our moral Sense..." (Treatise III, see. IV), nor does he seem to heed the fact that Hutcheson gives to the sense in general a basic cognitive role: "All our ideas, or the materials of our reasoning or judging are received by some immediate powers of perception internal or external, which we may call senses . . . reasoning or intellect seems to raise no new species of ideas" (Treatise IV, see. I). In conclusion, I shall merely mention two other important matters. I cannot agree with the claim (p. 77) that Hutcheson, when he speaks of the "reality of virtue," intends this to mean only that this is "an appropriate way to indicate the speaker's view of the moral significance of an action," i.e., that the speaker is merely "experiencing a unique kind of pleasure . . . and expressing this feeling by his verbal utterance," and thereby intending only "to evoke similar approval in others." This is to say that, for Hutcheson, virtue is at best subjective, while if there was anything he sought, and for which there is considerable textual evidence, it was a defense or proof of the objective reality of virtue. Also mistaken, I believe, is the suggestion that, for Hutcheson, "Exciting reasons" appeal only to self-interest, presupposing "motives stemming from selfish affections" (p. 19). Hutcheson is somewhat ambiguous about this in the Illustrations, leaving us to suppose (see. I) that the moral sense is not an instinct, and hence does not excite. But he is clear in the Inquiry, where he tells us (sec. VII) that the moral sense excites us to public good, and concludes with a not untypical comparison of the moral and external senses: Notwithstanding the mighty Reason we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the external Senses, or to direct our Actions for the Good of the Whole, without this moral Sense. Nor could we be so strongly determin'd at all times to what is most conducive to either of these Ends, without these expeditious Monitors, and importunate Sollicitors [the senses];... DAVID FATENORTON McGill University Kants Erfahrungsbegriff: Quellengeschichtliche und Bedeutungsanalytische Untersuchungen . By Helmut Holzhey. (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co. Verlag, 1970. Pp. 330. SwFr. 32.--) It has been a conviction of long standing with me that, if Kant had defined the term 'experience' in the Critique of Pure Reason the way he consistently referred to it in the Opus postumum, much misunderstanding of his transcendental idealism might have been avoided. Two or three quotations from the Opus postumum may illustrate my point. In the VII, Convolute, VI, page i, we read: "The aggregate of perceptions as a system (based upon observation and experiment) is experience. It is an absolute unity of cognition and is not given but made. One can therefore not speak of experiences but only of experience." And page 4 : "There are no experiences but only a totality of possible perceptions insofar as this [totality] constitutes a system . . . which is not given but only thought as a principle." VII, Convolute VIII, page 2: "The idea of the whole of all possible perceptions connected in a system is experience. It is therefore inherently contradictory to speak of experiences. Experience is, subjectively, absolute 10() HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY unity." And page 93: "Experience is (1) an empirical consciousness, i. e., perception; (2) an aggregate of perceptions in accordance with a principle (observation and experlinen0 ; (3) a thorough-going formation of this aggregate into a complete system of perceptions .... Experience is the empirically absolute whole of sense perceptions insofar as their manifoldness is bound together asymtotically in One System. " Hence, page 103: "one cannot say that we have experience but that we make it." And transcendental philosophy, as he now sees it, is concerned with the principles that make the construction of such a system possible. Such principles, it is now obvious, cannot be derived from...