United States-Soviet Research Articles

The US-North Korean asymmetrical security dilemma: Past the point of nuclear no return?

The bulk of literature on the security dilemma has examined the phenomenon within the context of rivalry between great powers of roughly equal strength (for instance, the United States-Soviet nuclear arms race). Yet no study has examined the implications of power asymmetry between a strong power and a weak one when they are facing the security dilemma in their interaction. This manuscript shall examine how the asymmetry of interaction in the United States-North Korean security dilemma has presented repeated obstacles for the United States in seeking the denuclearization of North Korea. The asymmetry of their rivalry has significant implications for how Washington and Pyongyang view one another in their interaction. This asymmetry has created challenges for Washington as well as Pyongyang, as illustrated through this empirical case study’s analysis of how successive United States White House administrations since 1993 have responded to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. In this regard, it is possible the asymmetry of their interaction has become so deeply internalized that North Korea is, effectively, past a “point of no return” insofar as its nuclear program is concerned.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE PERCEPTION OF CHINESE MEDIA: FROM 1985 THROUGH 1987

The article addresses main issues of United States-Soviet Union relations in 1985-1987 as per perception by the Media of the People's Republic of China. After World War II, the world split into two opposing blocs, led by the USA and the USSR. The 1980s brought about a significant shift in international economic relations. In 1985, new trends emerged: firstly, a number of developed and developing countries opposed the arms race fearing it might expand as far as the outer space and bring back the military polarization with unpredictable consequences for the economy; secondly, the demands of renouncing the tough confrontation were voiced within the military alliances. The leaders of both blocs found themselves unable to effectively control their allies. These changes forced the leadership of the USSR and the USA to adopt new foreign policies. This paper describes the course of negotiations between the USSR and the USA, the attitude of the Soviet leaders to American politicians, and the assessments of the actions of Soviet leaders by Chinese media. The evolution of Soviet foreign policy at that period can be divided into three stages: simultaneous dialogue and confrontation, first Soviet concessions and compromises, and two concessions of the USSR. In order to objectively and fairly describe the historical facts of the Soviet-American negotiations in 1985-1987, the author carefully analyzes the most important foreign policies of the USSR from the standpoint of the Chinese press and quotes the opinions of major Chinese newspapers, such as Renmin Ribao , Guangming Ribao , Xinhua Ribao and Zhongguo Qingnian Bao .

An Era Beyond Closure

The Cuban Revolution has elicited widespread scholarly interest since it came to power in 1959. Its role in the Cold War, arguably the key historical period in the latter half of the 20th century, not only inspired political plots and military operations but also stirred intellectual pursuit. Cuba, then an island-nation of six million people in the Caribbean, suddenly became a protagonist in a world stage caught in uncharted political, social, and cultural terrain. While the broader outlines of the period obviously corresponded to the United States-Soviet divide, its most direct impact in the Americas has always required a deeper understanding of Cuba’s role. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis remains its most dramatic event, but one should not lose track of other ramifications that left their mark on history, such as the Latin American impulse toward national emancipation, armed revolution, and anti-imperialist redress, which lingered and ultimately intensified. The main inspiration for that revolutionary fervor, at times the key material source, derived from the Cuban Revolution. The same could be said for its capacity to motivate the Left as a whole, both in the United States and Latin America. An unmapped era had arisen in the hemisphere, as Washington met the Cuban Revolution with a dogged opposition that ultimately became an obsession, which in turn fueled many counterrevolutionary measures throughout the area.

THE AMAZON AS A LOW-COST ARENA IN THE COLD WAR'S GAME OF POWER? THE CASE OF THE AMAZONIAN GREAT LAKES PROJECT (1964-1968)

The article examines an underexplored episode of the Brazilian history in the context of the Cold War: the role of the Hudson Institute in South America and the proposal to create a large lacustrine system in the Amazon domains. From the analysis of official documents and literary registers, some of them little-known from the public, we attempted to identify the existence of a relationship between the aforementioned project and the Cold War systemic agenda and, also, the role of Brazil in this paradigmatic moment of the contemporary history. Evidences did not allow us to point out a clear connection between the Amazon Great Lakes Project and the dynamics of the United States-Soviet Union political disputes, even though they have shown that such an enterprise, if carried out, could make the Hylea a low-cost arena for the achievement of U.S. interests in the Cold War's game of power.

FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles over Foreign Policy by Mary E. s> Glantz (review)

362 SEER, 85, 2, 2007 The authorhas adaptedhis title 'The Land of the White Dusk?' from that of Sir Paul Dukes's memoirsabout Soviet Russia, RedDuskandtheMorrow (London, I922). Fortunately, Finland experienced a happier morrow than Russia. Enormousprogresswas made during the 1920S and I930Sin building a democratic state in Finland. In I9I8-2I the nation was deeply divided; in 1939 Finland united to resist Soviet aggression. Berkhamsted J. E. 0. SCREEN Glantz, Mary E. FDRandtheSoviet Union: 7hePresident's Battles over Foreign Policy. Modern War Studies. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2005. Viii + 253 pp. Notes. Bibliography.Index. ?27.50. THE diplomatic battles identified by Mary Glantz that added to Franklin Roosevelt's burdens were between the president and those entrusted with carrying out his policy towards the Soviet Union. Glantz has undoubtedly made a distinct contribution to our understanding of the evolution of his policy in her wide-ranging, well researched and stimulatingstudy. Previous workshave focused on the makersof policy ratherthan its executors. Glantz makes effective use of an explanation of the tensions that can disrupt the businessof government offeredby Graham T. Allison, namely, that the main obstacle presidents must overcome is bureaucratic 'politics'. Glantz goes so far as to suggest that these struggles within the executive branch defined 'the formulation of United States-Soviet relations throughout Roosevelt's presidency' (pp. I, 35). Consequently,Glantz'sprime focus is on the machineryof governmentand the president's effort to modify it. These manoeuvres, she believes, offer 'a necessaryclue' (p. 2) to elucidatingthe enigmaticRoosevelt'smotives. She also gives due weight to the impact of militaryfactors on diplomatic calculations. The latterwould seem to be an obviousfactor,but the militarydimension has often been overlooked.The historiographyhas been influencedby an undue preoccupationwith diplomaticevents resultingfrom an obsessionwith seeking out the origins of the Cold War rather than illuminating the history of the Second World War. The basis of FDR's policy had been laid down before I939 thanks to the work of the Ambassador in Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, and the military attache, Lieutenant Colonel Philip R. Faymonville, who built up extensive contacts with the Soviet military. Their successors, Ambassadors Laurence Steinhardtand Admiral William H. Standley, and attaches Ivan Yeaton arid Joseph Michela, were much more hostile to the Soviet Union. They favoured a strictpolicy of reciprocity.Concessionsshouldbe demanded from the Soviet Union in return for any aid, and Soviet diplomats should be treated in the same way as the Americans, few of whom enjoyed their service in Moscow. Glantz argues that this group proved incapable of grasping the strategic importance of the Soviet Union within a broad internationalcontext. They allowed their anti-Sovietprejudicesto warp theirjudgment;Moscow Embassy staffunderestimatedthe importance of the Soviet Union as an ally. REVIEWS 363 Glantz explores the intellectuallegacy of Robert F. Kelley, the head of the State Department'sDivision of EastEuropeanAffairs.He chose and groomed an entire generation of Soviet experts that remained hostile to Roosevelt's policy of developing American-Soviet cooperation. Before I943 Roosevelt sought to hold the GrandAlliance together,mainly because of the vital Soviet contributionof pinning down the bulk of the Wehrmacht.He remainedwary of any compromisepeace that the Sovietsmight signwith Hitler, and thought reciprocity was a luxury the Western Allies could not afford. He was thus prepared to give the Soviet Union all the aid that it demanded. Roosevelt by-passedcriticsin the State Department and Moscow Embassyby sending a stream of special envoys to deal with Stalin directly, including Davies, Wendell Wilkie and W. Averell Harriman. He also by-passed the bureaucracyby creating the Office of Lend Lease Administration(OLLA),whose Moscow office for a time operated independently of the Embassyunder the direction of BrigadierGeneral Faymonville. Admiral Standley mounted a counter attack. He ambushed Davies at a Moscow press conference, having briefed the press against his predecessor. On 8 March I943 he denounced the Soviet Union and embarrassed Roosevelt, by claiming that the Kremlin was ungratefuland concealed from the Russian people the source of Lend Lease material. And Faymonville's reputation was besmirched when Michela had the FBI investigate him on 'moralscharges' (p. I35), that is, homosexuality. After I943 Roosevelt's dependence on the Soviet militarycontributiondid not diminish, as the Second Front could not be opened untilJune...

‘Strategic Theoretical Parasitism’ Reconsidered

The introduction and subsequent deployment of nuclear weapons is the most significant military development of the post-World War II era. The assumption in Canada has consistently been that Canadians are passive consumers of the nuclear doctrines and strategies of their allies. This assumption, in turn, is linked to the larger failure of Canadians to identify national strategic interests during the cold war (which Colin Gray labelled 'strategic theoretical parasitism').(1) This article argues, on the contrary, that the Canadian conceptual understanding and approach to deterrence theory and strategic stability, two of the critical concepts in post-war nuclear strategy, was distinct from the appreciation reached in the United States. Several recently declassified studies prepared by officials in the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) in the 1950s and early 1960s are compared with some of the principal contributions in American strategic thought from the same period to reveal a community of defence officials determined to reach independent judgments on issues of crucial importance. The conclusion reached is that the perception of a strategically disinterested and detached country requires revision, and indicates a need for more research in the field.Before examining the documents, the historical context should be established. Nuclear weapons were recognized in 1945 as immensely destructive, but military orthodoxy and a reluctance to question convention led to conservative findings among defence observers/strategists in the immediate post-war period. For example, both P.M.S. Blackett in Britain and Vannevar Bush in the United States predicted that nuclear weapons would have little impact on the outcome of war for the foreseeable future.(2) Although those findings were strongly challenged by Bernard Brodie and Liddell Hart,(3) there was no initial postwar consensus that strategy had been fundamentally altered by the discovery of the power of the atom.Inevitably, however, the nuclear (and thermonuclear) revolution(s) spurred new thinking, as strategists struggled to make sense of weapons that offered unimaginable destructive power and that seemed to turn conventional military wisdom upside down. By the early-to-mid 1950s, the gestation period of a new generation of strategists came to an end, and the modern arms debate was born. In the United States, this change was induced by the rapid growth in nuclear weapons stocks, the introduction of both tactical nuclear weapons and hydrogen bombs, the anticipated arrival of ballistic missiles, and the articulation of the strategy of 'massive retaliation.'(4)The difference between much of the literature that emerged at this time and previous contributions to strategy, however, was the emphasis on deterrence. In the nuclear age, any use of force could have disastrous consequences. Thus, it was widely believed (particularly in the West) that the most sensible military posture was to threaten an opponent with such enormous devastation that it would never be so foolish as to risk a military challenge. If confronted, however, the only response that was considered was annihilation on a scale never before seen in human history (an approach that was believed to make deterrence more 'credible'). Literature on deterrence, then, represented a reformulation of what strategy was and what could be effectively studied under its name.In the cold war environment of the 1950s, most of the major (American) studies attempted to address an essentially political question: how could the United States most effectively acquire, deploy, and employ its military forces to further American global interests but avoid large-scale military challenges? Dissatisfaction with the manner in which the United States-Soviet relationship was unfolding meant that early post-war American strategy was aimed at improving the quality of policy for dealing with the Soviet Union. It was not meant to be applicable in all (or even most) situations, which helps explain its essential irrelevance in much of the world during this period. …

Confrontation analyses of United States-Soviet grain negotiations

From 1976 until 1991, the government of the former Soviet Union bought wheat and coarse grains grown in the United States, from private grain companies, under the terms of Long Term Agreements (LTAs). The author conducted interviews with U.S. and Soviet government officials actively involved in the negotiations to establish the terms of those LTAs. Analyses of the negotiations were carried out using confrontation theory. The subsequent analysis shows how the changing issues, actors and positions over time affected the grain trading relationship between the two countries.

Power, affiliation, and war: Three tests of a motivational model.

From previous research, a model relating war outbreak to a pattern of high power motivation and low affiliation motivation is developed and tested by content analysis of (a) historical materials from over 300 years of British history, (b) British-German communications at the outbreak of World War I, and (c) United States-Soviet communications during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In all 3 studies, observed motive patterns in relation to war-versus-peace outcomes support the essential features of the model. Furthermore, wars once underway end only after power motivation drops and not after affiliation increases. Finally, ending of wars is followed by declines in power and achievement motivation. Alternative interpretations of the results are discussed and further, multivariate research is outlined

Swords into Market Shares: China's Conversion of Military Industry to Civilian Production

The Cold War is over, but international violence, and preparations for it, are not. Despite the end of the bipolar world and “balance of terror” associated with the United States-Soviet confrontation, peace has not broken out. The militarization of world politics continues, as shown by the Gulf War, ethnic and religious conflicts in central Europe and Asia and nuclear proliferation. Global military spending has somewhat diminished, but at somewhere between $900 billion and $1 trillion annually, it still is a major factor in the budgets and ambitions of most countries. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War provides opportunities for governments to re-examine their priorities and shift military resources to promote economic and social development, the so-called “peace dividend.” Although in recent years China has dramaticallyincreasedits official military expenditures (nearly 100 per cent between 1988 and 1993), beginning in 1979 the Chinese leadership inaugurated a major reorientation of its military-industrial complex.

United States-Soviet relations

United States-Soviet relations

United States-Soviet Relations

United States-Soviet Relations

United States-Soviet relations

United States-Soviet relations

Will the Two German States Solve the Problem of European Security?

WILL THE TWO GERMAN STATES SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY? Jonathan Dean . he "Gorbachev Era" and the improvement in East-West relations associated with it have not changed the basic political facts of the European situation: the division of Germany into two separate states and the continued incorporation of these states into opposing military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is regarded by most governments in both alliances as the precondition of military and political stability in Europe. True, the three Western wartime allies — France, the United Kingdom , and the United States— undertook a contractual obligation three decades ago in the 1954 Bonn Convention to promote the reunification of Germany, but this commitment does not alter the political facts. Even the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), while insisting that the possibility of ultimate self-determination must be kept open for the population of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), also insists that any chance of fulfilling this possibility is distant in time and that the security of the Federal Republic can be assured only by continued Federal German membership in the NATO alliance. Majority public opinion in the Federal Republic supports the government position, although this support could shift if the German public thought other possibilities were real and would at the same time assure continuation of their current level ofeconomic well-being, political freedom, and security. For its part, the government of the GDR insists that the status of the GDR as a separate state is permanent and that it has every intention of continuing GDR membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Jonathan Dean is arms control adviser to the Union of Concerned Scientists. This article is based on a contribution to a forthcoming book, The German States and European Security, edited by F. Stephen Larrabee, to be published under the auspices of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York. 173 174 SAIS REVIEW At present, only a portion of the GDR population (whose size cannot be measured given the authoritarian nature of the GDR system, but which is probably large) actively desires a change in the status quo, and then only under conditions that would maintain at least current standards of living and security. The forces supporting continuation of the status quo of the division of Germany and the membership of the two German states in opposing alliances are very strong. Yet, since their mutual acceptance as separate states in the Grundlagenvertrag , or Basic Treaty of December 1972, the Federal Republic and the GDR, in each case pushed by strong domestic public opinion, have entered into a complex relationship whose increasing scope and intensity has caused considerable concern in both East and West. To the allies of the two German states who have these worries, no aspect of the inner-German relationship is more sensitive — because it is, at least in appearance, so directly related to possible change in the status quo in Europe — than the possibility of inner-German collaboration on security and arms control issues. Starting from timid beginnings in the early 1970s, the security dialogue between the two German states has intensified with the emergence of the reform-minded Gorbachev leadership in the USSR. The policies of the two Germanies already overlap on an increasing number of arms control and security issues. The circumstances surrounding conclusion of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty have brought strong support in Federal Germany for negotiated reduction of tactical-range nuclear weapons, vigorously seconded by coordinated East German and Soviet pressures for the "third zero" — total elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe. The next five years may bring the conclusion and implementation of a United States-Soviet accord on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, a second Stockholm-type agreement on confidence-building measures covering NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces, a NATO-Warsaw Pact agreement to reduce these forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area and, possibly, a worldwide prohibition on production and storage of chemical weapons. Such developments would intensify the inner-German dialogue on security and arms control issues. This article examines the possible extent of such intensification, its implications for the inner-German relationship, for the security policies of...

The American Historical Association, Part 1

of Michigan), and Links on the Chain: Songs of the Labor and Civil Rights Movement demonstrated how drama and music can be effective history and teaching devices as well as entertainment. Collette A. Hyman (University of Minnesota) observed the ways in which dramatic presentations of two quite different unions reflected their labor philosophies. The efforts of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) were professional and conventional while the productions of the Wholesale and Warehouse Workers were rank-and-file attempts to challenge existing institutions. Nora Faires (University of Michigan, Flint) described how a class project on the 1937 sit-down strike brought students and participants together to make a vivid experience out ofthat fifty-year-old event. In the evening, Michael Honey (Wesleyan University) and David Sawyer accomplished the same thing in an occasion al sing-along concert. Contrary to past experience, the last day brought higher attendance than had the previous two. Daniel Leab presided over a popular session on Unions and the Rejection of Radicalism in which Gary L. Bailey (Indiana University), Robert G. Picard (Louisiana State University), and Ronald Edsforth (Skidmore College) concen trated on the 1940s and 1950s in studies of the late career of Powers Hapgood (Bailey); the New York Newspaper Guild (Picard); and the UAW (Edsforth). They agreed that organized labor participated fully in the growing anticommunism of the time, fanned as it was by United States-Soviet rivalry. They stressed the role of unions as barometers and purveyors of public opinion. Finally, at a luncheon gathering directed by Sidney Fine (University of Michi gan), Daniel Nelson (University of Akron) made a case for the limited extent to which scientific management practices affected working conditions during the movement's twilight years, 1915-25. By almost any measure, the three-day meeting was a success: more people came than ever before; a record number of sessions was held; and the spirited debates at those sessions often continued beyond the confines of the meeting rooms. Excluding the national professional conventions, the North American Labor History Conference is now the most important annual conference among American labor historians.

United States–Soviet Relations and Arms Control

United States–Soviet Relations and Arms Control

Doctrine and deterrence

H ave Soviet political and military leaders adopted strategic deterrence and arms control concepts compatible with those of their American counterparts? The Soviet view of strategy differs considerably from the American one in several important respects. Soviet military doctrine and military art (including strategy, operational art, and tactics) are based on both ideological and pragmatic traditions. Marxism-Leninism creates an ideological imperative which provides that history must continue to flow in certain, preferred directions, and that flow cannot be circumvented by technology. This longterm perspective admits of many short-run fluctuations in actual behavior. Of particular importance to Soviet planners is the "correlation of forces," which refers to a combination of social, economic, political, and military factors influencing the decision to go to war. Soviet leaders seek to avoid nuclear war with the same degree of seriousness that their military professionals are required to prepare for it. That the Soviets are serious about avoiding nuclear war, and pessimistic about what would happen if they could not, makes their interest in deterrence a matter of national self-interest. Western Sovietologists have noted that there is no exact Russian equivalent of deterrence, but I am asserting here that the Soviets understand what we mean by it. While they do not fully accept American formulations of deterrence theory and concepts, they have figured out where the bottom line is, and it is not unacceptable to them. A standoff in the military correlation of forces is preferable to Western superiority, with which the USSR has lived in the past. Arms control agreements that codify strategic parity provide confirmation that the USSR has reached coequal superpower status with the United States and represent commitments of the Soviet leadership which are judged binding upon their successors, other things being equal. Thus, United States efforts to redefine the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) regime as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks" (START), to deploy intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe, and to launch the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will be.interpreted by the USSR in terms of whether they contribute to, or detract from, their previously attained and acknowledged status. We can expect that, to the extent that the United States is perceived to be shifting the correlation of forces against Soviet interests in a significant way, the USSR will react with counterbalancing mechanisms. Having once attained the sweet smell of parity, the USSR is unlikely to give it up voluntarily. Whether the Soviet Union seeks military superiority is a much debated issue in the West. If the correlation of forces is taken on a global basis instead of being seen strictly as a United States-Soviet relationship, it is difficult to see that superiority is within their grasp, however much of their national product they commit to it. Although the Kremlin's position is not judged an enviable one, it is not one to be disparaged. Soviet geopolitical reach is assured by its expansive borders and secure interior lines, compared to the long distances its adversaries must travel to confront it at probable points of tension. Soviet military power is regarded as a prudent hedge against the failure of deterrence and. in the absence of war, as a useful coercive instrument. The United States and NATO can expect to continue to face Soviet pressures aimed at dividing the alliance politically. Soviet long-range objectives include, as they have declared, continuation of the class struggle primarily through indirect means. Nuclear war is not part of this scenario, unless Soviet rulers fail badly. Unlike the implausible expectations about war outcomes which took national leaders into World War I, today neither Soviet nor American officials could have many delusions about the risks to their societies and governments from nuclear war. A balance of terror may not be as appealing as a millennium, but it is the clear conviction of the USSSR, based on their behavior, that it has worked.

Soviet aims in europe

new arms control agreement to serve as the centerpiece of a second summit meeting in the latter half of 1986 or early 1987. The extent to which compliance has become a sore point in United States-Soviet relations and has raised doubts in the United States about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner, indicates that the two countries will need to pursue settlement of the outstanding compliance problems as a first step toward a new arms accord. Agreement on the issues that have emerged from the compliance d i spu te -more precise limits on LPHARs, more airtight limits on encryption and on ICBM modernization, and many other possible measures to strengthen the existing arms control regime--would provide an appropriate and convenient series of successful accords for another Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting. Formal United States and Soviet recommitment to the ABM treaty and other accords, together with agreement on updating and rendering much more precise the provisions that have come under pressure from the two countries' military programs, appear increasingly possible today because of Soviet incentives for a new arms control agreement. Such a set of agreed interpretations of past treaties could smooth the road toward new accords. In any case, it stretches the imagination to believe that the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to conclude the comprehensive agreements both are now proposing, reaching far beyond the terms of existing treaties, in the absence of the ability to even confirm their adherence to the more modest limitations of the past. []

Teaching the Revisionist Interpretation of the Cold War

There is a school of history, however, which argues that the United States was primarily responsible for the Cold War. It may not be very popular, but the revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Cold War ought to be pre sented to high school students precisely because most students will not agree with it. It will challenge them and thus make them think about the issue more deeply. Presenting two interpretations of the Cold War is an ideal way to build critical thinking skills. Before the students are given the interpretations, preliminary work needs to be done. The teacher could ask why the U.S. and the USSR are such ene mies. A discussion of Marxist-Leninist ideology should ensue followed by some background on the 1917 Revolution, the American intervention in Rus sia in 1918, the United States-Soviet alliance against Hitler, the issue of the second front, and the Yalta Conference. The students should also learn the countries and some of the capital cities in Europe. Finally, the students need to understand that the American foreign policy concept of self-determination (each country should decide its own policies free from outside interference) and the Soviet concept of spheres of influence (the big powers each have an area of dominance) were in basic conflict (a little country does not have self determination when it is being dominated by a big power). The students should now read the section of their text on the beginning of the Cold War and discuss which country was responsible for the Cold War and why. At this point I pass out the following reading and instruct the stu dents to write their reaction to it on the back. (The reading is adapted from O'Reilly, pp. 80-86. This reading was shortened considerably and leaves out many important issues such as the dispute over Poland and the wording of the Yalta Agreements.)

Reciprocity in United States-Soviet Relations: Multiple Symmetry or Issue Linkage?

This study examines two alternative process models of reciprocal interaction in post-war United States-Soviet relations. The multiple symmetry model holds that each dimension of interaction is evaluated and acted on independently so that an accurate portrayal one nation's responsiveness to another must be specified at the micro level of individual issues or sectors. By contrast, the issue-linkage model admits the possibility of cross-sector matching of behavior and in so doing requires a speciflcation of responsiveness to encompass behavior on several dimensions simultaneously. An empirical analysis using COPDAB events for the period between 1953 and 1978 revealed that both models are operative but in different issue domains. The implications of these results are discussed in the concluding section.

Gorbachev and Obstacles Toward Détente

The November 1985 Geneva summit meeting between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan has revived the hopes of many for a United States-Soviet detente similar to that of the early 1970s. Reagan administration officials indicate privately that they see the summit as showing Soviet readiness for rapid progress toward agreements substantially reducing strategic nuclear weapons on both sides, while foregoing their previous insistence on a simultaneous ban on the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet willingness, expressed just prior to the summit, to reunite a few Soviet citizens with their American spouses raises expectations for wider cooperation on humanitarian and emigration issues. While a persuasive case can be made that many opportunities for a lasting improvement in significant areas of U.S.-Soviet relations were indeed missed in the 1970s, I it is a mistake to believe that Gorbachev's approach to relations with the United States, whether the issue be arms control, economic relations, human rights, or almost any other foreign policy question, will bear but a superficial similarity to that of the Brezhnev regime in the early 1970s. In fact, this article argues that Gorbachev's deeply held perspectives, assumptions, and beliefs reflect a sea change in Soviet conceptions of what is possible and desirable in U.S.-Soviet relations. This change is away from notions of superpower partnership and toward greater