"Greed for Land":W. W. Ashe and the Environmental Roots of the 1921 Flood in Central Texas Char Miller (bio) Click for larger view View full resolution W. W. Ashe circa 1926. Photograph courtesy of Will Ashe Bason. [End Page 62] In 2010–11, the San Antonio River Authority (SARA) spent an estimated $4 million retrofitting the Olmos Dam (built between 1925 and 1927); workers drilled sixty-eight top-to-bottom holes in the dam and in each inserted cable tendons that were then anchored in bedrock, tightened, and sealed. This project was a consequence of floods in 1998 and 2002, during which a worrisome volume of water had roared down Olmos Creek, which at thirty-two square miles serves as the upper reaches of the San Antonio River—its headwaters. Each time, the floodwaters had piled up behind the aging detention dam and submerged US 281, San Antonio's vital north-south highway. Concerned about the dam's stability, engineers also were struck by how fast the rampaging flow had moved downstream. The two concerns were related and directly connected to US Route 281: it is a key thoroughfare for those commuting daily from their homes in the northern suburbs to work in the downtown core (and beyond). These commuters live in subdivisions that extend along and radiate out from the highway, and they shop in the many malls and strip centers platted at each exit. By the late 1990s, Olmos Creek's upper basin had been built out and what once had been a landscape of oaks, junipers, and grassland had been made impervious with every roof, gutter, street, and parking lot. These intertwined developments accelerated the movement [End Page 63] of water across this concertized terrain, forcing SARA to retrofit the Olmos Dam.1 W.W. Ashe (1872–1932), who had been a witness to the 1921 flood that had hammered San Antonio and led to the construction of the Olmos Dam in the first place, would not have been surprised that early twenty-first century engineers discovered there was a tight link between upstream conditions and downstream dangers. That is precisely what he had warned would happen if the city's public officials and business elite—the dam's lead advocates—did not better manage the environment north of where the flood-retention infrastructure was to be built. Ashe was not concerned about concrete, but cattle. Yet for all their differences, the inanimate building material and the four-legged ruminant had this in common: they flattened the land. As a scientist and researcher, Ashe, who was working for the United States Forest Service in 1921, had been studying the interplay between high country watersheds and valley communities that depended on them since the 1890s.2 He had begun this work while employed by the North Carolina Geological Survey, under whose aegis he examined how deforestation and overgrazing contributed significantly to the frequency and intensity of floods in the Appalachian Mountains. He assessed these and other anthropogenic factors in an 1897 path-breaking volume, Timber Trees and Forests of North Carolina, which he co-authored with forester Gifford Pinchot and who as first chief of the Forest Service later hired Ashe to work for the federal agency.3 He noticed that degraded land increased erosion, and that this erosion filled streams with silt. When heavy rains pounded cutover mountains and chewed-up hills, creeks quickly filled with debris-driving floodwaters, a churning force that carried uprooted trees and bushes, boulders, rocks, and gravel. This dangerous energy plowed up farmlands, undercut bridges, and slammed into river towns and cities. To combat the damage that such floods routinely produced in the Appalachians from New England to the Deep South, grassroots organizations championed legislation that would enable the federal government to purchase denuded land from willing sellers with the goal of regenerating forest and grass cover. After more than a decade of debate, activists in the North and South managed to secure congressional approval for what is known as the Weeks Act (1911). One crucial element of this bill was [End Page 64] the creation of the National Forest Reservation Commission, which would determine which...
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