United Russia Research Articles

Factors affecting Russian elites’ perceptions of civil protests: evidence from the survey of Russian elites, 2016 and 2020

ABSTRACT Which elites support civil protests, and which ones oppose them? Existing studies of civil protests in authoritarian regimes have mainly examined their triggers, effectiveness and the responses they provoke from authoritarian states. While these studies offer implications regarding the durability of authoritarian states, they have not examined elite perceptions of civil protests, which may contribute to the authoritarian reactions to such protests. Using the Survey of Russian Elites from 2016 and 2020, this paper analyses the factors that affect Russian elites’ perceptions of protests. I argue that elites’ perceptions of protests depend on their democratic value orientation, social position and media use. The findings reveal that elites who value civil liberties approve of protests, while those closely linked to the Kremlin, those who frequently use traditional media and members of the United Russia Party oppose protests. However, the effects of the independent variables differ slightly depending on the protest method’s intensity and the survey’s wave. This study sheds light on the causal relationship between Russian elites’ individual characteristics and their perceptions of protests.

Brilliant tragedy? Electoral effects of environmental protest cycle in autocracy

ABSTRACT When and how does an environmental protest cycle affect election outcomes under electoral authoritarianism? Drawing on the case of the Bashkortostan republic, a Russian ethnic region, I leverage the spatial proximity to the protest site to identify its effects on parliamentary elections. The environmental protest cycle peaked in Bashkortostan around the regional government’s decisions to extract minerals from shikhans – mountains composed of limestone. Employing a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, I show that precincts exposed to the environmental protest cycle experienced a significant drop in United Russia vote share, while voting for systemic opposition increased in the affected precincts. To explain the dynamics, I propose treating non-political protests, such as environmental ones, as an information revelation mechanism. The mechanism identified through a causal mediation analysis indicates that the environmental protest cycle conveys information on regional malperformance to voters. Their updated preferences, in turn, heavily undermine the electoral mobilizing capacity of local elites.

Technologies for the Formation of the Political Image of the Ruling Parliamentary Party in Social Networks and Blogs: on the Example of the All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”

Technologies for the Formation of the Political Image of the Ruling Parliamentary Party in Social Networks and Blogs: on the Example of the All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”

The sources of territorial resilience in Putin’s Russia

ABSTRACT This article aims to explain the sources of territorial resilience in Russia. It demonstrates that the basis of territorial resilience is the “power vertical,” i.e. the current model of center–regional relations. This model ensures political centralization and, consequently, political uniformity. The model is supported by several formalized institutions, including the selection of governors, the guidance and monitoring of governors by the presidential administration, and the interactions of governors with the United Russia party leadership. In addition, regional governors are included in patronage networks organized around the highest state officials and “state oligarchs.” This additional informal subsystem provides center–regional relations with a flexibility that is important for maintaining resilience.

Модель электорального поведения резидента Арктической зоны РФ на региональных выборах высшего должностного лица (2013–2022 гг.)

Being one of the strategically important regions for the development of the Russian Federation and a variety of aspects of its security, the Arctic represents a platform for defending the country’s national priorities. The nature of the policy pursued in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation determines the status of the state as an Arctic power. Therefore, the aim of the study was to investigate the electoral preferences and to design the electoral model of the residents of the Russian Arctic in the elections of the highest official of the region in the period from 2013 to 2022. By means of multifactor comparative analysis using the clustering methodology, the author managed to determine such variables for the construction of the electoral model of a resident of the Russian Arctic zone as the level of electoral activity, voting for typical and atypical candidates and for the conditionally designated candidate “against all” as a marker of legitimate support for registered candidates and/or protest voting. The study revealed that, unlike the other federal subject’s voters, residents of the Russian Arctic take a more active part in the election of the head of the region, providing electoral support to the candidates of the “United Russia”, although in some cases atypical voting was observed, the percentage of which was insignificant. At the same time, the data obtained show that the number of invalid ballots is higher in the Arctic regions than in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Thus, the constructed model of electoral behavior of the resident of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in the implementation of regional policy in the region allows taking into account not only quantitative, but also qualitative parameters of electoral preferences of the Arctic residents to predict the results of future elections.

Cleavages Structure and Distortion of the Electoral Space

The article presents the results of testing the hypothesis, according to which ballot stuffing in favor of the “party in power”, while causing minor distortions to the structure of electoral cleavages, does not fundamentally change it. The author tested the hypothesis on the data from the 2016 and 2021 elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation held via proportional system rules. He used the following method: in the regions where ballot stuffing was allegedly used in favor of the United Russia party, a certain number of votes were subtracted from the United Russia electoral results in accordance with the difference between the maximum and effective ranges of the electoral cleavage related to the confrontation between of the United Russia and the rest of elections’ participants. The author employed two models to run calculations: in the first model the threshold for deduction was a difference of 50% between the maximum and effective range, in the second model the difference was 5%. For 2016 elections, the first model took away more than 6.1 million votes from the United Russia, the second model subtracted more than 12.5 million votes; for 2021 elections — more than 5 and more than 10 million votes, respectively. Nevertheless, there was no radical change in the structure of electoral cleavages, let alone its elimination. The study showed that although ballot stuffing in favor of the “party in power” artificially overemphasizes the role of the authoritarian-democratic confrontation, sidelining other confrontations, the structure of electoral cleavages per se is largely preserved. Mathematical methods, especially factor analysis, can be efficiently used to detect this structure.

Импульс мобилизации и электоральные результаты «партии власти»

The article examines the connection between protests and elections in an authoritarian context. Using the concept of mobilization momentum, the authors attempt to find out whether intensive and massive collective actions on the eve of elections can affect electoral mobilization and support for the “party in power”, and if so, in what direction. Based on the modern literature on this topic, the authors identify two alternative models of the possible electoral effect of the mobilization momentum. According to the first model, by breaking through the information blockade and signaling to citizens about the widespread dissatisfaction with the authorities’ policies, intense mass protests contribute to an increase in voters’ turnout and a decrease in support for pro-government forces. According to the second model, such protests may easily increase the electoral performance of the “party in power,” since they often lead to the mobilization of an electorate that is loyal to the ruling circles. The authors test these hypotheses against the evidence from the 2011— 2016 parliamentary electoral cycle in Russia using methods of standard multiple linear regression, difference-in-differences and synthetic control. The results are mixed. It appears that the mobilization momentum has a weak electoral effect or even a positive effect on the performance of the “party in power,” but its influence may depend on threshold values: in the most protesting cities, support for the United Russia turns out to be lower than it would be in the absence of the mobilization momentum. At the same time, the findings convincingly demonstrate that the evidence and data from the Russian context, combined with modern methods of analysis, opens up an excellent opportunity for research at the intersection of the spheres of political participation and electoral politics.

Развитие регионального электорального процесса в России (на примере Республики Саха (Якутия))

In this article, the authors conducted a study of the regional electoral process development in the Russian Federation using the example of regional elections in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in 2018 and 2023, and specifically the elections of the Head of the subject and the Legislative Assembly of People’s Deputies (Il Tumen). The purpose of the work is to analyze the dynamics, factors of the results and process of elections in the region. The article used an institutional approach, in which the object of research is regional authorities – the Institute of Heads of Subjects of the Russian Federation, as well as regional parliaments (legislatures, assemblies). The following tasks are identified: to study the process of the Russian electoral system evolution at the federal and regional levels; determine the influence of federalism factors on the relations development between the federal center and regions; determine the main theoretical foundations for studying the regional electoral process, as well as the degree of competition in elections; study the results of regional elections in 2018 and 2023. The object of the study is the regional electoral process in Russia, the subject of the study is the regional elections of the Head of the subject and the Legislative Assembly of People’s Deputies of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). Within the framework of this article, the authors have come to the following conclusions and results: since 2012, after the return of the practice of direct elections of Heads of subjects and the return of the proportional electoral system, the development of a new electoral cycle begins in the regions; after the centralization of federal relations in the 2000s. the party composition of regional parliaments has become similar to the composition of the federal parliament of the State Duma, consisting of 4–5 parties. According to the results of the last two regional elections in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the current governor A. Nikolaev has won, and in the elections in Il Tumen the leading position has been occupied by the United Russia party.

Электоральная активность молодёжи в качестве кандидатов в депутаты Законодательного собрания Новосибирской области 2005-2020 гг

The object of the study was the Novosibirsk Region, which has the status of a border area, characterized by a high level of economic development and political competition among other Siberian regions. The study analyzed information about young candidates for deputies to the Legislative Assembly of the Novosibirsk Region, who participated in election campaigns in the period 2005-2020. A young candidate is a person under the age of 35 having the passive voting right. At the present stage, the majority of Russian researchers acknowledge the political passivity of young people. The analysis of the data posted on the official website of the Electoral Commission of the Novosibirsk Region allows to draw the following conclusions: the number of candidates, including young ones, nominated by political parties is growing; the number of young self-nominated candidates is decreasing with each electoral cycle. This fact may be explained by difficulties of signature collection process for non-partisan candidates. It is at this stage that a significant number of candidates drop out of the electoral race. At the same time, the number of young people elected to deputies over the course of four electoral cycles has consistently been 7-9 people from different political parties (in single-mandate constituencies and on party lists). Meanwhile, the number of vacant deputy mandates decreased from 98 to 76. Over the course of four electoral cycles, the LDPR has attracted the greatest number of young people as candidates for deputies in single-mandate constituencies and party lists. The United Russia party has the smallest percentage of young candidates in its ranks. Such a personnel policy of the ruling party is connected with the presence of a great number of well-known and trusted candidates. Other parties are experiencing a shortage of personnel and during the election campaign they run young candidates. Thus, young people have a real opportunity to be elected from different parties (the ruling party, parliamentary opposition parties).

ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ ВЛИЯНИЯ ЭТНИЧЕСКОГО ФАКТОРА НА ИТОГИ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫХ ВЫБОРОВ (2003–2021) В ВОСТОЧНОЙ СИБИРИ4

Eastern Siberia, which is considered by the author as comprising the republics of Buryatia, Sakha (Yakutia), Tyvaand Khakassia, the Transbaikal and Krasnoyarsk territories, the Irkutsk region, is characterized by a mosaic ethnic composition. Thereare distinguished large nations, living mainly in the republics, and small nations, residing in small areas in different territories of themacro region. The former, due to their large numbers, are able to influence election results, which is expressed in high turnout andpolitical preferences oriented toward support for the ‘party in power’ and its leader – the current president. However, in the last presidential election (2018) and State Duma election (2021), we noted a decrease in the close relationship between the share of indigenouspeoples and turnout as well as voting for the United Russia and Vladimir Putin. This article aims to analyze the dynamics of turnout in general elections to the State Duma from 2003 to 2016 in comparisonwith the last election campaign of 2021 and presidential elections in 2012–2018 as well as the dynamics of the number of votes for theparties and the presidential candidates (Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky). The research materials included the 2020 AllRussian Population Census, actually conducted in 2021, and the GAS-Elections database of the Central Election Commission of theRussian Federation. The study applied cartographic and statistical methods; a special method of correlation analysis was used to establish the closeness of the relationship between the indicators.An analysis of turnout dynamics showed a decrease in turnout at the 2021 elections to the State Duma compared to the 2003–2016 average, as well as at the 2018 presidential elections compared to the 2004–2012 level. The latest election campaign to the StateDuma demonstrated an increase in support for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and a decrease in the ratings of theUnited Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia in Eastern Siberia. In the presidential elections, there is noted a positivetrend in votes for Vladimir Putin in constituent entities of the Russian Federation with predominantly Russian population and its declinein some constituent entities created according to the national-ethnic principle (the Republic of Sakha) as well as territories formedbased on this principle (Aginsky Buryatsky District of the Transbaikal Territory), etc.

Przemiany polityczno-ustrojowe w Federacji Rosyjskiej w okresie pierwszej prezydentury Władimira Putina (2000-2008) – zagadnienia wybrane

Legal-political changes in the Russian Federation during the first presidency of Vladimir Putin, covering the years 2000-2008, are the subject of the article. The study first focuses on the strengthening of executive power, both at the central and regional levels, consolidating the power camp and shaping the political system of the state. In the period under analysis, the powers of the President of the Russian Federation were increased, the Federation Council was weakened, control over the regions was strengthened, and a number of rights and freedoms of citizens were limited. In his actions, Putin relied on the power ministries and secured the loyalty of the State Duma and the oligarchs. The United Russia party became his political base. Putin’s political opponents and competitors were ruthlessly eliminated from political life. An analysis of the features of the political system of the Russian Federation indicates that it had become an authoritarian state.

Communist Legacy, Anti-Elite Sentiments, and Modernization Theory

Communist rule left a strong imprint on the development of Eastern European countries, but the precise mechanisms and directions of this legacy effect are subject to debate. This article looks at the legacies of giant infrastructural projects, which played an important role in the ideology and policy practice of communist regimes. Using the natural experiment of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), we investigate the influence of this project on post-communist voting behavior. We show that the BAM legacy reduces the share of votes for United Russia, the party of power of Putin’s regime, and leads to a larger share of votes for the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). While the BAM legacy could be associated with a multitude of channels, we provide empirical evidence for at least one of them—the persistence of human capital, showing that BAM settlements are characterized by better educational outcomes than the control group.

Сравнительные итоги предварительного голосования по кандидатурам для последующего выдвижения от партии «Единая Россия» кандидатами в народные депутаты Государственного Собрания (Ил Тумэн) Республики Саха (Якутия) седьмого созыва и выборов в народные депутаты Государственного Собрания (Ил Тумэн) Республики Саха (Якутия) 10 сентября 2023 года

In the struggle for electoral votes, political technologies are coming to the forefront. Thus, the All-Russian party “United Russia” at the beginning of the XXI century began to use preliminary voting for the subsequent nomina-tion of candidates for elections. And if the use of this political technology for the party is justified, then its ulti-mate goals are not quite clear to the ordinary man in the street. The relevance of the topic of the article boils down to the fact that the political technology – the preliminary vote used by the Yakut regional branch of the United Russia Party – took place in May 2023, and the elections for which the preliminary vote was held took place in September of the same year. In this regard, there is a large amount of materials, analyzing which, it is possible to assess the effectiveness of the applied political technology, to determine its weaknesses and strengths. The article considers a comparative analysis of the results of the preliminary voting on candidates for subsequent nomination from the United Russia party as candidates for People’s Deputies of the State Assem-bly (Il Tumen) The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) of the seventh convocation and elections to the People’s Depu-ties of the State Assembly (Il Tumen) The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

Модельные варианты эффективных PR-кампаний кандидатов в депутаты Государственной Думы РФ восьмого созыва (на примере выборов в одномандатных округах Свердловской области)

In the information age, the correct strategy of PR-campaigns aimed at forming an attractive image of a candi-date for deputy to the voters is decisive for achieving success in elections. The article discusses the PR cam-paigns of Anton Shipulin, a candidate from the United Russia party (constituency No. 174), Natalia Krylova, a candidate from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (constituency No. 172), and Irina Vinogradova (constituency No. 170), a candidate from the New People party. Each of them turned out to be the most suc-cessful in the Sverdlovsk region in their own way. As a result of the analysis, both common points and differ-ences in the strategies of effective PR campaigns of candidates for deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the eighth convocation from the party in power, from one of the oldest opposition parties and from one of the newest parties participating in the election campaign were identified. Recommendations for improving the effectiveness of PR-campaigns of candidates for deputies are formulated.

Political Preferences Of Residents Of Donbass Republics (In The Context Of The Elections To The State Duma Of The Russian Federation In 2021)

Very approximate information is available about the electoral preferences of the residents of Donbass within the framework of the Russian political and legal field. The article considers the issue of establishing the exact results of the will of the voters of the L-DPR, who were citizens of the Russian Federation, in the elections to the State Duma in 2021. Conclusions about the electoral preferences of residents of the L-DPR are made on the basis of the difference in the results of voting on the proportional and majority components of the electoral system of the Russian Federation, within which residents of Donbass could not vote for majority candidates. The results of remote electronic voting (REV), “exit” voting at the polling stations of the Rostov region and post-election polling are analyzed. It is established that at least 200 thousand L-DPR voters voted in these elections. The results of the REV and “exit” voting differed somewhat. The greatest support was enjoyed by: “United Russia” (the “exit” vote of the DPR — 81 %, the LPR — 83 %, the REV — 88 %) and the LDPR (up to 10 % on the “exit” vote). The electoral culture of Donbass had features of “periphery” in relation to the whole of the Russian Federation: many residents are poorly versed in the intricacies of Russian politics, vote for patriotic forces, identify support for the Russian Federation and its leadership. According to the results of surveys, more than 60 % of residents of the L-DPR ethnically identify themselves as Russians. Depending on the wording of the questions, from 65 % to 80 % of respondents called joining the Russian Federation a priority vector of integration of the region. During the period of the existence of the L-DPR, the prevailing pro-Russian sentiments in this territory have only intensified.

Substituting the Opposition under Electoral Authoritarianism: The Case of the Russian Regional Parliamentary Elections in 2021

Abstract Political scientists have long known that modern electoral autocracies can use quasi-democratic institutions to neutralize the danger posed by the opposition. Participation in elections by completely controlled spoiler parties proved to be an effective tool for maintaining authoritarian stability. However, researchers know few cases of how aging authoritarian regimes create systemic semi-independent opposition in order to increase turnout and split the votes of the systemic opposition. Based on a database of candidates from single-member districts (SMD) in the 2021 regional parliamentary elections in Russia with more than 2,200 unique observations, we show how the participation of candidates from the newly created New People, Green Alternative, and the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice affected the electoral results of United Russia and two parties of the ‘old’ systemic opposition.

Features of the gubernatorial elections in the Yaroslavl region in 2022

The article describes the legal foundations and political features of the gubernatorial elections in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. In particular, authors focus on the political situation before the elections of the Governor of the Yaroslavl region in 2022. They come to conclusion that in the Yaroslavl region, the election campaign took place in the absence of political competition primarily due to the use of the “municipal filter” in the gubernatorial election system of the region, providing the overwhelming advantage of in the use of administrative, informational and financial resources to the main candidate, as well as low activity of other candidates. In addition, there were other important elements of the election campaign of federal leaders of public opinion, in particular federal ministers and senior state officials. Finally, one of the key features of the gubernatorial elections in the Yaroslavl region was the possibility of self-nomination of candidates that provided a solid public distance between the main candidate and the widely criticized United Russia party. These conclusions are confirmed with the help of the analysis of the political situation in the Yaroslavl region before the start of the election campaign, the overview of actions and resources of the main contenders based on open sources, and the content analysis of mass media.

The Scandalous Electoral Victory of the Governing Party United Russia

With unprecedented restrictions on voting rights and electoral manipulations, the governing party United Russia succeeded in gaining a comfortable majority in the Russian Duma elections despite growing dissatisfaction in the country. The secret winner of the election is the Communist Party, which unlike the other opposition parties increased its share of votes. During the parliamentary elections in Russia between 17 and 19 September 2021, the governing party United Russia officially won 324 of the 450 seats in the State Duma with 49.82 percent of votes. The results of the election again give the governing party a two-thirds majority, enabling it to amend the Constitution. However, its results are worse than in 2016, when United Russia received 54.2 percent of votes and 343 seats. At the same time, the approval rates for the party remained at a stable low of 27 to 28 percent during the entire electoral campaign according to the official sociological Russian Public Opinion Research Center.

Social Tradition: Theoretical Problems and Practical Implementation

The article examines the historical, logico-conceptual and politico-pragmatic content of an ideological trend, such as “social traditionalism”. The idea of combining socialism with the core tradition of Orthodoxy can be traced back in our history to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In Konstantin Leontiev’s statements, in particular. Later on, it appeared among the members of the “Christian Brotherhood of Struggle”: Valentin Sventsitsky, Vladimir Ern, and the Priest Pavel Florensky. Nikolai Berdyaev upgraded this idea to its logical fi nish, by describing the phenomenon of “Russian communism” as the metamorphosis of Russian religiosity: they created the Third Rome, but got the Third International instead. Alexander Shchipkov’s thesis, according to which the traditional ideological paradigm of modernity (“liberalism — conservatism — socialism”) is undergoing the reformatting stage and is being replaced by the “nationalism — socialism — traditionalism” paradigm, implies that “liberalism” is being driven out by “nationalism” as its alternative. However, in the fi eld of international relations, “nationalism” can be interpreted as a projection of liberal individualism justifying the right of a national state to freedom, that is, sovereignty. Against the background of evaluating the outcome of the Cold War, the USSR breakup can be understood as the victory of liberalism over socialism. Today, China embodies the idea of socialism, while the liberal West faces inner culture wars: liberalism is being attacked by supporters of multiculturalism and the “cancel culture”. In the course of evaluating the prospects of “social traditionalism” as a Russian state ideology, one should take into account that both the United Russia party and President Vladimir Putin defi ne their ideological position as “conservatism”. At the same time, the latest edition defi nes presidential conservatism as a political management technology. In this regard, the defi nition of traditionalism as a “set of methods” and “procedures for ethicization” proposed by Alexander Shchipkov can also be considered technological rather than ideological. But in this case, a contradiction emerges: social traditionalism claims to replace conservatism precisely as an ideology, striving to synthesize socialism and Christianity. Socialism becomes the result of an arbitrary choice procedure, while Christianity remains a tradition, but not in the sense of the basic defi nition of traditionalism.

Восприятие политических партий и их лидеров на фоне актуального психологического состояния российского общества

The article is devoted to the images of the Russian parties and their leaders against the background of the changes in the psychological state of our society in the modern conditions. The study was based on qualitative and quantitative research conducted in late 2022 — early 2023 in 22 regions. The object of the study were five parties represented in the State Duma (United Russia, The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, The Liberal Democratic Party, A Just Russia — For Truth, New People) and their leaders (A.Turchak, G.Zyuganov, V.Zhirinovsky, L.Slutsky, S.Mironov, and A.Nechaev). The research methodology included a survey, an in-depth interview, a semantic differential, a projective test, and a directed associations method. The study was not representative of the country as a whole, but the sample was balanced in terms of gender, age and education. The study demonstrated that the high level of anxiety and concerns of citizens about military actions did not affect a number of perception parameters, such as the attitude towards parties as a necessary part of the democratic process, the lack of a clear ideological identification of parties, and the personification of party images. At the same time, some parameters have undergone a significant transformation. First, the perception of a position of parties within the framework of the dichotomy “power — opposition” has changed. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, A Just Russia — For Truth and The Liberal Democratic Party have lost a significant part of their image as opposition in the perception of citizens, while support for United Russia, which is clearly associated with the authorities, has increased. Second, the popularity of a flamboyant style has become a thing of the past, and today the image of the centrist party is the most attractive for voters. The new political reality requires that parties work to consolidate the society in the face of an external threat rather than demonstrate their independence and distance themselves from the authorities. Third, if before the beginning of the 2020s the demand for conservatism prevailed in the society, in the current situation social democratic and liberal values are more in demand.