United Party Research Articles

ISSUES AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GENERAL ELECTION OF 1981

ONLY IN SOUTH AFRICA, perhaps, could a General election in which the ruling party was returned with 131 of the 165 seats in the House of Assembly be regarded as disastrous for the Government. For the National Party (NP), however, the first loss of seats since 1970 was compounded by a far greater loss of votes, which raised the spectre of cracks in the monolith of Afrikaner unity. Dramatic growth in support for the extreme right-wing Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) overshadowed gains made by the official Progressive Federal Party (PFP) Opposition, and gave no comfort to advocates of internal reform and rapprochement with the West. The result of the election was widely interpreted as a major personal setback for the Prime Minister, Mr P. W. Botha. His reasons for calling a General Election on 29 April, eighteen months before one was due, were the subject of much speculation. Whilst the three previous General Elections had also been held early, the reasons had been obvious: in 1970, to rout the then recently formed HNP; in 1974, to take advantage of internal strife in the United Party; and in 1977, to exploit Opposition disarray following the dissolution of the United Party earlier the same year.l Ostensibly Mr Botha's decision in 1981 was influenced by the large number of by-elections pending throughout the country, largely because of the transfer of Nationalist MPs to the new President's Council,2 and widespread changes in constituency boundaries made

PARTY, POLITY AND BUREAUCRACY: THE ZAMBIAN EDUCATION DEBATE, 1974–77

BETWEEN 1974 AND 1977, at the instigation of the single Party the United National Independence Party (UNIP)1 and the Government, the Zambian people debated the future of their education. The debate took place at a crucial period in the political and social development of the country. On the political level, it was designed to allay fears about the recently declared One Party State,2 involve the people actively in the country's second decade of independence and revive the image of UNIP as the country's leader. On the social level, the aim was to use education to redress the imbalances and inequalities becoming manifest in the society. Education had been seen as a major factor in creating and continuing status and income inequalities both between those living in the towns and those living in the countryside and also within those two areas. It was also intended that a new educational plan would assist the economic development of the country by making education more attuned to the needs of the country. After nearly ten years of independence, President Kaunda and UNIP had declared a one party participatory democracy in December 1972. Kaunda had decided to end the multiparty system not because of the strength of UNIP but from an awareness of its potential as a divisive force. Perpetual struggles had gone on within the party between leaders striving for power positions.3 These internal dissensions had led to the formation of breakaway parties such as the United Party and the United Peoples Party. Grass roots organizers lost influence as their power to deliver patronage lessened dramatically with the fall in the price of copper in the early seventies.4 As a mobilizing force the party was weak: less than 40 per cent of the electorate turned out for the first elections of the new One-Party State in early 1973. In its heyday, both before and after independence, UNIP had rightly prided itself on its ability to mobilize people to vote. As Harries-Jones wrote, 'Overall, UNIP was far more effective [in political mobilization] than many West African political parties'.5

Local officials of the polish united workers' party, 1956–75

Local officials of the polish united workers' party, 1956–75

The German Nationalist People's Party: The Conservative Dilemma in the Weimar Republic

The German Nationalist People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) was founded after the German Revolution of November 1918 when members from several right-wing political groups the German Conservative party, the Free Conservatives, the National Liberals, the Christian Social and volkisch groups joined forces.1 Whereas hitherto a splintered right could be assured that imperial power would oppose radical policies, such electorally weak groups faced political impotence in the new democratic republic. The foundation of the DNVP sought to give them influence in the new political system through a united conservative party with a wide political and social appeal. Throughout the 1920s however, the DNVP was never agreed on the extent to which, as a party dedicated to the restoration of the monarchy, it should cooperate in an apparently illegitimate political framework. Hans von Lindeiner-Wildau, the party's general secretary after 1919, expressed the dilemma in the following terms: 'The fundamental rejection of an illegitimate state dictated a clear stance of opposition, but the feeling of personal involvement with the fate of the state, which is the essence of conservative thought, encouraged constructive cooperation.'2 Although the DNVP professed to be a conservative party, in the 1920s there was no agreement on the meaning of conservatism. Attempts to define a German National philosophy merely reflected the views of strands within the party and were not valid for the movement as a whole.

Enkele implikasies van die Erika Theron‐verslag vir die toekomstige staatkundige ontwikkeling van Suid‐Afrika

Abstract The purpose of this article is to evaluate some politically relevant findings, recommendations and assumptions (underlying the recommendations) of the Theron Commission of inquiry into matters relating to the coloured population group. The report of this commission has a direct bearing on all future political developments in South Africa. Firstly, the orientations of the majority and minority members of the commission towards the issue of institutionalised vs optional separation of individuals and groups in society, are analysed. These orientations manifested themselves in several majority and minority recommendations pertaining to the provision of separate facilities and group areas for Coloureds, as well as the system of race classification. The majority favoured the abolition of separate facilities for Coloureds, the institution of common business and industrial areas and a slackening of the rigid race classification system, emphasising thereby the importance of the liberty of the individual. The minority group favoured the direct opposite view, emphasising the vested interests of the White group in the South African society by advocating more institutionalised separation between ethnic groups. Several shortcomings in the report regarding the aspects mentioned above, are also pointed out. Secondly, the findings and recommendations of the commission regarding the viability of the C.R. C. as an ethnic or communal authority, are analysed. As a result of constitutional defects, jurisdictional overlapping with other authorities and massive opposition by the Coloured population, the C.R. C. is found not viable. On this basis, the potential importance and operationalisation of the concepts of “communal authorities” formulated in the “federal” frameworks proposed by the United Party, the N.R.P. and Sprocas as well as that of the Turnhalle Conference, are questioned. The following hypothesis, substantiated by the findings of the Theron Commission, is put forward: One centralized collective political structure with federal characteristics seems to be the only realistic way of effectively accommodating the diverse political interests of especially Whites, Indians and Coloureds in South Africa. In the third place, the commission's constitutional recommendations are analysed. They consist of requests for a new system of government (not modeled on the Westminister type) in South Africa; direct representation of Coloureds in political decision‐making bodies; and a committee of experts to formulate particulars of the proposed schemes. The brevity of these recommendations is criticised and seen as insufficient to operationalise the objectives of the Commission. Fourthly, the government's reaction to the Theron report is analysed and it is concluded that the government apparently accepted the minority group's constitutional recommendations, although the cabinet committee's report on adaptions to the present Westminster system of government constitutes an implied attempt by the government to implement some of the constitutional findings and recommendations of the commission, but several problems in this regard still exist.

A note on finance committees in Western Australian non‐labor politics 1920–26

B. D. GRAHAM'S authoritative article on non-labor finance committees contains only a very brief section on Western Australia. The bulk of his material and the argument flowing from it pertains mainly to the states on the eastern seaboard. New evidence, however, has become available in Western Australia since Graham wrote his article, and it is now possible to delineate in some detail the activities and policies pursued by the National Union and its successor the Consultative Council in that state. This note is based on material culled from a collection of personal papers donated to the State Library of Western Australia by Harold Boas. Boas, an architect, first became interested in non-labor politics in 1911 when he joined the Western Australian Liberal League. Within a year he had become a member of the party's State Executive and secretary of his local branch. He assisted in the foundation of the Young Liberal League of Western Australia, and retained the vice-presidency of the organisation until 1916 when he resigned for war service abroad. Immediately after the war Boas concentrated on reestablishing himself in business, but in 1920 he resumed an active participation in politics by rejoining the State Executive of the Liberal League's successor the National Party. His administrative ability and experience were recognised and he reentered the party machine as treasurer, an office he retained until his resignation in 1926. The early anti-Labor fund raising body in Western Australia was known as the National Union, and led an uncertain and spasmodic existence. It generally resumed activity just before an election lying dormant in non-election years. Reference is made to this body in the first annual report of the organisation which replaced it, the Consultative Council. The United Party . . . had for some years relied upon an extraneous body of interested gentlemen who collected from supporters of the movement a few substantial subscriptions mainly just prior to election periods, and for the purpose only of financing very inefficiently, these elections.

THE POLITICS OF UGANDA AS A ONE-PARTY STATE 1969–1970

WITHIN UGANDA there was in 1969 and 1970 a tendency, among both those who supported President Milton Obote and those who opposed him, to suggest that no significant political activity was taking place. Obote's supporters argued that the Uganda Peoples Congress was a united party leading the majority of the people in the 'Move to the Left'. Obote's opponents on the contrary saw Uganda as a police state, in which any form of opposition to Obote, whether from within or outside the UPC, was impossible. In practice neither characterization bears any significant resemblance to the truth. It is the aim of this article to outline some evidence indicating that there was serious political conflict at the highest level, during the brief but highly important period when Uganda had a de facto one-party state. Uganda achieved independence in 1962 with an uneasy coalition government based on the Uganda People's Congress lead by Obote and the Kabaka Yekka movement (loosely translated as 'Support Only the King'), a traditionalist, locally based party in Buganda.1 A second nation-wide party, the Democratic Party, which drew much of its strength from being identified as a party for Catholics, formed an opposition in parliament. Within two years so many of the Kabaka Yekka and Democratic Party MPs had crossed the floor, that the UPC was able with a comfortable majority to form a government on its own. However the UPC was not in as strong a position as it appeared to be. The party was split into rival factions most notably around John Kakonge and Grace Ibingira, while the Baganda traditionalists resented both the fact that a referendum had resulted in the return of the 'Lost Counties' from their kingdom of Buganda to their traditional rival, Bunyoro, and that KY had been excluded from the government. The tensions cumulated in early 1966 in an attempt to remove Obote, first by getting parliament to request the suspension of the Deputy Commander of the Army, Colonel Amin, while charges against him of corruption and gold smuggling were investigated. In the debate on the motion charges were

Ethnic Voting and Political Change in South Africa

Immediately prior to the 1970 parliamentary election in the Republic of South Africa, 462 white voters in Cape Town were questioned about their demographic backgrounds, voting intentions, and political attitudes. The study showed that ethnicity is the major determinant of party vote: Afrikaners vote for the National Party, the English-speaking for the United Party. SES-related factors predict party identification only insofar as they covary with ethnicity. While a liberalization of political attitudes with rising SES can be observed, this has no bearing on electoral behavior. Party vote is not related to ideological or issue orientations, but is related to the intensity of the voter's identification with his own ethnic group and with white South Africans in general. Voters tend to react positively or negatively to the NP, with the UP serving chiefly as a vehicle for protest votes against the government. The slight drop in NP support in 1970 was due to a key group of abstainers who—while basically Nat supporters—were more liberal than those who said they would vote for the NP. It is “Ambiguous Afrikaners” (those who are changing to an “English” identity), and only some of those, who are defecting completely from their traditional political allegiance. They represent the one sign of potential change in South Africa's uniquely stable political system.

South Africa: Dialogue or Disaster

Perhaps it would be as well to start with the reminder that it is impossible to analyse South African politics in terms of political Right and Left, and quite misleading to try. Neither the United Party nor even the Progressive Party are really to the left of the Nationalist Party in any meaningful way. A case of sorts could be made out for saying that in some respects it is well to the left of the opposition parties, and certainly its policies are far less shy of radical solutions. But as I say, these terms do not really apply in South Africa, where we are living in a different set of dimensions from Europe or America.The two basic drives that power the Nationalist Party are intense Afrikaner nationalism and White colour prejudice. The two are distinct in principle, and there are Afrikaner nationalists of sensibility who take pride in the nationalism and genuinely abjure and deplore the prejudice. But they are few, and in the soul of the average nationalist the two drives are almost identical, or at least serve to boost and intensify each other. One might say, rather academically, that the basic drives of the United Party used to be a kind of Smutsian imperialism and White colour prejudice, but that the imperialism has vanished with the course of events, and so only the colour prejudice is left. It is true, up to a point; U.P. candidates, some of them, have not hesitated to appeal to colour prejudice in their electorates, or in their attacks on some government actions. The Progressive Party bases itself more on reason and the more humane sentiments of the heart, which is why it lacks any potent appeal among the dominant racial group in this country.

The unification of Sinn Fein in 1917

The Easter rising inaugurated a period of violence in Irish history, but its immediate consequence was to spark off a political rather than a military upheaval. The most important development in the next few years was the emergence of a united and organized separatist party which was capable of winning and holding the loyalties of most Irishmen; between 1916 and 1919 the achievements of the Sinn Fein party outweighed in importance those of the Irish Volunteers. This article will examine how the different Sinn Fein elements combined to form a single party, and how they overcame problems which nearly undermined its unity.For some time before the Volunteers resorted to their protest in arms the nationalist party of John Redmond had been in a state of crisis, and its roots had begun to wither even though few traces of decay were yet visible above ground. Its supporters were dismayed by Carson's successful defiance of the Asquith government and by the postponement of home rule until after the end of the war. The party's extremist rivals were growing in strength and influence, encouraged by Griffith's propaganda and by the formation of the Volunteers. The nationalists had become vulnerable to an onslaught from outside their ranks or to erosion from within. Yet until after the turning-point of May 1916 Redmond still retained the grudging and unenthusiastic support of the great majority of the population.

Divided Against Itself: South Africa's White Polity

What many prominent Afrikaners heralded as a new era of independence began on 6 October 1960, when a referendum was held to determine whether or not the populace wished South Africa to become a republic. As in virtually all other aspects of national political action, only Whites could voice their opinion via the ballot. Supported by the largely Afrikaner Nationalist Party and opposed by the predominantly English-stock United Party, the referendum, passed by approximately 850,000 to 776,000 votes, probably constituted one of the best indices of the relative strength of Afrikaner and non-Afrikaner elements among South Africa's ruling White polity.1 This dichotomy within the White elite and the friction which still sustains it have their roots in the late nineteenth century, when the Briton vanquished the Boer. Now, the situation has largely reversed itself while the animosities remain.

Conservatism and Criticism: The Literary Standards of American Whigs, 1845-1852

In I840, after an emotional campaign which substituted slogans and enthusiasm (Tippecanoe, and Tyler too!) for principles and issues, Benjamin Harrison, the Whig candidate, was selected president of the United States. Harrison died shortly after his inauguration, and Tyler, who succeeded to the presidency, broke with the party, which was only a makeshift conglomeration of hastily thrown-together elements, organized to put up some opposition to the Democrats. Whig leaders, including Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, determined to formulate and set before the public an ideology which would represent the principles of the party. For this purpose, they founded, in I845, American Review: A Whig Journal of Politics, Literature, Art, and Science, commonly called the Whig Review. magazine, which appeared monthly, was designed to offset the influence of the Democratic Party's United States Magazine and Democratic Review, a journal in which the Young America group was promulgating what Longfellow called a Loco-foco politico-literary system. first editor of the Whig Review was George H. Colton, 27, a Yale graduate and sometime poet. contents of the first issue provide an idea of the type and scope of material which the magazine offered its readers during the eight years of its existence: Introductory; The Position of

Political Competition and One-party Dominance in Zambia

Thisarticle concerns two important arenas of political competition in Zambia: on the one hand, between parties and, on the other, within the ruling party itself. Competition between political parties exists especially between the United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.) and two small party rivals, the African National Congress (A.N.C.) and the United Party (U.P.). Many U.N.I.P. officials at various levels have looked forward to the establishment of a one-party state in Zambia, on the familiar grounds that minor opposition parties appeal to parochial loyalties: that they oppose constructive programmes irresponsibly and hamper their implementation: and that political opposition is a luxury which diverts time, energy, and money away from the important tasks of development. In pursuit of its objective of eliminating inter-party competition, U.N.I.P. has generally employed two different sets of tactics, based on different assumptions about the strength and potential of the two minor parties.

The Emergence of Towkay Leaders in Party Politics in Sabah

Party politics started among the commercial Chinese in Sabah as indeed among the indigenous peoples by way of a reaction to the Malaysia proposal of May 1961. Though Chinese businessmen or towkays at first strongly opposed it they were cautious about how they should organize themselves and their protest. The big businessmen of Sandakan, apparently mindful of the relatively small population of the Chinese advised against a Chinese communal party and proposed a communally open one. Jesselton towkays thought in terms of a North Borneo Chinese Association, along the lines of the Malayan Chinese Association but made no move. Chinese leaders seemed to prefer to wait and see what the indigenous people did. The lead was enthusiastically taken by the United National Kadazan Organization, closely followed by the United Sabah National Party and a third party, Pasok Momogun (Son of the Soil) Organization, consisting of Muruts and those akin to the Kadazans but rejected that regional tribal name. In the event the cautious towkays were overtaken by differentiation among themselves. The lowkays' political organization was not only the last to open shop but did so in two different places under two different auspices. For a variety of reasons, the United Party started in February 1962 in Sandakan and the North Borneo Democratic Party began, after an initial reshuffle, in the same period in Jesselton.

The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria

The Ba'th party whose full name was 'The Party of Arab Renaissance', was established and developed in Syria during the forties as a party of the urban petit-bourgeois intelligentsia. Its founders were Michel Aflak and Salah-ad-Din-al-Beitar, and its motto was 'one Arab nation with an eternal mission'. Its ideology was based on a doctrine formulated in the party platform adopted at the first convention in I947. Essentially, this doctrine was a blend of nationalist pan-Arab radicalism with a moderate social programme agrarian reform and partial nationalization without infringing individual property rights, and with a neutralist policy towards the global struggle between the communist and western blocs. In order to emphasize the aspiration for unity, the party was from the start organized not on a regional Syrian basis but on an all-Arab one. Branches were set up in various Arab countries, and from I954 these were led by the all-Arab party leadership whose headquarters were, for the most part, in Damascus. Although its main support came from the Sunnite and Christian intelligentsia in Damascus, it set up branches in the provincial towns and in the areas populated by the two large communities of the Alawis in the north and Druzes in the south, as well as among the peasants and workers. Special attention was paid to army officers. In the early I95os the Ba'th party merged with Akram al-Haurani's Arab Socialist Party, whose stronghold was its place of origin, the central Syrian city of Hama, and the united party was called the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. The rise of the party in the fifties was the main factor prompting the Syrian parliament to decide in principle on a federal union with Egypt (I956). Faced with the threat, real or imaginary, of a communist takeover at the end of I957, the party leaders decided to implement the principle immediately. President Nasser's terms were as follows: a full union not a federative one and the aboli-

P. L. Lavrov's Concept of the Party

INTENSIFICATION of revolutionary activity in twentieth-century tsarist Russia expressed itself in the formation of the great parties of the revolution: the Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary parties.1 It had long been recognized that an organized party was needed to lead an aroused people against the governmental power, and many revolutionaries in Russia looked to the parties which had been formed in western Europe during the nineteenth century to provide models for party activity. A number of secret parties were first established in Russia during the days of the Decembrists. It was Lenin who developed the party into a disciplined force for the revolutionary elite, but it was Patr Lavrovich Lavrov (1823-1900) who was the most prolific of the earlier contributors to the theory of the revolutionary party.2 Lavrov informed a generation of the Russian intelligentsia that its objective must be the creation of a united party, disciplined enough to lead the people in a successful revolution.

Self-Confidence and Self-Criticism in South Africa

THREE times since 1948 the National Party has won the parliamentary elections in South Africa, and each time by an increased margin. These successive victories reflect the dominant place which Afrikaners have secured within the White oligarchy. The elections of last April gave the Nationalists 103 seats in the new parliament, compared to 53 for the predomi nantly English-speaking United Party. A wave of satisfaction and self-confidence is sweeping through the Afrikaner community as a result. Yet now that their political opponents have been crushed, a new spirit of constructive criticism is emerging within Afrikanerdom.

The RSDLP and Joseph Fels: A Study in Intercultural Contact

THAT travel throughout foreign countries and acquaintance with different peoples foster mutual respect, toleranice, and good will by a deepening understanding of human affairs is a commonplace of the liberal tradition. Yet in view of the increasing number of initernational and intercultural encounters in recent times one begins to wonder if this optimistic assumption might not need modification. Inideedi it may even be urged that the details and consequences of such contacts are given far too little attention in the study of modern history despite their obviLously profound significance for the course of human affairs. One remarkable case study, illustrative of some of the extraordinarily complicated situations which may arise from an encounter between different cultures and nationialities, was the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party (RSDLP) which met in London in May, 1907. This occasion brought some three hundred Russian revolutionaries to the epicenter of the western, capitalist world for a three-week stay, among them many of the future masters of the Soviet Union, including Lenin, T'rotsky, and Stalin. And they brought wvith them from home an uncertain atmosphere of waning revolution and reviving despotism. For repercussions of Russia's recent disastrous war with Japan and the ensuing internal upheaval were still being, widely felt, while ominious shadows of the future stretched across the sensitive negotiations already underway toward an Anglo-Russian entente. This congrress turned out to be the last such formal gathering of Russia's Marxist revolutionaries before 1917 and markled the peak effort attained by the united party before the Russian Revolution, with not just one major deleo-ation but five being-, present. These were Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Polish Social Deemocrats, Lettis'h Social Democrats, and the Jewish Bund. However, the record of this congress embodies not only the facts of its physical presence in the British capital but a strange note of dissonance in addition, a monetary

Union of South Africa: Politics of White Supremacy

party, which represented both a more extreme Afrikaner nationalism than had held such power before and a more clear-cut, legalistic approach to the relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. Though they governed at first with the support of the more moderate Afrikaner party, the Nationalists achieved independent political power in 1950 through the elections in SouthWest Africa, and an over-all majority of 29 seats in the House of Assembly in the general election of April 1953. Moreover, although the Opposition parties-the United party and the Labour party-which were united in an election pact, polled some hundred thousand more votes in 1953 than did the Nationalists,2 the latter increased their percentage of the popular vote over that received in 1948 more than did their

The South African Scene

is an Arabic saying, dating from the days of the slave traders, that if one played on a flute in Zanzibar all Africa danced. This was a picturesque way of saying that any event in Africa had its repercussions all over the continent. It is as true today as it was two hundred years ago. Perhaps the most important single event in Africa during the past year has been Dr. Malan's victory in the South African general election last April. This victory re-endorsing a policy of militant White supremacy has been watched with mixed feelings by European minorities in East and Central Africa and by millions of Africans, at different stages of political development all over the Dark Continent. For all practical purposes the election was fought between two parties, the Nationalist Party, led by Dr. Daniel Malan, and the United Party, formerly led by General Smuts and now under the leadership of Mr. Strauss. The South African Labour Party contested a few constituencies under an electoral agreement with the United Party but the influence of this party in South African affairs is slight. When parliament dissolved before the election Dr. Malan's Nationalist Party had a majority of thirteen seats over all the other parties. The election gave him a majority of twenty-nine seats. About this result two points must be made clear. Dr. Malan increased his majority in the election, but, as in 1948, he did not poll as many votes as his opponents. That his majority was as large as 29 seats on a minority vote, was due to the peculiarities of the South African electoral system which weighs the country constituencies over the urban ridings. The other point is, that, only a handful of non-Europeans voted at all. Some of the forty-eight thousand Cape Coloureds (people of mixed descent) who remained on the common electoral roll in spite of Dr. Malan's efforts to remove them in 1952, voted in the Cape Province. Apart from this exception, the election was a White affair,