United Nations Special Commission Research Articles

Orbis non sufficit — Co-operation and Discord in Global Space and Disarmament Governance

Summary This article seeks to contribute to the burgeoning debate on space diplomacy by examining the historic interplay between diplomatic discussions on outer space and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It studies three significant cases since the Cold War, when space technologies constituted a significant topic in diplomatic exchanges and in advancing foreign policy objectives related to global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The cases trace early negotiations between Washington and Moscow on using satellites to detect nuclear detonations, to multilateral attempts at establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and conclude with a study on the use of satellite imagery in inspections under the auspices of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq.

Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). 4. The Destruction of Iraqi Chemical Weapons

After the defeat of Iraqi army in Kuwait in February 1991, on April 3, the UN Security Council (UN Security Council) adopted Resolution 687, that «decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities». This UN operation was not the first forced disarmament of vanquished by victors, but it gave great impetus to the completion of the work on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, i.e. the destruction of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The aim of this article was to show the process of Iraqi`s chemical weapons destruction. The destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons included the formation of legal basis (United Nations Security Council Resolution 687); the establishment of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect and oversee the destruction or elimination of Iraq’s chemical weapons directly on Iraqi territory; certain measures of political, economic (UN sanctions) and military coercion (the US and the UK military operation «Desert Fox»). In summer 1991, UNSCOM formed a Destruction Advisory Panel to develop technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons, toxic substances and their precursors. Their destruction was carried out in the period October 1992 to May 1994 on the territory of the Muthanna State Establishment. Sarin, cyclosarin, tabun and their precursors were destroyed by hydrolysis in aqueous alkaline solution using a repurposed production facility. Thus 76 tons of sarin and sarin/cyclosarin mixture, as well as 40 tons of tabun were destroyed. For the sulfur mustard, the high-temperature direct burning method was used at the special factory, established under the project of the Destruction Advisory Panel. Thus were destroyed around 400 tons of liquid sulfur mustard. Chemical munitions and containers, after the extraction of poisonous agents, were destroyed using a specially developed technique of explosive ventilation and burning. 30 chemical warheads for Al-Hussein ballistic missiles, 12,8 thousand 155-mm mustard shells, 40,5 thousand 122 mm rockets for MLRS, filled with sarin/cyclosarin, were destroyed. In general, UNSCOM managed to solve the problem of chemical disarmament of Iraq. The article describes in details the Iraq’s chemical weapons destruction technologies

Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). 4. The Destruction of Iraqi Chemical Weapons

After the defeat of Iraqi army in Kuwait in February 1991, on April 3, the UN Security Council (UN Security Council) adopted Resolution 687, that «decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities». This UN operation was not the first forced disarmament of vanquished by victors, but it gave great impetus to the completion of the work on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, i.e. the destruction of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The aim of this article was to show the process of Iraqi`s chemical weapons destruction. The destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons included the formation of legal basis (United Nations Security Council Resolution 687); the establishment of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect and oversee the destruction or elimination of Iraq’s chemical weapons directly on Iraqi territory; certain measures of political, economic (UN sanctions) and military coercion (the US and the UK military operation «Desert Fox»). In summer 1991, UNSCOM formed a Destruction Advisory Panel to develop technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons, toxic substances and their precursors. Their destruction was carried out in the period October 1992 to May 1994 on the territory of the Muthanna State Establishment. Sarin, cyclosarin, tabun and their precursors were destroyed by hydrolysis in aqueous alkaline solution using a repurposed production facility. Thus 76 tons of sarin and sarin/cyclosarin mixture, as well as 40 tons of tabun were destroyed. For the sulfur mustard, the high-temperature direct burning method was used at the special factory, established under the project of the Destruction Advisory Panel. Thus were destroyed around 400 tons of liquid sulfur mustard. Chemical munitions and containers, after the extraction of poisonous agents, were destroyed using a specially developed technique of explosive ventilation and burning. 30 chemical warheads for Al-Hussein ballistic missiles, 12,8 thousand 155-mm mustard shells, 40,5 thousand 122 mm rockets for MLRS, filled with sarin/cyclosarin, were destroyed. In general, UNSCOM managed to solve the problem of chemical disarmament of Iraq. The article describes in details the Iraq’s chemical weapons destruction technologies.

Assessment of Heavy Metal Contamination in the Soil of Al-Muthanna Storage Site using Geospatial techniques

During the early 90s, military operations and United Nations Special Commission “UNSCOM” teams have destroyed the Iraqi past chemical program. Both operations led to a large number of scattered remnants of contaminated areas. The quantities of hazardous materials, incompletely destructed materials and toxic chemicals were sealed in two bunkers. Lack of appropriate destruction technology led to the spread of contamination around the storage area. This paper aims to introduce the environmental assessment of the hazard contamination in the storage site area using Geomatics analysis technique. The environmental assessment for contamination level of eight main chemical compounds (Chromium Cr, Phosphate PO4, Nitrate NO3, Cadmium Cd, Copper Cu, Nickel Ni, Zinc Zn and Lead Pb) have been assessed and analyzed. Soil samples taken from the grid on the site and its surrounding areas have been investigated and analyzed compared to the reference points. The storage area grid was divided into 30 major sectors. 10 samples from each sector were acquired and evaluated. The assessment results indicated that Cr level exceeded the permitted level by (180) times, PO4 level exceeded the permitted level by (35) times, Cu by (1050) times over the permitted level and Ni level exceeds the permitted level over by (50) times. Activity level of Zn in the soil samples of the study area also exhibits large variability with (16000) times over the permitted level on the surrounding isolation protection on the north-west Wall. Very high Contamination spot activity of Pb was found in Destruction zone, about (1350) times over the background level. There is no activity detected for the Cadmium and Nitrate in the storage area site.

Detection of Nutrients and Major Ions at Al Muthanna Storage Site Soil

In the early 90s military operations and United Nations Special Commission “UNSCOM” teams have been destroyed the past Iraqi chemical program. Both operations led an extensive number of scattered remnants of contaminated areas. The quantities of hazardous materials, incomplete destructed materials, and toxic chemicals were sealed in two bunkers. Deficiency of appropriate destruction technology led to spreading the contamination around the storage site. This paper aims to introduce the environmental detection of the contamination in the storage site area using geospatial analysis technique. The environmental contamination level of nutrients and major ions such as sulphate (SO4), potassium (K), sodium (Na), magnesium (Mg), calcium (Ca), chlorine (Cl), phosphate (PO4) and nitrate (NO3) were detected and analyzed. The grid soil samples on the site and surrounding areas have been investigated, analyzed, and compared to the background points. The storage area grid was divided into 30 major sectors and all samples were evaluated from acquires 10 samples from each sector. The detection results have indicated that SO4 level was exceeded the permitted level by 25 times, K level also exceeded the permitted level but by 460, Na ions were 85 times greater the permitted level. Mg level was 180 times higher than that of permitted content. Activity level of Ca in the soil samples of the study area has also exhibited variability with nine times over the permitted level near the bunkers. However, very high contamination spot activity of Cl was found in destruction zone about which 44 times over the background level was found while PO4 level exceeded the permitted level by 35 times over the permitted level and there was no activity detected for the nitrate in the storage area site.

Living Weapons: Biological Weapons and International Security

In the summer of 1996, as a (much younger) Army infectious disease physician, I headed off to a new assignment with the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland. It was a heady time to be entering the niche field of biodefense. Five years before the events of 9/11 and the subsequent “Amerithrax” attacks would become an integral part of the world’s consciousness, USAMRIID was (with the exception of a few veterinary laboratories studying anthrax, brucellosis, Q fever, and similar zoonotic diseases) the “only game in town.” The institute had quietly wrestled with issues of medical biodefense since the United States shuttered its old offensive biowarfare program in 1969. As an assignee to its division of operational medicine, I was enamored of my ability to master the sparse literature and science of the field and soon became an “expert.” Such luxurious self-confidence is no longer warranted (if it ever was) or even possible. The field has, for better or worse, burgeoned in the decade since 9/11. Hundreds of texts and thousands of scientific articles now address every aspect of the daunting problems of biowarfare and bioterrorism defense, and mastery of such material is beyond the grasp of any one scientist, diplomat, or arms-control expert. Fortunately, several good reviews exist to guide those wishing to gain a basic understanding of these complex issues. Was yet another treatise thus necessary? My initial reaction was an emphatic “no,” until I read Gregory Koblentz’s book, Living Weapons. Koblentz, deputy director of a graduate degree program in biodefense at George Mason University, tackles the myriad issues surrounding biodefense from a policy perspective. In so doing, however, he puts forth a readable, succinct, yet thorough review of the field. After a crisp introduction to the history of biowarfare, he focuses on the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to nonproliferation efforts aimed at state-sponsored weapons programs: treaty compliance verification, program oversight, and intelligence. He then addresses the parallel problems posed by nonstate actors and terrorists and closes with a prescription for reducing the dangers of uncontrolled biology. A tour de force of bureaucratic hurdles and treaty-compliance issues would hardly seem compelling reading for all but a few die-hard policy wonks. Not so in the case of Koblentz’s text. Even though his penchant for frequent summary makes for some redundancy, he provides an extremely readable, yet comprehensive, compendium of the implications for national security posed by wayward biology. Moreover, he does so without the ideological bias often found in other treatises on this subject. Specifically, Koblentz delivers a detailed review of the United Nations Special Commission inspections in Iraq and the lessons they provide. He similarly deals with the now-discredited 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, which provided much of the impetus for President George Bush’s decision to invade Iraq. Yet, he analyzes these efforts and their implications for diplomats, policymakers, and arms-control experts without descending into partisan politics or anti-US demagoguery. In summary, Living Weapons is a thoroughly readable book, filled with enough anecdotes to capture the reader’s interest. But, more importantly, it provides a disturbing yet refreshing look at the myriad obstacles confronting those who would play a role—whether political, diplomatic, or scientific—in attempting to rein in the use of biology in war and terror. It is a must read for graduate students and experts alike.

The Complete Genome Sequence of Bacillus thuringiensis Al Hakam

Bacillus thuringiensis is an insect pathogen that is widely used as a biopesticide (E. Schnepf, N. Crickmore, J. Van Rie, D. Lereclus, J. Baum, J. Feitelson, D. R. Zeigler, and D. H. Dean, Microbiol. Mol. Biol. Rev. 62:775-806, 1998). Here we report the finished, annotated genome sequence of B. thuringiensis Al Hakam, which was collected in Iraq by the United Nations Special Commission (L. Radnedge, P. Agron, K. Hill, P. Jackson, L. Ticknor, P. Keim, and G. Andersen, Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 69:2755-2764, 2003).

Is the Current UN and US Policy toward Iraq Effective?

On a day like this day 10 years ago, evil and all those who made Satan their protector lined up one place, facing those who represented the will to defend what is right. Iraq has remained, the people have remained, the army has remained. Iraq has triumphed over the enemies of the Saddam Hussein, 17 January 2001 (1) More than ten years ago, President George Bush ordered US troops into the Persian Gulf response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. At the end of the Gulf War 1991, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq-UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661--which were to remain place until the provisions of UNSCR 687 were complied, with, mainly the certification that Iraq has destroyed all of its weapons of mass destruction. In 1991, the UN expressed grave concern over the humanitarian situation and proposed a number of measures that would allow Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to meet the population's basic needs while the sanctions remained place. Iraq refused all offers. Over the following five years there was widespread suffering, with food shortages, absence of essential medicines, and a general deterioration essential social services. (2) In 1996, the UN established the Oil-for-Food program, which allowed Iraq to sell oil for the purchase of goods essential for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Weapons inspections Iraq, conducted by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), stopped prior to the December 1998 bombing of Iraq. Inspections have not been resumed, while sanctions and the Oil-for-Food program remain effect. Is this policy successful? Sanctions have kept Saddam in his box, but the Oil-for-Food program has allowed him to blame the UN for doing little to stop the widespread suffering and deprivation of his people. In addition, Saddam has not allowed weapons inspectors inside Iraq for the last three years, and support for the economic embargo on the international front is wavering. Now the situation is made even more complicated by the war on terrorism and Saddam's stated support for those who would harm the United States and the Western world. Still, President George W. Bush and his administration have opportunity to revisit the policy toward Iraq and devise a strategy that will work. This article reviews the current sanctions and Oil-for-Food policy Iraq from both national security and humanitarian intervention perspectives. The article is organized into three main sections--a review of the background, analysis of the current policy terms of national security and humanitarian criteria, and a recommendation for future policy. Background The comprehensive sanctions of UNSCR 661 were some of the strictest sanctions ever levied against a nation. In addition, April 1991 the UN passed UNSCR 687, which required Iraq to destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and stop all research into WMD, and which subjected Iraq to monitoring and verification. Soon after the implementation of the sanctions, the UN sent a mission to Iraq, which reported the makings of an imminent [human] catastrophe...if minimum life supporting needs are not rapidly met. (3) It was not until May 1996, however, that Saddam agreed to the Oil-for-Food program when he accepted UNSCR 986. The start of the program was delayed another seven months until December 1996 while Iraqi officials argued over the terms of implementation. Under the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq is allowed to sell oil for the purchase and import of food, medicine and medical equipment, and other goods for essential civilian needs. It is also allowed to import repair parts, equipment, and materials for use water sanitation, education, electricity, agriculture, and de-mining operations. UNSCR 1153 expanded the program to include repair to the civilian infrastructure and upgrading of the Iraqi oil infrastructure to enable it to pump the increased $5. …

Butler's blame: The end of UNSCOM

As the head of the United Nations Special Commission (uNscoM), Richard Butler's leadership was the centre of much controversy. In his book, Butler takes the opportunity to place blame firmly on others for the woes and collapse of this unprecedented experiment with imposed disarmament by a UN organisation. Although the title of the book leads one to expect a broader discussion of disarmament, the assigning of blame begins on the second page and barely relents in the final chapter, which is dedicated to this broader topic. Weapons of mass destruction, the Security Council's disarmament requirements and the details of interaction between UNSCOM and Iraq constitute a complex and technical subject; Butler may be commended for avoiding the hazards of boring or confusing his audience because the book is very easy to read. One problem, however, with such a reader-friendly text is that its analysis suffers. Butler asserts that the Iraqi government employed the logic of an insurgent that sought 'to weaken UNSCOM through any tactical means' (p 97) but fails to elaborate. When he does discuss Iraqi tactics, he is prone to exaggeration or misinterpretation. For instance, he portrays experiments in developing a missile with a range close to the maximum permitted under Security Council Resolution 687 as a breakout effort and illegal. In fact, it was legal, and represented a test of the limits of UN restrictions and enforcement rather than a breakout. Meanwhile UN tactics receive scant attention. Because the tactics of both sides matter a great deal in explaining the disarmament mission's successes and failures,' it is unfortunate that the former head of UNSCOM fails to discuss and to analyse them. Rather than analysing the power relations between UNSCOM and Iraq, Butler is intent on addressing some of his many critics. But instead of countering multiple charges, Butler argues that the individual leading the organisation was irrelevant

The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security

The leader of the United Nations' weapons inspection team issues a scathing indictment of the West's failure to stop Saddam Hussein--and a stern warning about the future.. The West may face no greater enemy than Saddam Hussein, and yet, as Richard Butler makes clear in The Greatest Threat, the West would rather bury its head in the Mesopotamian sands than deal with the problem. As the head of UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission that was supposed to regularly inspect Iraq for weapons violations after the Gulf War, Butler was the West's sheriff--the one person on the ground with the authority to shut the Iraqis down if he caught them cheating. And he was not the type to surrender to the Iraqis, not when he knew what was at stake. But Butler's authority was undermined behind his back. As he reveals in this outspoken, finger-pointing, newsbreaking book, Kofi Annan agreed to Hussein's outrageous demands and then claimed victory. Russia's foreign minister took secret payoffs from the Iraqis in exchange for his support. The French, eager to do business with the dictator, undercut American efforts to force Hussein to comply. And the result is that, despite Iraq's supposed defeat, Saddam Hussein has very likely resumed building nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that could be used against Israel, Turkey, or even the United States.The Greatest Threat is arousing, disturbing reading for anyone interested in American foreign policy, in the breakdown of controls on weapons of mass destruction, or in the precarious state of international relations. The West may face no greater enemy than Saddam Hussein, and yet, as Richard Butler makes clear in The Greatest Threat, the West would rather bury its head in the Mesopotamian sands than deal with the problem. As the head of UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission that was supposed to regularly inspect Iraq for weapons violations after the Gulf War, Butler was the West's sheriff--the one person on the ground with the authority to shut the Iraqis down if he caught them cheating. And he was not the type to surrender to the Iraqis, not when he knew what was at stake. But Butler's authority was undermined behind his back. As he reveals in this outspoken, finger-pointing, newsbreaking book, Kofi Annan agreed to Hussein's outrageous demands and then claimed victory. Russia's foreign minister took secret payoffs from the Iraqis in exchange for his support. The French, eager to do business with the dictator, undercut American efforts to force Hussein to comply. And the result is that, despite Iraq's supposed defeat, Saddam Hussein has very likely resumed building nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that could be used against Israel, Turkey, or even the United States.The Greatest Threat is arousing, disturbing reading for anyone interested in American foreign policy, in the breakdown of controls on weapons of mass destruction, or in the precarious state of international relations. *Butler is a commanding, charismatic, outspoken person who is passionately concerned about this subject Full of stories of political intrigue at high levels and an insider's portrait of major world figures .

Biological warfare against crops.

List of Figures List of Tables Preface Acknowledgements Glossary Introduction Iraqi and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) A Study of Disease in Plants Anti-Crop Biological Warfare and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) The Context of US Biological Warfare Research and Development Aspects of Anti-Crop Biological Warfare Activity, France, Germany, and Japan Post-World War Two United States Anti-Crop Biological Warfare Some Aspects of UK and US Anti-Crop Warfare Collaboration Between 1943 and 1958 Munitions for Anti-Crop BW Agents Targets Conclusions Related International Prohibitions and Controls on Dangerous Plant Diseases Appendices Notes Bibliography Index

Iraq: In Wake of December Air Campaign, U.N. Security Council Members Debate Iraq Policy, Establish Assessment Panels

All of you have seen The Washington Post story of today saying that the Secretary-General is suspicious that the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) assisted United States intelligence efforts in Iraq.

A convergence of weapons

Over the course of the post‐war era, two types of weapons—weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (traditionally nuclear arms, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery systems), and conventional arms, such as tanks, artillery, aircraft, and naval vessels—have become separated conceptually by scholars and policy makers. This has, in turn, produced separate research agendas among scholars. Proliferation research focuses on the countries acquiring WMD technologies, on how WMD technologies are acquired, on the impact of such diffusion, and on what might be done about it. Conventional arms research focuses on arms exports and imports—principally the transfer of major weapons by firms and governments, their motivations, and their consequences. The conceptual division between WMD and conventional arms has also produced separate weapons policies, pursuing separate paths. The Gulf War, for example, induced the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) to try to verify the destruction of Iraq's biological and chemical arsenal, and to halt the Iraqi nuclear program, while the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms—which emerged partly from the perceived Iraqi military buildup—focused on “transparency” or on making arms imports and exports more visible. While conventional wisdom often distinguishes “weapons of mass destruction” and “conventional arms,” in reality they are not completely difFerent. Thus, we should analyze the actual differences and similarities between them, the consequences of overfocusing on the differences, and the advantages of focusing more on the similarities.

Iraq Maintains Uneasy Tolerance Of U.N. Arms Inspections

The Security Council has reviewed the report of 16 April 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (S/1998/332) and the report of 9 April 1998 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (S/1998/312). The Council welcomes the improved access provided to the Special Commission and the IAEA by the Government of Iraq following the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary-General on 23 February 1998 (S/1998/166) and the adoption of its resolution 1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998. The Council calls for continued implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding.

UN Compensation Commission Panel Sets Precedents on Government Claims

While the public’s attention has recently focused on the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and its weapons inspection activities, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC or Commission), another ad hoc UN body created pursuant to Security Council Resolution 687 in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, has been making steady progress in resolving the war reparation claims asserted against Iraq. Nonetheless, the UNCC is under increasing pressure to speed up the claims review process and complete its work expeditiously.

Bioethics and Biological Weapons

Biological weapons, whether wielded by the military forces of nations or by terrorists, will continue to pose a serious threat to international security for the foreseeable future. Although access to toxic material and pathogenic strains of microorganisms is restricted, covert traffic in such agents is as difficult to control as that of illegal drugs. Since international travel of microbiologists qualified to perform applied biological weapons-related research is not restricted, the international bioscientific community must do its part to prevent the proliferation of biological weaponry to nations that now do not possess them and to eliminate these weapons where they presently exist. To prevent acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency must continue their activities in Iraq as called for by United Nations Security Council Resolution 697 (1991), including investigating past weapons programs, inspecting and monitoring suspect facilities, and controlling import of dual-use equipment and supplies. However, to secure peace for the long term, these activities need to be augmented by initiatives taken by nongovernmental scientific organizations. Most important, once sanctions have been lifted by the United Nations, Iraqi scientists must be brought back into the fold of the international scientific community. Communication and collaboration among scientists from all countries encourage shared values, mutual respect, and friendships. Interpersonal scientific contact with Eastern bloc scientists during the Cold War had beneficial effects and offers a model for the reintegration of scientists from countries such as Iraq. The international bioscientific community can take immediate steps to support colleagues in every country, including Iraq and the republics that once constituted the former Soviet Union (FSU), thereby countering the international proliferation of biological weaponry. Of special concern is the risk that scientific and technical workers who once were employed in a national biological weapons program, but now are unemployed or underemployed, might be induced by proliferant countries and terrorist groups to perform illicit biological weapons-related research and development. The best way to prevent this from happening is to provide those scientists with challenging and adequately remunerated work in their home nations. Recognizing this fact, the European Union, Japan, the United States, and other nations have established international programs designed to help weapons laboratories convert to peaceful uses. These programs, including the International Science and Technology Center, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, the International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New Independent States of the FSU, and the Civilian R&D Foundation for the Independent States of the FSU, should be supported and promoted by bioscientists worldwide. Scientists of countries alleged to be sponsoring or supporting biological weapons programs should be encouraged to participate in international scientific meetings, and electronic communication links should be established. In particular, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) and professional societies should help provide the equipment and funding necessary to set up electronic mail and Internet access for scientists from developing countries. Under Article X of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC), which enjoins member countries to cooperate in applied microbiology, BWC members could encourage reciprocal visits between scientists and fund joint research projects involving laboratories of all countries. Through these approaches, scientists of every country would become full partners in international collaborations. In addition, science students from nations suspected of pursuing the acquisition of biological weapons should be invited to international forums that include discussions of ethics in science. The International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, headquartered in Trieste and New Delhi, might lead such an effort. Scientists imbued with a strong sense of ethics will be more inclined to slow the progress of biological weapons-related research or alert outsiders to activities that violate international law. The codes of ethics promulgated by professional societies such as ICSU and the American Society for Microbiology can provide useful guidance for action.

The Application of The UNSCOM Experience To International Biological Arms

The activities of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which has investigated Iraq's biological weapons program, is presented as a model for international arms control. A detailed first-hand description and evaluation of UNSCOM's activities shows that its success depended on the quality of the inspectors and their human intelligence capacity. Discrepancies in Iraq's extensive and well-concealed biological weapons program was the key to revelation of the extent of the Iraqi biological weapons program. Each step in UNSCOM's painstaking investigation of the Iraqi program is discussed.

Chemical analysis of environmental samples collected in Iraq: Analysis for the presence of chemical warfare agents

AbstractNineteen samples from the United Nations Special Commission 65 on Iraq (UNSCOM 65) were analyzed for chemical warfare (CW) related compounds using a variety of spectroscopic and chromatographic techniques including multinuclear NMR, GC (phosphorus, sulfur and atomic emission detection), GC/MS (electron impact and chemical ionization), tandem MS, HPLC/ion chromatography, HPLC/thermospray/MS, FTIR, ICP and GFAA. The samples consisted of one piece of cloth, one piece of wood, six waters, six soils, two vegetation samples and two mortar shell crosscut sections. No intact CW agents were detected; however, diethyl phosphoric acid was unambiguously identified in three of the water samples and ethyl phosphoric acid was tentatively identified, at lower levels, in one of the water samples. Diethyl phosphoric acid and ethyl phosphoric acid are degradation products of munitions‐grade Tabun (GA), an organophosphorus nerve agent. However, these compounds are also degradation products of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) scheduled compound Amiton as well as many commercially available pesticides.

Biological Sampling and Analysis Procedures for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq

In June/July 1994, I was fortunate in having been selected by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to be the chief inspector (CI) of one of the most interesting inspections conducted by the commission, namely UNSCOM 84/BW6. This particular inspection was fascinating because of its complexity—the team not only conducted inspections of Iraqi biological research and production facilities, it also excavated a site that UNSCOM surmised might contain materials from Iraq's former BW program. As such, this inspection was the first time that UNSCOM collected environmental samples for analysis. In this paper I discuss my experiences during this inspection and comment on the effectiveness of sampling and analysis as a verification measure.

On-Site Inspection Measures and Interviews

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.