Butler's blame: The end of UNSCOM

Abstract

As the head of the United Nations Special Commission (uNscoM), Richard Butler's leadership was the centre of much controversy. In his book, Butler takes the opportunity to place blame firmly on others for the woes and collapse of this unprecedented experiment with imposed disarmament by a UN organisation. Although the title of the book leads one to expect a broader discussion of disarmament, the assigning of blame begins on the second page and barely relents in the final chapter, which is dedicated to this broader topic. Weapons of mass destruction, the Security Council's disarmament requirements and the details of interaction between UNSCOM and Iraq constitute a complex and technical subject; Butler may be commended for avoiding the hazards of boring or confusing his audience because the book is very easy to read. One problem, however, with such a reader-friendly text is that its analysis suffers. Butler asserts that the Iraqi government employed the logic of an insurgent that sought 'to weaken UNSCOM through any tactical means' (p 97) but fails to elaborate. When he does discuss Iraqi tactics, he is prone to exaggeration or misinterpretation. For instance, he portrays experiments in developing a missile with a range close to the maximum permitted under Security Council Resolution 687 as a breakout effort and illegal. In fact, it was legal, and represented a test of the limits of UN restrictions and enforcement rather than a breakout. Meanwhile UN tactics receive scant attention. Because the tactics of both sides matter a great deal in explaining the disarmament mission's successes and failures,' it is unfortunate that the former head of UNSCOM fails to discuss and to analyse them. Rather than analysing the power relations between UNSCOM and Iraq, Butler is intent on addressing some of his many critics. But instead of countering multiple charges, Butler argues that the individual leading the organisation was irrelevant