United Nations Climate Negotiations Research Articles

Leading from the Frontline: A History of Pacific Climate Diplomacy

ABSTRACT Pacific Island states have, for decades, considered climate change a threat to their security. In 1991, island leaders declared global warming and sea level rise as serious environmental threats, and that their ‘cultural, economic and physical survival’ was at risk. Pacific Island countries have since played a disproportionate role in United Nations climate negotiations, working as a diplomatic bloc to shape new rules and to drive multilateral cooperation to reduce emissions. Pacific Island states have also sought greater recognition of climate change as a security threat. This article considers the history of Pacific climate diplomacy. It explains how Pacific Island countries have played a key role in the global response to the climate crisis and outlines the history of regional climate politics in the Pacific Islands Forum. We also focus on recurring tensions between Pacific Island states and Australia with regard to ambition to tackle climate change.

Least developed countries versus fossil fuel incumbents: strategies, divisions, and barriers at the United Nations climate negotiations

Least developed countries versus fossil fuel incumbents: strategies, divisions, and barriers at the United Nations climate negotiations

Tactical Opposition: Obstructing Loss and Damage Finance in the United Nations Climate Negotiations

Abstract In 1991, in meetings constructing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the small island state of Vanuatu introduced a proposal requiring wealthy countries to pay for damages related to sea level rise. More than thirty years later, countries finally agreed to establish a financing mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change. Scholars have observed the slow progress on loss and damage finance, but what tactics did countries use to obstruct negotiations? We answer this question using data from primary and secondary sources, observations at negotiations, and key informant interviews. Our analysis details four periods of obstruction and outlines a typology of fourteen tactics countries have used to delay progress. These tactics limited the issue’s scope, reduced transparency, manipulated language, and advanced nontransformative solutions. These findings contribute to the study of obstructionism in climate governance and can help loss and damage advocates better anticipate and respond to obstruction.

The Paris Agreement and Climate Justice: Inequitable Impacts of Sea Level Rise Associated With Temperature Targets

AbstractAnthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are causing unprecedented changes to the climate. In 2015, at the United Nations (UN) Conference of the Parties in Paris, France, countries agreed to limit the global mean temperature (GMT) increase to 2°C above preindustrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. Due to the long‐term irreversibility of sea level rise (SLR), risks to island and coastal populations are not well encapsulated by the goal of limiting GMT warming by 2100. This review article investigates the climate justice implications of temperature targets in light of our increasing understanding of the spatially variable impact and long temporal commitment to rising seas. In particular we highlight the impact that SLR will have on island states and the role of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in UN climate negotiations. As a case study we review dual impacts from the Antarctic Ice Sheet under a changing climate: (a) recent climate and ice sheet modeling shows that Antarctic melt has the potential to cause rapid SLR with a distinct spatial pattern leading to AOSIS nations experiencing SLR at least 11% higher than the global average and up to 33% higher; and (b) future ice sheet melt will result in a negative feedback on GMT, thus delaying temperature rise. When considering these impacts in conjunction, justice concerns associated with the Paris Agreement are exacerbated.

Revisiting “Leadership” in Global Climate Governance: China’s Normative Engagement with the CBDRs Principle

Abstract This paper studies how China has established and exercised leadership by creating and operationalising the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDRs) in United Nations climate negotiations—from the embryo of this principle in the Stockholm Declaration to its operationalisation in the Paris Agreement. Building on the updated scholarship on climate leadership, this paper proposes a four criteria test to ascertain the existence of a leadership relationship. It comprises (1) a wilful leader; (2) consensual followers; (3) a commonly shared goal shaped mainly by the leader and accepted by the followers; and (4) a process of leadership-building triggered through use of any one of the following four modes of leadership: ideational, directional, instrumental, or structural. In light of the leadership criteria, this paper focuses on how China has operationalised these various leadership modes towards realising the evolving collective goals of its developing followers. In doing so, the paper provides empirical evidence of the significance of each of the four leadership modes in underpinning China’s leadership in the climate regime. This paper finds that while ideational leadership was prominent in creating the CBDRs principle, instrumental leadership, with the support of occasional usages of directional and structural leadership, has also been vital to China in tackling the internal divisions of developing countries and in overcoming the limitations of such countries’ normative power in the post-Kyoto era.

Financing climate justice in the European Union and China: common mechanisms, different perspectives

Climate justice is a concept with many different and competing interpretations. It has salience at intra-country, inter-country and intergenerational levels of climate politics. While inter-country climate justice has long been on the agenda of United Nations climate negotiations, the intra-country and intergenerational aspects of climate justice have assumed new prominence in many countries in recent years, as the economic consequences of mitigation became felt and transnational activism highlighted youth concerns. The diverse elements of and approaches to climate justice have this in common: realising them requires massive financial interventions and reforms. This article examines the still emerging frameworks to finance climate justice in two of the jurisdictions most important to the global response to climate change: the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. The EU and China have in common that they are both on the front line of financial innovation to respond to climate change. They are utilising similar tools of systemic financial intervention in order to transition financing to climate-friendly investment, in the first case domestically, but with clear implications for global financial markets. However, the EU and China are utilising climate financing mechanisms in the context of very different prevailing perspectives on climate justice. This article interrogates the relationship between these different perspectives on climate justice and the distribution, scale and pace of climate finance. The article also observes that while the EU incorporated climate justice considerations in its economic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic with a recovery package prioritising climate action, China did not take the opportunity to foster a ‘green recovery’.

Applying a leverage points framework to the United Nations climate negotiations: The (dis)empowerment of youth participants

Young people are both among the generations to be most affected by climate change and critical advocates for climate action. In the face of growing urgency surrounding the climate crisis, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has become an important institutional framework for political progress. We developed a community-based participatory action research project centered on youth involved in the COP climate negotiations. A “leverage points” approach guided our research; this paper is the first time the framework has been applied in an international negotiations context. Our findings point to the structural power, networks, and paradigms that youth might engage with for international climate justice work. We identify actionable leverage points through which youth organizers might increase their social power in the COP process to bring about climate action. Many of these leverage points are rooted in dynamics of power, which we expand upon and connect to broader literature. Moving forward, these findings can benefit and inform the strategies of youth as they participate in the COP process.

Role of Small Islands in UN Climate Negotiations: A Constructivist Viewpoint

This article is about small island developing states (SIDS) and their role in the United Nations (UN) climate negotiations. It presents a discussion about how a constructivist model of foreign policy analysis and international system design can be used to explain the impact of climate ideas of SIDS on UN climate system. The SIDS have been in the UN climate negotiations since the 1980s, committed to a climate agenda with clear ideas about the challenges they face and the type of solutions they seek from the international policy community. In this respect, this article seeks to explain that climate ideas shared among SIDS have established an intersubjective understanding to promote a compelling common voice at international climate negotiations, which is based on an island vulnerability identity. These ideas have shaped the policy thinking and interests of climate negotiators to design institutional frameworks that have given special consideration to SIDS. It concludes that this observation represents a disproportionate impact of SIDS. Despite the weak material powers for being small islands, their climate agenda has influenced the UN system design to address their concerns.

Sectors, Pollution, and Trade: How Industrial Interests Shape Domestic Positions on Global Climate Agreements

Abstract It is usually assumed that the cost of abating pollution is the main deterrent of domestic support for international climate cooperation. In particular, some scholars have argued that, due to the burden of pollution abatement, businesses commonly constrain governments, which then take less cooperative positions on global climate agreements. I suggest that this argument needs further qualification: pollution-related costs rarely have unconditional effects on preferences for global climate agreements. Instead, a sector's pollution level is more likely to influence preferences for climate cooperation if mediated by its trade exposure. If pollution is high, firms in high-trade sectors may be less able to absorb climate regulation, and hence they should be more sensitive to climate cooperation. If pollution is low, firms in high-trade sectors may support climate cooperation, because by being more efficient they are more capable of adjusting to regulation. These dynamics should then affect governmental positions on global climate politics. I test my sectoral argument with original data from business statements and national communications at the United Nations climate negotiations. In line with my argument, I find that businesses in trade-open sectors are more likely to oppose climate agreement as their sector's emissions increase. I also find that in countries where high-emission sectors are open to trade, governments have low preferences for climate cooperation. The findings have implications for the domestic politics of environmental agreements and the distributive politics of global public good provision.

A scientist and an advocate.

At first, I was confused by the 17 exclamation points in the subject line of the email from my master's thesis committee member. But a crater formed in my stomach as I read the message. The professor wrote that he was offended and disappointed by our class graduation picture—an informal tradition in our environmental science program. Creative props are encouraged, and some fellow students and I had held up signs that read “Sustainability requires social justice” and “Dismantle white supremacy in the environmental movement.” These issues were part of why I was pursuing these studies; highlighting them was important to me. But so was graduating in a few weeks, which would be in jeopardy if this professor didn't give me a passing grade on my thesis. ![Figure][1] ILLUSTRATION: ROBERT NEUBECKER To make matters worse, he had sent the email to my other committee members, my advisers, an assistant dean, and nearly a dozen of my classmates. I was terrified. I had never viewed my advocacy as separate from or incompatible with my research. They both stemmed from the same drive to make the world more equitable. Through my work with youth delegations to United Nations climate negotiations and a decade of community organizing, I had witnessed the impact of climate change on marginalized and vulnerable communities. These experiences shaped my research. As an undergraduate, I was inspired by graduate students who combined rigorous climate research with advocacy. Following their example, I did ecological research while leading a fossil fuel divestment campaign on campus. And I was lucky that my advisers supported me in being my most authentic self, regardless of whether we shared the same world views. But upon reading the professor's email, I realized that many academic institutions are not designed to accommodate the social engagement that makes me and many other young researchers passionate about science. For the most part, our success is measured by our research output. Any political engagement is, at best, tolerated. At worst, it can be seen as compromising the integrity of our research. As a productive researcher, I was the ideal graduate student. As an advocate, I was the worst graduate student. Many administrators and faculty members didn't know what to do with a student who was both. As news of the email spread, other faculty members, classmates, and alumni offered advice and support. The experience brought home just how important it is to find an academic community that nurtures every part of my identity—climate organizer, first-generation college student, and a woman in science. (A male classmate pointed out that, even though he had participated in the same demonstration, he had not been called out.) I eventually resolved the issue with my thesis committee member, graduated, and moved on to my Ph.D. program. (I had accepted the offer just a few days before receiving the email.) I am now at an institution where public engagement is encouraged. I have conversations with other graduate students about the kind of equitable world we would like to build through our research. Students in my program write opinion pieces in newspapers and online, informed by our research findings. I speak with faculty members about climate research that is “hopeful”—that both gets at the root of environmental problems and paves the way for solutions. I take part in an informal campus discussion group about science and social justice. My colleagues and I don't always agree, but we support one another's right to respectfully share our views. I recognize that, as I continue working at this nexus of research and policy, I may get pushback from the academic community for my public engagement. But caring about justice doesn't undermine my ability to conduct rigorous research or cloud my conclusions. For me, fighting climate change means persevering with both my research and my community organizing. I am grateful for the communities of young scientists who, rather than tiptoe around the edges of wicked problems, step right into the fire. [1]: pending:yes

Splintering South: Ecologically Unequal Exchange Theory in a Fragmented Global Climate

The article examines the changing nature of politics in the United Nations climate negotiations through the lens of ecologically unequal exchange theory, focusing on the lead up to and aftermath of the 2015 Paris negotiations. We identify and discuss three areas of tension that have emerged within the G-77 coalition: tensions within the global semi-periphery, tensions between the semi-periphery and periphery, and tensions within the periphery. Together, these tensions challenge the main link of solidarity in the G-77 coalition: the idea that all countries in the global South share a common predicament in the global system, with the North solely to blame. Drawing upon this case, we offer three related insights to develop ecologically unequal exchange theory. First, theory and empirical work must better consider the role of the semi-periphery, and divisions within the semi-periphery, in reproducing ecologically unequal societies. Second, theory should account for how fragmentation between the periphery and semi-periphery may produce distinct challenges for peripheral states to resist governance forms which intensify ecologically unequal exchange. Third, theory should better account for the ways in which ecologically unequal exchange as mobilized as a collective action frame reflects and diverges from the real-world distribution of environmental goods and bads in the world system.

Writing the fine print: Developing regional insurance for climate change adaptation in the pacific

CONTENTS I Introduction II Climate Change and Extreme Weather Events III Adaptation in the International Climate Regime IV Insurance and Adaptation in the International Climate Regime V Models for Climate Change Insurance VI Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility VII Climate Change Insurance and the Pacific Island States VIII Viability of Climate Insurance as a Long-Term Adaptation Strategy IX Conclusion I INTRODUCTION Many Small Island Developing States ('SIDS') lie only metres above sea level, making them particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in both the shorter (eg storm surge during large tropical cyclones) and longer (eg sea level rise) terms. (1) The modest ambition for mitigation (ie reduction) (2) of greenhouse gas emissions in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ('UNFCCC'), (3) Kyoto Protocol (4) and Copenhagen Accord (5) means that the prospect of avoiding an increase in mean surface temperature of less than two degrees is now very low. (6) The latest climate science suggests the Earth is on a path that will lead to a rise in mean surface temperature of between three and six degrees by 2100. (7) Unless there is a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over coming decades, SIDS are likely to experience tropical cyclones of greater severity, disrupted rainfall patterns and sea level rise. (8) Recent extreme weather events in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Typhoon Haiyan (9) and Cyclone Ian, (10) demonstrate the significant impact of these events on SIDS. (11) The lack of success in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions has led to adaptation to climate change impacts gaining greater prominence within the United Nations climate negotiations. Adaptation to climate change has been defined as '[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities'. (12) Adaptation may take many forms, including pre-emptive action to limit damage from climate change-related events (eg implementing more ambitious building codes to make buildings more resilient to storms) and building institutions to aid recovery after a climate-related event (eg improving emergency services capacity to respond in the immediate aftermath of adverse weather events). Domestically, insurance is an established mechanism to spread financial risk of adverse events and build societal resilience. However, at an international level, the issue of climate change-related insurance has only proceeded in fits and starts. Proposals for an insurance mechanism to support the adaptation of SIDS to climate change date back to 1991. At that time, the Alliance of Small Island States ('AOSIS') proposed an international, state-based pool to provide insurance against the impacts of climate change-related sea-level rise. (13) Despite this early call by AOSIS, a climate change-related insurance mechanism was not included in either the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. In 2007 climate change-related insurance emerged again on the UNFCCC agenda as the Bali Action Plan launched international discussion on enhanced action on adaptation 'including risk sharing and transfer mechanisms such as insurance'. (14) In 2008 AOSIS made a submission under the Bali Action Plan to include an insurance mechanism as part of a broader response to climate-related loss and damage. (15) In a departure from its earlier proposal in 1991, the 2008 AOSIS submission called for insurance cover for climate change-related extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods and droughts. (16) In 2010 the Cancun Agreements also invited submissions on the development of a climate risk insurance facility, as a part of an enhanced adaptation framework, to address impacts from extreme weather events. (17) The 2012 Conference of the Parties ('COP') 18 meeting in Doha appeared to be a breakthrough in the development of institutions to assist adaptation to climate change. …

Keeping discourses separate: explaining the non-alignment of climate politics and human rights norms by small island states in United Nations climate negotiations

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) encompasses more than 40 low-lying and island developing states that are among the most vulnerable but also most vocal parties in international climate negotiations. Over the years AOSIS's strategies comprised of the building of scientific expertise, and leadership by example, but also a particular framing that puts emphasis on multilateral processes to deal with issues of common concern and established principles of the international community. The initial assumption of the paper is that a frame alignment of climate change and human rights concerns would strengthen the coalition's moral and legal arguments. However, as a frame analysis of close to 50 coalition submissions and statements reveals, such a linkage is not established. The paper concludes by outlining three possible explanatory factors for this observation: the nature of the issue area, the character of the coalition and the professional background of AOSIS negotiators.

Market failure at Durban's climate summit

The United Nations climate negotiations – especially the annual Conference of the Parties (COPs) that have taken place since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol – have failed to address what scientists agree is the world's greatest-ever threat to the human species and much other life on Earth. In Durban, South Africa, the December 2011 COP17 summit yet again turned to failing market mechanisms to address emissions cuts, without advancing beyond unambitious 2009 Copenhagen COP15 targets. Carbon markets continued to fall for weeks after the COP17, with the Clean Development Mechanism declared to be in crisis 9 months later when a major UN report on its future was issued by a committee chaired by former SA Environment Minister Valli Moosa. Unlike in Copenhagen, a learned helplessness was evident as state delegations from the most adversely affected areas failed to speak up when it became apparent that no climate-saving deal was possible (in contrast to comparable trade summits in Seattle in 1999 and Cancun in 2003, when African delegates objected to harmful deals, thus slowing multilateral neoliberalism). Durban was thus not a ‘huge success’ (as SA president Jacob Zuma claimed), but instead a step in the conscious acquiescence to Africa's worst genocide yet. The lessons for geopolitical, environmental and political–economic dynamics are important for geographers to consider given the discipline's interest in the technical details of financial fixes for ecological problems in hotly contested socio-political settings.

Linkage as a Foundation for Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture

The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an opportunity to move toward a more robust international climate policy architecture. We describe one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Since linkage reduces the cost of achieving targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems and, in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We examine the potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in the longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links.

Beyond soft balancing: small states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations

The role of small states has been largely neglected in research on the process and outcome of multilateral negotiations. Even though these states may be active in the agenda-setting processes or display a specific engagement in certain thematic aspects of negotiations, in the end game the outcome of negotiations has been perceived to be dependent on the bargaining between major powers. However, small states also have strategies at their disposal to compensate for these weaknesses. Two principal ones come to mind, prioritization or niche diplomacy, and coalition-building to join forces with like-minded states in order to draw on their resources, expertise and manpower. In the article, we compare two cases of small state coalitions in multilateral negotiations, namely the Like Minded (LM) group in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in United Nations climate negotiations. While the two coalitions resort to similar strategies, they have not been comparably successful. We will show that the ability to translate discursive power into measurable effects on outcomes ultimately depends on the institutional setting of the negotiations and the nature of the issue that coalitions are tackling.

Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems

The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.

Climate Change and Global Development: Towards a Post-Kyoto Paradigm?

AbstractClimate change both reflects and transforms global development. Asymmetries of responsibility, impact and capacity reflect historical and current development hierarchies. At the same time, the imperative to reduce greenhouse gas emissions perversely empowers high-emitting newly industrialising counties. As inter-state negotiations enter a new post-Kyoto paradigm involving emissions reductions for ‘all Parties’ to the UN climate change convention, relations between industrial and industrialising countries, and more broadly between North and South, are re-orientated. This article charts these relations through two decades of United Nations climate negotiations, arguing the need to secure emissions reductions across the industrialising world opens up new possibilities for climate justice.

Opportunities for achieving biodiversity conservation through REDD

AbstractThe United Nations climate negotiations on reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) provide a rare opportunity for conservation of tropical forests and biodiversity. Here, we explore the implications of REDD design and implementation options on biodiversity conservation and ways to link REDD with biodiversity conservation. From both a mitigation and biodiversity perspective, the most important immediate steps are to ensure that REDD is included in the new global climate agreement and maximizes the area of tropical forest conserved. It may also be possible to include guidelines or incentives within a REDD framework or in national implementation to channel funding to areas of high biodiversity. However, if the immediate steps above are not taken first, REDD will reach neither its mitigation nor its biodiversity conservation potential.