United Malays National Organization Research Articles

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

The Salafi ulama (religious scholars) in Malaysia have seen their religious and political influence amplified over the last five years. Operating within a newly formed organization, the Pertubuhan Ilmuwan Malaysia (ILMU) and the newly augmented United Malays National Organization’s (UMNO) young ulama wing, Salafi scholars play a key role in providing Islamic legitimacy to the government and defending it against the opposition Islamist party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). The decision by Salafi scholars to support the Malaysian government is striking given their hardline views on the implementation of Islamic laws and their opposition to democracy. This paper seeks to understand the reasons for the Salafi ulama’s support for UMNO. It argues that the Salafi ulama’s involvement in UMNO is due to a convergence of interest between the two groups and as part of a strategy by the Salafi ulama to expand their influence at both the state and societal levels. The paper examines the religious-political positions of the Salafi ulama on issues such as the Islamic state, the implementation of Islamic laws and democratic political system, and argues that they are opposed to the current state of religious affairs and the political structure of the Malaysian state. Nevertheless, the ulama are working within UMNO to change the political system. For UMNO leaders, the Salafi ulama form an important group that could defend the party against religious attacks from PAS and provide the party with greater religious credence.

Post-GE13: Any Closer to Ethnic Harmony and Democratic Change?

Malaysia’s general election in 2008 seemed seriously to challenge the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), converting its simple party dominance into a two-party system. UMNO elites were stunned by the results, encouraging some of them to call for political reforms and greater cross-ethnic cooperation. Gradually, most reformers were swept aside. Even so, expectations mounted among politicians and observers that the opposition would make still greater gains in the next general election, held in 2013, possibly even winning outright. However, though the opposition did win a slight majority of the popular vote and more seats in parliament, UMNO was able to claim victory. It did this by tightening its grip on bedrock Malay supporters in rural areas, while retaining its hold on voters in Sabah and Sarawak, then heightening its numbers through extreme malapportionment of the country’s single-member districts. Further, if UMNO elites had grown fractious after Malaysia’s 12th general election, they displayed new unity, even defiance, after Malaysia’s 13th general election (GE13). Thus, they perpetuated the ethnic suspicions of the Chinese that they had heightened during the campaigning; and they imposed new controls on opposition party leaders and organisers. Far from advancing democratic change, then, GE13 has served to roll democracy back.

How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s 2013 General Election

Allegations of electoral irregularities loomed large prior to and following Malaysia’s 13th general election in May 2013. Yet while these irregularities elicited strong reactions domestically and internationally, they are unlikely to have played a significant role in shaping the election’s outcome. Rather than how the game was played, it was the very rules of the game itself that were responsible for returning the United Malays National Organization and its Barisan Nasional coalition to power for the 13th consecutive time, as Malaysia’s electoral institutions quietly transformed the incumbent coalition’s 4% deficit in the popular vote into a 20% winning margin of parliamentary seats. This is largely the result of substantial variation in the size of electoral districts, which had the effect of delivering parliamentary seats to Barisan Nasional with significantly fewer votes than were required by the opposition to secure its seats. This article has two primary aims. First, it seeks to understand better malapportionment in Malaysia by examining the degree of distortions at multiple institutional levels. It demonstrates these distortions to be exceptionally high from a comparative perspective. Second, it seeks to understand better the factors responsible for the size variation of electoral districts, specifically the extent to which the non-partisan factors stipulated in the constitution can explain the variation. Several tests are conducted using new data on the density of voters in electoral districts. The results strongly indicate a partisan element to malapportionment. This creates an institutionalized bias against the opposition and risks increasing polarization in the Malaysian polity.

Erik Martinez Kuhonta. The Institutional Imperative: The Politics of Equitable Development in Southeast Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011, xxiii+342p.

The Institutional Imperative: The Politics of Equitable Development in Southeast Asia ERIK MARTINEZ KUHONTA Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011, xxiii+342p.The Institutional Imperative provides an argument for equitable development, that is, economic growth with income equality. The research is conducted through a comparative-historical approach with Thailand and Malaysia as the major case studies, and the Philippines and Vietnam supplementary instances. Kuhonta rules out alternative explanations that rest on structural factors like democracy, class, and ethnicity, and makes an institutionalist argument: Institutionalized, pragmatic parties and cohesive, interventionist states create organizational power that is necessary to drive through social reforms, provide the capacity and continuity that sustain and protect a reform agenda, and maintain the ideological moderation that is crucial for balancing pro-poor measures with growth and stability (p. 4). Two cohesive, institutionalized parties, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), have geared their countries toward relatively equitable development. Thailand and the Philippines yield mediocre results largely because there have been no political parties with the requisite organizational capacity and ideology to advance social reforms (p. 244).The longitudinal between Malaysia and Thailand from the colonial era to the 2000s makes the study rich in history and detail. However, the research design is slightly problematic. When it comes to in-depth policy analyses, Kuhonta chooses a policy set of land resettlement, education reforms, and health care for Malaysia (pp. 100-114); but he selects rural debt, dams, and health care for Thailand (pp. 174-188). Such a mismatch saps the strength of the causal links and the alleged structured comparison (p. 5).Apart from research design, the book suffers from two analytical drawbacks and one misconception. Even though institutions and ideologies are considered to be the two determining factors in explaining developmental variation, the author does not take either of them seriously in analytical terms.Institutions as Temporally Prior to IndividualsTo begin with, while arguing in favor of the institutional imperative, the author downplays the role of institutions in shaping the incentives and interactions of political actors. Although insisting that [i]nstitutional variables therefore operate within a configurational and historical field and must always be kept in that context (p. 46), the close contextual analysis runs aground at the empirical level. Thailand's failure of party institutionalization is attributed to politicians' misbehavior and incapacity: Parties rose and fell in factions' battle for spoils rather than because of any struggles over principle . . . . Personalism pervaded the party system, with virtually every party . . . driven by a leader's charisma and political skills rather than by organizational and ideological imperatives . . . . Unlike in Malaysia, parties lacked continuity, institutional complexity, extensive memberships, and roots in society (p. 167).Missing are the different institutional arrangements that determine how the political games are played in both countries. At the meta-level, while electoral politics is the only game in town in Malaysia, it has never been so in Thailand. In post-independence Malaysia, the aristocrats have to ally with UMNO and maintain their interests through political party structures. In sharp contrast, Thai politics after the 1932 Revolution has been shaped by the ongoing struggle between the traditional elites and elected politicians. The former, whose power and prerogatives have not been eradicated by colonial power, has impeded party institutionalization through any possible means e.g. coups d'etat, gratuitous violence, judicial review, and ideological campaigning to delegitimize majority rule. …

Towards a More Democratic Regime and Society? The Politics of Faith and Ethnicity in a Transitional Multi-Ethnic Malaysia

The rising antagonistic attitudes and tension between the Malay majority and ethnic and religious minorities in Malaysia since 2007 is intriguing because it has occurred when society experienced an unprecedentedly large-scale and assertive multi-ethnic pro-democracy movement. This article argues that precisely these assertive and confident civil and political societies -and their emphasis on equal rights and equitable development for all Malaysians – have put the traditional Malay and religious elites on the defensive. The pro-democracy movement and the prospects of regime change have threatened not only the party-dominant regime but also – and more importantly – the constitutional and institutional foundations of ethnic exclusivism and privileges. Moreover, two Malay-based parties, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), are viewed as giving too many political concessions to the non-Malay communities to gain an electoral advantage, making the traditional Malay and religious elites even more defensive of their position and power. As a result, religious issues are excessively politicised, further deteriorating the already complicated inter-ethnic relations of the country. The prospects for achieving a democratic regime and society appear grim, although hopes have run high since the electoral rise of the multi-ethnic opposition.

Malay Politics and Nation State in Malaysia

Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country comprising three main ethnics, namely Malay, Chinese and Indian. As one of the multi-ethnic countries, construction of nation state becomes the government’s crucial agenda. After Malaysia achieved independence, the first endeavor towards integrity was uniting political parties, explicitly United Malay National Organization (UMNO), Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). However, this latest advancement creates upheavals particularly in Malay political parties which are UMNO, PAS (Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party) and PKR. If Malay political parties are dispersed, then how about the attempt to construct nation state? This research is about the nation state’s challenges affected by the upheavals in Malay political parties. This research uses secondary sources and interview with Malaysia’s political leaders. In these most recent uproars, media play an important role by worsening the existing crisis. All those scenarios have shown that civil movements also claim for a more democratic ruling system and election which challenges the government on the issues of unity and nation state.

Framing interethnic conflict in Malaysia: A comparative analysis of newspapers coverage on the keris polemics

The keris is a Malay or Indonesia dagger. In 2005, the then United Malays National Organization (UMNO) Youth Chief and Malaysia Education Minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, wielded the keris at the UMNO Youth general assembly, which he claimed to be a means to motivate the Malays. Following that, the UMNO Youth general assembly in 2006 and 2007 was noted for some racist statements made by several delegates in addition to the keris-wielding action repeated by Hishammuddin. The non-Malays perceived the action of wielding the keris as a gesture meant to defend ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) and to threaten those who opposed Malay special rights. After the political tsunami in 2008, the Malaysian Chinese Association and Malaysian People’s Movement Party (Gerakan) leaders blamed UMNO for their electoral debacle. Hishammuddin also admitted that his raising of the keris was among the causes of the Barisan Nasional’s poor performance in the general election. He apologized to the non-Malays because of the fear to a symbol which was not his intention and to the Malays for not being able to uphold their symbol of heritage. This study aimed to compare the coverage of the keris polemics by mainstream Malay, English and Chinese as well as alternative newspapers. By using framing as the theoretical framework and content analysis as the research methods, it was found that the newspapers framed the issue differently, reflecting the political economic and ideological boundaries within which the journalists work.

The Role of Malaysian Leaders in Nation Building Process (1957-2003)

Generally, this paper discusses Malaysia’s nation building process that includes the changing of national understanding from Sultanate perspective towards democratic nation. In 1957, Malaya achieved its independence. Ethnic Malays through United Malays National Organization (UMNO), ethnic Chinese through Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and ethnic Indian through Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) are the major political parties, which at that time maintained separate identities, based on ethnicity. However, they had to compromise and unify for independence. This paper will also touch on the factors, which influenced the process of nation building, especially internal and external factors. The role of several important leaders, especially former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, their policies and actions to develop and establish Malaysia’s nation building process, is discussed.

Malaysian Extraversion towards the Muslim World: Ideological Positioning for a “Mirror Effect”

Despite being ambitious, the solidarity expressed by Malaysia toward the global ummah has almost always remained tied to the strategic priorities of the country and been subject to non-religious factors. In this light, the changes throughout history in the Federation of Malaysia's policies regarding Muslim minorities in Asian countries illustrate the variable external use of Islamic themes by Malaysian officials. In order for Malaysian governments to reconcile opposing positions whose configurations emphasize the ambiguities inherent to their actions, throughout history these governments have been obliged to continually re-evaluate their positions according to the relevant contingencies. For example, they have occasionally delegated to third parties the mission of conducting, under their close monitoring, projects that they had taken on with reservations. In addition, the strongly promoted claim by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO, the leading Malay party of the governing coalition) – that it could offer a universal development model for Islamic society -has never really been convincing. This model has never been able to go beyond its initial local origins, which has greatly limited its ability to be replicated in other countries. However, beyond their opportunistic dimension (even if they are not without ideological aspects), Malaysia's diplomatic positions toward the Muslim world are marked by different inspirations. They have also been guided by an underlying search for the legitimation and international recognition of the country's broad domestic socio-political model, thereby appealing to a “mirror effect” to foster the reshaping of a postcolonial Malay identity within the framework of globalisation.

Southeast Asia. The institutional imperative: The politics of equitable development in Southeast Asia. By Erik Martinez Kuhonta. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. Pp. 342. Maps, Illustrations, Notes, Bibliography, Index.

Southeast Asia. The institutional imperative: The politics of equitable development in Southeast Asia. By Erik Martinez Kuhonta. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. Pp. 342. Maps, Illustrations, Notes, Bibliography, Index. - Volume 43 Issue 3

Malaysia – towards a topology of an electoral one-party state

For the first time in 51 years of independence, Malaysia's ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) under the weak leadership of Abdullah Badawi was denied its customary parliamentary two-third majority in the 2008 elections. The three major opposition parties, which formed the Pakatan Rakyat (The People's Alliance, PR) after the elections, increased the number of opposition-held state governments from one to five. The opposition had never held more than two state governments at any one time.1 For many practitioners and students of Malaysian politics, the 2008 poll means the birth of a long overdue ‘two-party system’, where two multi-ethnic coalitions contest for power and alternate in running the country. After all, two similar attempts to build a Malay-dominated second coalition to rival the ruling coalition dominated by the ethno-nationalist United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) were made in the 1990 and 1999 elections by former UMNO leaders who lost in their party in-fighting. Sadly, the coalitions built did not survive even the next elections. We argue that such optimism may be misplaced due to a failure to appreciate the ‘electoral one-party state’ nature of Malaysia.2 Despite having held 13 national elections without failure, and having almost no incidence of in- or post-election violence, neither a military coup nor ‘people's power’, Malaysia has never been anywhere close to being a ‘consolidated democracy’, 52 years after joining what Huntington called the second wave of democratization.3 For Linz and Stepan, a consolidated democracy requires not only a government with de facto authority to generate policy and exclusive de jure power, but also that ‘this government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote’. In other words, democracy has to become ‘the only game in town’.4

Islamization in Malaysia: processes and dynamics

Over the past three decades Malaysian society has undergone radical change and transformation. On one level this has been brought about by the country's rapid economic transformation, but equally significant has been the deepening Islamization of the country. From banking to law, from dress to education policy, almost no sector of Malaysian society has escaped the growing influence of Islam upon the socioeconomic and political make-up of the country. The prevalent explanation for this dynamic has been the political competition between the United Malay National Organization and the Islamic opposition party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, since the early 1980s. Such explanations, however, clearly marginalize the role of other societal factors and dynamics. Consequently, this article contends Islamization in Malaysia has created a series of processes that have produced results which are self-reinforcing. Ironically, the strategy for diverting the extremes of Islamic revival by co-option has actually produced a far more dynamic penetration of state and society by conservative Muslims who have become a powerful constituency supportive of the further religious coloration of government bureaucracies and programmes.

Crises of Identity in PAS and Beyond: Islam and Politics in Post 8 March Malaysia

Controversies and frictions related to Islam since the political ascendancy of the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat, after the 8 March 2008 general elections have revealed multiple crises of identity not only in PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia) and Pakatan Rakyat, but also in broader Malaysian society. It is argued that the pattern of frictions within PAS and Pakatan Rakyat has to do with the diminishing place of Muslim-Malay identity and interests in the avowedly multi-ethnic Pakatan Rakyat regime. It is suggested that these frictions are largely attributed to the distinctive character and emphasis of the Islamisation enterprises sponsored by the ruling regime under the United Malays National Organisation since the 1980s and growing Muslim anxiety and frustration about their position within the Malaysian polity.

The Limits of Malay Educational and Language Hegemony

In Malaysia, the implementation of official policies to entrench Malay educational and language hegemony has prevented the growth of an inclusive multicultural educational system. The New Economic Policy (NEP) period, 1971-90, was characterized by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) dominated state aggressively pursuing its educational and linguistic hegemonic objectives. In the 1990s, however, several developments forced the state to take a more conciliatory stance towards the educational and linguistic needs of the minority groups. The state claims that critical aspects of multiculturalism have been incorporated into the 1996 Education Act. But, in practice, it appears that official policies have not fully abandoned the hegemonic project, and minority languages and educational needs are still discriminated against in the national education system.

Malaysia and Thailand’s Southern Conflict: Reconciling Security and Ethnicity

Malaysia's policy towards southern Thailand has always required a balance between the country's internal security and concern about a neighbouring Muslim minority linked not only by religion but also ethnicity and culture. Security was a paramount concern at independence in 1957, with the southern provinces used as a base by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Party of Thailand and Malay irredentists. But after Parti Islam made inroads against the ruling United Malays National Organization by capturing Kelantan (a state adjacent to Thailand) in the 1959 elections, the two premier Malay parties competed to present themselves as the protector of Thailand's Malay Muslims. Security concerns eased with the surrender of the CPM in 1989, but re-emerged in late 2001 with the resumption of conflict in southern Thailand, and the surfacing of militant Islamic groups in Malaysia. Though initially supportive of Thai security interests, Malaysia's delicate balance swung towards focusing on the well-being of Thailand's Malays in 2004: the tragic 28 April Krue Se mosque and 25 October Tak Bai incidents led to strong Malaysian protests, an unprecedented parliamentary debate and a general willingness to push the envelope on intervention in Thailand's internal affairs. Tensions remained high through much of 2005, with Thailand alleging that Malaysia was complicit in southern violence. Nonetheless Malaysia ensured Thailand was not embarrassed in international forums such as the Organization of Islamic Conference or ASEAN, and relations improved late in the year. Changes in Thai policy after the September 2006 coup were largely welcomed in Malaysia, but since then Thai-Malaysian cooperation to address the problem has made little headway.

Malaysia in Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Asian Values, Islam Hadhari and 1malaysia

This paper discusses on the principles of Asian values, propagated by Malaysia fourth prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, Islam Hadhari by the fifth prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and 1Malaysia by the current prime minister Najib Razak. This paper gives a special attention to Abdullah and Islam Hadhari because it links the Mahathir’s period to current Najib’s leadership. The intension of this paper is to prove that actually these concepts are similar in theory and practice in stressing more on Islam and neo-feudalistic Malay agenda. In fact, Islam Hadhari is ironically a concept created by Mahathir himself to counter the idea of Islamic State from the Islamic party, PAS. Therefore, even after resigning from government, Mahathir’s agenda of Asian values is still being practiced. Najib Razak, current Prime Minister, on the other hand intended to promote quality leadership performance for the public and unity among the multiracial Malaysia. Although there are differences in term of the arguments for each of the idea, it is clear that these ideas or philosophies attempt to protect the real agenda of those three leaders which were to protect the political culture of neo-feudalism and ensure the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and Barisan Nasional (BN) will stay in power. This paper shows the debates between scholars in explaining the ideas and philosophies behind those three concepts in Malaysia’s realpolitik.

The transformation of political party opposition in Malaysia and its implications for the electoral authoritarian regime

Malaysia's electoral authoritarian system is increasingly coming under pressure. Indicators of this are the metamorphosis of opposition forces since 1998 and, in particular, the results of the 2008 parliamentary elections. From 1957 until 1998 political party opposition was fragmented. An initial transformation of political party opposition began at the height of the Asian financial crisis, after a major conflict within the ruling United Malays National Organization in 1998. However, the regime was able to weaken the opposition, resulting in its poor performance in the 2004 elections. Afterwards, in a second transformation that has continued until the present time, an oppositional People's Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat) has emerged that now has a serious chance of taking over the federal government. This article argues that the increase in the strength and cohesion of political party opposition since 1998 has been caused mainly by five combined factors: the emergence of pro-democratic segments within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious middle class; the intensified interaction of political parties and civil society forces; the impact of new media; the eroded legitimacy of the United Malays National Organization and other parties of the ruling coalition; and the internal reforms within the Islamist Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). Consequently it has become conceivable that the country will incrementally democratize in a protracted transition. Although the 1999 and 2008 elections were not foundational, they have been transitional. They may not have inaugurated a new democratic regime, but they have marked important phases in the struggle for democracy in Malaysia.

Malaysia: Political Transformation and Intrigue in an Election Year

The year 2008 will be remembered as a watershed for the Malaysian political system and for the forward trajectory of Malaysian democracy. This election year saw a refurbished coalition of oppositional political forces, the People's Pact (Pakatan Rakyat), deprive the ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional) coalition of its two-thirds majority of seats in Parliament. Even more significantly, four state governments fell, making it a total of five governments in Opposition hands. I suggest here that this development has created a de facto two-party system for a maturing Malaysian democracy. Economically, Malaysians will be facing a severe downturn though not a technical recession. The year also saw the denouement of a leadership crisis within the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) leading ultimately to the anticipated departure from the political stage in March 2009 of the fifth Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The political terrain remains fraught with pitfalls for premier-in-waiting Najib Abdul Razak and for Opposition Leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who awaits his sodomy trial. The Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi already had more than his fair share of a baggage of problems to deal with even before his tenure headed into 2008. Let me briefly recollect. After 25 November 2007, five HINDRAF lawyers remained in detention under the draconian ISA, while one was at large. The V.K. Lingam video expose in September 2007 and the Royal Commission inquiry into it in January 2008 remained much in the public consciousness,1 so too the Altantuya murder trial which had dragged on from 2007. Inter-faith

Changing Political Dynamics in Malaysia: Role of Ethnic Minorities

The 12th Malaysian general elections have been significant in more ways than one. Most importantly, the opposition unity combined with the grievance vote of the ethnic minorities challenged the United Malays National Organisation hegemony long prevalent in Malaysian politics. The Bersih rally and Hindraf agitation that saw large-scale mobilisation before the elections also points to the active participation of civil society. The socio-economic marginalization of the ethnic minorities, erosion of religious rights, corruption, and unemployment accelerated such a change in the political scenario. This paper looks into different facets of the changing political dynamics in Malaysia and the role of ethnic minorities. It also looks into the policy options before India with regard to ethnic Indians in Malaysia.

Malay Anti-Colonialism in British Malaya

The debate which arose between the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) in early September 2005, concerning the history of Malaysia's independence movement, necessitates a re-appraisal of the organizations and personalities involved. This article re-assesses the period and actors involved in bringing to fruition Malaysian independence. By utilizing mainly authoritative secondary sources, the reconstructed history belies the argument of the ruling elites that they inherit the mantle of `real independence fighters' from their political ancestors. Although the sources are readily available in Malaysian libraries, the truth contained in them has eluded the general public. Thus, to lay people, political history in Malaysia has been what ruling politicians tell them and what they find in school textbooks that, in any case, have been approved by the powers that be. This article reveals that pre-independence Malaysian history is replete with contradictions and paradoxes which may transform perceptions of who were and were not independence heroes.