United Democratic Front Research Articles

Thoughts on the Shaping of Post-Apartheid South Africa

What has happened here thus far is precisely what we needed to see: an analysis of what is happening in other parts of Africa and an honest exchange of views, including disagreements, in preparation for the kinds of discussions which must be undertaken right now about the future of South Africa. That is what I propose to address. A couple of preliminary remarks, however. Let me thank Valparaiso University and the School of Law for inviting me and the other speakers. This kind of discussion is extremely useful. Also, I direct your attention to our symposium at the University of Pittsburgh scheduled for March 17-19, 1988, the third in a series of symposia addressing post-apartheid South Africa. The sessions are open to the public, registration is free and some of the participants here will present papers. At previous symposia, we have had people like Professor Bob Seidman and representatives of the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress, the Black Consciousness Movement, the United Democratic Front and the South African Council of Churches. Other participants have included Aggrey Mbere, Godfrey Sithole, Ben Magubane and Jacqueline Williams. In addition, people like Peter Mahlangu would make an important contribution in the area of future labor relations and labor legislation. This diversity illustrates one facet of the problem which I will address: the future of South Africa is not going to be determined by any single force or any single faction. It is realistic to anticipate that we will have to recognize different players in this particular drama and various tensions that will arise in the future. The symposia at Pittsburgh have been more narrowly focused on in-depth analysis of a few issues than here, where a whole range of post-apartheid issues have been examined. One important issue addressed here has been in a rather different area: to examine critically the role of the churches in South Africa and to ask certain rather difficult questions about the churches-whether they are collaborators in a system of oppression

People’s Education for People’s Power

When the 35-year-old Zwelakhe Sisulu arose to deliver the keynote address reproduced below, he stepped into a spotlight of national leadership toward which he had been moving for a decade. From an important role in the Black Consciousness Movement, he had become a leading strategic thinker for the United Democratic Front, South Africa’s most widely representative, nonracial coalition. Described by a colleague as “a charismatic, handsome figure with a resonant voice,” a man of “sharp intellect” and “sharp wit,” he is now recognized as one of the country’s outstanding younger leaders, comparable to Steve Biko, who died at the hands of the security police in 1977.

People’s Education for People’s Power

When the 35-year-old Zwelakhe Sisulu arose to deliver the keynote address reproduced below, he stepped into a spotlight of national leadership toward which he had been moving for a decade. From an important role in the Black Consciousness Movement, he had become a leading strategic thinker for the United Democratic Front, South Africa’s most widely representative, nonracial coalition. Described by a colleague as “a charismatic, handsome figure with a resonant voice,” a man of “sharp intellect” and “sharp wit,” he is now recognized as one of the country’s outstanding younger leaders, comparable to Steve Biko, who died at the hands of the security police in 1977.

Towards a people's democracy: the UDF view

Below is part of a speech given on behalf of Murphy Morobe, Acting Publicity Secretary of the United Democratic Front (who has since been detained). It was delivered on his behalf to F. Van Zyl Slabbert's Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa in May 1987.

INKATHA MEMBERSHIP IN KWAMASHU: A REJOINDER TO SOUTHALL

ROGER SOUTHALL'S comment contains numerous inaccuracies in its account of my views on Inkatha and its membership, and one or two hasty judgements. Any reader can detail these and rather than respond to each, I prefer to take a step back and explore what seems to be the major analytic division between us. There is a fundamental issue at the heart of his comment, which I am pleased that he has raised, for it is one I broached in my paper but did not fully explore: namely, what status and role we should accord empirical survey data on South African politics. The view expressed in my paper was that special constraints operate in the South African case which force one to be cautious in interpreting survey research. Southall's comment usefully identifies some of the constraints I failed to mention. l He points out that it is difficult to assess the relative support for organizations when some of the leading ones are banned. He also emphasizes how rapidly events change in black politics, so that survey results quickly become dated. Indeed) I agree with Southall that two of the most significant changes to have occurred since 1980 are the rise of 'political unionism', as it is called, and the emergence of the non-racial United Democratic Front as the majority element in black politics, to replace the exclusivist ideology of Black Consciousness, which dominated black student, school and community politics in the previous decade. Contrary to the impression Southall gives of my views, I believe that it was not Inkatha which dominated politics in the 1970s but a variety of Black Consciousness organizations. Inkatha might have been the largest single political organization in 1980, but I do not place so much emphasis upon sheer numbers as Southall, whichever organization is concerned, for membership size and commitment is so problematic, as Southall points out for Inkatha. However, I do think that it is rash of him to assume that the non-paid-up members of Inkatha are behind in their subs because they no longer support the organization. I did not make these views clear because I do not believe that it is necessary to nail one's ideological flag to the mast in every piece written on South Africa. Accompanying the emergence of the UDF there has been a revitalization of the ANC as a political organization inside South Africa, where it is now playing an important role in internal politics. Increasing support for

A NOTE ON INKATHA MEMBERSHIP

THE REMARKABLE, SUSTAINED upsurge of popular resistance to apartheid in South Africa is inevitably calling forth urgent consideration within the white ruling bloc and beyond concerning the manner in which the revolutionary impetus can be stemmed by a restructuring of the presently discriminatory political and economic system into a 'fairer', non-racial and, above all, more stable form. Within such a context, discussion of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement as an agent of reform is to the fore in that not only is it seen as sufficiently moderate and responsible as to have committed itself to making federal and/or power sharing options work but also in that it is perceived in liberal-reformist circles as possessing the necessary minimum degree of legitimacy as a black nationalist movement to make a reformist pro ject viable. 1 Correspondingly, as the ANC or other movements (most notably the United Democratic Front, UDF) grow in stature in tandem with the growing challenge they mount, so attempts are madc if not to delegitimize them then at least to suggest that their predominance is diluted by widespread Black support for other less demanding and, it is often implied, more democratic bodies. A recent piece by Woodrow Wyatt (a former British Labour M.P.) which was given prominence in The Times is a case in point. Thus, after suggesting that the ANC looks forward to establishing some form of 'Trotskyist Government' and lambasting the Western media for unhelpfully highlighting the extent 'of outrages by the South African authorities rather than of less exciting constructive aspects', Wyatt continued as follows:

Law, Politics, and Treason in South Africa

In 1985 the Afrikaner Nationalist Party Government of South Africa arraigned fifty-six people on charges of treason in eight separate trials. Among the defendants were leading members of the broad-based opposition movement, the United Democratic Front (U.D.F.). Since 1979 the government has resorted increasingly to the use of the charge of treason as popular resistance to white minority rule has grown. The numerous treason trials in 1985 came in the wake of successful campaigns by the U.D.F. and other opposition groups against the government's constitutional and administrative reforms, which opponents saw as mechanisms for perpetuating white minority rule. The massive scale of repression occurring during 1985 exposed the absurdity of the claims of the white minority government to the allegiance of those whom it had arraigned on charges of treason. This paper examines some of the legal and political factors underlying this recent upsurge in treason trials in South Africa.

Official ideology and lay members’ beliefs in Inkatha

ABSTRACT The size, loyalty and commitment of Inkatha's members is seen as a vital element to Inkatha's importance in current South African politics. It is claimed to strengthen Buthelezi's bargaining position with the state and to differentiate Inkatha's support from the much less committed support of affiliate‐based organizations like the United Democratic Front. Yet this assumption about Inkatha ‘s lay members cannot be taken for granted, given the paucity of the empirical data on Inkatha membership. One measure of this commitment is the extent to which lay members have internalized the movement's official ideology. It is thus evident in the degree of coherence between official ideology and the beliefs of lay members. This paper reports on empirical research amongst a sample of Inkatha's members in Kwa Mashu in order to assess this coherence.

Disinvestment & black workers attitudes in South Africa: A critical comment

Michael Sutcliffe and Paul Wellings criticise Lawrence Schlemmer's widely‐cited survey which purports to show that a majority of black male production workers in South Africa are against ‘disinvestment’ and, by implication, would prefer US business to pursue a strategy of ‘constructive engagement’. Their critique was cited by the United Democratic Front on 12 June 1985 and debates at a widely‐publicised seminar in Durban on 25 June. Their paper goes beyond a critique of Schlemmer's methodology to question conventional assumptions about the significance of disinvestment in South Africa fr employment. Their critique raises central methodological questions about the inferences which can be drawn from opinion surveys and the political use to which their results can be put.

The failure of repressive monetarism: Chile, 1973–83

(1984). The failure of repressive monetarism: Chile, 1973–83. Third World Quarterly: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 310-326.