Unique Coalition Research Articles

N-Defendant Litigation and Settlement: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability

This article generalizes the analysis of settlement under joint and several liability from lawsuits involving one plaintiff and two defendants to those involving n≥2 defendants. We demonstrate that, depending upon the correlation of outcomes among the defendants, but regardless of the distribution of liability shares, joint and several liability may encourage plaintiffs to select some defendants for litigation while settling with those remaining. In particular, under joint and several liability, when each defendant is grouped with others sharing correlated outcomes, and the plaintiff's probability of success against any defendant is sufficiently high, we show that, in all Nash equilibrium, the plaintiff litigates against the defendant from each group with the smallest share and settles with all other defendants. There are a continuum of equilibria but they are all payoff-equivalent up to permutation. Plaintiff's payoff is identical in all equilibria; only the payoffs of the members with the smallest share within a group are permuted. We also show that, for sufficiently high plaintiff's probability of success, this result holds even when the defendants are allowed to form coalitions, and derive the set of offers in the behaviorally unique coalition proof Nash equilibrium; as before, these offers induce litigation against the defendant with the smallest share in each group and settlement with all other defendants.

The two-person blocks as a way to emphasize several semivalues

In this work we consider the formation of a unique coalition block with two players as a tool to characterize some semivalues within the set of all semivalues on cooperative games. We also offer explicit expressions for the increases of allocation to the players when the quotient game or the modified semivalues for games with coalition structure are computed.

SLAYING LITTLE DRAGONS: LESSONS FROM THE DRACUNCULIASIS ERADICATION PROGRAM

The word dracunculiasis comes from the Latin phrase “afflicted with little dragons.” The global Dracunculiasis Eradication Program (DEP) spearheaded by President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center has quietly “inched” towards world eradication with stunning success, as shown in Figure 1. In the midst of huge publicity and monies going into such global health campaigns as polio eradication, malaria, tuberculosis, and human immunodeficiency virus control, global guinea worm eradication is occurring without vaccine or curative therapy. As illustrated in this issue of the American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, the DEP has implemented grass-root innovative public health initiatives in Uganda with the help of multiple external donors. Despite civil strife, arguments about vertical or horizontal implementation strategies, migrating infected refugees, and egregious safety insecurities, the Uganda eradication effort succeeded and thus has much to teach us about tenacity, flexibility, and cooperative innovative strategies within infected communities. Dracunculiasis or guinea worm disease is transmitted to humans in contaminated drinking water containing copepods (water fleas) that are infected with the larvae of the worm. The larvae are expelled into the water by adult worms that emerge through the skin of infected people approximately one year after infection. Emergence of the adult worm is painful, disabling, and incapacitates individuals often during prime working periods for 2–3 months. Humans are the only reservoir and there is no effective treatment or vaccine. Infection is prevented by educating people to filter their drinking water through finely woven cloth to remove copepods by using temephos (Abate ; American Cyanamid, Wayne, NJ) larvicide in water supplies to kill copepods and larva or by providing clean drinking water from safe sources such as hand dug wells or borehole wells. As described by Rivakimari and others, women are often the predominant victims presumably (although not studied well) as a consequence of their role as the main gatherers of household water supplies where opportunities for drinking from contaminated sites is enhanced. In Uganda, a unique coalition of public and private sectors spearheaded by The Carter Center came together to provide ongoing operational support, filtering cloths, larvicides, and borehole wells. A national task force met monthly and cadres from ministries, non-government organizations, political leaders, religious and traditional leaders, and village volunteers all worked on empowering individual and community participation in the eradication campaign. When the usual measures of containment hit an impasse, unusual measures were taken such as employing elderly men “Pond Care Takers” to guard ponds against contamination by people with emerging worms. Water sources (to control access) were then watched over and * Address correspondence to Michele Barry, Department of Medicine, Yale University School of Medicine, 333 Cedar Street, PO Box 208025, New Haven, CT, E-mail: michele.barry@yale.edu

Strong Bar, Weak State? Lawyers, Liberalism and State Formation in Zambia

Members of the legal profession exercise potent, though largely hidden, influence on political processes in modern societies. This is taken for granted with respect to established democracies but the political agency of lawyers remains a largely unstudied phenomenon in post-colonial Africa. This contribution interrogates the role of Zambian lawyers and their Law Association in recent political developments in that country. The central focus of the article is on the Oasis Forum, a unique coalition of lawyers, clergy and feminists that blocked the incumbent president's unconstitutional bid for a third term in office in 2001. The article examines the rising importance of legal process and discourse in the political realm and reflects on the significance of an increasingly aggressive ideology of legalism for state formation in Zambia.

More than a token gesture: NGOs and trade unions campaigning for a common cause

With the passage of the 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act in the UK, a system of vouchers for all new asylum seekers was to be introduced from April 2000. These vouchers were widely regarded as iniquitous in that they discriminated against an already vulnerable sector of society. A unique coalition between two NGOs (Oxfam GB and the Refugee Council) and a trade union (the Transport and General Workers' Union—TGWU) led to a concerted campaign against the voucher scheme that included a range of media work, political lobbying, and public awareness raising. The voucher scheme was eventually scrapped. This article draws various practical lessons on how to develop successful collaborative relationships across different social sectors. The author concludes that the principal lesson is not that NGOs must work with trade unions, but that by working with others, united by a common goal, they can challenge injustice effectively and make a difference to people's lives.

Dynamic Coalition Formation in the Apex Game

This paper studies stability of coalition structures in the apex game by the use of Bloch's (1996) model of dynamic coalition formation. In our model, players' payoffs are given by the coalition values and a cost for proposal is newly introduced. We study stable coalition structures by the subgame perfect equilibrium and we show that in the apex game stable coalition structures depend on the cost for making a proposal and who the first proposer is. As opposed to the static analysis by Hart and Kurz (1983), it turns out that the apex may form a two-person coalition with a minor player. Owen (1977) defined the coalition value, that is, a generalized Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) with a priori coalition structure. Hart and Kurz (1983) studied stability of coalition structures using the coalition value. Their models were presented as strategic form games, and the strong Nash equilibrium (Au­ mann, 1967) was used to study stable coalition structures. In particular, they studied stable coalition structures in the apex game, and showed that if the number of the players is greater than or equal to five, the coalition of all minor players is a unique stable coalition. On the other hand, a dynamic process of coalition formation was investigated in Bloch (1996). In this paper, we apply Bloch's dynamic coalition forma­ tion model to the apex game after slightly modifying the model. Players' payoffs are given by the coalition value and costs for making proposals are newly introduced. We use the subgame perfect equilibrium to study stable coalition structures.

Independence of the Central Bank, Growth, and Coalitions in a Monetary Union

Within a Monetary Union, we assume that the policy of a hard-nosed central bank results in a real appreciation of the Union currency, which is in contradiction with the growth targets of several countries. These countries may join together to question the policy of the bank. As a consequence, the bank itself will try to form an alliance with other countries to prevent decisions that would be opposed to its goals. This makes it deviate from its primary monetary target. There is thus a game involving the formation of coalitions between the Union countries and the Central bank so as to determine the Union's monetary policy. We show that this game results, either in the formation of a unique stable coalition between the Bank and certain countries, or in a total independence of the Bank. The induced monetary policy depends on the majority required to modify the policy of the bank. Moreover, when a unanimous decision is necessary to question the bank's decision, the game prompts the worst possible solution for half of the Union countries.

A Ban for All Seasons

The Ottawa ProcessOn 3-5 December 1997 in Ottawa, representatives from 122 countries signed a convention to eliminate the manufacture, use, and export of anti-personnel landmines. Witnessing them were the secretary-general of the United Nations, Canada's prime minister, delegates from some twenty other observer countries, and a host of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian groups.As the number of signatories mounted to unprecedented levels, many other countries indicated that, even if they were not able to sign, they would honour the protocols set out in the convention. A new norm in international disarmament had emerged. In addition, the governments and organizations gathered in Ottawa made commitments of close to half a billion dollars U.S. towards implementing the convention in areas such as destruction of stockpiles, de-mining, and assistance to victims.The signature of the convention was the culmination of intensive campaigning by civil society and national governments. The campaign was exceptional in terms of process, speed, and final goals. A unique coalition of governments, civil society, and international groups worked closely together to bring the convention into being. Dialogue, lobbying, and outreach between governments and civil society on international issues are not new. In what became known as the Ottawa process, however, governments and civil society worked directly together as members of a team. That in itself is rare; the success of the approach in this instance was without parallel.Building on well-established previous efforts, it took only 14 months to go from the initial proposal for a convention banning antipersonnel mines outright to formal signature by 122 countries -- a number that far exceeded the most optimistic forecasts at the start of the process. Moreover, the convention was a first in the field of disarmament in that it banned a weapon in widespread, active use around the world. Thus it is a major step forward by the international community towards ending a severe, on-going humanitarian crisis. The goal of the convention is ultimately to eliminate a weapons system that every year kills or maims some 25,000 people, mainly civilians, and handicaps the economic and social development of many countries, primarily poor ones.(f.1)The International Context: Human Security, Soft Power, and Humanitarian LawThe convention stands on its own merits as a major accomplishment, but it also has broader significance. The Ottawa process clearly illustrates the changing nature of international politics, in terms of issues, relationships, and outcomes. In particular it reflects three major, related trends in international relations: the growing focus on human security; the growing importance of 'soft power'; and the growing need for a new framework of international humanitarian law. Thus it is worth examining the Ottawa process more closely, to draw out insights and lessons for determining future international behaviour.Traditionally, the focus within international security was on the nation-state. Foreign ministers worried about the security of national borders; the welfare of individual citizens was the purview of interior ministers. As borders become increasingly porous, however, and as cold war threats fade, international decision-makers find themselves called upon to deal with issues directly affecting the daily lives of individuals: crime, drugs, terrorism, pollution, human rights abuses, epidemics, and the like. The basic unit of analysis and concern has shrunk from the state to the community and even the individual. At the same time, to tackle effectively problems that ignore state boundaries, the field of action has expanded from the state to the region and even the globe.In response to these developments, the notion of 'human security' has emerged: the premise that security goals should be primarily formulated and achieved in terms of human, rather than state, needs. …

West Hollywood: a city is born

West Hollywood has an unusual population mix — a large majority of renters, and high percentages of senior citizens and homosexuals. This short article looks at how their combined concerns helped them to form a unique coalition and establish the city. Not only have they eased their own problems, but they are managing the city efficiently by subcontracting to private companies, showing that self-determination in local government can work.

The Saudi Religious Elite (ULAMA) as Participant in The political System of The kingdom

The Ulema are the power that holds the Sultan and his people together—the medium of control. But they seldom meddle in politics. This premise was expressed by Ameen Rihani, an Arab traveller, in 1928, before either Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz became king or Najd and its dependencies became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.Was Rihani correct in his conclusion? Is he right today? This article will endeavor to explore the term ulama in the Saudi context in the twentieth century. Later, an attempt will be made to discuss the participation of Saudi ulama in a number of key cases in the history of Saudi Arabia.The house of Saud along with the house of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Unitarian movement, were parties to a unique coalition in the eighteenth century. The coalition embraced the Unitarian movement, or Wahhabiyah, founded in the mid-eighteenth century, and members of the Arab noble house of Saud of Najd.

"For Christ's Sake:" A Study of Key '73 in New England

During 1973, a unique coalition of liberal and conservative Christian denominations in the United States attempted to conduct a mass evangelism campaign. This case study, based upon interviews with the clergy in two small cities in New England, examines the effects of this movement. The authors' central concern is the degree to which the movement either failed or succeeded in bridging the long-established theological gap between liberal ecumenism and conservative evangelism. The study explores implications of Key '73 for our understanding of local churches viewed as voluntary social organizations and for social movements in general.