Union Defence Research Articles

From El Wak to Sidi Rezegh: The Union Defence Force’s First Experience of Battle in East and North Africa, 1940-1941

After J.C. Smuts (1870–1950) had managed to unseat J.B.M. Hertzog (1866–1942) as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa it was clear that the country would enter the Second World War on the side of Great Britain. In spite of extensive changes and an increased budget the Union Defence Force (UDF) found itself in a state of war on 7 September 1939 with a Permanent Force of only 5 400 men with limited training and antiquated equipment. While Hitler’s armies conquered Western Europe the Springboks prepared to go North and in spite of trepidations about the might of Mussolini’s East African Empire the First South African Infantry Division set sail for East Africa in mid-July 1940. In five short months, Mussolini’s East African Empire had been torn to shreds. Victorious in every major engagement, the South Africans embarked for Egypt in June 1941. Here they encountered similar logistical problems as were prevalent before they embarked for East Africa. With two divisions in the field and a third in training, UDF planners had a trying time marshalling enough motorised transport to enable the Springboks to keep pace with the increased mobility that was a hallmark of desert warfare. Expecting to build on their success over the Italians the South Africans confidently went into battle, but by November 1941, the 5 th South African Infantry Brigade was annihilated and the victors of East Africa badly mauled. Fighting low-moraled Italian armies in the bush and mountains of Abyssinia was quite easy; beating the Germans in the desert would be a different story altogether.

The Suppression of Internal Unrest in South West Africa (Namibia) 1921–1933

In 1915, the Union of South Africa was requested to administrate South West Africa (SWA) (today Namibia) on behalf of the British Crown and approved the South West Africa Mandate. The policies of the Union strongly influenced the administration of SWA, and the administration met with indigenous opposition discontent with the maltreatment. An attitude of master and servant was prevalent in the mandated territory and the maltreatment of the indigenous people in the mandated territory, racial prejudice, double standards in executing branding laws, enforced indentured labour, dog and hut tax were some of the grievances that the Bondelswarts, the Rehoboth Basters and the Ukuambi had against the SWA Administration. The Administration perceived these actions as internal unrest and subdued it using police and military resources. Suppressing unrest through force was part of the military policing tradition prevalent in Southern Africa and abroad during the colonial era. The tactical deployment of ground forces in conjunction with aircraft was an innovation that transformed future operations in SWA between the suppression of the Bondelswarts and the actions against Chief Ipumbu. This article discusses the utilisation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and South West Africa Forces against indigenous people of South West Africa between the two world wars focusing on three incidents over the period 1922 to 1932. Tactical deployments of ground forces and the application of air power in support of ground forces to suppress internal unrest are explained and discussed. These discussions provide the military historian with salient facts on physical conditions encountered, the tactics employed and the role of a new weapon system, aircraft, yet to be fully understood in its role as a force multiplier.

The First South African Armoured Battle in Italy during the Second World War: The Battle of Celleno – 10 June 1944

The formation of 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div), during February 1943, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the chance to expand its military capabilities to that of armoured warfare. An armoured division further offered South Africa the opportunity to equip the UDF with modern fighting equipment and to master the art of combined warfare. Actual deployment in Italy differed vastly from the training which the division received in North Africa, for Italy was arguably, largely “untankable”. The Division’s first battle occurred at Celleno, on 10 June 1944, where it was able to “prove” itself by securing its first victory. As far as secondary sources are concerned, the Battle of Celleno is only superficially covered. Primary sources are however abundant, thus adding to the rich history which is available on the Division. This article analyses the Battle of Celleno, fought by 11 SA Armoured Brigade, in the context of the notion of “first battles”.1 Emphasis will be placed on the training received prior to deployment, the Battle of Celleno, the lessons that were learned by the division at Celleno, and the way these influenced future operations in Italy. The Division’s combined-arms approach is also evaluated, with specific emphasis on changing patterns of leadership, command, and employment of the Division after Celleno. Keywords : Union Defence Force, Italy, 6th South African Armoured Division, 11th South African Armoured Brigade, first battles, Celleno.

Decline and Fall: Why The South African Civilian Defence Secretariat Was Dissolved In 1966

Briefly, between 1912 and 1966 there was an independent Secretary for Defence, described in the Acts and the Permanent Force Regulations as the “Permanent Head of the Department”. Not only was this not true in practice after the establishment in 1918 of the office of Chief of the General Staff (later at various times General Officer Commanding the UDF, Commandant-General and Chief of the SADF) but the meaning of the characterisation was never clearly defined. A minefield of prerogatives and consequent overlapping developed between the two office holders and their staffs. Those attempts at solution all ignored the fundamental constitutional principles behind the establishment of the Secretariat as well as the principles of organizational theory, ambiguity about authority, mministerial failures, the personalities involved and ill-considered appointments and also the failure to exploit the benefits of a Secretariat. After years of conflict, worsened by the demands of the Second World War and recommendations by several committees of enquiries and the Public Service Commission, the Secretariat was taken into the SADF, in a civilian capacity under the Comptroller. Between 1966 and 1968 it was absorbed into the various Staff Sections at DHQ. The results were perhaps a mixed blessing. In some areas it was very successful. But many of the defects remained. Key Words : Accounting Officer, Chief of the General Staff, Executive Commanders, Ministerial policy, Permanent Head, Secretariat, Union Defence Forces.

Between history, amnesia and selective memory: The South African armed forces, a century’s perspective

2012 has a double significance for this year sees the centenary of the founding of the African National Congress (8 January) and of the creation of the Union Defence Forces (1 July), two organisations that have for much of the twentieth century shared a contested history. Yet, in a remarkable bouleversement, South Africa has come through this difficult past and, over the past two decades, a new South African society has been recreated following an interesting period of adjustment following the end of the Cold War and the growth of democracy in the developing world. These changes have necessarily affected her armed forces and the roles defined for them. Some commentators, particularly in the years immediately following 1994, asserted that military power had lost all of its vaunted, Cold-War importance in a new postmodern environment. Others still, recognising future challenges, argued that South Africa, beset with far-reaching socio-economic crises, could no longer afford the burden of military forces. Most scholars agree now that these perspectives were short-sighted and that, while the risk of major conflict has receded, the events of 9/11, and its consequences, demonstrate that the continental and international landscapes are less certain, less stable and less predictable, than that for which many had hoped. Clearly, South African interests are intertwined inextricably in regional and global affairs and if she is to protect these interests and ensure her security, she must maintain credible military force capable of meeting an array of contingencies. It was with this in mind that the strategic arms deal, since the subject of much debate, was passed by parliament:[i] the promise of a full technological transformation, to accompany the human transformation, offered. [i] J Sylvester & A Seegers. “South Africa’s Strategic Arms Package: A Critical Analysis”. Scientia Militaria 36/1. 2008. 52-77.

A Case of Arrested Development: The Historiography Relating to South Africa’s Participation in the Second World War

The quantity and quality of military historical work on the participation of South Africa in the Second World War, with few exceptions, namely that of a few significant academic contributions over the last decade, lags appreciably compared to the plethora of titles offered on all aspects of the war in the buoyant international market. This article investigates and evaluates more important South African primary and secondary sources pertaining to the Union Defence Force’s participation in the Second World War, highlighting available sources and limitations in published material. Possible opportunities for further research are identified where there are areas of historiographical hiatus. Reasons are offered for what amounts to a rather threadbare South African historiography, especially when compared to the prolific historiographical output of other belligerents. The article offers a brief survey of primary sources, identifying some of the archives that have received scant attention. Then follows an analysis of secondary sources broken down into official, semi-official and general history that examines their methodological integrity and completeness with a view to identifying what historical contributions may still be made in the light of what has been produced.

The Barrier to Turkey's Foreign Language Teaching is Foreign Language Policy: Macro-and Micro-Level Planning

When the foreign language policies of the European countries are examined, it is firstly seen that the countries have determined a macro-level policy and then they successfully apply their macro-level policy at the micro-level. The foremost example for this situation is the European Union's defense of teaching the languages of the other small countries as well as English. By looking at this, what the Turkey's macro-level planning of foreign language teaching is and its micro-level efficiency will be examined.

Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy

This article explains the establishment of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (esdp) in 1998–99 and its institutional design. I argue that both the soft balancing explanation and the “second wave” of approaches fall short. In contrast, the article shows that liberal-institutionalist thought and transaction costs economics offer a heuristically promising perspective. Most crucially, the pivotal concept of asset specificity provides explanatory leverage. The combination of risks of opportunism and the non-specificity of esdp's ultimate assets explains why and how the major European powers designed the eu's security and defense pillar in 1998–99. Empirically, I trace how the United Kingdom and France were gradually confronted with not fully credible commitments within nato for crisis management in Europe. Based primarily on the signals sent by us domestic politics, they were increasingly concerned about isolationism and questioned the American commitment to European security. Therefore, they were searching for another institutional option for providing security on a long-term basis. Although this assessment of ex post transaction costs triggered the initial establishment of esdp, ex ante transaction costs were responsible for its more specific design. Given the indirect American threat of disengagement when faced with Europe's aspirations for autonomy, esdp had to be designed in a compatible way with nato. Non-specific, and thus redeployable, military assets represented the institutional solution to the conflict between European autonomy and NATO's primacy. In other words, asset specificity as the key analytical concept of transaction costs economics is what differentiates this argument from previous accounts and provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding both the establishment and design of esdp in 1998–99.

EU power and armed humanitarianism in Africa: evaluating ESDP in Chad

This article analyses the European Union's (EU's) largest European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military mission outside Europe to date; Eufor Tchad/RCA was a 3700-strong force involving personnel from 23 states, deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic for 12 months from March 2008. Far from this mission achieving EU ‘supremacy’ or projecting an ‘imperial’ reach, an evaluation of its objectives and achievements reveals acute limitations in the EU's ability to project power. The article analyses the context in which Eufor was conceived and deployed. It notes that the mission's weaknesses, like those of the United Nations mission to whom the EU transferred its security role in 2009, reflected its convoluted origins and objectives. Finally, the article examines whether the EU as a unitary actor has the desire or the ability to ‘replace’ individual European nations—in this case France—in their post-colonial military and ‘humanitarian’ roles in sub-Saharan Africa.

3 FIELD SQUADRON, SAEC (PART 1)

From Cape to Cullinan Although the Union Defence Act of 1912 had made provision for the establishment of engineering units as part of the Active Citizen Force of the Union Defence Forces (UDF). no steps had been taken initially to put this part of the Act into effect and the outbreak of war in August 1914 found the UDF without any engineers.

DIE UNIEVERDEDIGINGSMAGTE OP DIE VOORAAND VAN DIE TWEEDE WÊRELDOORLOG (1934-1939)

On 23 March 1939 Mr Oswald Pirow, Minister of Defence of the Union of South Africa, reported in Parliament on the progress made in executing the Five-year plan launched in May 1934. The programme had been, aimed at developing and increasing the effectiveness of the Union Defence Forces. Ironically the five years covered by Pirow's plan coincided with the 'last five years of peace before the world was plunged into the second major conflict of the century. It is interesting therefore to consider to what extent the plan prepared South Africa's Defence Force for the war to come. When the programme was launched the Union's economy and military position was poor. During the preceeding years 1929 to 1932 the country had been gripped by an economic depression which coincided with the severest drought ever experienced in the country. The depression had an impact on nearly every facet of the South African economy, .including the public sector and the defence budget. In 1929 £1 019529 was budgeted but thereafter the 'amount declined yearly until the lowest figure was reached in 1932 - only £720976. But the depression's effect was now spent and a gradual improvement in the economic situation was noticeable. This gave way to an increase in the defence budget. Meanwhile the international situation was beginning to change as the European dictatorships began to disturb the balance of power in Europe. In South Africa this gave rise to a new crisis of divided loyalties, culminating in arguments about the country's international responsibilities and role in any future conflict. Thus by 1934 it was clear that the Department of Defence would have to. Enter a review phase of development. By then the need for the expansion and the reor~anisation of the Union's defence system were vital. The state of the international affairs added to the urgency which accompanied this necessity. Among the matters studied and discussed was the Union's ability to wage war with the supplies at hand. By 1934 there was a general trend towards mobilization which called for local manufactured motor and aeroplane engines. This rising cost of production together with the rapid obsolescence of aeroplane models and equipment hampered the local production effort. When it became difficult to import even the outdated models, it was decided to assemble Hawker Hartebeests locally. Yet by August 1938 the situation was still unsatisfactory as only 69 Hartebeests as well as seven Hawker Furies were available. The drive towards mechanization was nearly brought to an end in March 1939. By then it was believed that the Union Forces would operate in territory noted for its thick vegetation. Thus a narrow bush cart drawn by local oxen was considered a suitable solution for the transport problem, although this never passed the experimental stage. Another objective of the 'plan was aimed at adapting the South African industries to meet war needs. In May 1937 a, War Supplies Board was established to administer matters such as production and storage to ensure; that South Africa would be self-sufficient in times of war.In fact, the war in which South Africa was shortly to find herself involved was of greater scale than any of the planners had conceived.

A concise history of the South African Defence Force (1912-1987)

As the SA Defence Force celebrates its 75th anniversary, it can look back with pride at a truly remarkable history. Established just two years after Union, the fledging force was to be severely tested within the first two years of its existence to a degree perhaps unparalleled in the history of modern armies. Just over a year after its formation, when it still existed more on paper than in fact, the Union Defence Force (UDF) was called upon to suppress a violent industrial strike on the Reef. Having passed its first test with flying colours, the UDF was confronted a few months later by the far more serious crises of internal rebellion and World War. Once again, however, the young organization proved equal to the occasion, and by the end of the Great War the UDF had developed into a battle-hardened, professional force respected the world over for its prowess, courage and endurance in the field.

MILITÊRE GENEESKUNDIGE GEDURENDE DIE VROEE JARE (DEEL 2)

When the First World War broke out in August 1914, the Union Defence Force was still without a properly organised medical staff of .its own. Although the Defence Act of 1912 had made provision for a South African Medical Corps, financial difficulties and the importance of establishing fighting units seem to have relegated the importance of providing mil.itary medical services. On 4 August 1914, the personnel of the South African Medical Corps consisted of three men all at Defence Headquarters: a staff officer, a quartermaster and a clerk. As the Union was soon involved in the world conflict the proper establishment of a military medical service became of paramount importance. Initially a great deal was done by a skeleton staff from the Royal Army Medical Corps but South Africa was rich in civilian medical personnel and these people so on offered their services. The South African Medical Corps expanded rap,idly during the campaign in South West Africa and apart from establishing a large number of military hospit als in the Union, was able to staff several institutions in France and in German East Africa, where again the Corps worked in close co-operation with its British counterpart.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse vrou in landsverdediging - agtergrond en perspektief

In the history of South Africa its women always had some role to play in the defence of the country. Women were engaged in military activities even before the institution of the Union Defence Force in 1912. The role of the Voortrekker women and also the role of women during the Second War of Independence is referred to as well as their role during both World Wars. The Women's Auxiliary Services originated in 1939 and they played a major role during both war and post war periods. Important to note is the role that the Army Women's College at George played in the renewed militarization of women. The present-day training and utilization of women in the SADF as well as the question of National Service for women are dealt with including detailed arguments for and against the latter. Only one conclusion can be arrived at after having studied all the material and that is that women in uniform have definitely come to stay.

DIE MILITÊRE GENEESKUNDE GEDURENDE DIE VROEE JARE

SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY MEDICINE Until relatively recent times the attention of military commandershas been given over largely to considerations of tactics and weaponry, to the exclusion of the welfare of the ordinary soldiers who must ultimately carry out their Qrandplans. In earlier times no arrangementswere made for the treatment of injuries suffered by the common soldier, for once he was incapable of holding a weapon or moving with the army he became, not so much an embarrasmentas an encumbrance,something to be dis- .carded or disposed of as quickly as possible. Fatal casualties were therefore frequent, for the wounded were usually left to succumb to their injuries or were murdered and robbed by a civilian population wNch regarded almost all soldiery with hostility. Only gradually did military leadersbecomeaware of the need to preservethe wounded for service in later battles, yet even then the basic skills required to heal the sick and injured were lacking, and the first efforts strike us now as pictureque rather than effective Even in the armies of the great European powers the proper provision of military medical services is of recent date. fn Britain the CrimeanWar stands out lin popular memory with its legend of Florence Nightingale. From Britain the innovations of organised military medicine travelled quickly to the colonies, and to South Africa, where Imperialand colonial troops saw service together The volunteer colonial forces in South Africa were soon provided with their own small medical corps, and these, augmentedby the Royal Army Medical Corps, saw considerable service ;in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.On the Republicanside the efforts of the Transvaal Red Cross, staffed mainly by foreign volunteers, are of note. Once the war was over the colonial volunteer system was extended to include the Transvaal as well, and in 1912 the first steps were taken to launch a uniform South African African Medical Corps to take its proper place in the Union Defence Force.

DIE SAGD - SY ONTSTAAN EN ONTWIKKELING

'An Army Medical Service is an indispensable technical branch of the military organisation. On its efficiency the manpower of an army to a great extent depends.'The military medical service has been given little consideration in the past. In 1912 the Union Defence Force was created and with it, the organisation of a new medical service. During the First World War medical personnel offered their services in South Africa, German East Africa and in several parts of Europe. In 1918 the death rate had been 42 per thousand, many as a result of the tropical and sub-tropical campaigns. At the end of the Second World War a world record was created by die SAMC during the East African Campaign. The death rate had then been less than two per thousand. After the war the Medical Service returned to its peace-time work.Many recommendations have since then been accepted by the government and today the fourth arm of the SADF is formed by the Medical Service. It is commanded by a Lieutenant-general. Operational support facilities are also provided.

UNIFORM VAN DIE STAATSPRESIDENTSWAG - HERKOMS EN TRADISIE

The origin of the State President's guard with special uniform can be traced back to the early Republican days and the founding of Artillery Corps' by Presidents Brand and Burgers of the Free State and Zuid Afrikaansche Republics, respectively. To some degree the earliest and later uniforms were based on the ceremonial uniforms of the artillery and therefore these uniforms are discussed and described in detail by the author of this article. It is also interesting to note the influence of various nations on one another with regard to military uniforms. The first real State President's Guards wore a green uniform and the author discusses all the changes that it underwent through the years. A blue uniform was inter alia proposed in 1980 but finally rejected by the Prime Minister in 1984. Instructions were issued to put forth new ideas. All the arguments in favour of a new uniform are discussed in the article and in 1985 the new uniform was finally taken into use. The helmet reminds one of that of the Union Defence Force and the SSB and the uniform itself is that of the Army with a few ceremonial pieces added thereto.

DIE ONTSTAAN EN ONTWIKKELING VAN DIE STAFAFDELING HOOF VAN STAF PERSONEEL

The origin of the Staff Section Chief of Staff Personnel can be traced back to the year 1912, when the Union Defence Force came into being. Changes occured in the command and control structure of the Union Defence Force (from 1957 the SADF), changes very often also affecting the Staff Section Chief of Staff Personnel. The history of Chief of Staff Personnel is depicted in this article from 1912 to the present date.

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE MILITÊRE VERPLEGINGSDIENS

With the establishment of the Union Defence Force, provision was made for a nursing unit. Initially this merely took the form of a voluntary auxiliary detachment, but after the South West African campaign a pennanent unit, the South African Military Nursing Service, was established. This unit gave good account of itself serving both in Europe and elsewhere. With the conclusion of World War I, the unit, being specifically a wartime organisation, was nearly completely demobilised. During the 1920's however it was realised that should a war break out the Service would be in no position to provide the necessary nursing personnel. The Service was consequently reorganised, though this reorganisation did not come up to expectations for with the outbreak of World War II it was still not up to strength. In spite of this, however, the matron-in-chief managed to provide the requisite nursing personnel. In the aftermath of war, she has expressed her full satisfaction with the way in which the women have acquitted themselves, saying that South African nurses did not fall short of the ideals for which the nursing services of the world stand.

DIE ROL VAN DIE SEEMAG IN DUITS SUIDWES-AFRIKA 1914-15

At the outbreak of World War I the German colony of South West Africa poseda serious threat to the British war effort.' The colony wn situated on the main andsefest British supply and communication route to the eut, and It was therefore of theutmost Importance that It should fall Into Allied hands. Otherwise the harbours ofUideritzbucht, Walflsch Bay and Swakopmund might be used by the German Pacificsquadron - then operating off the South American Cont, and strong radio transmittersof the colony could keep the German High Command well Informed of the situationIn the southern hemisphere.General Botha, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, agreed to a Britishrequest to send an expedition against the German colony, but before this could getunder way, a serious rebellion broke out In the Union. The defeat of Cradock's squadronat Coronel and the prnenca of von Spee's warships in the Atlantic added to theanxietln of the South African leaders.For the next two months the Admiralty'. Inability to provide an adequate escortfor the expeditionary foree and the dlaorganlaetlon of the Union Defence Forenby the rebellion upset the South African plans for the campaign In South West Africa.Only with the defeat of von Spee at the Falkland Islands and the capitulation of theprincipal rebel forees In South Africa was It possibleto launch the expedition effectively.