AbstractAs synthetic biology is extensively applied in numerous frontier disciplines, the biosafety and biosecurity concerns with designing and constructing novel biological parts, devices, and systems have inevitably come to the forefront due to potential misuse, abuse, and environmental risks from unintended exposure or potential ecological impacts. The International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition often serves as the inception of many synthetic biologists’ research careers and plays a pivotal role in the secure progression of the entire synthetic biology field. Even with iGEM's emphasis on biosafety and biosecurity, continuous risk assessment is crucial due to the potential for unforeseen consequences and the relative inexperience of many participants. In this study, possible risk points for the iGEM projects in 2022 were extracted. An attack tree that captures potential risks and threats from experimental procedures, ethical issues, and hardware safety for each iGEM‐based attack scenario is constructed. It is found that most of the attack scenarios are related to experimental procedures. The relative likelihood of each scenario is then determined by using an established assessment framework. This research expands the traditionally qualitative analysis of risk society theory, reveals the risk formation in the synthetic biology team, and provides practical implications.
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