Unified Protector Research Articles

Assesment of the Development of European Air Forces in the Context of US-China Competition

The air force plays an important role in armed conflicts. It was no different in the Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector operations in Libya in 2011. The European dependence on the US became fully apparent during those operations. After 2011, US attention has been shifted to Asia. This article focuses on the evaluation of the development of European air forces from 2011 to 2021 in the context of the shift of US attention to Asia. The article uses a dataset to compare the number of aircraft in specific categories in 2011 and 2021. The research shows that European states maintain a fleet of around 2,000 fighter jets, while compared to 2011, the number of ISR aircraft decreased from 183 to 122 and the number of air-to-air refuelling aircraft from 70 to 67. In contrast, the number of MALE unmanned vehicles has doubled from 45 to 91. However, in the context of the US shift Asia, those numbers are insufficient, and European states are still dependent on US support.

Looking to the Skies: Operation Unified Protector and the Strategy of Aerial Intervention

Looking to the Skies: Operation Unified Protector and the Strategy of Aerial Intervention

Prawne uwarunkowania interwencji zbrojnej w koncepcji „odpowiedzialności za ochronę”. Uwagi de lege lata i de lege ferenda

The purpose of the article is to analyse the legal conditions of armed intervention under the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The author presented and assessed the effectiveness of undertaking military actions within its framework. It should be emphasized that the armed aspect of the R2P concept has not been broadly analysed in the doctrine. The author discussed the issues of the effectiveness of military intervention on the example of the “Odyssey Dawn” and “Unified Protector” operations in Libya in 2011. He also referred to the concept of applying the military intervention mechanism to the Syrian Arab Republic after 2011. The text indicates that the greatest weakness is the generality of the concept of armed intervention within the R2P concept and the vagueness of its forms of implementation. In the context of the military intervention in Libya, which occurred as a result of the lack of veto by one of the permanent members of the Security Council, the author showed that although the use of the formula of military intervention under the R2P model is possible, it is also reasonable to assume that in the near future in a similar situation, the permanent members of the Security Council will exercise their right of veto.

The attitude of the Russian Diplomacy towards the Western countries' intervention in the Libyan civil confrontation in 2011

The article analyzes the position of Russian diplomacy in relation to the interventionist policy of Western countries in Libya during the deployment of the confrontation in this country in 2011. The object of the study is the policy of the Russian Federation in the Middle East during the active phase of the «Arab Spring» (2011). The subject of the study is the evolution of the Kremlin's position regarding the intervention of Western countries in the internal affairs of the Middle East (on Libya's example). The main purpose of the work is to study the interventionism of the collective West during the internal political crisis in Libya in 2011 as the main factor that influenced the change in the nature of Moscow's Middle East policy as a whole. The presented research is carried out using general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, and is also based on the principles of historicism and scientific objectivity. In the course of the study, the author attempts to reflect the objective reasons for the refusal of the Russian Federation from formally following the general policy of Western countries in relation to the «Arab Spring» and the transition to an independent political course in the Middle East, based primarily on the national interests of the Russian state. Special attention is paid to the comparative analysis of the positions of representatives of the Russian political elite in relation to the operation «Unified Protector» conducted in Libya.

The barking dogs: junior coalition partners and military operations abroad in Italy

AbstractVarious studies explored under which conditions junior coalition partners are able to have an impact on foreign policy outcomes. However, these parties do not always manage to get what they want. In this situation, they face a dilemma: defecting or staying? In the Italian context, as far as Military Operations Abroad (MOA) are concerned, the latter option has invariably prevailed. In particular, Italy's involvement in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999) and Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011) raised considerable contestation from junior partners that did not result in the termination of the respective cabinets. Employing extensive qualitative data, including a set of original interviews with relevant policymakers, this article aims to understand why junior partners did not defect in these two cases. The empirical findings highlight a variation in parties' motivations according to their ideological leaning: while extreme-left parties were afraid of being punished by their own voters for leaving the cabinet because of the participation in the operation in Kosovo, the far-right and autonomist Lega Nord did not consider opposition to the military intervention in Libya as a salient issue. Therefore, the article has considerable implications for the research agendas on the party politics of military interventions and government termination.

LIBYA – SOMALIA AT THE GATES

Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and the end of NATO-led Operation Unified Protector, the security situation in Libya has deteriorated significantly. Lacking comprehensive post-conflict stabilisation and state-building, the country has become a de facto failed state which made the rise of different Jihadists groups possible. In comparison with the history of al-Shabaab on the Horn of Africa, it seems that the country is on a good way to become a new Somalia. This analysis examines which similarities can be discovered in the two crises. It will not explore the conflict in Somalia and Libya in details, but the paper will focus on the main parallel aspects of them. These will be the lack of strong basics, namely functioning central government and national identity, which easily led to the collapse of the state; the missed post-conflict stabilisation, which is the historical responsibility of both local and international actors; the deepening and atomized conflict which covered the interests of only a tight elite; and the rise of radical Islamists, who offered universal solutions for the woe of the neglected citizens

Air power in humanitarian intervention: Kosovo and Libya in comparative perspective

It would be hard to overstate the importance of air power in humanitarian intervention (HI) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Yet, the role of air power in HI and R2P has been understudied. This article seeks to remedy the lack of systematic investigation. It does so by developing a framework for assessing the effectiveness of air power during military operations in HI and R2P and applies it to NATO’s air campaigns in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) and Libya (Operation Unified Protector). Upon examination NATO is revealed to have fared better in Libya than Kosovo in positively accomplishing its stated humanitarian objectives, minimizing collateral damage and reducing the costs for the interveners, all of which are aspects considered by the model. The relative effectiveness of Operations Unified Protector is generally attributed to geography, diplomacy and technology. It is argued that better ground support, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and burden sharing are needed to enhance the utility of air power in HI and R2P even further.

Strategic Culture, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy: Finland’s Decision to Refrain from Operation Unified Protector

This article integrates literature on strategic culture with literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy, illustrating how the interaction of culture and domestic political calculation can influence government foreign policy on participation in international military operations. Empirically, the article investigates the decision made by the Government of Finland to refrain from participation in the military intervention in Libya in March–April 2011. The Finnish decision-making illustrates that domestic politics, in particular the factor of election timing, can strengthen the feeling among decision-makers that they should follow the country’s strategic culture. The article ends with theorization on the domestic political conditions under which decision-makers are more or less likely to deviate from strategic culture.

Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The impact of strategic culture

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the Swedish decision to participate in Operation Unified Protector in Libya and the Finnish decision to refrain from the same operation. It takes as its theoretical point of departure the concept of strategic culture and argues that differences in the strategic culture of the two countries contributed to the differences in behavior toward the Libya intervention. The Finnish and Swedish strategic cultures differ with respect to the core tasks of the armed forces, willingness to use force, and with respect to what types of operations and organizational frameworks Finland and Sweden find it appropriate to participate in.

Transitioning from military interventions to long-term counter-terrorism policy: The case of Libya (2011–2016)

The paper on Libya aims to analyse the military intervention in Libya, five years since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. In the context of this research project, Libya forms an interesting case study as it offers the possibility to evaluate a so-called ‘light footprint’ military intervention which is different from the approaches adopted both in Afghanistan and Mali. As we know now, the development of the country post-Gaddafi has defied expectations and has plunged the country into chaos and instability, allowing the so called ‘Islamic State’ to establish and strengthen its local foothold. The paper looks at the history and tribal composition of the country after which it delves into the decision-making process in some of the countries involved in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector under UNSCR 1973 (2011) and continues by assessing the transition phase and the complexities which have arisen following the fall of dictator Gaddafi. Finally, the paper assesses the outcome of the operation both inside and outside Libya and draws lessons and policy recommendations for future military interventions.

Lessons from the Air Campaigns over Libya, Syria, and Yemen

ABSTRACT: The international air campaigns over Libya, Syria, and Yemen offer lessons for the planning of future interventions. Planners and politicians must acknowledge hostile targets will evolve over time, and it is impossible prevent civilian casualties entirely. They should accept the likelihood every action will be filmed and posted online, and they should plan for post-conflict reconstruction as rigorously as they plan for conflict. ********** The past five years have seen four major air campaigns conducted by foreign powers in the Middle East: The NATO-led mission over Libya, the US-led mission against ISIL over Iraq and Syria, the Russian mission support President Assad in Syria, and the Saudi-led campaign over Yemen. While these interventions differ significantly in their focus, conduct, and participation, they offer a number of lessons for the political and military leadership of the United States and other Western nations. These lessons are particularly important the political preparation of military operations and the sustainment of political support over the long term. As such, it is vital for the military factor them into planning and communicate them political leaders. The five key lessons are: 1. The likelihood of creep, in which air strikes expand an ever-growing list of target types; 2. The likelihood of force evolution, in which new types of assets are brought into theater accelerate an apparently slow-moving campaign; 3. The inevitability of civilian casualties; 4. The new information environment created by observers on the equipped with smartphones, cameras and satellite imagery; and 5. The need for a coherent post-conflict reconstruction plan focused on providing immediate civilian services--shoes on the ground accompany boots on the ground. Target Creep The international campaign over Libya began on March 19,2011. Its authority was United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized UN members to take all necessary measures ... protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack. (1) For the first 12 days, the operation, dubbed (OOD), was conducted by a coalition of the willing, led and enabled by the United States, together with Britain and France; from March 31 onwards, NATO took over the command of the operation, renamed Protector' (OUP). The operation formally concluded on October 31, 2011. The author of this article was a NATO press officer throughout the operation. Militarily, the conflict can be divided into four phases. The first week of Operation Odyssey Dawn was marked by the rapid destruction of Gaddafi regime armored columns by high-tempo air and cruise-missile strikes, lifting the immediate threat the key rebel stronghold of Benghazi. (2) The assumption of command by NATO and the launch of OUP coincided with a prolonged period of predominantly urban fighting along relatively static front lines; during this period, NATO was accused of having fallen into a stalemate. (3) This second phase endured until late July when the forces opposed Gaddafi broke out of their strongholds and advanced on the capital, Tripoli, with a speed that surprised OUP's commander. (4) Following the fall of Tripoli, the final phase was marked by a gradual reduction in the tempo of combat, until by October, OUP was conducting only half as many sorties per day as it had in April--approximately 80 per day, against a peak of almost 150. OUP units clearly possessed overwhelming technological superiority over Gaddafi forces: in seven months of operations, not one Operation Unified Protector casualty was caused by enemy action. It was, moreover, unprecedentedly precise: Out of more than 6,000 airstrikes, five were confirmed as having resulted in civilian casualties (a subject which we shall return). …

NATO Burden Sharing in Libya

This study aims to explain the pattern of contributions to NATO’s military campaign in Libya. It combines collective action theory with hypotheses on balance of threat, alliance politics, and domestic constraints in a multicausal framework, which is tested with qualitative comparative analysis. The results suggest novel inferences on the interactions between partisan politics, and the benefits states wish to secure by contributing to a multilateral operation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were more inclined to support Operation Unified Protector than parties situated at the right. Whereas left-wing governments participated if they had the resources to contribute significantly to the fulfillment of the protection mandate and either highly valued their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-wing governments only contributed if their countries’ interests were threatened by the crisis in Libya or their participation was critical for the operation’s success.

NATO’s Libya Campaign 2011: Just or Unjust to What Degree?

Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s violence against the Libyan population in the face of a fledgling rebellion in March 2011 prompted an international intervention. The United Nations Security Council authorised the use of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly zone. Following a preliminary American-led military intervention, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation sponsored a seven-month campaign, ‘Operation Unified Protector.’ Was the operation ethically justified? Through the lens of the Just War tradition, seven moral principles are assessed in both qualitative and quantitative fashion. The analysis applies the novel Just War Index to the 2011 case concluding that it exhibited a moderate degree of justness overall. Still, significant flaws and ethical problems emerged. While high evaluations were made of just cause, legitimate authority, last resort and right conduct, lower assessments were given for right intent, net benefit, and proportionality of means. The outcome of the intervention is still unknown, but the broad outlines of a moral assessment are distinguishable.

Proces targetingu na příkladu Libye

Protection of the civilian population against the Gaddafi regime, it was a clear UN mandate for military intervention in Libya in 2011. Not only a new approach to leading the fight against terrorism after 11 September 2001, but also requires a change in approaches to conducting combat operations coalition forces, as shown by the recent armed conflict in Libya, inevitably required a new perspective on the concept and approach to the process of targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and responding to them in accordance with operational requirements and capabilities of units, synchronization of NATO forces, particularly with regard to collateral damage with an impact on the protection of civilians. And Unified Protector operation is a clear example.

Sweden's Participation in Operation Unified Protector: Obligations and Interests

This article examines the necessary conditions behind the decision made by the Government of Sweden to participate with fighter jets in the monitoring of the no-fly zone over Libya in March 2011. The article identifies five explanatory factors whose presence was necessary for Sweden's military contribution: a feeling of moral obligation to intervene on the part of the government; the international legal foundation for the operation; strong leadership provided by NATO; broad parliamentary support; and the availability of military capabilities.

Forcible intervention in Libya: revamping the ‘politics of human protection’?

Following the end of NATO ‘Operation Unified Protector’ in Libya there has been an intense debate in the international community with respect to the impact of the military engagement on both the emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) norm as well as on the international community's commitment to enforce it. The study examines the impact of the international military intervention in Libya on this debate by looking at whether Operation Unified Protector contributed to strengthening or weakening the development of R2P. To do so, it first examines whether the authorization to use force in Libya was indeed grounded on R2P, as well as whether it was perceived as such by the international community. Secondly, the research examines whether the intervening parties' actual use of force was consistent with R2P. Finally, the research provides an assessment of the current state of R2P post-Libya.

Operational challenges of the Law on Air Warfare. The example of Operation Unified Protector

Operational challenges of the Law on Air Warfare. The example of Operation Unified Protector

Airpower in contemporary interventions: stabilization, coercion, peace enforcement and peacemaking. Case: Operation Unified Protector, Libya 2011

This paper intends to analyze whether airpower is decisive and irreplaceable in putting an end to violent conflict nowadays, evaluating airpower as an instrument in contemporary warfare and its role in peace operations. The research will seek to confirm or invalidate the hypothesis according to which airpower can successfully take the lead in the Western Allies' contemporary stabilization operations given that it reduces costs in terms of human lives and resources. Moving forward, the research will focus on airpower characteristics in the Libyan case, with an analysis of NATO's Operation Unified Protector.

K některým aspektům aplikace mandátu RB OSN během operace NATO Unified Protector

The question of the compliance of the NATO operation Unified Protector with the international law has not become a key topic of scholarly debate yet. The prevailing attitude is such that NATO intervention was in accordance with the international law. Nevertheless, the article argues that NATO in Libya exceeded the UN Security Council mandate. Unified Protector was an operation conducted in the favour of one side, in this case, the rebels. NATO military engagement in Libya very much approached providing air support to Libyan rebelling groups in order to topple the regime. Furthermore, this conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that Western countries had provided military advisors and arms as well.

The Libyan Model and Strategy: Why it Won't Work in Syria

Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) is the latest example of how a limited-means military intervention in a humanitarian crisis can stop the murder of innocent civilians. Proponents of intervention in the name of "responsibility to protect" (R2P) have stated that the air campaign strategy used in Libya could be the model for future U.S. military engagement overseas. This begs the question of when the United States should insert itself militarily into a humanitarian crisis. For instance, Syria is a potential candidate for military intervention. The following article takes the reasons for military intervention in Libya, as explained by President Obama in his address to the nation in March 2011, and creates criteria for future humanitarian military intervention. By defining and applying these criteria to a humanitarian crisis such as Syria, it is revealed that the Libya campaign model does not fit Syria now, nor does the model provide a panacea for all future humanitarian crises. While the tenets of the Libya strategy could apply to other humanitarian crises, proponents for military intervention must meet the criteria laid out in this article, or the United States may find itself committed to a futile air campaign unable to achieve the nation's strategic objectives.