Understanding Of Pretense Research Articles

Larger corpus callosum volume is favorable for theory of mind development in healthy children.

While previous research has demonstrated a link between the corpus callosum (CC) and theory of mind (ToM) abilities in individuals with corpus callosum agenesis (ACC), the relationship between CC volume and ToM remains unclear in healthy children. The present study examined whether CC volume influences children's performance on ToM tasks that assess their understanding of pretense, emotion recognition, and false beliefs. Forty children aged 6-12years underwent structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and a cognitive test battery. We found that larger mid-anterior and central subsections of the CC significantly correlated with better ToM abilities. We could also demonstrate age- and sex-related effects, as the CC-ToM relationship differed between younger (6-8years) and older (9-12years) children, and between female and male participants. Importantly, the older children drove the association between the CC mid-anterior and central subsection volumes and ToM abilities. This study is the first to demonstrate that CC size is associated with ToM abilities in healthy children, underlining the idea that the CC plays a vital role in their socio-cognitive development. CC subsection volumes may thus not only serve as a measure of heterogeneity in neurodevelopmental populations known to exhibit socio-cognitive deficits, but also in typically developing children.

Understanding pretense as causal inference

There is a long-standing interest in the role that children’s understanding of pretense plays in their more general theory of mind development. Some argue that children understand pretense as a mental state, and the capacity to pretend is indicative of children possessing the capacity for mental representations. Others argue that children understand pretense in terms of actions and appearances, and an understanding of the mental states involved in pretending has a prolonged developmental trajectory. The goal of this paper is to integrate these ideas by positing that children understand pretense as a form of causal inference, which is based on both their general causal reasoning capacities and specific knowledge of mental states. I will first review literature on children’s understanding of pretense, and how such understanding can be conceptualized as integrating with children’s causal reasoning ability. I will then consider how children’s causal knowledge affects the ways they make inferences about others’ pretense. Next, I will consider the role of causal knowledge more broadly in children’s reasoning about pretense worlds, judgments of possibility, and counterfactual reasoning. Taken together the goal of this review is to synthesize how children understand pretending into a rational constructivist framework for understanding social cognitive development in a more integrative manner.

Do single pretend signals promote understanding of pretense in children ? -comparison of pretense and real conditions

Do single pretend signals promote understanding of pretense in children ? -comparison of pretense and real conditions

The pretense debate

In a number of publications, Alan Leslie and colleagues have developed a theory of the psychological mechanisms underlying pretense. This theory maintains that pretense is an early manifestation of “theory of mind” or “mindreading” – the capacity to attribute mental states to oneself and others. Nichols and Stich proposed an alternative theory of pretense on which pretense in young children does not require mindreading. Rather, they argued, young children have a behavioral understanding of pretense. In a lengthy critique, Friedman and Leslie made a persuasive case that the Nichols and Stich theory cannot account for the early emergence of children’s capacity to engage in joint pretense and recognize pretense in others. In this paper, we set out a new “pretense game” theory of pretense that avoids the problems raised by Friedman and Leslie, and does not require that children who engage in joint pretense must have a theory of mind. We go on to argue that our pretense game theory can explain many of the facts about pretense that go unexplained in Leslie’s theory. The central shortcoming of Leslie’s theory is that it attempts to explain the production and recognition of pretense behavior by positing the existence of an innate concept, without explaining how this concept enables those who have it to recognize or produce pretense behavior.

The development of understanding of pretense

The development of understanding of pretense

Maternal Behavior Modifications during Pretense and Their Long-Term Effects on Toddlers’ Understanding of Pretense

Recent studies indicate the need to investigate the sources of toddlers’ understanding of another person's pretense. The present study is a cultural and longitudinal extension of the work of Lillard and Witherington (2004), who claimed that mothers modify their behaviors during pretense and that the some of these behavior modifications help their toddlers understand maternal pretense. Experiment 1 investigated whether mothers would change their behaviors during pretense with a sample of 31 Japanese mother–infant pairs. Experiment 2, with a subsample of 20 mother–child pairs who had participated in Experiment 1, examined whether the maternal behavior modifications at 18 months predicted their toddlers’ understanding of pretense at 24 months. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that Japanese mothers smiled more frequently, gazed at their toddlers longer, used sound effects more frequently, and engaged in more frequent snack-related actions in a “pretense condition” than in a “real condition.” In addition, some of these behaviors were significantly related to their toddlers’ apparent understanding of pretense. Experiment 2 showed that both the frequency of maternal smiles and the number of sound effects in the pretense condition at 18 months predicted toddlers’ understanding of the pretense enacted by a strange adult at 24 months. This research indicates the impact of maternal behavior modifications during pretense on the development of symbolic thought in the 2nd year of life.

What guides pretence? Towards the interactive and the narrative approaches

This paper will explore one aspect of the relationship between pretence and narratives. I look at proposals about how scripts play guiding roles in our pretend play practices. I then examine the views that mental representations are needed to guide pretend play, reviewing two importantly different pictures of mental guiders: the Propositional Account and the Model Account. Both accounts are individualistic and internalistic; the former makes use of language-like representations, the latter makes use of models, maps and images. The paper will discuss some worries with the notion of mental guiders, and offer some positive suggestions about what else might be playing the guiding role in pretence. I propose that environmental affordances and socially scaffolded engagements provide the basis of pretence guiders (the Interactive Account), and suggest that engagement in narrative practices further frames and allows elaborations of acts of pretend play (the Narrative Account). I take first steps in developing a new embodied, enactive and intersubjective understanding of pretence, showing why it is a viable alternative to the mental representational accounts of pretence.

Preschoolers’ Theory-of-Mind Knowledge Influences Whom They Trust About Others’ Theories of Mind

Two experiments examined whether particular aspects of social-cognitive knowledge predicted how preschoolers would treat informants who displayed a more or less developed understanding of that knowledge. In Experiment 1, children's own success on false-belief measures correlated with the extent to which they endorsed information generated by a confederate with a more developed sense of false belief over a confederate with a less developed sense of false belief. In Experiment 2, preschoolers were assessed for whether they possessed a more action-based or mental state-based understanding of pretense. They were then presented with informants who displayed each kind of knowledge. Children's own knowledge again correlated with which informant they believed was a reliable source of knowledge about novel pretend actions. These results not only extend findings in the “trust in testimony” literature beyond word learning, but also potentially reveal another mechanism by which children learn from others—they might trust others’ information about a specific piece of knowledge based on examination of their own knowledge of that domain.

Can 15-month-old infants understand pretence? An investigation using the ‘violation-of-expectation’ paradigm

Productive tests are unsuitable for measuring infants' earliest understanding of pretence, because performance demands may render infants unable to produce the actions required to pass the test. Recently, Onishi, Baillargeon and Leslie (2007) used the violation-of-expectation (VOE) paradigm as a measure of infants' understanding of others' pretence that is free from such performance demands. They found that 15-month-old infants looked longer at an Unexpected event in which an actor pretended to pour into one cup but pretended to drink from another cup, compared to pretending to pour and drink with the same cup. On this basis, they argued that 15-month-old infants expect others' pretence to be consistent, demonstrating their understanding of others' pretence. However, infants may have responded to expectations they had about familiar action sequences, rather than to pretence per se. To test this hypothesis, the current study firstly replicated Onishi et al.'s results in a sample of 28 typically developing 15-month-old infants, and then added a condition using closely matched real versions of their pretend VOE tasks. It was found that infants looked longer at unexpected events, whether or not the events were real or pretend. It was concluded that 15-month-old infants may look longer at pretend events due to violations of expectations they have about familiar action sequences, rather than because they understand others' pretence behaviour.

Interactions between causal models, theories, and social cognitive development

We propose a model of social cognitive development based not on a single modeling framework or the hypothesis that a single model accounts for children's developing social cognition. Rather, we advocate a Causal Model approach (cf. Waldmann, 1996), in which models of social cognitive development take the same position as theories of social cognitive development, in that they generate novel empirical hypotheses. We describe this approach and present three examples across various aspects of social cognitive development. Our first example focuses on children's understanding of pretense and involves only considering assumptions made by a computational framework. The second example focuses on children's learning from "testimony". It uses a modeling framework based on Markov random fields as a computational description of a set of empirical phenomena, and then tests a prediction of that description. The third example considers infants' generalization of action learned from imitation. Here, we use a modified version of the Rational Model of Categorization to explain children's inferences. Taken together, these examples suggest that research in social cognitive development can be assisted by considering how computational modeling can lead researchers towards testing novel hypotheses.

Enabling conditions and children’s understanding of pretense

Two experiments examined whether preschoolers’ difficulties on tasks that required relating pretending and knowledge (e.g., Lillard, A. S. (1993a). Young children’s conceptualization of pretense: Action or mental representational state? Child Development, 64, 372–386) were due to children’s inability to appreciate the causal mechanism behind enabling conditions. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were told about a character who knew about one kind of animal and did not know about another. The character acted in a manner consistent with both animals. Children were asked whether the character was pretending to be the animal of which he was ignorant. The character’s knowledge was either represented in a generic manner (as a picture) or in a manner that suggested a particular enabling condition relation that children found accessible (as a battery, which most 4-year-olds recognize is critical for making toys work). Children were more successful at relating knowledge and pretending in the battery condition. This improvement in performance extended to another task in which children had to identify the enabling condition relation between knowledge and identification, in which there were reduced demands on the inhibitory mechanisms necessary for success. Experiment 2 found that the results in Experiment 1 were not due to demands of the procedure used in Experiment 1. These results are discussed in the context of recent theories of theory of mind that focus on the importance of causal relations among mental states.

Theory of Mind in Williams Syndrome Assessed Using a Nonverbal Task

This study examined Theory of Mind in Williams syndrome (WS) and in normal chronological age-matched and mental age-matched control groups, using a picture sequencing task. This task assesses understanding of pretence, intention and false belief, while controlling for social-script knowledge and physical cause-and-effect reasoning. The task was selected because it is entirely non-verbal, so that the WS individuals could not rely on their good verbal skills when performing the task. Results indicated a specific deficit in understanding of false belief within the WS group. There was also evidence of heterogeneity in the WS group, with the false belief impairment restricted to only a particular subgroup of WS individuals identified originally by Porter, M., & Coltheart, M. (2005). Cognitive heterogeneity in Williams syndrome. Developmental Neuropsychology, 27(2), 275-306.

Young children's understanding of multiple object identity: appearance, pretense and function

Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).

Two‐year‐olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense acts

Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending to perform an action and trying to perform that action - were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas after the trying models they properly performed the action or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are discussed in the light of recent debates about children's developing understanding of pretense and theory of mind.

The role of experience and discourse in children's developing understanding of pretend play actions

The present work investigated the development of an explicit understanding of pretend play actions. Study 1 revealed a long décalage between earlier implicit understanding of pretence as an intentional activity and a later more explicit understanding. Study 2 was a training study. It tested for two factors – systematic pretence experience and explicit pretence discourse – that may be important in development from early implicit to later explicit pretence understanding. Two training groups of 3.5‐year‐old children received the same pretence experiences involving systematic contrasts between pretending, really performing and trying to perform actions. In the ‘explicit’ group, these experiences were talked about with explicit ‘pretend to’ and ‘pretend that’ language. In the ‘implicit’ group no such discourse was used, but only implicit discourse in talking about pretence versus real actions. The two training groups were compared with a control group that received functional play experience. After training, only the explicit group showed improvement in their explicit pretence understanding. In none of the groups was there any transfer to tasks tapping mental state understanding, false belief (FB) and appearance‐reality, (A‐R). The findings are discussed in the context of current theories about the developmental relations between pretence, discourse, and mental state understanding.

How fantasy benefits young children's understanding of pretense

Sobel and Lillard (2001) demonstrated that 4-year-olds' understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented.

Mothers' behavior modifications during pretense and their possible signal value for toddlers.

An important issue for understanding early cognition is why very young children's real-world representations do not get confused by pretense events. One possible source of information for children is the pretender's behaviors. Pretender behaviors may vary systematically across real and pretend scenarios, perhaps signaling to toddlers to interpret certain events as not real. Pretender behaviors were examined in 2 experiments in which mothers were asked both to pretend to have a snack and really to have a snack with their 18-month-olds. Episodes were analyzed for condition differences in verbal and nonverbal behaviors, including smiling, looking, laughter, and functional movements. Reliable differences were found across conditions for several variables. In a 3rd experiment, children's apparent understanding of pretense in relation to their mothers' behaviors was examined, and significant associations were found with some of the mothers' behavioral changes but not others. This work provides a first inroad into the issue of how children learn to interpret pretense acts as pretense.

Pretending and imagination in animals and children

Foreword Sue Taylor Parker Preface and acknowledgements Part I. Historical, Developmental and Comparative Overviews: 1. Imaginative animals, pretending children Robert W. Mitchell 2. A history of pretense in animals and children Robert W. Mitchell 3. Pretending as representation: a developmental and comparative view Lorraine McCune and Joanne Agayoff Part II. Pretense and Imagination in Children: 4. Language in pretense in the second year: what it can tell us about 'pretending' in pretense and the 'know-how' about the mind Edy Veneziano 5. A longitudinal and cross-sectional study of the emergence of the symbolic function in children between 15 and 19 months of age: pretend play, object permanence understanding and self-recognition Pierre-Marie Baudonniere, Sylvie Margules, Soumeya Belkhenchir, Gwennaelle Carn, Florence Pepe and Veronique Warkentin 6. Caregiver-child social pretend play: what transpires? Robert D. Kavanaugh 7. Just through the looking-glass: children's understanding of pretense Angeline Lillard 8. Young children's understanding of pretense and other fictional mental states Jacqueline D. Woolley 9. Pretend play, metarepresentation and theory of mind Peter K. Smith 10. Replica toys, stories and a functional theory of mind Greta G. Fein, Lynn D. Darling and Lois A. Groth 11. Young children's animal-role pretend play Olin Eugene Myers Jr. 12. Imaginary companions and elaborate fantasy in childhood: discontinuity with nonhuman animals Marjorie Taylor and Stephanie M. Carlson Part III. Pretense and Imagination in Primates: 13. Pretending in monkeys Anne Zeller 14. Pretending primates: play and simulation in the evolution of primate societies Peter C. Reynolds 15. Representational capacities for pretense with scale models and photographs in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) Sarah T. Boysen and Valerie A. Kuhlmeier 16. Pretending in free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans Anne E. Russon 17. Seeing with the mind's eye: eye-covering play in orangutans and Japanese macaques Anne E. Russon, Paul L. Vasey and Carole Gauthier 18. Possible precursors of pretend play in nonpretend actions of captive gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) Juan Carlos Gomez and Beatriz Martin-Andrade 19. Pretending culture: social and cognitive features of pretense in apes and humans Warren P. Roberts and Mark A. Krause 20. Empathy in a bonobo Ellen J. Ingmanson 21. Pretend play in a signalling gorilla Marilyn L. Matevia, Francine G. P. Patterson and William A. Hillix Part IV. Prospects: 22. Exploring pretense in animals and children Robert W. Mitchell References Index.

The impact of fantasy and action on young children's understanding of pretence

Theorists examining children's understanding of the mind have been particularly interested in pretence as it may be a marker for early understanding of mental representation (Leslie, 1987). Although Lillard (1993a, 1996) found that children appeared not to understand that pretence involves mental representation or even the mind, Lillard and Sobel (1999) showed that for certain types of pretence, in particular, pretence involving fantasy characters, children's understanding might be more advanced. The twoexperiments here replicate andextend this finding. In both experiments, children performed better on fantasy items than items that did not involve fantasy. This was true regardless of the amount of action the pretence involved.

Children's Elicited Use of Pragmatic Language Functions: How Six- and Seven-year-old Children Adapt to the Interactional Environments of Story Scenarios

Pragmatic language skill involves adapting to an interactional environment where a communicator must interpret and originate communicative acts. This study used an elicitation procedure to reveal how 80 six- and seven-year-old children adapted to the pragmatic context of a story and furnished a remark that would be pragmatically appropriate for a story character to utter. Children 'spoke for' characters in about 70% of the contexts and thus revealed facility in conceptual perspective-taking and attributing mental states to others. The use of self-generated extra-textual language reveals one way that pragmatic language skill is at work when young children comprehend and respond to text. Given these findings, a model of children's transaction with narrative based on interpretation of others' mental states, understanding of pretence and characterisation, and pragmatic language skill is proposed.