Understanding pretense as causal inference

Abstract

There is a long-standing interest in the role that children’s understanding of pretense plays in their more general theory of mind development. Some argue that children understand pretense as a mental state, and the capacity to pretend is indicative of children possessing the capacity for mental representations. Others argue that children understand pretense in terms of actions and appearances, and an understanding of the mental states involved in pretending has a prolonged developmental trajectory. The goal of this paper is to integrate these ideas by positing that children understand pretense as a form of causal inference, which is based on both their general causal reasoning capacities and specific knowledge of mental states. I will first review literature on children’s understanding of pretense, and how such understanding can be conceptualized as integrating with children’s causal reasoning ability. I will then consider how children’s causal knowledge affects the ways they make inferences about others’ pretense. Next, I will consider the role of causal knowledge more broadly in children’s reasoning about pretense worlds, judgments of possibility, and counterfactual reasoning. Taken together the goal of this review is to synthesize how children understand pretending into a rational constructivist framework for understanding social cognitive development in a more integrative manner.