Underdetermination Of Theory Research Articles

The Diffuse Light of the Universe

In 1965, the discovery of a new type of uniform radiation, located between radiowaves and infrared light, was accidental. Known today as Cosmic Microwave background (CMB), this diffuse radiation is commonly interpreted as a fossil light released in an early hot and dense universe and constitutes today the main 'pilar' of the big bang cosmology. Considerable efforts have been devoted to derive fundamental cosmological parameters from the characteristics of this radiation that led to a surprising universe that is shaped by at least three major unknown components: inflation, dark matter and dark energy. This is an important weakness of the present consensus cosmological model that justifies raising several questions on the CMB interpretation. Can we consider its cosmological nature as undisputable? Do other possible interpretations exist in the context of other cosmological theories or simply as a result of other physical mechanisms that could account for it? In an effort to questioning the validity of scientific hypotheses and the under-determination of theories compared to observations, we examine here the difficulties that still exist on the interpretation of this diffuse radiation and explore other proposed tracks to explain its origin. We discuss previous historical concepts of diffuse radiation before and after the CMB discovery and underline the limit of our present understanding.

Realism and the absence of rivals

Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory being underdetermined depends crucially on social and historical factors, such as the structure of scientific communities and the time that has passed since the theory first became accepted. This is then shown to serve as the epistemological foundation for a version of scientific realism which avoids Stanford’s New Induction in a principled and non-question-begging way.

Three indeterminacies of Quine`s

In this text we shall examine three well known theses that W. V. Quine held. In order, these are the theses of the indeterminacy of translation, ontological relativity and underdetermination of theories. First two theses are interwoven inside Quine?s writings on the possibility of the unambiguous translation from the unknown language, while the third results from the examination of the nature of scientific theories. All three theses are closely related to each other, since we can speak of both indeterminacy and ontological relativity of any single theory. However, Quine considers relativity of scientific theories a temporary matter, while, on the contrary, indeterminacy is the permanent aspect of language.

Rediscovering Einstein's legacy: How Einstein anticipates Kuhn and Feyerabend on the nature of science

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend promote incommensurability as a central component of their conflicting accounts of the nature of science. This paper argues that in so doing, they both develop Albert Einstein's views, albeit in different directions. Einstein describes scientific revolutions as conceptual replacements, not mere revisions, endorsing ‘Kant-on-wheels’ metaphysics in light of ‘world change’. Einstein emphasizes underdetermination of theory by evidence, rational disagreement in theory choice, and the non-neutrality of empirical evidence. Einstein even uses the term ‘incommensurable’ specifically to apply to challenges posed to comparatively evaluating scientific theories in 1949, more than a decade before Kuhn and Feyerabend. This analysis shows how Einstein anticipates substantial components of Kuhn and Feyerabend's views, and suggests that there are strong reasons to suspect that Kuhn and Feyerabend were directly inspired by Einstein's use of the term ‘incommensurable’, as well as his more general methodological and philosophical reflections.

Space–time philosophy reconstructed via massive Nordström scalar gravities? Laws vs. geometry, conventionality, and underdetermination

What if gravity satisfied the Klein–Gordon equation? Both particle physics from the 1920–30s and the 1890s Neumann–Seeliger modification of Newtonian gravity with exponential decay suggest considering a “graviton mass term” for gravity, which is algebraic in the potential. Unlike Nordström׳s “massless” theory, massive scalar gravity is strictly special relativistic in the sense of being invariant under the Poincaré group but not the 15-parameter Bateman–Cunningham conformal group. It therefore exhibits the whole of Minkowski space–time structure, albeit only indirectly concerning volumes. Massive scalar gravity is plausible in terms of relativistic field theory, while violating most interesting versions of Einstein׳s principles of general covariance, general relativity, equivalence, and Mach. Geometry is a poor guide to understanding massive scalar gravity(s): matter sees a conformally flat metric due to universal coupling, but gravity also sees the rest of the flat metric (barely or on long distances) in the mass term. What is the ‘true’ geometry, one might wonder, in line with Poincaré׳s modal conventionality argument? Infinitely many theories exhibit this bimetric ‘geometry,’ all with the total stress–energy׳s trace as source; thus geometry does not explain the field equations. The irrelevance of the Ehlers–Pirani–Schild construction to a critique of conventionalism becomes evident when multi-geometry theories are contemplated. Much as Seeliger envisaged, the smooth massless limit indicates underdetermination of theories by data between massless and massive scalar gravities—indeed an unconceived alternative. At least one version easily could have been developed before General Relativity; it then would have motivated thinking of Einstein׳s equations along the lines of Einstein׳s newly re-appreciated “physical strategy” and particle physics and would have suggested a rivalry from massive spin 2 variants of General Relativity (massless spin 2, Pauli and Fierz found in 1939). The Putnam–Grünbaum debate on conventionality is revisited with an emphasis on the broad modal scope of conventionalist views. Massive scalar gravity thus contributes to a historically plausible rational reconstruction of much of 20th–21st century space–time philosophy in the light of particle physics. An appendix reconsiders the Malament–Weatherall–Manchak conformal restriction of conventionality and constructs the ‘universal force’ influencing the causal structure.Subsequent works will discuss how massive gravity could have provided a template for a more Kant-friendly space–time theory that would have blocked Moritz Schlick׳s supposed refutation of synthetic a priori knowledge, and how Einstein׳s false analogy between the Neumann–Seeliger–Einstein modification of Newtonian gravity and the cosmological constant Λ generated lasting confusion that obscured massive gravity as a conceptual possibility.

The Interpretation of String-Theoretic Dualities

We analyse the possibility that string-theoretic dualities present a genuine case of strong underdetermination of theory by evidence. Drawing on the parallel discussion of the hole argument, we assess the possible interpretations of dualities. We conclude that there exist at least two defensible interpretations on which dualities do not present a worrying case of underdetermination per se.

An introduction to the philosophy of science

Part 1 Science as an intellectual activity: growth of knowledge objectivity and the external world prediction and explanation. Part 2 Induction: Baconian induction presuppositionless observation the role of imagination in scientific theorizing inductive proof. Part 3 Falsification: Popperian philosophy of science a Bayesian approach. Part 4 Science and non-science: the demarcation criterion are theories ever falsified? Kuhnian relativism the relationship between the history and philosophy of science. Part 5 Observation and theory: observational common ground between theories observation and theory empiricism unobservability and underdetermination of theory by data. Part 6 Scientific realism: positivism the inference to best explanation scientific laws and the representation of reality the absolute view of the world partial pictures - Schrodinger's cat. Part 7 Probability: probabilistic explanations interpretations of probability. Part 8 Scientific reductions: reductions in the physical sciences criteria for reduction. Part 9 Science and culture: science as mythology myths and science science and technology science and value.

Evidence: wanted, alive or dead

This paper is meant to link the philosophical debate concerning the underdetermination of theories by evidence with a rather significant socio-political issue that has been taking place in Canada over the past few years: the so-called ‘death of evidence’ controversy. It places this debate within a broader philosophical framework by discussing the connection between evidence and theory; by bringing out the role of epistemic values in the so-called scientific method; and by examining the role of social values in science. While it should be admitted that social values play an important role in science, the key question for anyone who advocates this view is: what and whose values? The way it is answered makes an important epistemic difference to how the relation between evidence and theory is appraised. I first review various arguments for the claim that evidence underdetermines theory and shows their presuppositions and limitations, using conceptual analysis and historical examples. After broaching the relation between evidence and method in science by highlighting the need to incorporate epistemic values into the scientific method, my discussion focuses on recent arguments for the role of social values in science. Finally, I address the implications of the approach outlined for the current ‘death of evidence’ debate in Canada.

Underdetermination in evidence-based medicine.

This article explores the philosophical implications of evidence-based medicine's (EBM's) epistemology in terms of the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence as expounded by the Duhem-Quine thesis. EBM hierarchies of evidence privilege clinical research over basic science, exacerbating the problem of underdetermination. Because of severe underdetermination, EBM is unable to meaningfully test core medical beliefs that form the basis of our understanding of disease and therapeutics. As a result, EBM adopts an epistemic attitude that is sceptical of explanations from the basic biological sciences, and is relegated to a view of disease at a population level. EBM's epistemic attitude provides a limited research heuristic by preventing the development of a theoretical framework required for understanding disease mechanism and integrating knowledge to develop new therapies. Medical epistemology should remain pluralistic and include complementary approaches of basic science and clinical research, thus avoiding the limited epistemic attitude entailed by EBM hierarchies.

Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence

It is commonly argued that values “fill the logical gap” of underdetermination of theory by evidence, namely, values affect our choice between two or more theories that fit the same evidence. The underdetermination model, however, does not exhaust the roles values play in evidential reasoning. I introduce WAVE – a novel account of the logical relations between values and evidence. WAVE states that values influence evidential reasoning by adjusting evidential weights. I argue that the weight-adjusting role of values is distinct from their underdetermination gap-filling role. Values adjust weights in three ways. First, values affect our trust in the testimony of others. Second, values influence the evidential thresholds required for justified epistemic judgments. Third, values influence the relative weight of a certain type of evidence within a body of multimodal discordant evidence. WAVE explains, from an epistemic perspective, rather than psychological, how smokers, for example, can find the same evidence about the dangers of smoking less persuasive than non-smokers. WAVE allows for a wider effect of values on our accepted scientific theories and beliefs than the effect for which the underdetermination model allows alone; therefore, science studies scholars must consider WAVE in their research and analysis of evidential case studies.

Novel Predictions: From Empiricism to Unificationism

From Fresnel’s wave theory of light to Einstein’s general theory of relativity, the use of novel predictions has a long history in the method of science. Since predictions concern empirical matters, associated models of the method are usually empiricist ones. However, much of the recent philosophy of science shows a lack of emphasis on novel predictions. The central reasons include the general thesis of underdetermination of theory by evidence and the marginalization of novelty to a narrower issue in theory assessment, the prediction-accommodation distinction. In particular, novelty has become nothing more than code for methods classified as unificationist criteria of theory assessment. In this paper, I will extend Harker’s criticisms to a broader history of novel predictions in philosophy of science. I will then suggest a philosophy of science rooted in empiricist ideas, new experimentalism, to recontextualize novel predictions and their epistemological role. I do so in hopes rehabilitating novel predictions as the core of empirical methods. The literature known as new experimentalism offers a particularly promising context for attempting this because it concerns itself with empirical progress as analyzed through the many epistemic values of experiments. The guiding theme of new experimentalism is the theory-independence of experimental phenomena. Thus, it bypasses all unificatory methods and extra-empirical tools of theoretical science. Through this, I aim to provide a basic characterization of novel prediction as experimental interventions, contrary to its current unificationist formulations.

Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does

In a recent paper entitled “Truth does not explain predictive success” (Analysis, 2011), Carsten Held argues that the so-called “No-Miracles Argument” for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude), survives Held’s criticism unscathed.

The intelligibility objection against underdetermination

One of the objections against the thesis of underdetermination of theories by observations is that it is unintelligible. Any two empirically equivalent theories — so the argument goes—are in principle intertranslatable, hence cannot count as rivals in any non-trivial sense. Against that objection, this paper shows that empirically equivalent theories may contain theoretical sentences that are not intertranslatable. Examples are drawn from a related discussion about incommensurability that shows that theoretical non-intertranslatability is possible.

Truth and Objectivity Regained

There is no greater threat to the relevance of organizational and administrative research, or to effective management, than erosion of confidence in truth and objectivity. The authors warn management and organization researchers against becoming institutionalized into an exaggerated perspective of self-doubt by giving too much credence to discussions of subjectivity and the underdetermination of theory by evidence. The concepts of trustworthiness, integrity, honesty, reliability, competency, fairness, or bias all rest on the concepts of truth and objectivity. The authors urge managers to seek the truth and base decisions on evidence and good theory. In responding to a cluster of recent promising articles on the topic, the authors carefully explicate the notions of truth and objectivity, show how these are attached to the notion of trust, and detail their place in social science and the art of management. The authors demonstrate that it is a mistake to think that one can abandon the notions of truth and objectivity and continue to use normative vocabulary as before.

Realism, underdetermination and string theory dualities

String theory promises to be able to provide us with a working theory of quantum gravity and a unified description of all fundamental forces. In string theory there are so called ‘dualities’; i.e. different theoretical formulations that are physically equivalent. In this article these dualities are investigated from a philosophical point of view. Semantic and epistemic questions relating to the problem of underdetermination of theories by data and the debate on realism concerning scientific theories are discussed. Depending on ones views on semantic issues and realism different interpretations are possible of the dualities.

Epistemic Equivalence and Epistemic Incapacitation

AbstractOne typical realist response to the argument from underdetermination of theories by evidence is an appeal to epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence to argue that, while scientifi...

Distinguishing scientific from pseudoscientific psychotherapies: Evaluating the role of theoretical plausibility, with a little help from Reverend Bayes.

[Clin Psychol Sci Prac 18: 105–112, 2011] In their stimulating article, David and Montgomery (2011) underscore the importance of identifying pseudoscientific and potentially harmful psychotherapies, and observe that the criteria for empirically supported therapies neglect to take into account the theoretical support for treatment packages. They propose a framework for evidence-based therapies that includes empirical support for both the efficacy of the treatment and the theory that spawned it. I discuss several challenges to this and similar frameworks, including (a) the absence of convincing data regarding how most current therapies work, (b) the underdetermination of theory by data, making it difficult to strongly corroborate models of therapeutic change mechanisms using only a small number of studies, and (c) the risk of false negatives, viz., efficacious treatments derived from nonexistent or flawed theories. As a friendly amendment, I propose a Bayesian alternative to David and Montgomery’s classification that incorporates the role of theoretical plausibility while minimizing the aforementioned difficulties.

How to take particle physics seriously: A further defence of axiomatic quantum field theory

Further arguments are offered in defence of the position that the variant of quantum field theory (QFT) that should be subject to interpretation and foundational analysis is axiomatic quantum field theory. I argue that the successful application of renormalization group (RG) methods within alternative formulations of QFT illuminates the empirical content of QFT, but not the theoretical content. RG methods corroborate the point of view that QFT is a case of the underdetermination of theory by empirical evidence. I also urge caution in extrapolating interpretive conclusions about QFT from the application of RG methods in other contexts (e.g., condensed matter physics). This paper replies to criticisms advanced by David Wallace, but aims to be self-contained.

Thomas Bonk: Underdetermination. An Essay on Evidence and the Limits of Natural Knowledge

In his book Thomas Bonk offers an analysis of the problem of underdetermination of theories by empirical quantitative data (observation and experiments). The monograph consists of six chapters. Bonk begins with explanations of the underdetermination thesis (UT for brevity; this thesis will be formulated in the next paragraph) in its historical and methodological context. The next topic concerns undetermination issues in exact sciences, that is, mathematics and physics. Bonk discusses theorems about eliminability of theoretical terms (formulated by Ramsey and Craig), semantic problems of UT, physical equivalence as well as underdetermination in geometry. This part is followed by a discussion of competing truths in science. The relations between rationality, method and evidence are analyzed in chapter 4; in particular, Bonk compares deductivism and inductivism in the context of competing theories. Questions of representations with a long presentation of conventionalism are considered in chapter 5. The last chapter returns to general issues and proposals. The author proposes a distinction between indeterminacy (in Quine' s sense) as related to translation and underdetermination as a property of theories. Bonk argues that although the indeterminacy thesis (IT) entails UT, the converse relation raises several doubts. Now, since IT is very problematic, it does not give a convincing evidence for UT.

Massive Nordström scalar (density) gravities from universal coupling

Both particle physics and the 1890s Seeliger-Neumann modification of Newtonian gravity suggest considering a "mass term" for gravity, yielding a finite range due to an exponentially decaying Yukawa potential. Unlike Nordstr\"{o}m's "massless" theory, massive scalar gravities are strictly Special Relativistic, being invariant under the Poincar\'{e} group but not the conformal group. Geometry is a poor guide to understanding massive scalar gravities: matter sees a conformally flat metric, but gravity also sees the rest of the flat metric, barely, in the mass term. Infinitely many theories exhibit this bimetric 'geometry,' all with the total stress-energy's trace as source. All are new except the Freund-Nambu theory. The smooth massless limit indicates underdetermination of theories by data between massless and massive scalar gravities. The ease of accommodating electrons, protons and other fermions using density-weighted Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors in scalar gravity is noted.