Can psychoanalysis take its place in the science that is psychology? I put aside the therapy, and ask about the theory, its evidence and generation. For at the heart of psychoanalysis is a theory about the nature, development and functioning of the human mind, especially in relation to motives. There are a number of features of this theory, in particular the role and nature of unconscious mental states and processes, that makes it recognizably distinct and a competitor with other psychological theories deriving, for instance, from cognitive psychology or neuroscience. For psychoanalysis to qualify as scientific psychology, it needs to generate data that can evidentially support theoretical claims. Its methods, therefore, must at least be capable of correcting for biases produced in the data during the process of generating it; and we must be able to use the data in sound forms of inference and reasoning. Critics of psychoanalysis have claimed that it fails on both counts, and thus whatever warrant its claims have derive from other sources. I discuss three key objections, and then consider their implications together with recent developments in the generation and testing of psychoanalytic theory. The first and most famous is that of ‘suggestion’; if it sticks, clinical data may be biased in a way that renders all inferences from them unreliable. The second, sometimes confused with the first, questions whether the data are or can be used to provide genuine tests of theoretical hypotheses. The third will require us to consider the question of how psychology can reliably infer motives from behavior.