Implicit false belief tracking is preserved in late adulthood.

Abstract

It is now well established that relative to their younger counterparts, older adults experience difficulties on tasks that require the conscious and explicit processing of others' mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions; theory of mind [ToM]). Despite the importance of relatively automatic and unconscious mental state attribution processes in everyday life, no study to date has tested whether tasks that require the implicit processing of others' belief states also show age-related changes. In this study, younger and older adults completed an implicit false belief task, in which their eye movement patterns were monitored while they passively viewed true and false belief movies. In addition, they were assessed on measures of explicit ToM processing. While older adults showed impairments in explicit ToM processing relative to younger adults, both age groups demonstrated a similar capacity for implicit false belief processing. These findings suggest that implicit components of ToM are preserved in late adulthood and are consistent with dual process models of ageing that emphasise age-related stability in automatic processing and declines in more controlled and effortful cognitive operations. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for social interactions in old age.