Unconscious Cerebration Research Articles

Unconscious cerebration

Journal Article Unconscious cerebration Get access ED. Marshall ED. Marshall Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Notes and Queries, Volume s6-VII, Issue 178, 26 May 1883, Page 405, https://doi.org/10.1093/nq/s6-VII.178.405a Published: 26 May 1883

Unconscious Cerebration

I HAVE delayed noticing a communication, headed Unconscious Impressions, by Mr. C. J. Monro, in NATURE, vol. xx. p. 426. This refers to what Dr. Carpenter calls Unconscious Cerebration, but which when I discovered it likewise, I called Unconscious Thought.

Reflex, Automatic, and Unconscious Cerebration: A History and a Criticism

VIII.—Turning from the living mechanism and its energies, to the energies derived from without that move it—the “strings of the puppet”—to use the mechanical phraseology, we come upon another class of words and phrases which are ambiguously used in the “old metaphysics,” but which have a definite and wholly different meaning in studying the organic bases of mental life. These are such words as impression, irritation, suggestion, and the like. I may be permitted to state, somewhat dogmatically, what is now admitted generally, that all changes in the constituent matter of living things result from the operation of physical or molecular energies therein. This being so, the cerebral series of changes involved in mental states of the individual, and constituting the process termed cerebral reflex action, are due to as purely physical causes as those on which spinal reflex action depends. And this is true, not less as regards feelings like corporeal pain, and sensations, than as regards the highest work of the intellectual faculties. This operation of physical energies, however, was not recognised by Marshall Hall and Dr. Carpenter in 1838, nor, indeed, by physiologists in general. One source of the difficulty experienced in doing this is in the imperfect appreciation of what is physically included under the word impression. Thus, an anonymous defender of the views of the eminent physiologists named observes, in 1846, in opposition to my views—

Reflex, Automatic, and Unconscious Cerebration: A History and a Criticism

VIII.—Turning from the living mechanism and its energies, to the energies derived from without that move it—the “strings of the puppet”—to use the mechanical phraseology, we come upon another class of words and phrases which are ambiguously used in the “old metaphysics,” but which have a definite and wholly different meaning in studying the organic bases of mental life. These are such words as impression, irritation, suggestion, and the like. I may be permitted to state, somewhat dogmatically, what is now admitted generally, that all changes in the constituent matter of living things result from the operation of physical or molecular energies therein. This being so, the cerebral series of changes involved in mental states of the individual, and constituting the process termed cerebral reflex action, are due to as purely physical causes as those on which spinal reflex action depends. And this is true, not less as regards feelings like corporeal pain, and sensations, than as regards the highest work of the intellectual faculties. This operation of physical energies, however, was not recognised by Marshall Hall and Dr. Carpenter in 1838, nor, indeed, by physiologists in general. One source of the difficulty experienced in doing this is in the imperfect appreciation of what is physically included under the word impression. Thus, an anonymous defender of the views of the eminent physiologists named observes, in 1846, in opposition to my views—

2. French Retrospect

In this valuable paper M. L. Dumont gives a critical history of cerebral reflex action, and of unconscious cerebration. Having given a short summary of the first definitions of reflex action, and taking the views of Procbaska and Legallois as a starting-point of his history (Unzer was, however, the teacher of Prochaska, and the most philosophical inquirer of the last century), he brings the subject to the time when Marshall Hall, founding on the experiments of Flourens, maintained that the brain is not an excito-motor organ, and cannot, therefore, be the seat of any reflex action.

Reflex, Automatic, and Unconscious Cerebration: A History and a Criticism

An Essay in the Journal of Mental Science for October, 1875, entitled, “Can Unconscious Cerebration be Proved ?” by Dr. Ireland, Superintendent of the Institution for the Education of Imbeciles at Larbert, ends thus:—“In any case the theory of ‘unconscious cerebration’ derives no support from physiology. It is a child of the old metaphysics, to be brought forward and repelled by the study and analysis of mental operations, cognisable by internal examination.”

Can Unconscious Cerebration be proved?

Unconscious cerebration is regarded as so important a discovery that two well-known scientific men have contended for the priority of its publication, and while some people are anxious to give it fresh applications and illustrations, others proclaim it to the public as a new demonstration of science, accepted by physiologists, and stable enough to uphold new theories founded upon it. After having carefully considered the evidence upon which the theory of unconscious cerebration is supposed to rest, I am disposed to think that the facts, or assumed facts, may be explained in a simpler manner, and that the theory itself is superfluous and unproved. For an exposition of what is understood by unconscious cerebration, and on what grounds it is believed to exist, I have used a work called, “The Principles of Mental Physiology,” by Dr. Carpenter, the well known physiologist, who claims to have worked out the theory in his own mind, without knowing that any other had preceded him, and whose recognised reputation is a sufficient guarantee that the argument, in his hands, is sure of being well stated. The term itself seems far from being a happy one. Dr. Carpenter tells us that it has been found readily intelligible; he objects to “unconscious reasoning” as a contradiction in terms, and yet his own description seems either to imply unconscious reasoning, or unfelt feeling; and the difficulty of finding an appropriate term for this class of operations, is really owing to the difficulty of conceiving what these operations really are. In fact, to state them clearly, is to render the theory incredible. To call thought cerebration, may show the desire of a writer to assign thought as the product of brain action; but it is neither warranted by true philosophy, nor by the popular and scientific uses of speech. When the liver secretes bile, one does not say that it hepatates; or when a man breathes, we do not say he pulmonates.

Can Unconscious Cerebration be proved?

Unconscious cerebration is regarded as so important a discovery that two well-known scientific men have contended for the priority of its publication, and while some people are anxious to give it fresh applications and illustrations, others proclaim it to the public as a new demonstration of science, accepted by physiologists, and stable enough to uphold new theories founded upon it. After having carefully considered the evidence upon which the theory of unconscious cerebration is supposed to rest, I am disposed to think that the facts, or assumed facts, may be explained in a simpler manner, and that the theory itself is superfluous and unproved. For an exposition of what is understood by unconscious cerebration, and on what grounds it is believed to exist, I have used a work called, “The Principles of Mental Physiology,” by Dr. Carpenter,* the well known physiologist, who claims to have worked out the theory in his own mind, without knowing that any other had preceded him, and whose recognised reputation is a sufficient guarantee that the argument, in his hands, is sure of being well stated. The term itself seems far from being a happy one. Dr. Carpenter tells us that it has been found readily intelligible; he objects to “unconscious reasoning” as a contradiction in terms, and yet his own description seems either to imply unconscious reasoning, or unfelt feeling; and the difficulty of finding an appropriate term for this class of operations, is really owing to the difficulty of conceiving what these operations really are. In fact, to state them clearly, is to render the theory incredible. To call thought cerebration, may show the desire of a writer to assign thought as the product of brain action; but it is neither warranted by true philosophy, nor by the popular and scientific uses of speech. When the liver secretes bile, one does not say that it hepatates; or when a man breathes, we do not say he pulmonates.

Scientific Serials

The Journal of Mental Science, July 1874—Dr. Nicolson proceeds with his Morbid Physiology of Criminals, discussing, on this occasion, prison discipline as a test of mind; and he finds a large number of prisoners who, tried by this test, he must class together as “weak-minded.” In spite of his strong common sense, Dr. Nicolson at times betrays amiable leanings towards the hopeful rather than towards a perhaps unpalatable truth. We must confess ourselves among the “sceptics”from whom “the sight of a class of adult and veteran criminals plodding away at their books in the halls of a prison” “would but draw an ominous shake of the head.” Granting that the book education of criminals could be carried further than there is any reason to believe possible, the assumption remains that this would tend more than any other form of discipline to make them less criminal than before—the only thing in which society has any special interest concerning them. The “weak-minded” criminal, being on the border line of sanity, is naturally a perplexing subject to the prison authorities. In dealing with him practically Dr. Nicolson's sagacity might be fully relied on, though in such expressions as “we can punish badness, but we must treat madness,” there is implied a sharp line of distinction which exists only in our phraseology. Madness ought to be punished when that is the best treatment; and badness ought to be treated when treatment is the best remedy.—In an interesting paper On children fostered by wild beasts, W. W. Ireland, M.D., favours the opinion that there is not a single authentic instance of the kind.—J. H. Balfour Browne, barrister, makes a psychological and medico-legal problem of the character of Léonce Miranda, the hero of Mr. Browning's Red Cotton Night-Capt Country; and by intensely commonplace standards of measurement concludes that Léonce was mad. We sincerely hope his principles of judgment will never find place in the deliberations of actual legal tribunals. It would be a terrible prospect to think that our wills might be set aside at the instance of greedy relatives on the ground that we were somewhat “anomalous,” not exactly like the herd “in our mental constitution;” “to say which,” says Mr. Balfour Browne, “is only to say that a man is insane.” Perhaps “all the doctrines of Rome will not make a practical man who professes its creed believe in a nowadays miracle;” but what is the worth of the statement? Strike out the word practical, which here means stupid, and give the sentence definite meaning by substituting believes for professes, and the proposition becomes a contradiction in terms. But to be logical may be to be insane, according to the wisdom of our practical men who profess instead of believing.—The Morisonian Lectures; The treatment of insanity, abstracted from Drs. Bucknill and Tuke's chapter on that subject; Clinical notes and cases; Notes of the quarter, and reviews, make up the number. Dr. Carpenter's “Mental Physiology” is the most important review. His defence of the old freewill doctrine is severely handled; and an attempt, not quite so successful, is made to set aside the theory of unconscious cerebration.

Scientific Serials

THE Journal of Mental Science, July,—We have heard or read of a rather impressionable gentleman who, as he perused Dr. Buchan's “Domestic Medicine,” fancied himself afflicted with every disorder therein described, not even excepting the pains of pregnancy. Bearing this in mind, we would recommend that none save those well assured of their own sanity should read the Journal of Mental Science. There is so much about morbid psychology, madness, and idiocy, that weak readers are in some real danger of being taken possession of by an uncomfortable suspicion that they may be a little touched themselves. The place of honour is given to an address on idiocy by Dr. J. C. Bucknill. This is a piece of special pleading (justified, perhaps, by its occasion) for the education of idiots. Now, as these miserable abortions must be kept in life because of the indirect evil effects of any system of extinguishing them, we certainly desire that they should be kept in asylums and made comfortable. But we cannot even grant that they are “more worthy of our efforts than those races of animals which men strive to bring to perfection.” Except in so far as Science may be advanced by such work, it seems very much of a waste of time for such a man as Séguin to labour for four months to fix the eye of an idiot as the first step in the education of sight. We cannot go into ecstacy on hearng that idiots are actually taught to use knives and forks, when so many rational beings around us have neither knives nor forks to use, nor any use for them. By all means let the charitable support asylums for idiots; but at the same time it should not be forgotten that these poor creatures can never be educated into anything useful or lovely, and that a point is soon reached beyond which further education is misspent labour.—A valuable paper on “The Use of Digitalis in Maniacal Excitement” is contributed by Dr. W. J. Mickle. Next follows, under the title of “onsciousness and Unconscious Cerebration,” a rather muddled attempt, on the part of W. G. Davies, B.D., to upset Dr. Carpenter's doctrine of “unconscious cerebration.” From this article one might suppose that the views combated were peculiar to Dr. Carpener and his so-called disciples Dr. Bastian and Miss Cobbe, whereas its truth the writer has against him not these only, but also the most distinguished of living psychologists. His writing is a good deal in the bad old style, the language serving at times, as it seems to us, to obscure rather than express thought. Dr. Carpenter is accused of imagining a nervous anatomy to suit his theory. But Mr. Davies does not himself seem to be up with the latest scientific surmises. For example, in laying the groundwork of one of his own arguments, he says: “The very same cells in the visual sense-centre cannot, at one and the same moment, see brown and yellow.” He does not seem to be aware that it is highly probable that the cells that see one colour never do see another. There are over a dozen other papers, all of more or less, some of them of considerable interest.

Consciousness and “Unconscious Cerebration.”

Is consciousness something distinct from the intellectual operations named perceiving, conceiving, reasoning, recollecting, imagining; or do these operations ever take place in the absence of consciousness? In order to answer this vital question it is necessary that consciousness should be examined with a microscopic nicety, rarely, as we take it, attained to since Reid explored this field of science. When we consider that, for forty years, Reid, with an enthusiastic admiration for that inductive method which the genius of Newton and others illuminated with such brilliancy, questioned Nature, Nature in man, as to the character of perception, and decided that the objects disclosed by it were not mentally possessed; investigators are bound, for their own credit's sake, to show beyond doubt that Reid is in error before they flippantly accuse him of being singularly wanting in penetration. Yet the conclusion which is forced upon us by the present aspect of psychology and cerebral physiology, not to mention metaphysic, is to the effect either that Reid was singularly wanting in analytical ability, or that the living race of psychologists must be going far astray on a most vital point. We have lately been forced to believe that Reid is on the right road; yet, sooth to say, during many years objects have been to us, as it would seem to psychologists in general, a most fertile source of perplexity and confusion. It is only very lately we have succeeded in realising the fact that the object, or the known, is not an element of the knowing; that knowing is not knowing plus known, but knowing purely and simply, a single fact, not a double one; not a synthesis of consciousness and object, but consciousness only, that and nothing more.

Consciousness and “Unconscious Cerebration.”

Is consciousness something distinct from the intellectual operations named perceiving, conceiving, reasoning, recollecting, imagining; or do these operations ever take place in the absence of consciousness? In order to answer this vital question it is necessary that consciousness should be examined with a microscopic nicety, rarely, as we take it, attained to since Reid explored this field of science. When we consider that, for forty years, Reid, with an enthusiastic admiration for that inductive method which the genius of Newton and others illuminated with such brilliancy, questioned Nature, Nature in man, as to the character of perception, and decided that the objects disclosed by it were not mentally possessed; investigators are bound, for their own credit's sake, to show beyond doubt that Reid is in error before they flippantly accuse him of being singularly wanting in penetration. Yet the conclusion which is forced upon us by the present aspect of psychology and cerebral physiology, not to mention metaphysic, is to the effect either that Reid was singularly wanting in analytical ability, or that the living race of psychologists must be going far astray on a most vital point. We have lately been forced to believe that Reid is on the right road; yet, sooth to say, during many years objects have been to us, as it would seem to psychologists in general, a most fertile source of perplexity and confusion. It is only very lately we have succeeded in realising the fact that the object, or the known, is not an element of the knowing; that knowing is not knowing plus known, but knowing purely and simply, a single fact, not a double one; not a synthesis of consciousness and object, but consciousness only, that and nothing more.

Consciousness and Volition

IN an interesting review of Lankester's “Comparative Longevity in Man and the Lower Animals,” which recently appeared in the Times, is the following sentence:—“Once commenced, its continuance (that of the act of walking) is quite involuntary, and may even be unnoticed by the consciousness.” I am anxious to ascertain, from those readers of NATURE who have paid special attention to psychology, whether this is, in their opinion, a correct statement of the condition of the mind during such an habitual act as that of walking. There are undoubtedly certain actions of the body, those denominated reflex, which are performed without any exercise of the will whatever; but these are all either momentary, or, if continued, are nearly uniform and unchanging. To me it seems impossible that any action which is constantly varying can be wholly involuntary. Take, for instance, the motion of the fingers in writing: we are absolutely unconscious of the exercise of the mental faculties by which each successive change in the position of the pen is regulated; but yet is it not certain that each up-stroke and down-stroke is the consequence of a separate effort of the will? There is here an evident connection between the state of mind at the time and the action of the body; and by what other means is it possible to suppose that the mental act which conceives the word we are writing can convey its instruction to the fingers? Certainly not by any process of instinct. A better instance perhaps is in the motion of the muscles of the face and throat in speaking. These muscles are entirely under the control of the will; and every separate motion of them must surely be effected by a distinct voluntary effort, of which however we are entirely unconscious. The same seems to me the case in walking. When we sway the body out of the perpendicular in turning a corner, I am at a loss to understand how this can be performed involuntarily. The explanation seems to me to be that consciousness cannot, so to speak, work so fast as volition, and therefore cannot take cognizance of a large number of rapidly successive acts of the will. The question is not so much one of a nice metaphysical distinction as simply of a correct use of terms, although I am afraid I am opposing the views of such high authorities as Huxley and Carpenter. We have been made familiar with the term Unconscious Cerebration. Is there not also an enormous field of Unconscious Volition?

Unconscious cerebration

Journal Article Unconscious cerebration Get access A. H. A. H. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Notes and Queries, Volume s4-VI, Issue 152, 26 November 1870, Page 458, https://doi.org/10.1093/nq/s4-VI.152.458-l Published: 26 November 1870

Sensation and Perception: II

THE doctrine that there is a distinct organ for the realisation of Sensations only, apart from that for Perception, has been very generally taught, and has been insisted on by no one more strongly than by Dr. Carpenter in his otherwise most able and suggestive expositions of nervous physiology. He says:* “The general rule of action appears to be that the impressions made by external objects upon the afferent nerves, when transmitted to the spinal cord, ascend towards the cerebrum without exciting any reflex movements in their course. When such an impression arrives at the sensorium,† it excites the consciousness of the individual, and thus gives rise to a sensation and the change thus induced being further propagated from the sensory ganglia to the cerebrum, gives occasion to the formation of an idea” And that Dr. Carpenter here means by the word ‘idea’ what we have previously spoken of as that complex intellectualised sensation generally called a ‘perception’ seems obvious from the following passage occurring on another page, where the same author says: “It is further important to keep in mind the distinction between the sensations themselves and the ideas which are the immediate results of those sensations when they are perceived by the mind. The ideas relate to the cause of the sensation or the object by which the impression is made”(p. 711). But since, in Dr. Carpenter's view, the sensory ganglia constitute the sensorium, in which impressions become conscious sensations; and because he naturally thinks it very improbable that there are two distinct organs of consciousness, he is compelled to adopt the hypothesis that the superficial grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres, in which intellectual operations are principally carried on, is not itself endowed with the function of consciousness. Thus he assumes—as the most probable inference to be drawn from various kinds of evidence—“that the sensory ganglia constitute the seat of consciousness not merely for impressions on the organs of sense, but also for changes in the cortical substance of the cerebrum; so that until the latter have reacted downwards upon the sensorium we have no consciousness either of the formation of ideas or of any intellectual processes of which these may be the subject.”‡ And, although we are quite-unable to agree with the conclusions themselves as to the absence of consciousness in connection with the activity of the cerebral hemispheres, and as to its presence as a functional attribute of the sensory ganglia alone, still it is sufficiently interesting, in a philosophical point of view, to find Dr. Carpenter declaring so confidently in favour of a distinct organ of consciousness, even altogether separate from those parts of the cerebral hemispheres in which what we have called § potential knowledge is produced—meaning by this term what is called knowledge, so far as it can exist minus the attribute of consciousness. The elaboration of this potential knowledge is, in fact, a process the possibility of which has been ably discussed by Dr. Carpenter in the section in which he speaks of “unconscious cerebration.”