This paper studies two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games for continuous time jump processes with the following features: (1) the payoff and transition rates are unbounded and time-dependent, (2) the state and action spaces are general Borel sets, (3) the discount factors can vary in time. Differing from those with the risk-sensitive parameter as a differential variable in previous works, we introduce a new type of Shapley equation (NSE) with the time as a differential variable. Under some technical assumptions, we derive a representation of a solution to the NSE, which in turn is used to establish the existence of a solution to the NSE by iterations and approximation. With the help of the NSE, we prove the existence of the value of the game and a saddle-point equilibrium depending on the time, which explicitly shows the nonstationarity of the risk-sensitive discounted equilibria. We illustrate our results by two examples with unbounded transition and payoff rates.
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