Unanimity Decision Rule Research Articles

Managing environmental change through inter-agency collaboration: Protective governance in mandated sustainability planning

When organizations must collaborate to address resource sustainability dilemmas, concerns about the risk of losing autonomy can dissuade them from joining formal collaborative institutions. We argue that governing rules designed to protect autonomy can entice participation from diverse stakeholders, including underprivileged and often marginalized environmental actors, while enhancing confidence in the collaboration’s ongoing and anticipated sustainability efforts. We test this argument in the context of large-scale governance reform in the state of California, which recently mandated local governing entities to collaborate for sustainable groundwater planning or risk state intervention. Using data collected from both archival records and a statewide survey of local groundwater managers, the analysis shows that inclusive representation, unweighted voting power structures, and unanimity decision rules constitute protective governance, which in turn boosts participating agencies’ confidence in sustainability efforts. This study provides theoretical and empirical insights into how organizations can address constitutional issues to improve collaborative processes and outcomes of environmental sustainability efforts.

On anonymous and weighted voting systems

Many bodies around the world make their decisions through voting systems in which voters have several options and the collective result also has several options. Many of these voting systems are anonymous, i.e., all voters have an identical role in voting. Anonymous simple voting games, a binary vote for voters and a binary collective decision, can be represented by an easy weighted game, i.e., by means of a quota and an identical weight for the voters. Widely used voting systems of this type are the majority and the unanimity decision rules. In this article, we analyze the case in which voters have two or more voting options and the collective result of the vote has also two or more options. We prove that anonymity implies being representable through a weighted game if and only if the voting options for voters are binary. As a consequence of this result, several significant enumerations are obtained.

Protective Rules and Collaborative Governance: Modeling Anticipated Success in Sustainable Management of Common-Pool Resources

When organizations collaborate to address resource sustainability dilemmas caused by environmental change, they must decide how to structure the rules governing collective decisions. Concerns about the risk of losing autonomy dissuade organizations from collaborating, yet the study of such governing rules has not been a central focus in both environmental and organizational literatures. We argue that governing rules designed to protect agency autonomy can entice participation from diverse stakeholders, including underprivileged and often marginalized environmental actors while enhancing confidence in the collaboration’s ongoing and anticipated sustainability efforts. We test this argument in the context of large-scale governance reform in California, in which the state recently mandated local governing entities to collaborate for sustainable groundwater planning or risk state intervention. Using data collected from both archival records and a state-wide survey of local groundwater managers, the analysis shows that inclusive representation, unweighted voting power structures, and unanimity decision rules constitute protective governance, which in turn boosts participating agencies’ confidence in sustainability efforts. This study provides theoretical and empirical insights into how organizations can address constitutional issues to improve collaborative processes and outcomes of environmental sustainability efforts.

Contractually Stable Alliances

We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance affect the formation of strategic alliances. We adopt the concept of contractual stability to predict the alliances that are going to emerge in the long run. We find that any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule. In addition, the grand alliance which is the efficient structure is stable. If we allow for side payments to compensate former partners, then some less efficient structures that were stable without side payments are no longer stable. Moreover, we show that the stability of alliances under the unanimity rule to exit is robust to the type of firms, myopic or farsighted. Finally, there is no contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority decision rule.

Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains

We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are constrained by attributes possessed by the alternatives (Nehring and Puppe, Games Econ Behavior 59:132–153, 2007a; Nehring and Puppe, J Econ Theory 135:269–305, 2007b). Solidarity conditions require that when some parameters of the economy change, the agents whose parameters are kept fixed either all weakly lose or they all weakly win. Population-monotonicity (Thomson, Math Oper Res 8:319–326, 1983a; Thomson, J Econ Theory 31:211–226, 1983b) applies to the arrival and departure of agents, while replacement-domination (Moulin, Q J Econ 102:769–783, 1987) applies to changes in preferences. We show that either solidarity property is compatible with voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness if and only if the attribute space is quasi-median (Nehring, Social aggregation without veto, Mimeo, 2004), and with Pareto-efficiency if and only if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity.

Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes

AbstractThe article focuses on judicial politics in three international regimes. The courts of these regimes are trustee courts, operating in an environment of judicial supremacy with respect to states. An international trustee court meets three criteria: (1) the court is the authoritative interpreter of the regime’s law; (2) the court’s jurisdiction is compulsory; and (3) it is virtually impossible, in practice, for contracting states to reverse the court’s important rulings. After developing a theory of trusteeship, we turn to how judges have used their powers. Although there is variation, each court has engaged in “majoritarian activism,” producing law that reflects standard practices or a high degree of state consensus but that would not have been adopted by states under unanimity decision rules. Majoritarian activism helps judges to develop the law progressively, to mitigate potential legitimacy problems, and to render efforts at curbing the growth of their authority improbable or ineffective.

Contractually stable networks

We consider situations where players are part of a network and belong to coalitions in a given coalition structure. We propose the concept of contractual stability to predict the networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium when the consent of coalition partners is needed for adding or deleting links. Two different decision rules for consent are analyzed: simple majority and unanimity. We characterize the coalition structures that make the strongly efficient network contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule and the coalition structures that sustain some critical network as contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule and under any decision rule requiring the consent of any proportion of coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency in some classical models of network formation.

Stable and efficient coalitional networks

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with her coalition members and with individuals outside her coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability imposes that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and efficiency. Moreover, this new framework can provide insights that one cannot obtain if coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and independently.

Trustee Courts and the Evolution of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the ECHR, the EU, and the WTO

The paper focuses on judicial politics in three international organizations: the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the World Trade Organization. The courts of these regimes are trustee courts, operating in an environment of judicial supremacy with respect to states. An international trustee court meets three criteria: (1) the court is the authoritative interpreter of the regime’s law; (2) the court’s jurisdiction, with regard to state compliance with treaty law, is compulsory; and (3) it is virtually impossible, in practice, for contracting states to reverse the court’s important rulings. After developing a theory of trusteeship, we turn to how judges have used their position of supremacy. The case studies focus on the adjudication of what have been the courts’ most politically-sensitive set of disputes, cases involving state claims to exemptions from treaty obligations for measures that are “necessary” to achieve a specified public interest. Although there is variation, we find that each court has engaged in a strategy of “majoritarian activism,” producing law that reflects standard practices or a high degree of state consensus but which would not be adopted by member states under unanimity decision-rules. Majoritarian activism helps judges develop the law in a progressive manner, to mitigate potential legitimacy problems, and to render efforts at curbing the growth of their authority improbable or ineffective.

Individual Differences and Group Negotiation: The Role of Polychronicity, Dominance, and Decision Rule

AbstractThe purpose of the current study was to integrate two streams of research that have remained largely distinct: negotiation and group composition. Specifically, this experiment examined the interactive effects of two individual difference variables (polychronicity and dominance) on multi‐party negotiation performance (task conflict and joint profit) in either unanimity or majority rule contexts. Results from business students in a multi‐issue negotiation exercise revealed that personality does play a role in group negotiation, but relationships were contingent, as revealed by the presence of a significant two‐way interaction for task conflict and a three‐way interaction for joint profit. Group polychronicity resulted in higher task conflict, but only when group dominance was low. The polychronicity–dominance interaction significantly predicted joint profit under majority rule, but had little effect under a unanimity decision rule. Consistent with task conflict results, polychronicity negatively predicted joint profit, but only for lower dominance groups under majority rule. Findings reinforce the importance of examining how multiple individual differences interact with each other, as well as with situational factors, to determine group negotiation outcomes.

Integrative and Distributive Bargaining Situations in the European Union: What Difference Does It Make?

Despite the distinction made between integrative and distributive bargaining situations in European studies literature, few studies have focused specifically on how these two situations differ. This article attempts to close this gap by examining two key bargaining situations involving fisheries that led to the Europeanization of this policy field. The integrative bargaining situation dealt with the negotiations about the structural policy and common organization of the market for fish products. In contrast, the distributive bargaining case focused on the protracted negotiations over resource conservation and management policies. The article focuses primarily on how the unanimity decision rule may affect negotiation patterns in the European Union and on how the specific type of bargaining situation affects policy outcomes. The thesis is that different bargaining tools are used to reach an agreement.

Effects of group decision rules on decisions involving continuous alternatives: The unanimity rule and extreme decisions in mock civil juries

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and unanimity decision rules on group decisions involving continuous alternatives. Each experiment used mock civil juries to test three hypotheses related to the claim that when the distribution of group members’ initial preferences is skewed, the group’s decision will be influenced more by the presence of outlier members under unanimity rule than under majority rule. Experiment 1 tested the hypotheses using a punitive damages case and positively skewed preference distributions. Experiment 2 tested the hypotheses using a compensatory damages case and manipulating the skewness of preference distributions in a 2 (group decision rule) × 2 (valence of skewness) factorial design. In both experiments, the extreme (outlier) member’s individual preference was significantly correlated with the group decision only under unanimity rule. A simple thought experiment based on the experimental results is suggested regarding the implications of using unanimity or majority rule for making decisions in civil juries.

Ethical dilemmas and the decision-making process. Is a consensus realistic? : Bérubé, G. G. and Villeneuve, F. Energy Policy, 2002, 30, (14), 129–1285

This study contributes to the new and growing body of research on shared cognition by examining how individuals entering a group decision-making context with different perspectives of the issues to be discussed arrive at cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus refers to similarity among group members regarding how key matters are conceptualized and was operationalized as shared assumptions underlying decision issues in the present research. Utilizing 37 student groups participating in a multi-issue decision-making exercise, the study investigated antecedents and correlates of cognitive consensus. Results revealed that unanimity decision rule groups achieved more cognitive consensus than majority rule groups. In addition, group members inquiring concerning the reasons underlying others' decision preferences, accepting others' viewpoints as legitimate, and incorporating others' perspectives into their own interpretations of the issues was positively related to arriving at a greater degree of cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus also positively influenced expectations regarding decision implementation and satisfaction.

An investigation of changes in attitude over time of GDSS groups under unanimity and majority decision rules

Under controlled laboratory conditions, we examine the effects of variations in decision rules on attitudes of individuals operating within groups. We find that significant changes in satisfaction and commitment occur across sessions when groups operate under a unanimity decision rule, but not when groups operate under a majority decision rule. We also observe that these two DRs produce opposing results both when there is membership continuity and when there is membership change.

Cognitive Diversity and Consensus in Group Decision Making: The Role of Inputs, Processes, and Outcomes

This study contributes to the new and growing body of research on shared cognition by examining how individuals entering a group decision-making context with different perspectives of the issues to be discussed arrive at cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus refers to similarity among group members regarding how key matters are conceptualized and was operationalized as shared assumptions underlying decision issues in the present research. Utilizing 37 student groups participating in a multi-issue decision-making exercise, the study investigated antecedents and correlates of cognitive consensus. Results revealed that unanimity decision rule groups achieved more cognitive consensus than majority rule groups. In addition, group members inquiring concerning the reasons underlying others' decision preferences, accepting others' viewpoints as legitimate, and incorporating others' perspectives into their own interpretations of the issues was positively related to arriving at a greater degree of cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus also positively influenced expectations regarding decision implementation and satisfaction.

Group Decision Making Under Majority and Unanimity Decision Rules

Etude de la distribution des decisions de groupe en fonction de l'information recue sur la position des autres membres du groupe et de la regle adoptee: majorite ou unanimite. Quatre-vingt groupes de trois personnes ont pris trois decisions impliquant un choix parmi un certain nombre de solutions formant un continuum. La moitie des groupes devait prendre les decisions suivant la regle de la majorite, l'autre moitie suivant la regle de l'unanimite. Dans la moitie des groupes, les membres etaient informes des preferences de chacun; dans l'autre, ce n'etait pas le cas

Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs. Unanimity Decision Rules

Ruling on the constitutionality of less than unanimous juries, the majority and dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court offered differing theories of social influence processes in jury deliberations. Some areas of disagreement involved verdict distribution, majority‐minority interactions, and community confidence as a function of unanimity vs. non‐unanimity requirements. The present series of three studies concentrated on these issues. In the first two studies, groups that were split 4:2 in initial vote deliberated a case involving first degree murder. In the third study, individuals served as jurors in each of seven mock trials (both civil and criminal). Half of these groups were required to deliberate to unanimity, the other half being required to deliberate to 2/3 majority. Results indicated that verdicts were not appreciably altered as a result of unanimity vs. non‐unanimity requirements. However, unanimity groups were more likely to reach full consensus; their deliberations were characterized by more “conflict”; more opinions were changed as a result of the deliberation process; they reported more confidence in the verdict and tended to feel that justice had been administered. The findings tend to corroborate the influence theories of the dissenting Justices.

Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: Effects of concept definition and assigned decision rule on the judgments of mock jurors.

Examined the concept of reasonable doubt as both an individual and group decision criterion. Previous research indicates that neither criterion has an effect on verdicts. A reexamination of this research suggested that such effects might occur for cases producing maximum disagreement. An experiment was performed in which 606 mock jurors reached individual and group verdicts for such a case. The decision criteria for individuals (judge's definition of reasonable doubt) and groups (assigned decision rule) were varied in a factorial design. As predicted, mock juries assigned a unanimity decision rule were significantly less likely to reach a verdict than juries assigned a majority rule. Minority members of juries assigned a majority decision rule were particularly dissatisfied with group deliberation. Definitional variations in reasonable doubt significantly affected both individual and group verdicts. The effects of the independent variables for the group decision-making process were also examined using a model-fitting approach to J. H. Davis's.

The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities

In an article, “The Paradox of Vote Trading,” (APSR 67 [December, 1973]) William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams have argued that systematic logrolling among all members of a legislature produces a paradox: While each trade is individually rational, the effects of externalities offset the potential gains from exchanging votes and each voter finds himself worse off than he would have been by voting sincerely. We extend the results of Riker and Brams to a unanimity decision rule and find that a paradox of vote trading holds for that decision rule as well as for simple majority rule. Under a unanimity rule, however, trades which would be collectively rational (i.e., which would produce a Pareto optimal result) are not individually rational; the non-trader is the beneficiary under such a decision rule. Finally, we pose the question Riker and Brams suggested: Is the paradox of vote trading inescapable? Except under very restrictive conditions, we find that it is. However, given certain assumptions about the distributions of individual utilities, we present proofs of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Pareto optimality of vote trading and argue that in actual legislative situations, when vote trading is Pareto optimal, learning behavior should serve to extricate the members from the paradox of vote trading.