UN Sanctions Regime Research Articles

‘Wolf Warriors’ in the UN Security Council? Investigating power shifts through blaming

AbstractWhat shifts in the extent and patterns of China's blaming are observable at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? This article employs automated content analysis to measure the frequency of blaming by China and other permanent UNSC member states based on a dataset of all speeches (19,623 overall) in the UNSC from January 1995 to May 2022. Furthermore, it uses qualitative text analysis and network analysis to examine the targets of blaming in three different case studies of UN security governance—UN peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia (1998–2008), the UN sanctions regime against North Korea (2007–2017) and the broader peace and security discourse at the UNSC (2008–2018). The study conceptualizes Chinese blaming as a previously unexamined discursive strategy of compulsory power with potential long‐term effects on shifts in productive power. However, the results indicate the absence of blaming‐related shifts in the discursive space of the UNSC: China's rhetoric in the UNSC, compared with other UNSC members, has remained restrained over time. Variance in blaming behaviour between actors and across bilateral and multilateral settings seems to depend on strategic considerations that assess how to exert power most effectively.

Humanitarian aid under sanctions: From the problem statement to the search for solutions

In the context of a sharp aggravation of interstate rivalry, an increase in natural disasters and the emergence of new epidemiological challenges, the problem of timely provision of humanitarian assistance to the population of the most affected countries and regions becomes especially acute. Its solution, already fraught with a whole complex of objective economic, political and other difficulties, is further complicated by the existing practice of imposing unilateral and multilateral or international sanctions, which have become one of the key instruments of the leading subjects of world politics. And although formally sanctions regimes are provided with humanitarian exceptions designed to minimize their negative consequences for the population of target countries, their imposition inevitably results in new obstacles to the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need. The paper identifies the key challenges associated with provision of humanitarian aid under the existing sanctions restrictions, and assesses the prospects for addressing them in the contemporary context. The first section examines political and academic debates on the negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions and possible ways to overcome them. In particular, the author identifies the logic behind the transition from comprehensive to ‘smart’ sanctions, as well as the specifics of applying humanitarian exceptions. The second section outlines key aspects of the complex disruptive impact of restrictions on humanitarian assistance, including the technical and political barriers faced in the implementation of humanitarian exceptions. Finally, the third section identifies current trends in the use of humanitarian exceptions by the main initiators of restrictive measures. In this context, particular attention is paid to the UN Security Council Resolution 2664, adopted in December 2022, which mandates the inclusion of standardized exemptions in UN sanctions regimes in order to minimize the impact of restrictive measures on the provision of assistance and to alleviate the suffering of those in need. The author concludes that although there still remain possibilities to address the negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions, this requires strong political will on the part of the international community.

Beyond hegemony, world order as domination: Iran’s Green Movement and the nuclear sanctions regimes

Contributing to neo-Gramscian IR and debates regarding world order, this article puts forward Gramsci’s domination as a framework for better understanding the dynamics of a so-called ‘western liberal order’. It shows how Gramsci can be used to explore the power relations of world order that moves beyond Eurocentrism by highlighting the agency of the ‘non-West’ or ‘Global South’. In so doing, it illustrates the contradictions of a liberal world order. To make its case, it examines the relationship between Iran’s Green Movement, and the EU, US and UN sanctions regimes imposed on Iran in response to its nuclear programme. It is argued that domination, rather than hegemony, allows for a better understanding of the power relations in this case.

State Changes: Prototypical Governance Figured and Prefigured

My 2019 article ‘From Planning to Prototypes: New Ways of Seeing Like a State’ (P2P) drew attention to some shortcomings of the kinds of critical, reformist impulses fostered in law and development work. I sought to show that persistent preoccupations with the destructive hubris of ‘top-down’ planning—especially state planning—bypassed the tendency for great power to be deployed in other stylistic modes: through the release and responsive tweaking of prototypes, for instance. This article engages with later developments—at one of P2P’s main field sites and scholarly literature in dialogue with P2P—to build upon the analysis therein. It elaborates on the kinds of power animated through prototyping, showing how prototyping is often combined with other governance styles and what it makes of the inputs on which law has typically been said to draw and of law’s claims to autonomy. It complicates the provenance of this style by reference to mid-to-late-twentieth century UN sanctions regimes, highlighting that governance prototyping is as much state-made as business-led and not restricted to the development field. With particular attention to the strangeness of the human user presupposed by prototyping, this article also aims to identify some modes of critical engagement to which this governance style might be answerable.

UN Sanctions as Leverage in Mediation Processes?

Abstract This article analyzes the role of UN sanctions in the context of peace negotiations in South Sudan from the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013 until the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015. Drawing on the literature regarding third-party intervention in civil wars, it explores whether the UN sanctions regime—established in March 2015—was conceived as an instrument of leverage to get the parties to agree to a settlement. The article asks two questions: Have sanctions and mediation been coordinated? Has the interlink between sanctions and mediation been successful? First, there has been little coordination between sanctions and mediation. Second, UN sanctions did not appear to play a crucial role in the mediation process. This analysis is based on desk research and nineteen interviews with officials from the UN, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and other regional actors conducted between 2017 and 2018.

Who Blames Who in UN Security Governance? Explaining Blame Games in UN Peacekeeping, UN Sanctions Regime, and the Peace & Security Discourse

Who Blames Who in UN Security Governance? Explaining Blame Games in UN Peacekeeping, UN Sanctions Regime, and the Peace & Security Discourse

Development Prospects of the Foreign Trade Coercion System in the Russian Federation

The article examines the problems and directions of improving the foreign trade coercion system in the Russian Federation. Current realities of the international economic relations development are characterized by the active use of foreign trade coercion measures. In the conditions of international economic integration they serve as one of the most effective means of influence, in connection with which we can state the steady spread of tools of foreign trade coercion, which, along with wide attention of international organizations and the public to this problem, determines the relevance of the study. The improvement of the current foreign trade coercion system should be carried out through the active participation of the Russian Federation in the activities of the UN and, in particular, in promotion of two main directions. The first one is designed to solve the problem of collateral damage by creating a unified list of products for which bans may be imposed, and mechanisms for monitoring their use, which, as a result, make it possible to humanize the use of foreign trade coercive measures. The second direction is designed to address the illegal misuse of restrictive measures. This can be done by developing a system for assessing the legitimacy of their use by third countries, as well as by unifying the implementation of UN sanctions regimes, including the adoption of norms on the responsibilities for their violation. The implementation of the presented directions will increase the efficiency of the foreign trade enforcement measures system, and provide an opportunity to defend the legitimate rights and interests of Russian entities, which, given the current trends in the development of international economic relations, will strengthen the position of the Russian Federation on the global stage.

Aktuelle Fragen der Schweizerischen Völkerrechtspraxis

The national implementation of UN sanctions, which typically obligate Member States to restrict travel and freeze assets of listed individuals and entities, cannot be legally challenged within the UN system. This leads to challenges being brought by concerned individuals before national and regional courts that assess the legality of listings and their implementation. The Office of the Ombudsperson has the mandate to examine petitions brought by individuals in the context of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime only. This review mechanism suffers from certain deficits. The article discusses the challenges and highlights efforts by Switzerland and other States to improve due process of UN sanctions regimes. The respect, reinforcement and promotion of international humanitarian law are among Switzerland’s foreign policy priorities. Switzerland is notably leading a joint initiative with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to strengthen respect for international humanitarian law and is proposing an amendment to the Rome Statute to prohibit the starvation of civilians in non-international armed conflicts. The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) constitutes an unprecedented situation that gives rise to fundamental questions under international law, for EU Member States as well as for third countries such as Switzerland. Due to the uncertainties surrounding the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement between the EU and the United Kingdom, Switzerland has adopted a strategy in order to safeguard on the same level and possibly extend its bilateral relations with the United Kingdom as well as to address the challenges posed by Brexit.

Refining United Nations Security Council Targeted Sanctions

The United Nations Security Council’s targeted sanctions seek to protect global peace and security. The majority of these sanctions are imposed on individuals deemed to be a terror threat and include measures such as asset freezes and travel bans. These measures can impede, inter alia, the right to private life and freedom of movement of targeted individuals. While it is accepted that certain rights can be restricted for the protection of public security, restrictions must be proportional under international human rights law. Given that UN sanctions regimes have come under scrutiny in recent years for their lack of procedural safeguards and disproportionate restrictions on fundamental rights, this article argues that proportionality based reasoning should be included in sanctions committees’ substantive decision-making processes. Other procedural safeguards should also be incorporated by UN sanctions committees. This would help ensure that sanctions are more measured and minimise impairment of human rights.

The NORTH KOREA’S GAUNTLET, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council’s reaction to the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in 2016 through Resolutions 2270 and 2321 have significantly changed the picture of UN sanctions regime against this country and created the most comprehensive, legally-binding, sanctions program imposed against a State since Iraq in the 1990s. While raising questions on their lawfulness under international law, the DPRK’s military actions have repeatedly challenged the international community. At the moment of finalising the present article, the situation seems more precarious than ever: despite the severity and comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, the DPKR’s launches of ballistic missiles hit the headlines again, and its military aggressiveness does not appear reversed. The article examines this regime against the background of the Council’s past practice and the international rules on non-proliferation, also by discussing legal issues related to the different actions by Pyongyang. Ultimately, it seeks to assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests vis-à-vis relevant international law and to determine the main limitations of the new set of binding obligations placed upon Member States to thwart the “North Korean threat”. For, in order to succeed, sanctions must be capable of coercing their targets into adjusting the particular course of behaviour that, according to the Security Council, poses a threat to international peace and security, the article concludes that the new sanctions regime is still affected by weaknesses that impair its effectiveness.

A Dangerous Cat-and-Mouse Game: The North Korean Nuclear Proliferation and the UN Security Council

The Security Council’s reaction to the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) on 6 January and 9 September 2016 and its ballistic missile launch of 7 February 2016 through Resolutions 2270 and 2321 have significantly changed the picture of UN sanctions regime against North Korea and created the most comprehensive, legally-binding, sanctions program imposed against a State since Iraq in the 1990s. While raising questions on their international status, the DPRK’s military provocations have repeatedly challenged the international community. At the moment of finalising the present article, the situation seems more precarious than ever: despite the severity and comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, the DPKR’s launches of ballistic missiles hit the headlines again and its military aggressiveness does not appear reversed. The article examines this regime against the background of the Council’s past practice and the international rules on non-proliferation, also by discussing legal issues related to the different Pyongyang’s provocations. Ultimately, it seeks to assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests vis-a-vis relevant international law and to determine the main limitations of the new set of binding obligations placed upon Member States to thwart the ‘North Korean threat’. For, in the final analysis, to succeed sanctions must be capable of coercing their targets into adjusting the particular course of behaviour the Security Council has determined poses a threat to international peace and security, it is submitted that the new sanctions regime is still affected by weaknesses that impair its effectiveness.

The Sanctions Regime against Iraq (1990-2003): Policymaking and Values

From 1990 to 2003, US/UK policymakers insisted that the UN sanctions regime against Iraq was worth the cost, which, by 1999, amounted to half a million child deaths in Iraq. US policymakers emphasized that the ends (saving the world from Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction program) justified the means (the adverse humanitarian consequences of the dismantling of Iraq’s economy). The draconian blockade was especially disastrous for the women and children of Iraq. This paper explores the ethical dimensions of the sanctions while presenting an unorthodox view of foreign policy administration and generating new ideas for improving it. I argue that pro-sanctions policy managers had to defend a “Sophie’s Choice:” killing children to save other children. I argue that this was a false dichotomy operating in the US policy towards Iraq since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and that it served as a cover-up for a hidden agenda related to US hegemony in the Middle East region.T1 Interviews in 1999 with three pro-sanctions diplomats reveal the personal moral dilemma of defending a policy of infanticide while appearing virtuous in doing so. I suggest an alternative paradigm and a number of strategies that would ask policymakers whether they speaking truth to power.

The North Korea’s Gauntlet, International Law and the New Sanctions Imposed by the Security Council

The Security Council’s reaction to the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in 2016 through Resolutions 2270 and 2321 have significantly changed the picture of UN sanctions regime against this country and created the most comprehensive, legally-binding, sanctions program imposed against a State since Iraq in the 1990s. While raising questions on their lawfulness under international law, the DPRK’s military actions have repeatedly challenged the international community. At the moment of finalising the present article, the situation seems more precarious than ever: despite the severity and comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, the DPKR’s launches of ballistic missiles hit the headlines again, and its military aggressiveness does not appear reversed. The article examines this regime against the background of the Council’s past practice and the international rules on non-proliferation, also by discussing legal issues related to the different actions by Pyongyang. Ultimately, it seeks to assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests vis-a-vis relevant international law and to determine the main limitations of the new set of binding obligations placed upon Member States to thwart the “North Korean threat”. For, in order to succeed, sanctions must be capable of coercing their targets into adjusting the particular course of behaviour that, according to the Security Council, poses a threat to international peace and security, the article concludes that the new sanctions regime is still affected by weaknesses that impair its effectiveness.

Refining Aviation Sanctions from an Air Law Perspective

Aviation sanctions exist at the intersection between the UN Charter and the Chicago Convention, in that the former enables the Security Council to interrupt air communication and the latter forces International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to render assistance to the UN with regard to air matters when world security is concerned. This article examines how air law, which aims to promote the development of air transport and the universal application of air rules, came to accommodate the UN sanctions regime, an exclusive mechanism designed to prevent targeted States from utilizing international air transport. As UN sanctions evolved from being blunt instruments to smart ones, taking into account human rights and humanitarian concerns, aviation sanctions have evolved in tandem from the comprehensive air bans of yesteryear to more complex mechanisms that incorporate an array of supplementary tools that facilitate other sanctions measures. Nevertheless, there remains ample room to refine aviation sanctions with the aid of an air law perspective and the active involvement of ICAO. Aviation safety, the cornerstone of air law, deserves due regard when the UN and ICAO design and implement aviation sanctions, and a two-way dialogue between the UN Charter and the Chicago Convention will confer more legitimacy on aviation sanctions.

Peripheral Hegemony in the Quest to Ensure Security Council Accountability for its Individualized UN Sanctions Regimes

A demand for strengthened Security Council accountability has been put forward quite vigorously in the context of individualized UN sanctions regimes. This accountability gap was effectively created when the heavily critiqued Security Council policy to impose comprehensive sanctions transmuted into designs of targeted sanctions regimes in the 1990s. The traditional procedures and accountability mechanisms that controlled the comprehensive sanctions against states were overall political and diplomatic in nature and not considered fit for the new sanctions paradigm which had the individual rather than the state as its core focus. The shift to targeted sanctions thus required fresh thinking about and new approaches to Security Council accountability. This article examines issues of Security Council accountability in relation to individualized UN sanctions regimes. It particularly assesses and appraises the role of external forces in bringing about change within the UN system, with a focus on the ECJ and its Kadi case. While acknowledging the multiple positive effects that the Kadi case has had in terms of triggering innovations at UN level, the article presents the argument that peripheral litigation may not always be sufficiently sensitive to intricacies and limits of a more global and centralized organization and it may not take full account of the systemic implications of its judgment beyond the concrete confines of the case that is being adjudicated. More concretely regarding the external effects of the Kadi II judgment, it is posited that the ECJ’s principled, or perhaps hegemonic, approach and its non-negotiable commitment to high standards of judicial review might actually have negative repercussions for broader attempts to foster accountability processes across all UN sanctions regimes. By way of conclusion, some afterthoughts are offered regarding the focus that is needed in ongoing and future sanctions accountability discussions which go beyond Kadi and the 1267/1989 Al Qaeda counter-terrorism sanctions regime.

Threat Analysis and the UN's 1267 Sanctions Committee

Because of its dynamic nature, those confronting the al-Qaeda threat must follow its evolution very closely. As demonstrated here, this task is particularly challenging when counterterrorism is carried out under the aegis of international organizations. This article explores the threat identification function of the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee (also known as the 1267 Committee) charged with supervising the UN sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and its associates. Examination of the role of threat identification in the committee's work, and of the content of the threat analysis presented in the periodic reports of its subsidiary monitoring team, suggests the marginality of strategic threat assessment and underscores the constraints created by bureaucratic and political factors. The article also demonstrates the failure of the Committee and the monitoring team to thoroughly engage in central questions regarding al-Qaeda's nature, objectives, and organizational strategy.

‘Between a rock and a hard place?’: The European Union’s financial sanctions against suspected terrorists, multilateralism and human rights

This article focuses on the financial sanctions adopted by the European Union (EU) against individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. This sanctions regime has been sharply criticised for its negative impact on human rights and has seen several judicial challenges before the European Courts. In contrast with most of the existing literature, which focuses on legal issues or examines the consequences of the EU financial sanctions, this article takes a step back to examine the reasons for which the EU decided to adopt these controversial financial sanctions in the first place. This article argues that it is mainly its commitment to ‘UN-centred effective multilateralism’ that has led the EU to adopt these financial sanctions measures in order to align itself with the UN financial sanctions regime. However, the Kadi landmark ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has challenged the pre-eminence of multilateralism over other considerations, such as the respect for human rights. As the Court of Justice prepares to hand down its second judgment in this case, the EU is left torn between its commitment to multilateralism and its commitment to human rights, which can be fully reconciled only if the UN sanctions regime meets the EU’s human rights standards.

COMMENTS ON THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE ECHR

The Security Council’s reaction to the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in 2016 through Resolutions 2270 and 2321 have significantly changed the picture of UN sanctions regime against this country and created the most comprehensive, legally-binding, sanctions program imposed against a State since Iraq in the 1990s. While raising questions on their lawfulness under international law, the DPRK’s military actions have repeatedly challenged the international community. At the moment of finalising the present article, the situation seems more precarious than ever: despite the severity and comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, the DPKR’s launches of ballistic missiles hit the headlines again, and its military aggressiveness does not appear reversed. The article examines this regime against the background of the Council’s past practice and the international rules on non-proliferation, also by discussing legal issues related to the different actions by Pyongyang. Ultimately, it seeks to assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests vis-a-vis relevant international law and to determine the main limitations of the new set of binding obligations placed upon Member States to thwart the “North Korean threat”. For, in order to succeed, sanctions must be capable of coercing their targets into adjusting the particular course of behaviour that, according to the Security Council, poses a threat to international peace and security, the article concludes that the new sanctions regime is still affected by weaknesses that impair its effectiveness.

The Constitutional Limits to Security at UN and EU Level

Targeted or “smart” sanctions directed against named individuals – such as those established by Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) in the fight against al-Qaeda – have evolved into a mainstay of the United Nations’ (UN) collective security system, particularly in the fight against terrorism. With the Kadi appeal judgment, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), overruling the Kadi and Yusuf/Al Barakaat case-law of the European Court of First Instance (CFI), has defined the relation between EU and UN law in a classic dualistic way which is usually charactistic of nation-states. The Court also sent a message to the UN, proposing a secure transfer of information as a solution for the lack of effective human rights in the UN sanctions regime. However, it is questionable whether this could sufficiently replace an independent review system at the UN level.

Multilateral sanctions against terror suspects and the violation of due process standards

The UN and EU sanctions regimes against suspected terrorists at first clearly violated commonly accepted due process standards. Both organizations gradually reformed the procedures that regulated which individuals and entities were subject to sanctions, yet the UN procedures in particular still evince important shortcomings. While international law scholars have debated how the sanctions regimes must be designed to be consistent with international law, political science scholars have, as yet, largely held back from looking into why the regimes evolved in the way they did. This article suggests that court decisions and proceedings and, in the case of the UN, falling commitment from member states, have prompted the UN Security Council and the Council of the EU to implement limited reforms. However, courts did not challenge the sanctions regimes per se and there was no substantial pressure from civil society actors. Moreover, owing to the competences and working methods of the UN Security Council and the Council of the EU, powerful member states could fairly easily deflect reform proposals from disaffected states and other UN and EU bodies.