IntroductionFor over half a century, the Korean Peninsula has posed a foreign-policy dilemma for every American president. During this time, continuity, rather than change, has been the prevailing characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. Since President Reagan's Modest Initiative in 1988, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) have attempted to normalize their relations through dialogue and negotiations.1 In 1994, North Korea and the United States signed an agreement by which Pyongyang pledged to freeze and eventually dismantle its weapons program. In return, the United States pledged to provide a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits. The U.S. support of the Agreed Framework has been inconsistent. Since then North Korea has launched several rockets and missiles, and has increased its weapon arsenal. In recent years six-party talks have been used as a vehicle for change in regard to the North Korean issue. The major players-China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the United States-have worked to collectively implement their national initiative with regard to North Korea. The result has been that these negotiations have yet to result in a concrete solution and direction for forward progression and movement. These sessions of dialogue and negotiations have proceeded without altering the underlying configuration of the United States and North Korea's Cold War postures towards each other, such as armed deterrence. Nonetheless, the persistent duality of diplomacy exercised by U.S. leaders has largely contributed to the inability to resolve their differences. The recent Bush administration, in relation to its policy towards North Korea, has been characterized by its dualism -believing in the same goal, but divided over goal achievement actions. These divisions took place within the administration, which consisted of an influential coalition of Pentagon officials and advisers, among them Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, officials of Vice President Dick Cheney's office, and proliferation experts in the State Department and White House led by Undersecretary of State John Bolton.2Unfortunately, the internal division of policy at home has resulted in the North Korean issue being in a worse shape today than it was eight years ago after the Clinton-Bush regime change. After President Bush refused to follow Clinton's engagement path, North Korea significantly increased its plutonium stockpile, tested bombs and announced itself a nuclear weapons state. With his election as president, Barack Obama inherited not only difficult issues and initiatives on the home front but also internationally. The new Obama administration is inundated with a plethora of policy issues ranging from economics to foreign policy. President Obama has his hands full dealing with the current dismal economic situation at home and with equally important foreign policy issues, especially when it comes to North Korea.Without UN involvement, the North Korean communists held their own elections in September 1948, and under the tutelage of Russia, Kim Il Sung established the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea.3 Thus, the 38th parallel became Korea's Berlin Wall. Since then, the country has been a troubled issue for every American president. Since Obama took office, North Korea has attempted to make a statement to the new president through a series of missile tests. In the past few years, many experts in North Korean policy have juxtaposed various strategies that have been used and should be included with relation to North Korea. This paper will underline motives for North Korea's actions, updates of previously communicated policy options with real-time information and offer a unique twist, with truths that are often overlooked, on how they should be implemented in the new Obama era, moving forward.North Korean MotivationSince the early 1990s, North Korea has dealt with a harsh economic and food crisis that has left the country desperate to earn hard currency. …