ABSTRACT This article shows first that Marx, in his quest for a scientific theory of history, followed a path entirely comparable to that which Gaston Bachelard described for the sciences of nature with their epistemological ruptures. The first break is with pre-scientific knowledge. Marx outlined this break in the area of classical economics, but proceeded to deepen this rupture, leading to his first problematic. This is the one that was constructed using the famous opposition relations of production/productive forces, base/superstructure, and material life/ideological forms, that would serve as his “common thread.” The article then shows that these pairs of concepts presented several difficulties, that would lead Marx to his second, much stronger problematic. This was based on the pair of concepts “concrete” labour or useful work/ “abstract” labour or energy expenditure. These constitute the two sides of the production process, the first representing the ultimate determination and the second the main determination. The article responds to objections made concerning the generality of these concepts, and then explains how the other two oppositions are also profoundly modified. In addition, the article focuses on the Marxian conception of scientific work, which anticipates the constructivist one of Bachelard, and on the breaks that Marx made with a continuist and determinist vision of history.
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