Ulster Unionist Research Articles

‘Our father organization’: The cult of the Somme and the unionist ‘Golden Age’ in modern Ulster Loyalist commemoration

Memories of military sacrifices and demonstrations of ‘national’ characteristics of bravery, comradeship and integrity still have considerable popular purchase within contemporary states and communities, and as such can accrue significant political capital. With this in mind, this paper will show how Ulster Loyalists attempt to anchor themselves in the memory of the Somme, seeking to deliberately construct a line of direct continuity between modern Loyalism, which has been suffering from a variety of pressures, fissures and marginalization throughout the Northern Ireland peace process, and Ulster Unionism of the early 20th century, a period which in contrast was marked by unity, mass mobilization and elite leadership. Crucially, that political generation's decimation during the First World War is a potent myth of blood sacrifice which thickens, rather than pollutes, the narrative of a Unionist ‘Golden Age’ of mobilization and strength. As such, the mythic proving grounds of battlefields long gone have become advantageous sites for modern political acquisition. This use of the memory of the Great War as an identity resource will be compared and contrasted with similar projects in Canada and Australia. Rather than simply miring Loyalists in archaic and militaristic tropes, and invented links to the past, this paper will argue that commemorations, particularly that of the Somme, can have a transformative and cohering effect on modern Loyalism, in both the political and paramilitary spheres.

‘Preaching to the Choir?’ An Analysis of DUP Discourses about the Northern Ireland Peace Process

This article analyses the Democratic Unionist Party's (DUP) discursive responses to the Northern Ireland peace process. Drawing on narrative analysis of DUP discourses in the Belfast News Letter (1998–2005), it argues that the party has articulated five themes: the de‐legitimisation of David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party, the immorality of the peace process, the security threat, the victimisation of Protestants, and the ‘renegotiation’ of the Belfast Agreement. These discourses are analysed in light of a framework for understanding the relationship between the party's public discourses and the political strategies that have allowed for its electoral success. The framework includes the relationship between discourses, agenda‐setting in the media, ‘the politics of support’, and ‘the politics of power’. It considers how the DUP's discourses may impact on its relationships with nationalists and unionists. However, efforts by the DUP to communicate with the unionist grassroots may allow it to minimise alienation, thus contributing to a space in which principles such as power‐sharing can become bedded down.

Attitudes towards a Truth Commission for Northern Ireland in Relation to Party Political Affiliation

In Northern Ireland there has been a long‐term and often heated debate, particularly within civil society, about how to address the legacy of the conflict and unresolved issues of the past. This paper critically examines the first large‐scale survey to focus specifically and in depth upon the question of a possible truth commission for Northern Ireland. The paper analyses responses in relation to self‐declared support for Northern Ireland's five main political parties (Ulster Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Alliance Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Fein). The results of the survey reveal a mixed picture on attitudes towards a possible truth commission but suggest that despite obvious, sometimes serious, community and party political differences on a number of important issues, there are also clearly grounds on which consensus exists.

Irish Republican Politics and Violence before the Peace Process, 1968–1994

Analyses of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland tend to underplay the influence of political strategy in the 1970s, preferring to emphasise militarism. Similarly, the persistence of militarism in the 1980s is often obscured by the attention paid to a ‘new’ republican political orientation. This article seeks to draw attention to the IRA's evolving attitude to the ‘problem’ of Ulster unionism, and republicanism's various estimations of the likely efficacy of violence throughout the period. Republicanism is best understood as a deeply rooted working-class ethno-nationalist movement interacting closely with the other agents of the Northern Ireland conflict: constitutional nationalism, unionism and the British government. ‘Armed struggle’ became a declining asset for republicanism as it came to be seen less as a form of ‘popular guerrilla warfare’ and more as ‘terrorism’.1

Is Contemporary Ulster Unionism in Crisis? Changes in Unionist Identity during the Northern Ireland Peace Process

This paper addresses the way in which the Northern Ireland Peace Process has impacted on unionist identity. In particular, it offers a critique of the three constituent philosophies of unionism – cultural unionism, liberal unionism and economic unionism – and suggests that a new form of unionism that reflects the altered polity of Northern Ireland must be constructed.

P. S. O'Hegarty and the Ulster Question

Like many of his nationalist contemporaries, the Irish separatist P. S. O’Hegarty (1879–1952) viewed Ulster Unionist resistance to assimilation into a united self‐governing Irish nation as the outcome of British policy and politicking in Ireland. In constructing an ethnic and political tie with the Protestant population of north‐east Ulster from the 1801 Act of Union, subsequent British governments cultivated a ‘false consciousness’ among Ulster Unionists to further their political and economic self‐interests. This article examines the deficiencies in O’Hegarty’s arguments against partition but its main purpose is to highlight that, contrary to his conventional image as a doctrinal nationalist, O’Hegarty’s ‘Irishness’ consisted of a liberal and civic concept of citizenship. It concludes that O’Hegarty’s view of nationalism was pluralistic, inclusive and ahead of its time during a period when ethnicity was perceived as a non‐negotiable determinant of national identity.

Ulster Unionists in America, 1972-1985

Ulster Unionists in America, 1972–1985 Andrew J. Wilson Throughout the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, Irish nationalists received vital support from across the Atlantic.1 Leading Irish-American politicians formed a powerful political network that pressured the British government and worked for a constitutional nationalist agenda on Capitol Hill. In addition, millions of dollars and supplies of weapons were channeled to the IRA and played a key role in sustaining its campaign of violence. While this Irish-American connection has been the focus of extensive media and scholarly analysis, virtually nothing has been written about the simultaneous small, but determined, Unionist support network in the United States. Unlike Irish-American nationalists, Unionists had little constituency from which they could draw support. Although nearly 250,000 Ulster Protestants had crossed the Atlantic in the eighteenth century and initially formed a distinct Scotch-Irish community, the vast majority, over time, assimilated into mainstream American society. Their descendants had little or no interest in the politics of their ancestral homeland—a fact that Unionists in Northern Ireland have sometimes failed to appreciate. Restrictive immigration laws drastically reduced the numbers of Irish entering the United States throughout the twentieth century. Almost all of those who were able to enter came from the Republic of Ireland or were Catholics from Northern Ireland, driven into exile by the lack of opportunities under the Stormont regime. Ulster Protestants who migrated to North America tended to settle in Canada. For the few who did come to the United States, the Irish cultural and political environment they found was generally a "cold house" for anyone from a Unionist background; many aspects of the "Irish kitsch" in America, from bars to St. Patrick's Day parades, were decidedly nationalist in tone. In this environment, it is hardly surprising that when journalist Wendy Martin [End Page 50] interviewed Ulster Protestant immigrants in the early 1970s, she found that most hesitated to talk about Irish politics and just wanted to be left in peace.2 * * * Despite these obstacles, a small network of Ulster Protestant and Unionist activists, composed of members of the Orange Order, the Scotch-Irish Society of the United States, and the Ulster-Irish Society, emerged when communal violence erupted in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s. They tried to undermine the activities of Irish-American support groups for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association by launching "information initiatives" that portrayed Stormont as a bastion of equality and good government. Leaders of this network also helped to organize the Unionist Party's first coordinated publicity drive in August, 1969, when Robin Bailie, a member of the Stormont parliament, and William Stratton-Mills, a member of the British House of Commons, traveled to New York as part of a "Truth Squad" aiming to confront Bernadette Devlin, who was then in the midst of a highly publicized tour. The climax of the campaign came with a nationally televised debate between Stratton-Mills and Devlin during which raucous exchanges and scuffles erupted between Irish-American nationalists seated beneath an Irish tricolor and members of the Ulster-Irish Society clustered around a Union Jack.3 The "Truth Squad" initiative convinced a few Unionist Party officials that nurturing a more extensive grassroots support network in the United States could be a useful way to promote their views abroad. Eventually two new groups emerged. In New York, Reverend Charles Reynolds, from a fiercely Unionist background in Belfast, established the Northern Ireland Service Council (NISC). In Los Angeles, Harry Bennison, another Belfast native, launched the Ulster American Loyalists (UAL). Both organizations claimed about one hundred members and followed similar tactics. Reynolds and Bennison led letter-writing campaigns to local and national newspapers, appeared on television and radio to debate Irish-American nationalist leaders, and provided logistical support for visiting Unionist politicians. Their most ambitious initiative, however, was to bring Prime Minister Brian Faulkner to the United States in late June, 1972, shortly after the British government had prorogued Stormont and imposed Direct Rule. Bennison and Reynolds organized a nationwide series of media appearances, public forums, and receptions, at which Faulkner was given [End Page 51] the opportunity to defend his administration, explain the Unionist case, and attack...

Henry Maxwell, M.P., Author of An Essay upon an Union of Ireland with England (1703)

Henry Maxwell, M.P., Author of <i>An Essay upon an Union of Ireland with England (1703)</i>

The First Government of Northern Ireland, Education Reform and the Failure of Anti-populist Unionism, 1921-1925

This article examines education reform under the first government of Northern Ireland (1921–5). This embryonic period offered the Ulster Unionist leadership a chance to construct a more inclusive society, one that might diminish sectarian animosities, and thereby secure the fledgling state through cooperation rather than coercion. Such aspirations were severely tested by the ruling party’s need to secure the state against insurgency, and, more lastingly, to assuage the concerns of its historic constituency. The former led to a draconian security policy, the latter to a dependency on populist strategies and rhetoric. It is argued here, however, that this dependency was not absolute until July 1925. Before that, the Belfast government withstood growing pressure from populist agitators to reverse controversial aspects of its education reforms, only relenting when Protestant disaffection threatened the unity of the governing party and the existence of the state.

Protestant Alienation in Northern Ireland: A Political, Cultural and Geographical Examination

It is claimed that the Protestant community in Northern Ireland has become increasingly alienated. Unionist politicians, Protestant church leaders and the media have all referred to ‘Protestant alienation’. Yet, conceptually speaking, there exists a lack of clarity not only about the term but also about the factors which may give rise to it. Accordingly, this paper attempts to explore the phenomenon from three interconnected perspectives: political, cultural and geographical. It is argued that, when researched in this way, a clearer (but in no way perfect) understanding of the term is achieved and a better comprehension of the generating factors of Protestant alienation is gained. It is also suggested that, at a time when the voting preferences of unionists have shifted away from the more moderate political articulations of the Ulster Unionist Party, Protestant alienation might be considered to be a timely subject to investigate.

The Internment of Cahir Healy M.P., Brixton Prison July 1941-December 1942

The arrest and internment in Brixton prison of the leading Northern Ireland nationalist politician and Stormont MP, Cahir Healy, in 1941 has long remained something of an historical enigma. Contemporaneous accounts that his arrest amounted to little more than an unwarranted act of anti-nationalist persecution or was the result of his alleged involvement in ‘acts prejudicial’ during time of war both benefited from the blanket of secrecy that surrounded the case. This article casts light on this affair. It offers an insight into the strategic considerations of Northern nationalist politicians at a time when British victory in the war was uncertain. It argues that some senior nationalist activists, including Healy, did envisage a situation in which British defeat and German victory could bring closer the prospect of Irish unity, did contemplate a policy of cooperation with Germany and did take steps to make this known to the German Legation in Dublin. The article also examines Healy's relationship with fellow internees in Brixton prison and his continued post-war association with figures on the British far-right, particularly Sir Oswald Mosley.

“For God and for the Crown”: Contemporary Political and Social Attitudes among Orange Order Members in Northern Ireland

The Protestant Orange Order is the largest organization in civil society in Northern Ireland. From 1905 until 2005, the Order was linked to the Ulster Unionist Party, until recently the dominant local political force. However, widespread Unionist disenchantment with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement led to a shift in the votes of Orange Order members, in common with other Protestants, to the anti‐Agreement Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which traditionally has had no links to the Order. This article examines the political, religious, and cultural attitudes of Orange Order members that prompted such a switch. It suggests that a combination of cultural and political insecurities over the fate of Protestant‐British‐Unionism has led to a realignment of Orangeism towards the stronger brand of Protestant and Unionist politics offered by the DUP.

Ulster unionism and the peace process in Northern Ireland

Ulster unionism and the peace process in Northern Ireland

In the Land of King Canute: the Influence of Border Unionism on Ulster Unionist Politics, 1945–63

Ulster Unionism, which is often seen in monolithic terms, was in fact subject to significant internal stresses in the post-1945 period. Unionists in the west and south of the province were concerned that policies adopted by the Stormont government were undermining Unionist political control in these areas. This article focuses on how the complaints and pressures from this important group were dealt with by the leadership of the party and the government and the obstacle they represented to a timely reform of the regime.

Imposing power-sharing: conflict and coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon

Kerr (history, London School of Economics and Political Science) examines efforts to end sectarian violence in the two territories through power-sharing arrangements devised and enforced by third parties. He considers why the efforts failed, whether the failure was inevitable and if so why they were used again, the impact of external pressures, and whether such consociation can be successful in the absence of positive external pressures. He is an official of the Ulster Unionist Party.

The Moral Boundaries of the Nation: The Constitution of National Identity in the Southeastern Border Counties of Ireland

This article argues that nationalism is more varied in the way that it constructs its boundaries than contemporary scholarship suggests. In an interdisciplinary, multi-stranded qualitative study of ethno-national identity on the Southern side of the Irish border, it shows the moral repertoires that qualify, conflict with, and on occasion replace, territorial, ethnic and state-centred aspects of national identity. It refocuses attention on the cultural and normative content of imagined national communities, and the different ways in which general norms function in particular communal contexts. It casts a new light on Southern attitudes to Irish unity. More generally, it suggests that a form of ‘moral nationalism’ is possible, distinct from the forms of nationalism—ethnic and civic nationalism and trans-nationalism—discussed in the literature.

Intra-Party Support for the Good Friday Agreement in the Ulster Unionist Party

Party organisations are often ‘black boxes' overlooked by scholars in favour of party leaders, manifestos and elections. Yet intra-party dynamics are often crucial. This article uses the example of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) to illustrate this. Events in the 1998–2003 period highlight the importance of splits within the party's governing Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) over the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) which underpins the Northern Ireland peace process. This article pioneers the use of postcode-profiling technology and uses multi-level analysis of a UUC party list to show that delegates' party section provides the best predictor of their stance towards the Good Friday Agreement. Consequently, the article argues that delegate voting behaviour within the UUC is best explained by reference to highly embedded, meso-level institutions which perpetuate networks and condition individual preferences.

‘…it’s a United Ireland or Nothing’? John Hume and the Idea of Irish Unity, 1964–72

This article explores John Hume’s thinking on Irish unity from the point of his first public commentary on the issue, a two‐part article written for The Irish Times in May 1964, through to the infamous statement he made in the aftermath of the Bloody Sunday killings in January 1972. In doing so it attempts to put in their proper context the words for which Hume he is most well remembered, particularly by the Protestant community and unionist commentators. The article shows that, at the outset of his political career, Hume’s position on Irish unity was aspirational rather than imperative. However, it demonstrates how political developments in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s and early 1970s – chiefly the increasing repression and radicalisation of the Catholic community, and the revival of the republican movement in that context – impacted on Hume’s articulation of his ideas regarding Irish reunification, such that this end came to be seen, quite wrongly, as his sole political ambition. The article concludes by suggesting that Hume’s original position on Irish unity was vindicated by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

The Northern Ireland Government, the ‘Paisleyite Movement’ and Ulster Unionism in 1966

This article presents original documentary material discovered at the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, relating to the RUC’s position in June 1966 on what was referred to as the ‘Paisleyite Movement’. According to the documents that were sent by the RUC Inspector‐General to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the ‘Paisleyite Movement’ was an organisation made up of the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee, the Ulster Protestant Volunteer Division, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Ulster Defence Corps, the Ulster Protestant Action Defence Committee and the militant Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). We know that these documents were seen by the Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, and the Minister of Home Affairs, Brian McConnell. These documents appear to have partly informed the cabinet decision to ban the UVF at the end of June 1966. The documents confirm the scale and significance of the threat presented by extremist Protestantism to the stability of the state in the eyes of the RUC and the government at that time and suggest that the starting date of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland should be back‐dated to 1966.

The decline of Ulster Unionism: the problem of identity, image and change

A few months after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998, Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble delivered a speech entitled ‘Engaging Reality’, at the Ulster Young Union...