Typological Thinking Research Articles

Eradicating Typological Thinking in Prokaryotic Systematics and Evolution

In 1982, John Maynard Smith called for an evolutionary "New Synthesis" specific for prokaryotes, observing that "population thinking has been well developed for fully half a century, but has yet to be adopted by microbiology" (Maynard Smith 1982). Twenty-seven years later, typological thinking (population thinking's antithesis) still dominates the field. Evidence for this includes the continuing debates on the reality of prokaryotic species, the value of the term "prokaryote," and the significance of the tree of life (TOL). In each case, the unexpected prevalence of interlineage transfer of genetic information has been (or should now be) the catalyst for the final Darwinization of our discipline. With examples from phylogenomics, I argue that "species," "domains," and the "TOL" are reifications that we can do without, especially as genomics dissolves into metagenomics.

Typology Reconfigured: From the Metaphysics of Essentialism to the Epistemology of Representation

The goal of this paper is to encourage a reconfiguration of the discussion about typology in biology away from the metaphysics of essentialism and toward the epistemology of classifying natural phenomena for the purposes of empirical inquiry. First, I briefly review arguments concerning 'typological thinking', essentialism, species, and natural kinds, highlighting their predominantly metaphysical nature. Second, I use a distinction between the aims, strategies, and tactics of science to suggest how a shift from metaphysics to epistemology might be accomplished. Typological thinking can be understood as a scientific tactic that involves representing natural phenomena using idealizations and approximations, which facilitates explanation, investigation, and theorizing via abstraction and generalization. Third, a variety of typologies from different areas of biology are introduced to emphasize the diversity of this representational reasoning. One particular example is used to examine how there can be epistemological conflict between typology and evolutionary analysis. This demonstrates that alternative strategies of typological thinking arise due to the divergent explanatory goals of researchers working in different disciplines with disparate methodologies. I conclude with several research questions that emerge from an epistemological reconfiguration of typology.

From the shoulders of a giant: Perspectives on the legacy of William White Howells (1908-2005)

William White Howells was one of the intellectual giants of the discipline of biological anthropology during the twentieth century. He was a devoted student of Earnest A. Hooton; yet he played a central role in directing the discipline away from the typological thinking that infused the work of his predecessor, and toward the population perspective that characterizes the field today. An original and productive scholar with diverse interests, his influence was extraordinary not merely because of his brilliance, but also because of the kind of mentor he was. Almost two dozen graduate students, and countless others with whom he interacted in various capacities, have carried Howells' legacy into the twenty-first century.

On the possible operation of natural laws in ecosystems.

In this manuscript, after a brief review of the history of typological thinking in the biological sciences from Transcendentalism to Structuralism, it is argued that natural Platonic laws may operate in ecosystems. This claim is based on two observations of law-like behaviour. Firstly, that adaptation towards specialization can be considered as a form of typological lineage degeneration, where specialized species are more vulnerable to environmental perturbation. And secondly, that the convergent recurrence of biological forms indicates that there exists a finite number of niches which in the abstract could be considered as ecological analogies to Denton's molecular Platonic moulds, operating as attractors and restricting the range of possible organismal body plans based on the physical and chemical gradients that partly define their hyper-structure.

Typological thinking strikes again

Typological thinking strikes again

Unburdening evo-devo: ancestral attractions, model organisms, and basal baloney

Although flourishing, I argue that evo-devo is not yet a mature scientific discipline. Its philosophical foundation exhibits an internal inconsistency that results from a metaphysical confusion. In modern evolutionary biology, species and other taxa are most commonly considered as individuals. I accept this thesis to be the best available foundation for modern evolutionary biology. However, evo-devo is characterized by a remarkable degree of typological thinking, which instead treats taxa as classes. This metaphysical incompatibility causes much distorted thinking. In this paper, I will discuss the logical implications of accepting the individuality thesis for evo-devo. First, I will illustrate the degree to which typological thinking pervades evo-devo. This ranges from the relatively innocent use of typologically tainted language to the more serious misuse of differences between taxa as evidence against homology and monophyly, and the logically flawed concept of partial homology. Second, I will illustrate how, in a context of typological thinking, evo-devo's harmless preoccupation with distant ancestors has become transformed into a pernicious problem afflicting the choice of model organisms. I will expose the logical flaws underlying the common assumption that model organisms can be expected to represent the clades they are a part of in an unambiguous way. I will expose the logical flaws underlying the general assumption that basal taxa are the best available stand-ins for ancestors and that they best represent the clade of which they are a part, while also allowing for optimal extrapolation of results.

From types to typological thinking: a reply to Asendorpf

We continue to disagree with Asendorpf (2006) on the best way to analyse Q‐sort data and on our priorities for personality research. We believe on statistical grounds that the large first factor found in inverse factor analyses of raw CAQ items tells us much about response norms, but little or nothing about individual differences. These emerge more clearly in analyses of standardised items, which show the familiar dimensions of the Five‐Factor Model. Based on our research on types and the mixed results reported by other researchers, we do not believe that replicable empirical types are likely to be found, and suggest that a more profitable line of research would focus on the heuristics of types and the configural interpretation of traits. Published in 2006 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The history of essentialism vs. Ernst Mayr's “Essentialism Story”: A case study of German idealistic morphology

Idealistic morphology as perhaps the most important historical manifestation of typology is very suitable for a historical analysis of Ernst Mayr's “Essentialism Story”, which postulates an antagonism between “typological thinking” and “population thinking”. We show that German-language idealistic-morphological theories consisted of two clearly distinguishable parts. The cornerstone of these theories was the concept of the type as an abstract pattern representing a certain class of phenomena and embodying the norm of this class. The primary objective of pure typology was to create a non-phylogenetic classification system for living organisms based on structurally explicable characters. Thus, typology, as a non-phylogenetic foundation of idealistic morphology, was conceptually neutral with respect to hypotheses of evolutionary mechanisms. Typology was often accompanied by concepts such as Lamarckism, orthogenesis, creationism, essentialism, etc. These peripheral (with respect to pure typology) concepts were autonomous constructions and did not represent a direct logical consequence of typology. In our view “population thinking”, as part of the Darwinian theory of evolutionary mechanism, could not be directly opposed to “typological thinking”. Rather, it was peripheral concepts such as essentialism or creationism that led to conflicts between the Modern Synthesis and idealistic morphology.

Polemics and synthesis: Ernst Mayr and evolutionary biology

Mayr has justifiably earned for himself the title “Darwin of the 20th century”. He declared himself Darwin's champion, and was particularly wont to point out that a most important consequence of the Darwinian revolution was the destruction of typological thinking. Mayr also repeatedly stressed that there were important differences between Darwinism and contemporary theories of evolution. Evolution as conceived by Darwin was not goal-directed, while contemporary theories were orthogenetic or aristogenetic in the sense that they believed in a predetermined progression of lower to higher forms. Furthermore, by focusing on individuals, Darwin destroyed the tyranny of typological thinking, which was a left over from the essentialism of Plato, who believed that groups of organisms were constructed according to certain homogeneities. By attacking the concept of essentialism, Darwin provided a mechanism by which individuals became both a focus and an essential ingredient in the evolutionary process. This was a paradigm shift and according to Mayr, a conceptual leap that constituted a true scientific revolution. Mayr's zeal in defending Darwin and in protecting organismal biology and evolution from the “non-believers” has formed the subject of this entire article, but it can also be seen in the titles of some of his recent books, e.g.One Long Argument. Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought (1991),This is Biology—the Science of the Living World (1997), andWhat Evolution Is (2002).

Rethinking Pelvic Typologies and the Human Birth Mechanism

Paleoanthropological reconstructions of childbirth in the genus Homo typically rely upon a model incorporating the evolution of a monotypic human birth mechanism. Two features characterize this proposed mechanism or pathway taken by the fetus through the birth canal: fetal rotation and neonate emergence in a position facing away from the mother. The evolution of these two features is said to facilitate birth through the bipedal pelvis but is also taken as evidence of the difficulty of human birth relative to that in other primates and our smallerbrained ancestors. In contrast, the present work takes the position that birth mechanisms vary now and probably did so in the past. The notion of a monotypic birth mechanism has been imported into paleoanthropological discourse from typological thinking in EuroAmerican biomedical practice and text. The history of anatomical descriptions of pelvic types and associated birth mechanisms shows a trend toward the concept of a singular normal birth mechanism in biomedical practice. This paper suggests that biomedically defined pelvic typologies constitute a static definition of human variation in pelvic morphology and that pelvic typology, in turn, has contributed to a static definition of the normal human birth process that has been incorporated into paleoanthropological models.

Scientists Prefer them Blind: The History of Hypogean Fish Research

The history of hypogean fish research has been strongly influenced by neo-Lamarckism (including orthogenesis) and typological thinking. Only in the last few decades neo-Darwinism has made any inroads in the research approach to this subject. The majority of the most distinguished and productive hypogean fish researchers have used their research subjects to confirm their own views on evolution rather than to use those subjects as a spring of knowledge to enrich mainstream biological thought. Of these views, I found that the most perversive of all is the notion of evolutionary ‘progress’ that has led many researchers to envision hypogean fishes as prime examples of ‘regressive’ evolution. I propose that the utilization of hypogean fishes for the study of convergent evolution should catapult these subjects of research into prime objects of evolutionary ideas.

Typological thinking, statistical significance, and the methodological divergence of experimental psychology and economics

While correctly describing the differences in current practices between experimental psychologists and economists, Hertwig and Ortmann do not provide a compelling explanation for these differences. Our explanation focuses on the fact that psychologists view the world as composed of categories and types. This discrete organizational scheme results in merely testing nulls and wider variation in observed practices in experimental psychology.

Typological thinking and the conservation of subspecies: the case of the San Clemente Island loggerhead shrike

Abstract. Hybridization with closely related taxa poses a significant threat to endangered subspecies (e.g. outbreeding depression, inbreeding) and confounds efforts to manage and conserve these taxa through a loss of taxonomic identity, in part because of the practical necessity of defining subspecies in a typological manner. We examined nine morphological characters in 167 post‐juvenile museum specimens to determine if loggerhead shrikes Lanius ludovicianus Linnaeus 1766 on San Clemente Island (off the coast of California) remain diagnosable as L. l. mearnsi Ridgway (1903); an island endemic listed as endangered by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Four recent shrike specimens from the island were compared to historical specimens using a bivariate scatter plot and a discriminant function (the latter was used to classify recent specimens post hoc). The few recent specimens were not diagnosable as L. l. mearnsi, but instead appear to be intergrades between L. l. mearnsi and L. l. anthonyi Mearns 1898 (the subspecies endemic to Santa Cruz, Santa Catalina, Santa Rosa and Anacapa islands), and are perhaps closer to pure anthonyi. Our data and the species’ natural history and distribution suggest that shrikes currently on San Clemente Island are the result of genetic ‘swamping’ of mearnsi by anthonyi. Under a necessarily typological definition of a subspecies, it is evident that mearnsi is probably no longer diagnosable. However, we conclude that protection of the entire Channel Islands population of the loggerhead shrike would be the best management strategy, as the species has declined drastically throughout the islands.

Some problems with typological thinking in evolution and development.

Some problems with typological thinking in evolution and development.

Molecular markers and the species concept: New techniques to resolve old disputes?

Key words: fish, molecular marker, speciation, species conceptIntroductionAlthough all biologists recognize the value of parti-tioning biodiversity into recognizable units organizedintodifferenthierarchicallevels, therehasbeena long-standing, and at times unhelpful, controversy on thenature and significance of the species as the basic unitof biodiversity. Despite the exhaustive considerationof various species concepts over many decades, thereappears to be no abatement to the outpouringof strongsentiments, as evidenced by the articles herein. Suchforceful and dedicated considerations are perhaps notsurprising in light of the fundamental role that speciesplay in the biological world, though have they reallyhelped our understandingof biodiversity? Here, in thisbrief personalized viewpoint, we do not present yetmore critiques of species concepts or their variants,but rather make some comments on the underlyingforcesgeneratingsuch focus, and considerwhethertheapplication of molecular genetic markers is an aid or ahindrance.Species as biological entitiesThe extensive (and often repetitive) literature onthe species concept reveals several features of thecontinuing dispute on the species concept: (1) mostauthors believe that the species is the only biologi-cally meaningful taxonomic unit, and that it is adefinable entity; (2) most authors vigorously defendtheir favourite (or their own) definition of that unit,and discard others as completely wrong; and (3)almost 250 years of Linnaeus’ binomial classificationof species were apparently insufficient to define thespecies to a level acceptable to most scientists. Theseobservations may give rise to the suspicion that thecourse of the species concept dispute is a result of‘typological’ thinking, as expressed in the typolog-ical species concept, and itself a result of Platonicphilosophy stating that there is an ideal ‘universal’with material manifestations(see Turner,this volume).While the typological species concept is now gener-ally disregarded, the search for an definable, ideal‘universal’ of a species, despite ubiquitous imperfectmanifestations of that ideal in the natural world, maybe a legacy of typological thinking in biology. This isnot to say that we do not need the species as a taxo-nomic unit, but rather that the biological reality of aspecies may not always be amenable to rigid defini-tion. It may be more helpful for the understanding ofbiodiversity and our research efforts to recognize theimperfections of each species concept and to acceptexceptions as a fact of life rather than a conceptualnuisance.Clearly, the species is crucial to the classifica-tion of biodiversity, and abandoning it would meanto throw our current description of biodiversity intodisarray. Nevertheless, the belief that the unit ofbiodiversity as defined by taxonomists is in all casesa real biological entity may be questionable, and thusthe search for a universal definition of that entity maybe futile. Indeed, an uncritical adherence to a givenspecies conceptmay be counter-productiveby fuellingadditional confusion and unnecessary dispute, and byaffecting the way many empirical studies are carriedout. For example, typological conceptions seem toinfluence many phylogenetic publications on closely

The problem of typological thinking in mental retardation.

Despite the acceptance of evolutionary theory in the biological and social sciences, typological thinking--the belief that individual differences diverge around an underlying type or essence--has persisted. The most egregious example is J. H. Langdon Down's "ethnological classification of idiocy," taken seriously in the field for almost 80 years after its origin in 1866. Past and present controversies over the definition of mental retardation have turned on an unacknowledged typological axis. Some contemporary research on Down syndrome indicates that the allure of typology is still an obstacle to the appreciation of individual differences and human dignity in the field of mental retardation.

The Crumbling Infrastructure of Biodiversity: The Avian Example

The successful conservation of biodiversity depends in part upon an accurate assessment of the diversity to be preserved. This assessment is in the domain of systematics, taxonomy, and general comparative biology. Specimens play a central role in this science, and research collections thus represent the touchstone of biodiversity. The massive job of describing and understanding avian diversity is far from complete, yet the specimen basis for much‐needed work is not being added to our collections; current holdings are inadequate. The dwindling influx of specimens is due primarily to opposition to collecting, which is fueled by (1) focusing conservation at the level of the individual; (2) unfamiliarity with population biology; (3) misunderstanding of scientific research; (4) typological thinking; and (5) misplaced morality. Specimen‐based avian research has a long and scientifically strong history, and the benefits of this research have been extensive. Our research collections must serve as functional biological libraries. The majority of avian populations can easily withstand the relatively tiny levels of collecting required to keep this science vigorous. Insofar as avian conservation necessarily includes the preservation of a myriad of species comprising the ecosystems upon which birds rely, this problem has broad implications for the conservation of biodiversity.

Perilous Ideas: Race, Culture, People [and Comments and Reply

Ideas about race, culture, and peoplehood or ethnicity have long served to orient anthropology's inquiries and justify its existence. As both offspring and critic of the human condition, anthropology bears a special responsibility to examine the commonplaces of its thought and the fighting words of its speech and to subject them to resolute analysis. The present contribution to this task suggests that we must remind ourselves of the importance of Boas's critique of typological thinking about races as we confront the intensifying racisms of our time, take much greater account of heterogeneity and contradictions in cultural systems, and recognize that ethnicities come in many varieties and to call a social entity an ethnic group is merely the beginning of the inquiry.

Developmental Psychology, Education, and the Need to Move beyond Typological Thinking

There is a certain conceit in believing that a contemporary perspective represents the highest point of development in a field. Present-day views of development have their origins in the historical and cultural contexts of earlier eras, and it is possible to trace the cyclical waxing and waning of developmental perspectives across the centuries priorto the present “scientific” era in the field. Throughout history, cultures have varied in the significance they place on age and the relationship between age and the stages of development. For example, the stages that contemporary Western societies take for granted, such as infancy, childhood, and adolescence have changed their meaning and significance considerably over the centuries (Aries, 1962).

I Developmental Psychology, Education and the Need to Move beyond Typological Thinking

I Developmental Psychology, Education and the Need to Move beyond Typological Thinking