Types Of Voters Research Articles

Active vs. Passive Ambivalent Voters: Implications for Interactive Political Communication and Participation

Voters express different attitudes toward competing political parties and the issues they support. In this study, a polytomous latent class analysis of their opinions regarding party-divided issues identifies several types of voters and highlights the distinction between active and passive ambivalent voters. Such a distinction is necessary to clarify the relationship between party ambivalence and political participation. Drawing on research into ambivalent attitudes, the current study postulates that active ambivalent citizens adopt amplification strategies, whereas passive ambivalent citizens adopt avoidance strategies. A comparison between them further indicates that active ambivalent citizens are motivated to fulfill their civic duties and be accountable when they seek political information, and they express more political interest than their passive counterparts. A three-wave panel survey confirms the influence of ambivalent voter types (wave 1) on political participation (wave 3), according to voters’ political orientation (i.e., civic duty motives to seek political information and interest in politics) and their interactive political communication (interactive engagement with digital political information and interpersonal political discussions) (wave 2).

Sociocultural Types of Russian Voters

Sociocultural Types of Russian Voters

Who buys vote-buying? How, how much, and at what cost?

In this paper, I estimate the causal effects of a local food-subsidy program on electoral outcomes. I exploit the variation in voters’ walking distances from the program stores to identify their accessibility to the program. I find that a distributive spending in the amount of ∼5% of GDP per capita buys an additional vote for the incumbent. I then investigate who –based on partisanship– responds to the subsidy, and how much and how they respond. The findings indicate that all types of voters respond to the distributive spending in line with the reciprocity rule; however, they respond through different channels and in different magnitude. Importantly, the salient channel for opposition voters is abstention-buying, whereas incumbent supporters respond by an increased turnout.

Issue congruence between voters and parties: examining the Democratic Party mandate in Ireland

ABSTRACT Political parties often employ the rhetoric of electoral mandates, claiming that the people who voted for them endorsed their policies. However, the level of voter-party issue congruence may vary across parties, issues, and elections; and the views of certain types of voters may be better represented by their party than others. This paper puts forward a series of hypotheses to explain variation in issue congruence, relating to how well-informed voters are about party policy, the role of non-policy determinants of vote choice, and the nature of policy competition between parties. The hypotheses are tested using data from surveys of voters and parties conducted during the 2020 general election and the 2019 European Parliament election in Ireland. Congruence is found to be higher when a party is particularly associated with an issue. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, for whom non-policy attributes play a significant part in voters’ assessments, are found to have lower policy congruence with their voters overall than other parties. While there is no evidence that certain socio-demographic groups are systematically more or less well represented by their parties across all policy areas, some gaps in representation are identified, particularly in relation to so-called ‘cultural’ issues.

Pelanggaran Administrasi Pemilu Penyelenggaraan Pemungutan Suara Ulang Pada Pemilu Serentak 2019 Di Kabupaten Bangka Tengah

The reason for the recommendation of Re-Voting (PSU) by the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) of Central Bangka Regency is that voters who do not have the right to get votes are given the opportunity to exercise their rights. This is an indication of the election administration violation and negligence of the Voting Organizing Group (KPPS) in carrying out its duties and obligations. PSU took place at TPS 10 Beluluk Village and TPS 04 Air Mesu Village, Pangkalan Baru District. This study aims to determine the electoral administration violations and negligence of the KPPS as the cause of the Bawaslu recommendation. By using descriptive qualitative research methods through interviews with election organizers, literature study and documentation. The results showed administrative violations because the KPPS had difficulties in distinguishing the types of voters. The negligence of KPPS is a form of accidental duty caused by the lack of understanding of KPPS, heavy workload, pressure from voters who are enthusiastic, lack of coordination between TPS supervisors and KPPS and KPPS feels experienced.Keywords: Administrative Violations, Negligence, Voting Again (PSU)

Voting Experiences, Perceptions of Fraud, and Voter Confidence

ObjectiveAssuring voter confidence is important for the legitimacy of democratic elections. In this article, we test four hypotheses about the correlates of voter confidence at various levels of election administration.MethodsWe take advantage of a large online survey of registered voters in a single election jurisdiction, Orange County (CA), which was implemented immediately after the November 2018 midterm elections. We measure voting experience and social media usage using item response theory as well as voters' perceptions of various election or voter fraud, and estimate their association with voter confidence via logistic regression models.ResultsOur results show that voters who cast mail ballots are less confident about their own votes being counted correctly than in‐person voters. For both types of voters, those who have poor experiences with the voting process are much less likely to report confidence in the election. We also find that voters who have strong concerns about election fraud are less likely to report being confident in the election. Our last result indicates that information from news and social media is associated with a decline in voter confidence in election administration at the national level.ConclusionGiven the many conversations about election fraud that have occurred since the 2016 presidential election, this research provides important implications for election administration in future elections in the United States.

Reaching consensus under a deadline

Group decisions are often complicated by a deadline. For example, in committee hiring decisions the deadline might be the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. It may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no one - an option that may cost dearly. As a result, committee members might prefer to agree on a reasonable, if not necessarily the best, candidate, to avoid unfilled positions. In this paper we propose a model for the above scenario—Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD)—based on a time-bounded iterative voting process. We provide convergence guarantees and an analysis of the quality of the final decision. An extensive experimental study demonstrates more subtle features of CUDs, e.g., the difference between two simple types of committee member behavior, lazy vs. proactive voters. Finally, a user study examines the differences between the behavior of rational voting bots and real voters, concluding that it may often be best to have bots play on the voters’ behalf.

A note on the growth of the dimension in complete simple games

The remoteness from a simple game to a weighted game can be measured by the concept of the dimension or the more general Boolean dimension. It is known that both measures can be exponential in the number of voters. For complete simple games it was only recently shown in O’Dwyer and Slinko (2017) that the dimension can also be exponential. Here we show that this is also the case for complete simple games with two types of voters and for the Boolean dimension of general complete simple games, which was posed as an open problem in O’Dwyer and Slinko (2017).

“Paz sí, pero no así”?Voter Profiles and Attitudes Toward the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement

ABSTRACTIn October 2016, the proposed peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was narrowly defeated in a referendum that sought its public approval. This article examines how previous structured political predispositions and attitudes shape voters’ preferences in a referendum. In a combined survey—a face-to-face sample in Bogotá and an online sample—conducted before the plebiscite, it identifies voter cleavages using principal component analysis (PCA). It finds three consistent components with profiles reflecting whether an individual is a progovernment citizen, a right-conservative voter, and a citizen with an evangelical religious identity. The findings suggest that voters are heterogeneous and that different predispositions and attitudes cluster in specific types of voters, which shaped these voters’ willingness to endorse the proposed peace agreement.

Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications

The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are “neighbors.” A social choice function is locally strategy‐proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to a type that is a neighbor of her true type. A social choice function is strategy‐proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to an arbitrary type. Local‐global equivalence (LGE) is satisfied if local strategy‐proofness implies strategy‐proofness. The paper identifies a condition on the graph that characterizes LGE. Our notion of “localness” is perfectly general. We use this feature of our model to identify notions of localness according to which various models of multidimensional voting satisfy LGE. Finally, we show that LGE for deterministic social choice functions does not imply LGE for random social choice functions.

Election Cycles in European Public Procurement

This paper studies the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union for the national level. We analyze different steps along the procurement process, namely the publication of the contract notice, the awarding of the contract, and the project completion. We point out how these steps should differ in their potential to address specific types of voters. We argue that the award provides politicians with a particularly appealing opportunity. It allows them to please the award-winning firms' stakeholders and the spending decision becomes binding and credible also from the perspective of forward-looking voters. We find robust evidence for electioneering in contract notices and awards prior to national parliamentary elections. The effect in contract awards is particularly strong for certain sub-categories like education and is more pronounced for visible projects.

ANALISIS TIPOLOGI PEMILIH PEMULA DALAM MEMILIH CALON ANGGOTA LEGISLATIF PADA PEMILU 2019 DI KOTA MATARAM DALAM PERSPEKTIF PEMASARAN

This study aims to analyze the typology of first-time voters in determining their political choices in the 2019 legislative elections in Mataram from the perspective of consumer behavior. This research utilised a qualitative-descriptive approach. The informants were 14 first-time voters who were purposively selected according to a number of criteria. The results showed that each typology of voters for legislative candidates in Mataram by first-time voters was related to several types of purchasing decisions by consumers. This paper provides recommendations for candidates in approaching each type of first-time voters. Specific and different strategies had to be prepared by the winning team of candidates before conducting a campaign to take voters' voting rights.Keywords:First-Time Voters, Rational Voters, Critical Voters, Traditional Voters, Skeptic Voters

Political Parties in Constitutional Theory

In this paper, I first provide an idealized functional account of political parties and party systems. I argue that parties are difficult to regulate constitutionally because of their Janus-faced public-private character. The key function they perform, when functioning as they ought to function, is to facilitate a mutually responsive relationship between public policy and popular opinion by acting as an intermediary between a state and its people. They perform this intermediary function in a unique manner, because of their bi-directionality and their plenary character. When they perform this function effectively, political parties significantly reduce four key information and transaction costs which would otherwise make democratic governance impossible: political participation costs, voters’ information costs, policy packaging costs, and ally prediction costs. This idealised account helps us identify pathological parties and party-systems and ground four principles that constitutions should seek to optimise in relation to political parties. The second part of this paper outlines and defends these four principles. Here I argue that state constitutions: i. should guarantee maximum autonomy for the formation, organisation, and operation of political parties, moderated by the restrictions necessitated by their purpose of winning (a share in) state power (for fixed terms) in competitive elections by acting as intermediaries between the state and its people (the ‘purposive autonomy principle’); ii. should try to optimise the party system such that the total number of serious political parties is large enough to broadly represent every major ‘voter type’, but not so large that the information costs on judicious voters are too high (the ‘party system optimality principle’); iii. should ensure a separation of parties and the state (the ‘party-state separation principle’); and iv. should discourage the factionalization of political parties (the ‘anti-faction principle’). These political principles are drawn from the value of democracy itself. They are likely to bring real world political parties and party systems closer to their idealised form, thereby improving and deepening democratic governance. As such, they should—alongside other relevant political and constitutional norms—inform fundamental constitutional design choices.

Time preferences as partisan politics: what do party manifestos show in twenty-two OECD countries?

ABSTRACT This study examines the correlation between economic freedom and sexual freedom in the twenty-two OECD nations included in the 2020 Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady and Stephens, 2020. Comparative welfare states data set. University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center). Our research builds on prior work by Unwin (1934. Sex and culture. Oxford University Press, 1935. Sexual regulations and cultural behaviour. Oxford University Press, 1940. HOPOUSIA or the sexual and economic foundations of a new society. Oskar Piest) and Bose (2013). License to Sin: The Politics and Opportunity Cost of Sexual Freedom. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039060 or http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2039060. who suggest that economic freedom and sexual freedom are negatively related. We develop an economic and sexual freedom score from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2020. The manifesto data collection. In M. P. (MRG/CMP/MARPOR) (Ed.), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)) and take the difference between the two and track the difference since primarily the end of World War II. Our hypothesis is that right parties will emphasize more economic freedom in their party platforms than sexual freedom, whereas left parties will have more to say about sexual freedom in their party platforms than economic freedom. The difference is because the parties are attracting different types of voters based on their time preferences.

Social Inclusion, Cash Transfers, and Discrimination in Latin America, Plus a Quick Assessment of the Repercussions of the Covid‐19 Pandemic in Key Countries

The second issue of Latin American Policy for this year features six relevant pieces of research dealing with trending topics in the region. Rosario Palacios, Sofia Larrazabal, and Rocio Berwart explain how educational policies in Chile compound a “policy assemblage” where diverse human and non-human actors are permanently negotiating their range of agency and power. Meanwhile, Norma Muñoz del Campo and Melina de Souza Rocha Lukic suggest that public policy changes in Brazil and Chile are better understood by highlighting continuities rather than focusing on theories based on critical junctures or exogenous shocks. Carlos Costa suggests that, in Brazil, spaces with greater homogeneity of voter types receive fewer cash-transfer benefits than their more-heterogeneous counterparts. Oscar A. Martínez-Martínez, Silviya Pavlova Nikolova, Brenda Coutiño-Vázquez, and Araceli Ramírez-López reveal that people in Mexico in situations of disability are less likely to access social services and educational opportunities, and to participate fully in work, and are, therefore, more prone to earn a lower income to cover their basic needs. Adrian Duhalt studies the development trajectory of Pemex’s petrochemical industry and situates the discussion within Mexico’s new policy shifts. Finally, Juan M. Gil-Barragan, Andres Aguilera-Castillo, and Llanet Suárez Galeano present the results of a bibliometric analysis of the literature on the economic and political relations between China and Latin America. Despite the research progress in this field, they conclude that coverage of the topic is in a relatively incipient phase. In this issue, in our Perspectives section, we also present a vigorous debate on sensitive current affairs affecting key Latin American countries. We are grateful to Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano, the director of the Nordic Institute of Latin American Studies at Stockholm University, for sharing his thoughts on how the Covid-19 crisis is challenging the current health and economic policies of Latin American countries. Diego Hernández Nilson and Camilo López Burian’s (University of Uruguay) contribution sheds light on how Uruguay is coping with the pandemics. Essays written by Lorena Oyarzún-Serrano (University of Chile), Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann (PUC-Rio), and Alejandro Simonoff (University of La Plata), reflect on how the health and economic crises are resonating in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, respectively. Finally, a collective contribution by Luis Huesca Reynoso (CIAD-Mexico), Oscar A. Martínez-Martínez, and Ricardo Velázquez Leyer (the latter two from Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City) offers an assessment of López Obrador’s first 2 years in office. We hope our readers find this collection of research articles and essays, as well as the two book reviews, useful and attractive. Isidro Morales is a researcher and professor in the School of Government and Public Transformation at Tecnológico de Monterrey, and an external fellow of the Mexico–United States Center and the Energy Center at Rice University’s Baker Institute.

The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering

In the United States, the boundaries of congressional districts are often drawn by political partisans. In the resulting partisan gerrymandering problem, a designer partitions voters into equal-sized districts with the goal of winning as many districts as possible. When the designer can perfectly predict how each individual will vote, the solution is to pack unfavorable voters into homogeneous districts and crack favorable voters across districts that each contain a bare majority of favorable voters. We study the more realistic case where the designer faces both aggregate and individual-level uncertainty, provide conditions under which appropriate generalizations of the pack and crack solution remain optimal, and analyze comparative statics. All districting plans that we find to be optimal are equivalent to special cases of segregate-pair districting, a generalization of pack and crack where all sufficiently unfavorable voter types are segregated in homogeneous districts, and the remaining types are matched in a negatively assortative pattern. Methodologically, we exploit a mathematical connection between gerrymandering—partitioning voters into districts—and information design—partitioning states of the world into signals.

Socio-political stability, voter’s emotional expectations, and information management

The dependence of socio-political stability on the emotional expectations of voters is investigated. For this, a model of a socio-political system consisting of a society of voters and a democratically elected politician is considered. The neuropsychological model of the voter takes into account his emotional expectations. The social stability is guaranteed by the expectations of positive emotions of all voters. Socio-political stability means both the social stability and the re-election of politician. One type of voter is a Progressist who seeks to fulfil his desires. It is shown that for the socio-political stability of the Progressist society, is enough a supportive environment. Another type of voter—a Phobic works in a fearful environment. It is shown that for the socio-political stability of the Phobic’s society, regular impacts that support their phobias are sufficient. As an example, emotional expectations, socio-political stability and information management in Eastern Europe are considered. The management of phobias in a weak economy is investigated. It is shown that in the absence of regular impacts supporting phobias a Phobic turns into a Progressist. Then the socio-political system becomes unstable with a weak economy and growth limits. The classification of the main social threats and phobias is given. The socio-political consequences of creating phobias, including corporate psychopaths and toxic leaders, are examined. Ways are proposed to resolve the contradiction between increased consumption and growth limits without the use of phobias, using high humanitarian technologies.

¿Quién se expone a los sondeos preelectorales en campaña? Voto estratégico y competencia electoral en España (2011-2019)

The increased relevance of pre-election polls in campaigns raises an interesting debate about their effects on voting. This article analyzes the type of voters who are exposed to the polls and the impact of the latter on those voters’ final decision. Based on data from post-electoral surveys by the Center for Sociological Research (CIS) for the general elections held in Spain in November 2011, December 2015 and April 2019, a statistical analysis model is presented to observe the people most likely to be exposed to polls and how the size of the constituency and internal electoral competition affect this consumption. The results show a transformation of voting decision mechanisms, that have been used as a source of information to develop a strategic vote, especially in the April 2019 elections. With the parliamentary entry of the right-wing populist party, VOX, and the consolidation of polarized pluralism in Spain, the data reveal a higher exposure in provinces with fewer seats and where electoral competition between parties is greater.

Voter Beliefs and Strategic Voting in Two-Round Elections

How widespread is strategic voting in two-round electoral systems, and which types of voters are most likely to engage in such behavior? While runoff elections are common in presidential systems around the world, research on strategic voting in these settings remains limited. This paper explores four different types of strategic behavior that are possible in two-round systems, including some types, such as “strong-to-weak” strategic voting, which are not possible in single-shot elections. We use a nationwide survey to assess the incidence and correlates of strategic voting in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, where thirteen candidates competed in the first round. We find evidence of “weak-to-strong” strategic voting at a similar rate to that documented in single-round elections in other countries. We find little evidence of other types of strategic voting. Furthermore, we show that voters’ confidence in their predictions of the likely electoral outcome and their ideological preferences strongly predict strategic voting. These results point to the importance of accounting for voter beliefs and attitudes in addition to objective voter characteristics to explain strategic voting.

투표자 유형 및 특성:정당투표자, 정당 간 투표자, 간헐적 투표자, 습관적 투표불참자

투표자 유형 및 특성:정당투표자, 정당 간 투표자, 간헐적 투표자, 습관적 투표불참자