Type Of Pleasure Research Articles

콘텐츠 창조와 플로우:동영상 UCC 이용 동기

This study looks at motivations of video UCC users as a member of creative class. A qualitative research method was used for analyzing data collected by interviews. Killing time users, active clickers and creators are distinguished as different types of UCC users and their differing motivations are explored. The findings of the study are as follows: First, information sharing, self presentation, communication needs, ease of use for self presentation, usefulness are expressed as motivating factors for both active clickers and creators, Pleasure motivates every type of users. However, content creators experience a specific type of pleasure which is the pleasure of creativity or flow, which this study highlights as a key driving factor for content creators. The study adds to the findings of UCC user research which applies the TAM and the PAD model by revealing what pleasure and flow specifically mean for different types of UCC users.

Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I

Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (henceforth, AR) have argued that Millian qualitative superiorities are possible without assuming that any pleasure, or type of pleasure, is infinitely superior to another. But AR's analysis is fatally flawed in the context of ethical hedonism, where the assumption in question is necessary and sufficient for Millian qualitative superiorities. Marginalist analysis of the sort pressed by AR continues to have a valid role to play within any plausible version of hedonism, provided the fundamental incoherence that infects AR's use of such analysis is removed. But what AR call ‘Millian superiorities’ are never genuine qualitative superiorities in Mill's sense. Mill scholars need to appreciate this point and recognize that the interpretation of qualitative superiorities as infinite superiorities is the only interpretation which is compatible with the text of Mill's Utilitarianism. The continuing failure to appreciate the possibility of infinite superiorities has precluded any adequate understanding of the extraordinary structure of Mill's pluralistic hedonistic utilitarianism.

J.S. Mill's Test for Higher Pleasure

The standard reading of Mill's test for higher pleasure is as follows: one pleasure is higher than another if and only if most people who have experienced both always prefer the first to the second regardless of their respective quantities. This standard reading has two problems: (1) it results in a lexical ordering of pleasures, which leads to the counterintuitive result that in no case can a large quantity of lower pleasure morally trump a tiny quantity of higher pleasure, and (2) because it takes Mill to be making a metaphysical distinction between types of pleasures, it appears to commit Mill to recognizing mysterious inherent qualities to pleasures. The standard reading is mistaken. The standard reading interprets Mill's test as comparing two kinds of pleasure; whereas Mill's test compares (1) the capacity to experience one pleasure with (2) any quantity of a second pleasure that one could experience in virtue of having the capacity to experience the second pleasure. On the correct interpretation, Mill's test for higher pleasures makes an epistemological and normative distinction between pleasures, not a metaphysical one.

Towards an Aesthetics of Navigation

Towards an Aesthetics of Navigation

Past Experiences with Gambling and Its Impact on Benefits Sought: A Case Study of Gambling Travelers to Black Hawk, Colorado, USA

AbstractThe study, based on gambling travelers to Black Hawk, Colorado, was carried out to examine the influence of past experiences with gambling on benefits sought. An underlying premise was that our perception on gambling needs a shift to see gambling as a leisure activity. Results showed that different gambler groups (infrequent, moderate, and frequent gamblers) had different demographic characteristics. Results also revealed that, overall, gambling travelers did not travel for the sake of gambling itself. Rather, among other things, such benefits as “enjoyment” and “relaxation” were most highly sought by them as found in other types of pleasure- and outdoor-oriented travels. However, authors revealed that past experiences with gambling influenced the “self-expression” dimension benefits significantly.

Sexualité et troubles du comportement alimentaire: vrai-faux toxique sexuel et jouissance endogène

The clinical aspect of addictive behaviour (alimentary and sexual behaviour) constitutes the basis of this study, and the theme of sexuality in eating disorders (ABD) has been examined as follows: consideration of an incestuous environment during childhood, or the extensive sexual repression within the family; and homosexual influence, i.e., its primary narcissistic aspect, on the patient's sexuality. These two points lead to the consideration of pleasure, which is discussed with reference to the psychopathological structure underlying the addiction It appears that the pleasure experienced by a patient suffering from ABD is associated with a fantasy in which the subject and the object are obliterated, thereby reactivating a phase of disinvestment, ie, withdrawal from the existential continuity which she had experienced earlier. The afflux of sensations generated by this behaviour results in repetition of the original traumatism, that is to say, the inability to contain her internal impulsional overload. This type of pleasure is pursued in a compulsive manner in that the subject perceives this experience as representing a state close to dereliction (preventive décorporalisation to avoid depersonalisation); thus, it constitutes a lived negative sensation which provides an access to the reality of being. The pleasure obtained via a return to continuity following the lived absence of self, and the illusion of a narcissistic ecstasy which appears to provide a solution to the original deficiency (fantasised original unity with the mother) are hypothesised to be fundamentally associated with the fear of depersonalisation and anguish regarding a dissolution of the self.

‘Pleasures’,'Pains’ and Animal Welfare: Toward a Natural History of Affect

AbstractIn hedonic theories of motivation, ‘motivational affective states’ (MASs) are typically seen as adaptations which motivate certain types of behaviour, especially in situations where a flexible or learned response is more adaptive than a rigid or reflexive one. MASs can be negative (eg unpleasant feelings of hunger or pain) or positive (eg pleasant feelings associated with eating and playing). Hedonic theories often portray negative and positive MASs as opposite ends of a one-dimensional scale.We suggest that natural selection has favoured negative and positive affect as separate processes to solve two different types of motivational problems. We propose that negative MASs (eg thirst, fear) evolved in response to ‘need situations’ where the fitness benefit of an action has increased, often because the action is needed to cope with a threat to survival or reproductive success. We propose that these negative MASs develop in response to a change in the body (eg dehydration) or the environment (eg the approach of a predator) which creates the need for action, and that negative MASs can become intense and prolonged if the threat to fitness is high and persistent. We propose that positive MASs evolved in ‘opportunity situations ‘ where an action (eg playing, exploring) has become advantageous because the fitness cost of performing it has declined. We propose that these positive MASs occur during, or as a result of, the performance of types of behaviour which are beneficial for fitness at a variety of times, not only when they are required to meet immediate needs; and that the pleasure inherent in the behaviour motivates the animal to perform it when the cost of so doing is sufficiently low. Some behaviour (eg eating) can be motivated by both positive and negative affect. Other behaviour, such as playing or fleeing from a predator, may be motivated largely by positive or negative affect alone. Our hypothesis needs to be tested, but we suggest that it corresponds well to common human experience.The hypothesis provides a basis for predicting whether an aspect of animal management is likely to cause strong and prolonged negative affect (‘suffering’), or to prevent animals from experiencing certain types of pleasure. This distinction is important for bringing animal welfare assessment into line with ethical concerns.

Hutcheson on the Higher and Lower Pleasures

Hutcheson on the Higher and Lower Pleasures MARK STRASSER FRANCISHUTCHESON,noted moral sense theorist, offers an account of higher and lower pleasures in which he distinguishes among four different types of pleasures. He claims that any of the pleasures of a higher type are both qualitatively and quantitatively better than any of the pleasures in any of the lower types. Thus, the pleasures of the second lowest class are both quantitatively and qualitatively better than any of the pleasures in the lowest class, while the pleasures of the highest class are both quantitatively and qualitatively better than any of the pleasures in any of the other three classes. Hutcheson does not, contrary to what some would expect, establish the ordering of pleasures by simply looking at what the individual finds most pleasing, nor does he do it by simply looking at what the individual's conscience indicates should be the most enjoyable pleasure. Rather, Hutcheson bases his decision on what a 'knowledgeable' judge would say, a knowledgeable judge who both has experienced all of the pleasures under consideration and who understands and appreciates the primary importance of the principle of utility. 1. Hutcheson distinguishes among the following pleasures: (l) "pleasures of the external senses [which] are of two classes; those of the palate, and those between the sexes.''1 (2) "pleasures of the imagination in the grandeur and elegance of living, and the perceptions of beauty and harmony, to which we may add those of l FrancisHutcheson,A System of Moral Philosophy (henceforthreferred to as System), (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, x969), 1~2. Here, I have not followedHutcheson'spractice of capitalizing practicallyevery noun. In all quotationsin this paper, words are capitalizedor italicizedonlywhentheirbeingso helpsto clarifythe meaning. [517] 518 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 25:4 OCT 1987 the ingenious arts, and knowledge. ''2 He suggests, "We have a pleasure... in beholding the effects of art and design, in any ingenious machinery adapted to valuable purposes, in any utensil well fitted for its end .... We have delight in exercising our own rational, inventive, and active powers, we are pleased to behold the like exercises of others, and the artful effects of them. ''3 These pleasures are those which Mill will later call the mental or higher pleasures. (3) "pleasures of the sympathetic kind, TM that is, pleasures which arise from our seeing others who are happy. (4) moral pleasures which arise "from the consciousness of good affections and actions. ''5 Hutcheson argues that the higher pleasures are better both quantitatively and qualitatively (that is, both in degree and in kind) than are any of the lower pleasures. Comparisons of pleasures involve comparisons of both the dignity and the duration of the pleasures, "dignity denoting the excellence of the kind, when [pleasures] of different kinds are compared, and the intenseness of the sensations when we compare those of the same kind. ''6 For instance, insofar as one is comparing the pleasures of reading poetry with the pleasures of reading philosophy, one will compare the intensities and durations of the two pleasures; that which is deeper and longer-lasting is the better pleasure. "Better" in this case denotes a quantitative but not a qualitative difference. As the two pleasures are within the same category, one pleasure is not qualitatively better than the other. 7 In cases involving a comparison of pleasures of different types, Hutcheson claims that there are qualitative differences. He wants "to prevent any imagination that the inferior sensation of the lower kinds with sufficient Ibid., 127-28. Ibid., 16. 4 Ibid., 129. Ibid., 131. 6 Ibid., 119. 7 Hutcheson does not explain how to evaluate intensity versus duration. For instance, he does not explain whether 75 intensity units for a duration of lo minutes is better than 4~ intensity units for a duration of ~o minutes. One might wellclaimthat the product of intensity and duration is not an accurate indication of the worth of a pleasure. For instance, a half unit of pleasure intensity might seem so insignificant that it, even if of twenty hours duration, would not be preferable to four units of pleasure intensity of two hours duration. Hutcheson suggests that the "value of any pleasure is...