Types Of Property Rights Research Articles

Closed or open innovation? Problem solving and the governance choice

Scholars have recently highlighted the promise of open innovation. In this paper, we treat open innovation—in it's different forms and manifestations—as well as internal or closed innovation, as unique governance forms with different benefits and costs. We discuss how each governance form, whether open or closed, is composed of a set of instruments that access (a) different types of communication channels for knowledge sharing, (b) different types of incentives, and (c) different types of property rights for appropriating value from innovation. We focus on the innovation “problem” as the central unit of analysis, arguing for a match between problem types and governance forms, which vary from open to closed and which support alternative forms of solution search. In all, the goal of this paper is to provide a comparative framework for managing innovation, where we delineate and discuss four categories of open innovation governance forms (markets, partnerships, contests and tournaments and user or community innovation) and compare them with each other and with two internal or closed forms of innovation governance (authority and consensus-based hierarchy).

Situating Property in Transformation: Beyond the Private and the Collective

In most parts of the post-socialist world high expectations regarding privatisation were quickly disappointed when it became obvious that property practices did not follow the ideal type predicted by market models. The article addresses this divergence and emphasises the necessity of overcoming the dualism of an ideal type of property rights on the one hand and the way property is handled in everyday life on the other. It argues that concrete situations as well as the necessary justifications of practices have hitherto both been widely neglected as empirical foci in studies on property relations. Five brief episodes from the privatisation of collective farms in rural Russia serve as examples to illustrate how situations and justifications are reflexively linked by drawing on and negotiating about differing ‘orders of worth’.

Open Innovation, Problem Solving, and the Theory of the (Innovative) Firm

Scholars have recently highlighted the promise of open innovation. In this paper we treat open innovation — in it’s different forms and manifestations — as well as internal or closed innovation, as unique governance forms with different benefits and costs. We discuss how each organizational form, whether open or closed, is essentially an instrument for accessing a) different types of communication channels for knowledge sharing, b) different types of incentives, and c) different types of property rights for appropriating value from innovation. We discuss the “problem” as the central unit of analysis for deciding among different forms of governance, whether open or closed, examining in particular the varying capacities of governance forms for supporting alternative forms of solution search. In all, the goal of this paper is to provide a comparative framework for managing innovation, where we delineate and discuss four categories of open innovation governance forms (markets, partnerships, contests and tournaments and user or community innovation) and compare them with each other and with two internal or closed forms of innovation governance (authority and consensus-based hierarchy).

Rethinking Terra Nullius and Property Law in Space

This is a draft version of the paper and will be expanded on in due course. With a new era dawning with regard to access to space and an increase in the number of nations capable of reaching and exploiting space; the field of space law as a whole needs to be re-evaluated. One such area where current legal thinking needs to be examined is with regard to the property rights to objects in space. While it was sufficient in the past for governments to frown upon the institutions of ownership in outer space and leave many space-related issues at an impasse, one would need to re-examine the current body of space-law and related international instruments against the light of the ability of developing countries and now private enterprises’ ability to partake in and commercially exploit space travel. This paper aims to investigate what types of property rights would or should be available to space-faring nations and individuals, as well as how these rights could be acquired. In order to know what property rights will be applicable, one also needs to re-define the objects to which those rights can be acquired. Characteristics such as the impersonality; tangibility, independence, susceptibility to control and the usefulness and value for mankind will once again be of crucial importance when it is necessary to determine if an object in space can be classified as an object with regard to which one can have property rights. When, for example, one is able to start colonizing and commercially exploiting heavenly bodies such as the Moon, Mars or even asteroids; it is only natural that people and governments will want to demarcate and protect their colonized territories and make use of the inherent ability to exclude others by means of property law to protect their investments and interests. These issues as they relate to sovereignty, jurisdiction and international law will be discussed and certain recommendations made as to how some of the problematical property law issues could be addressed for the benefit of all of man-kind. This will be discussed against the background of objects that are deemed to be res nullius (things belonging to nobody) as well as the theory of terra nullius (land belonging to nobody). A recommendation is made that private ownership of (sections of) celestial bodies should be recognised in certain instances.

Corporate Social Responsibility Does Not Avert the Tragedy of the Commons - Case Study: Coca-Cola India

ABSTRACT. of is a powerful concept to analyze a variety of problems related to environmental sustainability. The commons problem can be solved if individuals behave altruistically. In business context, this article studies proposition that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can avert tragedy of commons by examining one case study in depth: Coca-Cola's bottling operations in Rajasthan, India. In spite of choosing a context favorable to proposition, results indicate that CSR does not avert tragedy of commons. To address major environmental challenges, it is essential to develop regulatory regimes with appropriate incentives and ability to enforce sanctions.JEL Codes: G34; M14; Q56Keywords: corporate social responsibility; tragedy of commons; common-pool resource; environmental sustainability1. IntroductionIn one of most cited scientific articles ever written, Garrett Hardin outlined the tragedy of a powerful metaphor that users of a commons are caught in an inevitable process that leads to destruction of very resource on which they depend.1 It is now a central concept in human ecology and study of environment, and can be used to view a variety of commons related problems, such as population growth, environmental pollution, groundwater basins, forest management, climate change, fishing, wildlife habitats, and traffic congestion. The prediction of inevitable tragedy assumes that all individuals are inherently selfish. The tragedy of commons, of course, can be averted if individuals behave altruistically, and voluntarily act in interests of others in wider community. Translating this to business context, tragedy of commons can be averted if companies have a corporate social responsibility (CSR) to go beyond making profits and achieve some positive social goals.This article studies proposition that CSR can avert tragedy of commons by examining a case study in depth. I choose a case study - CocaCola's bottling operations in Rajasthan, India - that is favorable to proposition. The company Coca-Cola, both globally and in India, vociferously proclaims to be socially responsible. Since water is critical input to CocaCola's operations, it is not surprising that company emphasizes its water stewardship efforts, especially in desert location of Rajasthan. In spite of choosing a context favorable to proposition, results indicate that CSR does not avert tragedy of commons.Following Hardin's famous article, there is a vast literature on managing commons. I provide a very brief overview of critical concepts for solving commons problem, and translate these ideas to business context. There is also a vast literature on CSR, and next section provides a brief overview of this concept, and links together these two fields. The rest of paper describes case study and draws conclusions about effectiveness of CSR for averting tragedy of commons.2. The Tragedy of CommonsHardin explained tragedy of commons using fable of a pasture open to all. Each herdsman rationally adds more sheep because his expected benefits are greater than expected costs, since he selfishly ignores costs imposed on others. Thus, individual decisions cumulate to tragic overuse and potential destruction of commons. Subsequent research has argued that it is necessary to distinguish between intrinsic nature of resource and property regime under which it is held.2 Common-pool resources (CPRs) are characterized by 1) difficulty of excluding beneficiaries through physical and institutional means, and 2) subtractability, that is use by an individual reduces resources available to others. The literature identifies four types of property rights: open access (that is, no property rights), individual property, group property and government property. …

Efektivitas Kelembagaan Lokal dalam Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan pada Masyarakat Rumahkay di Seram Bagian Barat, Maluku (The Effectiveness of Local Institution in Forest Resources Management in Rumahkay Community, Western Seram District, Maluku)

Debate on the role of local institution in ensuring natural resources sustainability was re-tested in this research. The local institution in question consisted of kewang, church, and sasi darat (rules) being practiced in the management of dusun (forest) in Rumahkay village. This study described the effectiveness of local institution in the sustainable management of dusun under various types of property rights i.e. dusun dati, dusun negeri, dusun pusaka, and dusun parusahaan. Case study method was used in this research. Data were collected through semi-structured interview, participant observation, field observation, dusun stand measurement, and focus group discussion (FGD). The results of this study showed that Rumahkay community had for generations categorized their forest and regulated the rights of ownership and their utilizations through institutional development such as sasi negeri and kewang based upon mata rumah i.e. mata rumah anakele, anauweng, and anarete. While Sasi Gereja complemented kewang institution to be very effective in rules enforcement based on understanding, trust, and obedience. Overall, the strong local institution had been able to enhance the performance of dusun as shown by the vegetation density in dusun dati, dusun negeri, dusun pusaka, and dusun parusahaan.

A Property Rights Approach to Understanding Human Displacement from Protected Areas: the Case of Marine Protected Areas

The physical, economic, and sociocultural displacement of local peoples from protected areas generates intense discussion among scholars and policy makers. To foster greater precision and clarity in these discussions, we used a conceptual framework from the political economy literature to examine different forms of human displacement from protected areas. Using marine protected areas (MPAs) to ground our analysis, we characterized the 5 types of property rights that are reallocated (lost, secured, and gained) through the establishment of protected areas. All forms of MPA "displacement" involve reallocation of property rights, but the specific types and bundles of rights lost, secured, and gained dramatically shape the magnitude, extent, and equity of MPA impacts--positive and negative--on governance, economic well-being, health, education, social capital, and culture. The impacts of reallocating rights to MPA resources vary within and among social groups, inducing changes in society, in patterns of resource use, and in the environment. To create more environmentally sustainable and socially just conservation practice, a critical next step in conservation social science research is to document and explain variation in the social impacts of protected areas.

Local Conservation Practice and Global Discourse: A Political Ecology of Sea Turtle Conservation

This article employs political ecology and common property theory to examine sea turtle conservation, how it is articulated and executed at different sociopolitical and geographic scales, and the consequences for local rights of access to resources. It draws on ten years of research at various field sites in Costa Rica, and on sea turtle conservation policy in general, to show that although most sea turtle conservation policy is legitimized in the language of ecology, beliefs about rights to sea turtles as a resource underlie ecological arguments. This becomes clear through analysis of the local, national, and international scales, where ecological arguments are employed differently in order to discount or promote certain types of property rights and to promote particular types of conservation interventions; thus, promoting conservation action at a particular scale is not simply a matter of ecological necessity. The article's main purpose is to outline a political ecology of sea turtle conservation; it also contributes to political ecology and common property theory, and illustrates the productive combination of these for analyzing conservation. Furthermore, it addresses questions about the appropriate scale at which conservation should take place and the rights of local people to use and manage resources, both of which are topics of considerable debate in the wider conservation community.

How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action

The study of collective action has matured dramatically since Mancur Olson challenged scholars by positing a general theory in his pathbreaking book on The Logic of Collective Action (1965). Olson's theoretical predictions related to the incapacity of individuals, except under limited conditions, to solve on their own what are now known as `collective action problems'. Olson argued that one characteristic of goods - that of exclusion - defined all public goods. In contemporary analysis, the problem of achieving exclusion of noncontributors has come instead to characterize all types of collective action problems. Multiple subtypes of collective action problems have been identified. One major class of collective action problems are referred to in contemporary literature as public goods. Another class are referred to as common-pool resources. Common-pool resources are characterized by difficulty of exclusion and subtractability of resource units and are threatened by overuse leading to congestion or even destruction of the resource. Such threats do not apply to public goods. Diverse production and allocation functions generate further important differences in behavior and outcomes. Scholars have also begun to recognize multiple types of property right bundles that distinguish among authorized entrants, users and claimants, proprietors and full owners. Empirical studies show that groups of individuals who possess at least the rights of proprietorship are able to govern and manage their systems more effectively than presumed in the earlier theoretical literature. The article ends with an analysis of the factors that may be conducive to the organization of a common-property regime as contrasted to a private-property regime.

Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights

The law of every jurisdiction defines a set of well-recognized forms that property rights can take, and burdens the creation of property rights that deviate from those conventional forms. In this respect, property law differs from contract law, which generally leaves parties free to craft contractual rights in any form they wish. The law's restrictions on the forms of property rights have recently been rationalized as establishing an optimal standardization of property rights into a limited number of discrete forms to facilitate communication of the content of those rights to third parties. We argue, in contrast, that the law's limitations on property rights take the form, not of standardization, but rather of regulation of the notice required to establish different types of property rights. These limitations serve, not to facilitate communication of the content of rights, but to facilitate verification of ownership of the rights offered for conveyance. Property law generally addresses this verification problem by presuming that all property rights in an asset are held by a single owner, subject to the exception that a division of rights is enforceable if there is adequate notice to subsequent owners. Because the benefits of divided property rights are often low and the costs of verifying those rights are often high, property law takes an unaccommodating approach to all but a few basic categories of partial property rights. In the course of developing our analysis, we offer a simple and clear characterization of the distinction between property rights and contract rights. We explore the varieties of verification rules by which the law establishes the forms of notice required to establish property rights, and illustrate the close relationship between verification rules and the forms of property rights that those rules support. We set out conditions for assessing the efficiency of alternative property rights regimes, and discuss the extent to which that efficiency calculus is actually reflected in property law. We survey some of the principal categories of partial property rights - including security interests, legal entities, coordinating rights in real and personal property, and intellectual property - showing how the structure of those rights reflects limits on the feasible verification rules. We also seek to clarify the relationship between property rights and contract rights, the connection between property rights and property rules, and the limits on specific performance as a remedy in contract.

Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal

National governments in almost all developing countries have begun to decentralize policies and decision making related to development, public services, and the environment. Existing research on the subject has enhanced our understanding of the effects of decentralization and thereby has been an effective instrument in the advocacy of decentralization. But most analyses, especially where environmental resources are concerned, have been less attentive to the political coalitions that prompt decentralization and the role of property rights in facilitating the implementation of decentralized decision making. By comparing decentralization in four cases in South Asia—Forest Councils in Kumaon in India, Joint Forest Management in India, the Parks and People Program in Nepal's Terai, and Community Forestry legislation in Nepal—this article provides answers to two questions: When do governments decentralize environmental decision making? and Which types of property rights must be devolved if decentralized decision making is to be effective?

From POTS to E-commerce: What Have the Developing Countries Learnt About Property Rights Over the Last 50 Years?

The challenge of electronic commerce is new to the developing world. Will this technology-driven initiative allow developing countries in Asia to leapfrog? Electronic commerce will trot or walk depending upon the property rights shaping its behaviour. The history of information infrastructural provision teaches us that efficient property rights can only be expected in rare circumstances, when the polity has a highly developed civil society and existing institutions produce restraint. Sequencing and the fit between domestic institutions and the types of property rights are important. Well-organized large user groups are clear winners from reforms, but universal service in countries like South Korea and Singapore resulted from state prerogatives. Three layers of an electronic commerce network along with five conditions of property rights efficiency are identified.

The institutional environment and effects of telecommunication privatization and market liberalization in Asia

Are the privatization and market competition models resulting in the leveling of the supply-side playing field, and are they demand driven as expected? Quantitative indicators of network expansion and efficiency provide a partial and inconclusive picture. Instead, an evolutionary property rights framework is favored. Examined in detail are the institutional environments that lead to particular types of property rights which in turn affect network expansion and efficiency. The article offers two conclusions: (a) introducing market competition is slow, messy and difficult to manage but, where present, it is better for growth than privatization alone, and (b) network expansion and efficiency are most noticeable where adequate property rights and enforcement mechanisms are in place. It also conjectures that the “East Asia Model” toward network expansion may not be easily generalizable.

Property rights in fishing: from state property towards private property?: A case study of three EU countries

Fishing limitations to protect fish stocks can develop to different types of property rights. A move towards full private rights is promoted by some authors. The article questions whether such a move is desirable and it also investigates whether private rights are indeed becoming more important in EU fisheries. A study on property rights in the Danish, Dutch and UK fishery (WP Davidse, ed., Property Rights in Fishing, LEI-DLO, The Hague, 1997, OV159) sector forms the background of this approach. Bromley’s definition of property rights (D W Bromley, Environment and Economy: Property Rights & Public Policy, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991), including ‘a right to a benefit stream’, has been used to identify rights in these three EU fishing sectors. These property rights regimes vary from a domination of state property, the Danish one, to a complete system of individual rights, the Dutch case. The UK position is between these extremes, showing characteristics of common property, apart from kinds of state- and individual property of fishing rights. The article ends with a consideration of the review of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2002 from the viewpoint of property rights. Negotiations in the run up to 2002 will demonstrate conflicts between views on state property and on private property rights. This regards the tension between the principle of relative stability of quota allocations and the EU principle of free movement of capital, goods and services. Finally, two possibilities are suggested to combine both these principles.

The Legal Basis for the Securities Market in the Republic of Kazakhstan

AbstractLegal support for the securities market falls within the state's activities in the person of its agencies for the purpose of enacting relevant legislation creating the necessary conditions under which securities can circulate in the most effective and appropriate manner. The state interests can thereby correspond to the needs of the public to the maximum extent, according to the objective economic laws for the development of any market-oriented society. In our case, the term "legislation" (zakonodatel'stvo) includes all the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Presidential Edicts, and decrees of the Kazakhstani Government, as well as any normative legal acts enacted by the National Securities Commission and other national executive bodies within their authorities. When dealing with legal support for the securities market, we first need to specify that such a market is understood by us as a field where certain pecuniary debt obligations, rights of participation in capital and management circulate (i.e., are sold and purchased) with respect to business entities set up in specific organizational and legal forms. The aforementioned types of property rights in the securities market are certified by a special type documents called securities, or by other methods certifying property rights established by law (e.g., non-documentary securities).As they are basically a form of certain civil law relations, not all types of securities may circulate in the securities market. In particular, mortgage certificates, bills of lading, and other types of commodity instructional documents recognized by Kazakhstani law circulate in the commodity markets, including a commodity exchange. In turn, the securities market, being an element of the financial market, includes the following types:- the capital market, where stocks and bonds are sold and purchased and where other obligations circulate relating to the attraction of funds for setting up enterprises and developing business activities, as well as for solving national or local (oblast') economic, social and cultural problems; and- the money market, where short-term monetary obligations (promissory notes, bills of exchange, checks) circulate, performing the function of payment instruments by means of delayed or split (by installments) payments.In this article, we will research the issue of legal support for the capital and money markets in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Property rights and entrepreneurship in science

This paper examines the evolving relationship in science between the reward structure and entrepreneurial activity. We draw a distinction between two types of property rights. Basic science is fostered by a mechanism of reputational rights; technological advances-and the products and processes they produce - are fostered by a mechanism of proprietary rights. The two forms of property rights differ markedly in terms of the incentives they provide to share information in a timely fashion. We argue that because of a host of factors university-based scientists in certain fields are more likely to “privatize” knowledge today than in the past, trading reputational rights for proprietary rights. Events in the life sciences serve as a case study. A discussion of how privatization affects basic science follows. Although the evidence is far from complete, we conclude that the movement towards privatization may be more beneficial to product development and the scientists engaged in the activity than to basic science.

Tenures in Transition, Tenures in Conflict: Examples from the Zimbabwe Social Forest1

The landscapes of rural communities are commonly divided into areas in which distinctive resource uses are practiced and for which there exist particular types of property rights. Such tenure niches for different resources may overlap where those resources themselves occupy the same space (e.g., land and trees). Further, competing legal and utilization systems (e.g., national and local) may place the same resource in different incompatible tenure niches. Conflict may involve overlapping tenure niches. Co‐management by conflicting right‐holders may offer a solution.

From Production to Property: Decollectivization and the Family-Land Relationship in Contemporary Hungary

The concept of property has long occupied a central place in Western political and economic theory, but it has had a chequered history in social anthropology, and has not figured strongly in recent work in the discipline. This article draws on fieldwork carried out in rural Hungary since 1976 and concentrates on a specific type of property right, the ownership of agricultural land. Recent moves to decollectivize farmland pose dilemmas for many villagers, particularly as the wider economic climate is presently very unfavourable to agriculture. The evidence suggests pessimism concerning the prospects for the restoration of capitalist property relations in the countryside, an important part of the programme of post-socialist policy makers. The article makes a case for the practical significance of anthropological research in a period of social transformation, as well as for the continued significance of earlier theoretical agendas in economic anthropology. It also engages debates concerning the character of peasantry, with special reference to the limitations of archival sources, and the validity of neo-marxist approaches.

The Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical Results from a Natural Experiment

In the property rights theory of the firm (Williamson 1969, 1970; Alchian 1961; Alchian and Kessel 1962; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Furubotn and Pejovich 1972) a connection is made between the property rights in the firm held by the decision maker and the behavior of that decision maker. This paper compares the performance of firms with different types of property rights in providing a standardized product under contract to the federal government.' The standardized product is physician services insurance (Part B) claim processing for the Medicare program. Both private property firms (commercial profit-seeking insurance companies) and attenuated property rights firms (nonprofit mutual and Blue Shield firms) provide these services to the Medicare administration for different administrative areas. Thus, the Social Security Administration has provided an opportunity for observing the influence of alternative specifications of property rights on the performance of the firms.

Job Property Rights and Job Defections

RECENT interest in the ownership arrangements or types of property rights that exist throughout the world has led economists to theorems which apply to wide classes of behavior. Writers have focussed on the comparative discretionary behavior of managers of resources in government, private not-forprofit institutions, and private for-profit firms,' with differences in behavior being explained by testable, utility-maximization models. The specification of rights to direct resources and bear the consequences, and the costs of enforcing rights are determinants of the constraints that are faced. That is, different kinds of property rights affect the marginal rates of transformation that confront individuals in trading off alternative sources of utility.2 This has yielded testable implications that appear to be borne out by observed differences in the behavior of firms. Two obvious extensions of this analysis would be to (1) the behavior of labor unions (and their leaders) and (2) the behavior of employees where employer discretion in allocating labor resources is narrowed (by law or collective contract). With respect to the latter extension, economists and students of industrial relations have long been interested in many of the legislated and contractual constraints attendant to employment relationships. These constraints are of