Two-way Quantum Key Distribution Research Articles

Fully measurement-device-independent two-way quantum key distribution with finite single-photon sources

Fully measurement-device-independent two-way quantum key distribution with finite single-photon sources

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In this paper, we prove the security of the LM05’s two-way quantum key distribution (TWQKD) under the assumption that detector devices in both Alice’s and Bob’s sides are controlled by eavesdroppers. Using a relatively simple method, more practical, we give an analytical proof that LM05’s TWQKD is measurement-device-independent (MDI) security in both the quantum forward channel and the quantum backward channel. This is the first work shows that TWQKD has fully MDI characteristic, thus makes it immune to all possible detector-device-attacks in two-quantum-way in actual implementations.

Security of plug-and-play continuous-variable quantum key distribution

Subject of study. Two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution schemes are studied. Aim. This study aims to prove the security of the plug-and-play continuous-variable quantum key distribution system in the context of the model of trusted noise from legitimate users. Method. Based on an analog of the well-known implementation in the plug-and-play format, the performance of such a system operating under the GG02 protocol is evaluated. The evaluation is conducted in the presence of collective attacks, considering the finite-key effects. Main results. A secure key that satisfies the composability criteria can be distributed with a channel loss of 5 dB, which is expected to be approximately half that in a one-way scheme. Practical significance. Two-way quantum key distribution schemes are more stable than one-way schemes, and hence, their stability requires detailed consideration. This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to propose considering the security of a two-way implementation of continuous-variable quantum key distribution, considering the trusted equipment noise.

FPGA based Quantum Key Distribution Electronic System for Multipurpose Optical Setup and Protocols

The purpose of the FPGA electronic control system for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is to improve the analog electronic system in optoelectronic conversion. In the existence of the Mezzanine FPGA board, the main conversion of optical laser signal and optical detector signal can be improved. Mezzanine board can reduce the noise errors during the transmission and receiving a signal. Commonly, the optical signal needs to interface with an analog electronic system. This process requires the conversion process and interfacing with a digital signal to control the optical device and produce a good quality optical signal. The Mezzanine board can reduce the uncertainty during signal conversion and gives the digital capability to control the optical devices. The optical modulation signal for phase modulator control can achieve a full complete phase shift in the Mezzanine board. Plus, the voltage phase has capability up to 10 V with an accuracy of 2.4 µV. The time conversion for phase modulator can be extended in the Mezzanine board based on the digital control signal from FPGA. The system is capable to extend into multiple timing control to handle all the signal and to synchronize the signal in receiving, transmission or in between of the transmission. Thus, the system can handle one way or two-way QKD system accordingly.

How Secure Are Two-Way Ping-Pong and LM05 QKD Protocols under a Man-in-the-Middle Attack?

We consider a man-in-the-middle attack on two-way quantum key distribution ping-pong and LM05 protocols in which an eavesdropper copies all messages in the message mode, while being undetectable in the mode. Under the attack there is therefore no disturbance in the message mode and the mutual information between the sender and the receiver is always constant and equal to one and messages copied by the eavesdropper are always genuine. An attack can only be detected in the control mode but the level of detection at which the protocol should be aborted is not defined. We examine steps of the protocol to evaluate its security and find that the protocol should be redesigned. We also compare it with the security of a one-way asymmetric BB84-like protocol in which one basis serves as the message mode and the other as the control mode but which does have the level of detection at which the protocol should be aborted defined.

Towards satellite-based quantum-secure time transfer

High-precision time synchronization for remote clocks plays an important role in fundamental science and real-life applications. However, the current time synchronization techniques have been shown to be vulnerable to sophisticated adversaries. There is a compelling need for fundamentally new methods to distribute high-precision time information securely. Here we propose a satellite-based quantum-secure time transfer (QSTT) scheme based on two-way quantum key distribution (QKD) in free-space, and experimentally verify the key technologies of the scheme via the Micius quantum satellite. In QSTT, a quantum signal (e.g., single photon) is used as the carrier for both the time transfer and the secret-key generation, offering quantum-enhanced security for transferring time signal and time information. We perform a satellite-to-ground time synchronization using single-photon-level signals and achieve a quantum bit error rate of less than 1%, a time data rate of 9 kHz and a time-transfer precision of 30 ps. These results offer possibilities towards an enhanced infrastructure of time-transfer network, whose security stems from quantum physics.

Two-way quantum key distribution in a uniformly distributed quantum space via a special mapping and its analytical security proofs

Within the field of quantum cryptography, two-way direct quantum secure communication is a relatively new proposal for sharing secret information that is not fully explored yet. We propose a general model for two-way deterministic quantum key distribution, and a special mapping from integers to a uniformly distributed quantum space is introduced for qubit pad preparation. A reduced model, more practical, is also proposed by relaxing the security assumption of the qubit pad preparation. The main work of this paper focuses on the security proofs of these two models. Under collective attacks, we fully analyze the security basis of the general model, and, in a relatively simple way, we provide an analytical security proof for the reduced model in a depolarization quantum channel. Our results show exactly the analytical upper-bound of the amount of useful key that a powerful eavesdropper could extract in both models, and the security of the reduced model is not reduced. One advantage of this work is that the special mapping guarantees the random distribution property of the qubit pad in a uniformly distributed quantum space, thus guaranteeing the security of the two models, and the other advantage is the simplicity of the analytical derivations of security proofs.

Ambiguous discrimination among linearly dependent quantum states and its application to two-way deterministic quantum key distribution

It is impossible to distinguish a set of linearly dependent quantum states, which ensures the security of quantum key distribution (QKD). When considering some features such as symmetry, one may distinguish a part of the quantum states from another part, called ambiguous discrimination. In this paper, we demonstrate that two-way deterministic QKD (TDQKD) is immune to photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks for two-photon signals. When there are three or more photons in signals, the eavesdropper can gain the key bits probabilistically, without introducing any error rate. When the average number of photons per pulse takes the value of 0.1, the successful probability of PNS attacks on nonempty pulses is about 0.001, and the corresponding channel loss is about 30 dB. Our results show that TDQKD is robust against PNS attacks.

Security-proof framework for two-way Gaussian quantum-key-distribution protocols

Two-way Gaussian protocols have the potential to increase quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols' secret-key rates by orders of magnitudes~[Phys.~Rev.~A {\bf 94}, 012322 (2016)]. Security proofs for two-way protocols, however, are underdeveloped at present. In this paper, we establish a security proof framework for the general coherent attack on two-way Gaussian protocols in the asymptotic regime. We first prove that coherent-attack security can be reduced to collective-attack security for all two-way QKD protocols. Next, we identify two different constraints that each provide intrusion parameters which bound an eavesdropper's coherent-attack information gain for any two-way Gaussian QKD protocol. Finally, we apply our results to two such protocols.

Ping-pong protocol based on the orbital angular momentum of light

Orbital angular momentum (OAM) is one of the photon’s degrees of freedom in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. In this paper, we use this photon property to propose a modified version of the deterministic two-way quantum key distribution protocol, known as ping-pong protocol, based on the OAM of light. The advantage of the protocol is that it does not require Bell measurement for decoding the information being transmitted, which makes the protocol more flexible and feasible for practical applications. We propose an implementation setup and show how the channel capacity of the protocol can be easily increased. The security of the protocol is analyzed and the probability of detecting Eve in a general incoherent attack is obtained.

Number state filtered coherent states

Number state filtering in coherent states leads to sub-Poissonian photon statistics. These states are more suitable for phase estimation when compared with the coherent states. Nonclassicality of these states is quantified in terms of the negativity of the Wigner function and the entanglement potential. Filtering of the vacuum from a coherent state is almost like the photon addition. However, filtering makes the state more resilient against dissipation than photon addition. Vacuum state filtered coherent states perform better than the photon-added coherent states for a two-way quantum key distribution protocol. A scheme to generate these states in multi-photon atom–field interaction is presented.

Deterministic MDI QKD with two secret bits per shared entangled pair

Although quantum key distribution schemes have been proven theoretically secure, they are based on assumptions about the devices that are not yet satisfied with today’s technology. The measurement-device-independent scheme has been proposed to shorten the gap between theory and practice by removing all detector side-channel attacks. On the other hand, two-way quantum key distribution schemes have been proposed to raise the secret key generation rate. In this paper, we propose a new quantum key distribution scheme able to achieve a relatively high secret key generation rate based on two-way quantum key distribution that also inherits the robustness of the measurement-device-independent scheme against detector side-channel attacks.

Two-way QKD with single-photon-added coherent states

In this work we present a two-way quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme that uses single-photon-added coherent states and displacement operations. The first party randomly sends coherent states (CS) or single-photon-added coherent states (SPACS) to the second party. The latter sends back the same state it received. Both parties decide which kind of states they are receiving by detecting or not a photon on the received signal after displacement operations. The first party must determine whether its sent and received states are equal; otherwise, the case must be discarded. We are going to show that an eavesdropper provided with a beam splitter gets the same information in any of the non-discarded cases. The key can be obtained by assigning 0 to CS and 1 to SPACS in the non-discarded cases. This protocol guarantees keys’ security in the presence of a beam splitter attack even for states with a high number of photons in the sent signal. It also works in a lossy quantum channel, becoming a good bet for improving long-distance QKD.

A quantum key distribution scheme based on tripartite entanglement and violation of CHSH inequality

Entanglement is a well-known resource in quantum information. In particular, it can be exploited for quantum key distribution (QKD). In this paper, we define a two-way QKD scheme employing GHZ-type states of three qubits obtaining an extension of the standard E91 protocol with a significant increase in the number of shared bits. Eavesdropping attacks can be detected measuring violation of the CHSH inequality and the secret key rate can be estimated in a device-independent scenario.

Noise-enhanced CVQKD with untrusted source

The performance of one-way and two-way continuous variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) protocols can be increased by adding some noise on the reconciliation side. In this paper, we propose to add noise at the reconciliation end to improve the performance of CVQKD with untrusted source. We derive the key rate of this case and analyze the impact of the additive noise. The simulation results show that the optimal additive noise can improve the performance of the system in terms of maximum transmission distance and tolerable excess noise.

Additive Classical Capacity of Quantum Channels Assisted by Noisy Entanglement.

We give a capacity formula for the classical information transmission over a noisy quantum channel, with separable encoding by the sender and limited resources provided by the receiver's preshared ancilla. Instead of a pure state, we consider the signal-ancilla pair in a mixed state, purified by a "witness." Thus, the signal-witness correlation limits the resource available from the signal-ancilla correlation. Our formula characterizes the utility of different forms of resources, including noisy or limited entanglement assistance, for classical communication. With separable encoding, the sender's signals across multiple channel uses are still allowed to be entangled, yet our capacity formula is additive. In particular, for generalized covariant channels, our capacity formula has a simple closed form. Moreover, our additive capacity formula upper bounds the general coherent attack's information gain in various two-way quantum key distribution protocols. For Gaussian protocols, the additivity of the formula indicates that the collective Gaussian attack is the most powerful.

Practical quantum private query with better performance in resisting joint-measurement attack

As a kind of practical protocol, quantum-key-distribution (QKD)-based quantum private queries (QPQs) have drawn lots of attention. However, joint-measurement (JM) attack poses a noticeable threat to the database security in such protocols. That is, by JM attack a malicious user can illegally elicit many more items from the database than the average amount an honest one can obtain. Taking Jacobi et al.'s protocol as an example, by JM attack a malicious user can obtain as many as 500 bits, instead of the expected 2.44 bits, from a ${10}^{4}$-bit database in one query. It is a noticeable security flaw in theory, and would also arise in application with the development of quantum memories. To solve this problem, we propose a QPQ protocol based on a two-way QKD scheme, which behaves much better in resisting JM attack. Concretely, the user Alice cannot get more database items by conducting JM attack on the qubits because she has to send them back to Bob (the database holder) before knowing which of them should be jointly measured. Furthermore, JM attack by both Alice and Bob would be detected with certain probability, which is quite different from previous protocols. Moreover, our protocol retains the good characters of QKD-based QPQs, e.g., it is loss tolerant and robust against quantum memory attack.

Security of the Decoy State Two-Way Quantum Key Distribution with Finite Resources**Supported by the National Basic Research Program of China under Grant No 2013CB338002, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos 11304397 and 61505261.

The quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties to share a secret key by typically making use of a one-way quantum channel. However, the two-way QKD has its own unique advantages, which means the two-way QKD has become a focus recently. To improve the practical performance of the two-way QKD, we present a security analysis of a two-way QKD protocol based on the decoy method with heralded single-photon sources (HSPSs). We make use of two approaches to calculate the yield and the quantum bit error rate of single-photon and two-photon pulses. Then we present the secret key generation rate based on the GLLP formula. The numerical simulation shows that the protocol with HSPSs has an advantage in the secure distance compared with weak coherent state sources. In addition, we present the final secret key generation rate of the LM05 protocol with finite resources by considering the statistical fluctuation of the yield and the error rate.

Performance Improvement of Two-way Quantum Key Distribution by Using a Heralded Noiseless Amplifier

We show the successful use of a heralded noiseless linear amplifier on the detection stage in the two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution to improve the performance. Due to the excess noise, the secret-key rate of the two-way protocol becomes negative for a certain distance of transmission. The use of a heralded noiseless linear amplifier increases this distance by the equivalent of 20 log10g dB of losses, and it also helps the two-way protocol tolerate more excess noise.

Practical security analysis of two-way quantum-key-distribution protocols based on nonorthogonal states

Within the broad research scenario of quantum secure communication, Two-Way Quantum Key Distribution (TWQKD) is a relatively new proposal for sharing secret keys that is not fully explored yet. We analyse the security of TWQKD schemes that use qubits prepared in non-orthogonal states to transmit the key. Investigating protocols that employ an arbitrary number of bases for the channel preparation, we show, in particular, that the security of the LM05 protocol can not be improved by the use of more than two preparation bases. We also provide a new proof of unconditional security for a deterministic TWQKD protocol recently proposed [Phys. Rev. A 88, 062302 (2013)]. In addition, we introduce a novel deterministic protocol named TWQKD six-state and compute an analytical lower bound (which can be tightened) for the maximum amount of information that an eavesdropper could extract in this case. An interesting advantage of our approach to the security analysis of TWQKD is the great simplicity and transparency of the derivations.