Two-person Non-cooperative Game Research Articles

Game Theory as a Tool for Understanding Information Services Outsourcing

In recent years, game theory has provided valuable insights into many different types of organizational arrangements. In this paper we investigate some of the ways in which game theory can help us to understand the structure and function of information systems outsourcing arrangements. We provide a brief review of two-person non-cooperative game theory. We discuss the basic concepts of dominance and Nash equilibria. In particular we stress the importance of the information structure of two-person games. We then provide a general game-theoretic interpretation of many key aspects of information systems outsourcing arrangements. In particular, we investigate the rationales behind many of the different ways of determining fees and the effects of the transfer of assets between the outsourcing company and the outsourcing vendor. Finally, we discuss how one particular type of non-cooperative two-person game might be useful as a model of information systems outsourcing arrangements. This model, the principal-agent model, has been extensively studied and in the hands of the authors has provided some initial insights into information systems outsourcing arrangements.

A game theoretical approach to reconstruction of public finance

This paper explores a dynamic game between the government and the public by using a two-person noncooperative differential game. The public intends to maximizetotal consumption by controlling a propensity to save. The government wishes to maximize a weighted sum of total consumption and the (negative of the) terminal stock of government bonds by controlling the rate of consumption tax. This paper differs from the literature on optimal taxation on this point. We show that there is a case in which the government should choose a maximal rate of consumption tax to minimize the terminal stock of government bonds.

Open-Loop Equilibria for an LQ-Differential Game of Stabilization Policies

In this paper we study a two-person non-cooperative differential game model of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation with the government as player one and the central bank as the second player. Open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium solutions are derived analytically; it is shown that they do not coincide. Using numerical examples we study the sensitivity of the optimal open-loop solutions with respect to the parameters for both solution concepts. We show that in the examples used both players prefer the Stackelberg to the Nash equilibrium solution

A Two-Person Exchange Model

This paper deals with a situation of middle-man behavior between two otherwise separated economies. A two-person noncooperative exchange game is proposed whereby each player's strategy consists of two parts taken in a sequence: a price strategy, to be followed by a demand strategy. The concept of a special kind of mixed strategies is introduced, and a solution is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium pair of such mixed strategies. It is shown that a trivial class of equilibria always exists, and that under certain conditions, more interesting nontrivial equilibria can exist as well.

Toward an Economic Theory of Liability

RECENTLY there have appeared a number of important articles by both lawyers and economists analyzing the economic effects of liability rules.? This paper formalizes the analysis of these effects. When two parties, the injurer and the victim, can both take measures to reduce the likelihood of accidents, and the measures are costly for both, the standard theory of production with two inputs and one output yields the conditions for the socially optimal amount of each accident avoidance measure. The effects of decentralizing the problem and using only liability rules to solve it can then be analyzed in terms of a two-person noncooperative game. I first show that there is a complete symmetry within each of the following pairs of liability rules: no liability and strict liability; the negligence rule and strict liability with contributory negligence; and the negligence rule with contributory negligence and strict liability with what I call dual contributory negligence. An analysis of the legal standards for negligence follows. I show that there is an important ambiguity in the so-called "Learned Hand Rule" for determining the level of avoidance effort below which a party is adjudged negligent. Two of the formulations of the rule lead to inefficient results.

Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games

Previous article Next article Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix GamesN. N. Vorob’evN. N. Vorob’evhttps://doi.org/10.1137/1103024PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAboutAbstractAn algorithm for computing all equilibrium points (situations) for the case of bimatrix (i.e., finite two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero-sum) games is given.[1] John Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. (2), 54 (1951), 286–295 MR0043432 0045.08202 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[2] L. S. Shapley and , R. N. Snow, Basic solutions of discrete gamesContributions to the Theory of Games, Annals of Mathematics Studies, no. 24, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1950, 27–35 MR0039216 0041.25403 Google Scholar[3] David Blackwell and , M. A. Girshick, Theory of games and statistical decisions, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1954xi+355 MR0070134 0056.36303 Google Scholar Previous article Next article FiguresRelatedReferencesCited byDetails Where Do Mistakes Lead? A Survey of Games with Incompetent Players10 February 2022 | Dynamic Games and Applications, Vol. 97 Cross Ref , Vol. 689 Cross Ref Sets of Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Mixed-Strategy Games10 March 2018 Cross Ref Approximation of Isomorphic Infinite Two-Person Non-Cooperative Games by Variously Sampling the Players’ Payoff Functions and Reshaping Payoff Matrices into Bimatrix Game23 January 2017 | Applied Computer Systems, Vol. 20, No. 1 Cross Ref Ordered Field Property for Semi-Markov Games when One Player Controls Transition Probabilities and Transition TimesInternational Game Theory Review, Vol. 17, No. 02 Cross Ref ORDERED FIELD PROPERTY IN A SUBCLASS OF FINITE SER-SIT SEMI-MARKOV GAMESInternational Game Theory Review, Vol. 15, No. 04 Cross Ref Incompetence and impact of training in bimatrix gamesAutomatica, Vol. 48, No. 10 Cross Ref Routing of Hazardous Material Shipments Under the Threat of Terrorist Attack12 January 2010 Cross Ref Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games6 March 2009 | Economic Theory, Vol. 42, No. 1 Cross Ref A taxonomy of best-reply multifunctions in 2×2×2 trimatrix games21 September 2007 | TOP, Vol. 15, No. 2 Cross Ref A Taxonomy of Best-Reply Multifunctions in 2x2x2 Trimatrix GamesSSRN Electronic Journal Cross Ref Enumeration of All the Extreme Equilibria in Game Theory: Bimatrix and Polymatrix Games29 November 2006 | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 129, No. 3 Cross Ref Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix GamesEconometrica, Vol. 74, No. 2 Cross Ref Solving three-player games by the matrix approach with application to an electric power marketIEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 18, No. 4 Cross Ref Tuning of discretization in bimatrix game approach to power system market analysisIEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 18, No. 2 Cross Ref Chapter 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games Cross Ref Chapter 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games Cross Ref Game Theory 1950–2000 Cross Ref Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games18 August 1998 | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 95, No. 17 Cross Ref Pareto equilibria for bimatrix gamesComputers & Mathematics with Applications, Vol. 25, No. 10-11 Cross Ref On the structure of the set of perfect equilibria in bimatrix games1 March 1993 | Operations-Research-Spektrum, Vol. 15, No. 1 Cross Ref Un nuevo algoritmo para la resolucion de juegos bimatricialesTrabajos de Investigacion Operativa, Vol. 7, No. 1 Cross Ref Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium pointsMathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 15, No. 1 Cross Ref B Cross Ref Maximal nash subsets for bimatrix gamesNaval Research Logistics Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 Cross Ref Polymatrix Games with Joint ConstraintsB. Curtis Eaves17 February 2012 | SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, Vol. 24, No. 3AbstractPDF (489 KB)On the Set of Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game: a Survey Cross Ref Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game Cross Ref Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix GamesO. L. Mangasarian13 July 2006 | Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Vol. 12, No. 4AbstractPDF (301 KB)Two-person nonzero-sum games and quadratic programmingJournal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 3 Cross Ref Volume 3, Issue 3| 1958Theory of Probability & Its Applications History Submitted:12 March 1958Published online:17 July 2006 InformationCopyright © Society for Industrial and Applied MathematicsPDF Download Article & Publication DataArticle DOI:10.1137/1103024Article page range:pp. 297-309ISSN (print):0040-585XISSN (online):1095-7219Publisher:Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics