Two-person Cooperative Game Research Articles

An Extension of a Class of Cost Sharing Methods to the Class of Solutions to Two-Person Cooperative Games

An Extension of a Class of Cost Sharing Methods to the Class of Solutions to Two-Person Cooperative Games

Understanding the intent behind sharing misinformation on social media

ABSTRACT Several studies have been conducted in annotating and collecting the misinformation spread on various social media sites. The misinformation spread during COVID-19 pandemic increased many folds. Understanding the reasons and intent of the misinformation during COVID-19 is a crucial task. Existing approaches have not focused on understanding the intent behind sharing misinformation in the first place. To understand the intent, we introduce a new dataset MisMemoir that apart from annotating misinformation, also collects the social context and site history of the user sharing misinformation. Utilising the established benefits of game theory in social media behaviour analysis, we deploy two-person cooperative games to understand how prominent positive feedback cues like likes and retweets are in motivating an individual to share misinformation on the platform Twitter. Experimental results demonstrate that the spread of misinformation’s primary intent is the intentional/unintentional manoeuvre to increased reach and possibly a false sense of accomplishment. Empirically, we show that in a competitive environment like social media, feedback cues like retweets and comments assume the role of ‘attention’ payoff that significantly affects the strategy of a user on Twitter to share misinformation intentionally.

Two-person cooperative uncertain differential game with transferable payoffs

Uncertain differential game models conflicts and interests among players in the context of an uncertain dynamic system. However, cooperative behavior in uncertain differential game is an unexplored terrain. This paper proposes a spectrum of a cooperative uncertain differential game with transferrable payoffs. First, group rationality is achieved by maximizing the coalitional payoff through an uncertain optimal control method. Second, the concept of imputation is introduced as a solution, and a stability condition called subgame consistency condition for an imputation is proposed as well. Furthermore, the derivation of payoff distribution procedure for subgame consistent imputation is discussed. In addition, two optimal principles, i.e., Nash bargaining solution and Shapley value, are extended to this kind of model and are proved to be subgame consistent imputations, and their payoff distribution procedures are derived analytically. Finally, a two-person resource extraction game is studied for illustrating purpose.

Joint decisions for Cold Chain Cross-border E-commerce with Overseas Warehouse Logistics Outsourcing

Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one overseas warehouse logistics provider and one cross-border e-commerce retailer with cold chain products over a finite time horizon, this paper studies the optimal decision-making of logistics pricing, freshness-keeping effort level and cold chain product pricing under the Stackelberg game and the cooperative game, and makes a comparative analysis of the two models. Through two-person cooperative game of transferable payment, it is proved that (1)both the total supply chain profit and individual profit of the two parties are greater than the Stackelberg game;(2) the freshness level is higher than that of the Stackelberg game;(3) the logistics price is lower than that of the Stackelberg game;(4) e-commerce transaction scale (i.e. logistics demand scale) is higher than that of the Stackelberg game; and (5) the retail price of the cold chain product is lower than the Stackelberg game. Numerical results bear out the validity of the theoretical models.

Vbargain: A Market-Driven Quality Oriented Incentive for Mobile Video Offloading

With the increasing popularity of video delivery among mobile users, the problem of explosive traffic growth becomes more and more serious for the mobile wireless networks. To deal with this problem, in this paper we propose to exploit opportunistic transmission and the idea of crowdsourcing to offload mobile video traffic. Based on this idea, a Quality of VIDEO (QoV) oriented pricing incentive scheme, namely Vbargain, is proposed to stimulate mobile users to deliver video data collaboratively. More specifically, in our scheme, the network is regarded as a Virtual Market, and the video packets are treated as commodities, which are dynamically priced according to their expected marginal gains on the quality of reconstructed video; the process of video delivery is regarded as a sequence of packet transactions which are modeled as two-person cooperative games. Driven by the profit-hunting nature of mobile users, the video data is delivered from the source to its destination. In order to gain deep insight into our scheme, we also analyze the overhead and the influence of start-up capital on the performance of video delivered theoretically, and give its lower bound and upper bound. Our simulation results, based on both the synthetic and real-life traces of mobile users, verify the efficiency of our scheme and analysis.

Two-person cooperative games on minimizing the makespan

This paper considers the problem of two-person cooperative games on minimizing the makespan. A special case of this problem is proved NP-hard, and a dynamic programming algorithm is presented for the general case, which runs in pseudo-polynomial time and indicates that this problem is binary NP-hard. This paper also adopts List Scheduling (LS) and Longest Processing Time (LPT) algorithms for classical parallel machines scheduling problem to cooperative game problem and develops the performance ratios of the algorithms.

On optimal reinsurance treaties in cooperative game under heterogeneous beliefs

In this paper, we study the optimal reinsurance policies as the result of a two-person cooperative game. We assume that both the insurer and the reinsurer are risk averse and expected-utility maximizers. In addition, we assume that they “agree to disagree” on the distribution of the underlying losses in the contract negotiation.In our analysis, we consider two scenarios. In the first one, the reinsurance premium is fully negotiable, whereas in the second one, the premium is determined by the reinsurer using the expected value premium principle. For both scenarios, we first derive the set of Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts and then identify the reinsurance contract corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution as well as that corresponding to the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution.

On Optimal Reinsurance Treaties in Cooperative Game under Heterogeneous Beliefs

In this paper, we study the optimal reinsurance policies as the result of a two-person cooperative game, where both parties in the negotiation are risk averse and are trying to maximize their expected utility. We incorporate information asymmetry by assuming that the insurer and the re-insurer have different beliefs on the distribution of the underlying losses. Our analysis consists of two parts. The first part deals with the situation when the reinsurance premium is fully negotiable; whereas the second part deals with the situation when the premium is determined by an actuarial premium principle. For both parts, we first derive the Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts, then the reinsurance contracts in the Nash equilibrium as well as in the Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium are identified.

Incentive Mechanism Design in Mobile Opportunistic Data Collection With Time Sensitivity

Mobile crowdsensing systems aim at providing various novel sensing applications by recruiting pervasive users with mobile devices, which are now equipped with enriched built-in sensors (e.g., GPS, microphone, camera, gyroscope, accelerometer, etc.). A key factor to enable such systems is substantial participation of large amount of mobile users. In this paper, we focus on the data collection in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing, where the data can be transferred between mobile users via opportunistic device-to-device communications. The goal is to deliver the sensed data from the collector to the corresponding requester, which can maximize the collector’s rewards. Here, we assume that the data collection has time-sensitive characteristics, i.e., the reward is time-sensitive. We consider selfish mobile users with rational behaviors, and propose a credit-based incentive-aware mechanism to stimulate mobile users to participate in data collection for mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. Particularly, we propose an effective mechanism to define the expected rewards for the sensed data, and formulate the sensed data trading as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is obtained through the Nash bargaining theory. Extensive simulations based on both synthetic and real-world mobility traces are conducted to validate the efficiency of our incentive-aware mechanisms.

Incentive Mechanisms for Data Dissemination in Autonomous Mobile Social Networks

This work focuses on the incorporation of incentive stimulations into data dissemination in autonomous mobile social networks with selfish nodes. The key challenge of enabling incentives is to effectively track the value of a message under such a unique network setting with intermittent connectivity and multiple interest data types. We propose two data dissemination models: the data pulling model where mobile users pull data from data providers, and the data pushing model where data providers generate personalized data and push them to the intended users. For data pulling, we present effective mechanisms to estimate the expected credit reward of a message that helps intermediate nodes to evaluate the potential reward of it. Nodal message communication is formulated as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by a heuristic approach which achieves Pareto optimality. Under the data pushing model, “virtual checks” are introduced to eliminate the needs of accurate knowledge about whom and how many credits data providers should pay. The check buying process is formulated as an online auction model to further accelerate the circulation of credits. Extensive simulations carried out based on real-world traces show the proposed schemes achieve better performance than fully cooperative scheme, but significantly reduce communication cost.

Multi-Attribute Vertical Handover Decision-Making Algorithm in a Hybrid VLC-Femto System

Due to the complementary natures of visible light communication (VLC) and radio frequency, a combined application is regarded as a promising approach of supporting both hyperspeed data transmission and reliable signal connectivity. Vertical handover (VHO) is critical for guaranteeing seamless service in such a heterogeneous network. This letter employs a family hybrid VLC-Femto system and proposes a VHO algorithm based on decision selection. Our approach considers multiple attributes, including dynamic network parameters and actual traffic preferences by utilizing analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Additionally, it can compensate for the weakness of classic AHP in comparing the criteria values of different candidates by applying a two-person cooperative game (CG) model. Finally, the rationality degree (RD) of each decision is calculated by combining the results of AHP and CG, and the decision with the higher RD is selected. The simulation results validate the superiority of the proposed AHP-CG VHO algorithm over existing schemes under various circumstances.

Maximum Lateness Scheduling on Two-Person Cooperative Games with Variable Processing Times and Common Due Date

A new maximum lateness scheduling model in which both cooperative games and variable processing times exist simultaneously is considered in this paper. The job variable processing time is described by an increasing or a decreasing function dependent on the position of a job in the sequence. Two persons have to cooperate in order to process a set of jobs. Each of them has a single machine and their processing cost is defined as the minimum value of maximum lateness. All jobs have a common due date. The objective is to maximize the multiplication of their rational positive cooperative profits. A division of those jobs should be negotiated to yield a reasonable cooperative profit allocation scheme acceptable to them. We propose the sufficient and necessary conditions for the problems to have positive integer solution.

Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing.

In this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate user, the former replies to it and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Different data providers can reply to the same query. When a user that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides feedback to the data provider, which gives the reply. When a user that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the user in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile users. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash theorem. To improve the credit circulation, we design an online auction process, in which the wealthy user can buy replies and feedbacks from the starving one using credits. We have carried out extensive simulations based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes.

An Extension of a Class of Cost Sharing Methods to the Solutions of the Class of Two-Person Cooperative Games

Two-person games and cost/surplus sharing problems are worth for studying because they are the base for their extending to the classes of such problems with variable population with the help of very powerful consistency properties. In the paper a family of cost-sharing methods for cost sharing problems with two agents [Moulin 2000] is extended to a class of solutions for two-person cooperative games that are larger than both cost-sharing and surplus-sharing problems, since cooperative games have no no restrictions on positivity of costs and surpluses. The tool of the extension is a new invariance axiom -- self covariance -- that can be applied both to cost-sharing methods and to cooperative game solutions. In particular, this axiom replaces the Lower composition axiom not applicable to methods for profit sharing problems.

Two-person cooperative games on scheduling problems in outpatient pharmacy dispensing process

This paper considers two-person cooperative games on scheduling problem which is motivated by the medication dispensing at outpatient pharmacies. We prove that two-person cooperative games on minimizing the number of tardy jobs is NP-hard, and two-person cooperative games on minimizing the total weighted number of tardy jobs and on minimizing the total weighted completion time are NP-hard even if the jobs have the same processing times. We develop dynamic programming algorithms for problems of two-person cooperative games on minimizing the total (weighted) number of tardy jobs and on minimizing the total (weighted) completion time respectively, which run in pseudo-polynomial time and indicate that they are binary NP-hard.

Maximum latency scheduling problem on two-person cooperative games

This paper studies a two-person cooperative game in which a set of jobs has to be processed jointly by two people. Each of them has a single machine and his processing cost is defined as the minimum value of the maximum latency of his negotiably assigned jobs. The objective is to maximize the multiplication of their rational positive cooperative profits. In the case where all jobs have the same processing time, if they have a common due date, the problem is polynomial-time solvable; if due dates can be different, there exits an optimal schedule in which the jobs assigned to each person are scheduled in Earlier Due Date first (EDD) order and a polynomial-time dynamic programming is further proposed. In the case where processing times can be different, the NP-completeness of this problem is proved, and a pseudo-polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm is developed.

Achieving User Cooperation Diversity in TDMA-Based Wireless Networks Using Cooperative Game Theory

In this letter, a two-person cooperative game is proposed to perform the resource allocation for time division multiple access (TDMA) based commercial cooperative communication networks. In the game, one selfish node could trade its own resource (data symbols and power) for its cooperative partner's relaying directly. And both the nodes are willing to achieve an optimal channel capacity increase through cooperative relaying. We prove that the game is indeed a two-person bargaining problem and use the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) method to obtain the unique solution of the game. Simulation results indicate that the NBS resource allocation is Pareto optimal, in that both nodes could experience better performance than if they work independently. Furthermore, and the NBS resource allocation is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a node only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to improve its own performance.

Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi-Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry

This paper analyzes the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In the 1950s, Harsanyi draws Nash's solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930), and Schelling proposes a multifaceted theory of conflict that, without dismissing the assumption of rational behavior, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi's and Schelling's contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry, as postulated by Nash (1950), are then presented. This debate explains why, although in the early 1960s two different approaches to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, only Harsanyi's insights were fully developed later.

Cooperation under interval uncertainty

In this paper, the classical theory of two-person cooperative games is extended to two-person cooperative games with interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions called ψ α-values are introduced and characterizations are given.

Cooperation under Interval Uncertainty

In this paper, the classical theory of two-person cooperative games is extended to two-person cooperative games with interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions are introduced and characterizations are given.