This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer are risk-averse decision makers. The capital-constrained retailer may adopt two mixed financing modes: (1) bank credit and equity financing (BEF) and (2) trade credit and equity financing (TEF). Using a mean-variance framework, we analyze the supply chain members financing and ordering decisions in two cases: symmetric and asymmetric retailer risk aversion threshold information. In the case of symmetric information, we characterize the conditions under which both the supplier and the retailer prefer BEF or TEF. In the case of asymmetric information, we demonstrate that the retailer has an incentive to pretend to be less risk averse. To prevent this distortion behavior, we design a minimum quantity contract for the supplier. Finally, we extend our model to a bank loan-trade credit-equity mixed financing mode (BTEF) in which the retailer can borrow from the bank and the supplier and seeks financial support from investors. The numerical simulations support our results.